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I 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing mainly from the Tazanian experience this study 
attempts to review the principal issues in the legal regulation of 
prices, by identifying both the general and specific importance 
of law in this respect. The position I shall present is that 
legal control is both necessary and desirable for the welfare 
and social development of the people. The key issue is whether 
the market-place will perform its function satisfactory: Will 
it produce socially desirable results? If it will not, wny will 
it not? And will legal regulation help to do the job a little 
better? 
In an attempt to answer some of these questions, 
first of all, outline the basic issues raised by the study in 
the first Chapter. Then I examine the general case for price 
controls - the theory about the controls, the motives and reasons 
for their imposition and the manner in which they are effected 
in different economic systems. This is done in Chapter Two. Relying 
most on the available literature on the regulatory process, this 
Chapter also looks at the relationship between law and economic 
regulation and concludes that the effectiveness of law depends 
on the existence of a conducive socio-economic environment. In 
Chapter Three I describe the past record of price control laws 
in Tanzania. I conclude that despite the failure in the past, 
the controls still constitute an important poiicy instrument 
in the transition to socialism. In Chapters Four and Five I describe 
the manner in which the current regulations are implemented and 
the problems encountered. I conclude that the operational performance 
of the controls 
is constrained by internal and external influences 
-xl- 
on the economic and political life of the country. In the concluding 
Chapter I assess the impact of the controls: Do the controls 
work? Do people buy goods at the controlled prices? Why today 
the controls are almost popularly accepted as worthwhile? I conclude 
that while there may be no measurable economic gains derived 
by consumers, the controls have a stabilising effect on the social 
and political front. In the final section I argue that the 
future success of the legislation depends on creating a correspondence 
between the economic structures and the control system. What 
makes the controls ineffective is not so much defects in the 
law but the contradictions between the orientation of and functioning 
of the economic system and the ideological commitment. 
-xii- 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Scope and Purpose 
Tanzania is among the few countries that pursue a 
vigorous policy of statutory price controls (ILO 1982). A rough 
estimate shows that out of the 625 Acts passed between 1967 
and 1985, about 400 (i. e. 65%) have to do with regulating prices 
of goods or services of one kind or another (Tables of Acts 
of Parliament, Chief Parliament Draftsmen, Daresalaam). Today 
legal regulation of prices still remains one of the difficult 
problems facing contemporary Tanzania (Budget Speech 1986/87, 
Daily News, Daresalaam, June 20,1986). Overall many governmental 
and parastatal bodies (perhaps almost all) have as some f eature 
of their activities an aspect of price regulation. The main 
control machinery, the subject of this study, was established 
by the Regulation of Prices Act 1973. Historical accounts, however 
show that the government had for many decades before that legis- 
lated to control prices. The first law was passed as early as 
1920 (Kimble 1970 p. 28; Price Control ordinance 1920). 
The revival of interest in price controls that took 
place in 1973, however, occured in a very different context 
from the earlier legislation on the subject. A change in the 
whole social, economic and political climate had taken place 
dating back to the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The Declaration 
proclaimed a policy of socialism and self-reliance and emphasized 
the need for economic independence (Nyerere 1977). It gave priority 
to the eradication of social and economic evils such as poverty, 
-1- 
ignorance and diseasel the improvement in the standards of living 
of the majority; the removal of social and economic inequalities 
with the accent on the equitable redistribution of wealth and 
spending power; the maintenance of economic stability and stimula- 
tion of long term growth by removing factors that cause inf lation 
and undeveXopment; the reorganisation of farm production on 
the basis of communal (ujamaa) villages and the promotion of 
national unity. 
Following this Declaration, the government nationalised 
all major economic activities and enacted laws to place them 
into public ownership (Mittelman 1981); and passed laws to authorise 
nationalisation of the remaining commanding heights of the economy. 
The nationalised activities covered banking, insurance and large 
trading enterprises. Also nationalised were all key services 
and industries. Since then majority government shareholdings 
have been acquired in the main manufacturing enterprises, oil 
companies, transport and shipping (Industrial Shares Acquisition 
Acts 1967 and 1984); while major newspapers are wholly owned 
1 by the state (Newspaper Act 1968, No. 23) . Wholesale, export 
and import trade also came under state control and ownership. 
State Trading Corporations were set up and given a monopoly 
over the procurement, distribution and supply of specified goods 
(under the State Trading Corporation Acts 1967 and 1972; and 
the Confinement of Imports Order 1981, G. N. 96). Besides public 
ownership and control of the major means of production, the 
broad economic Policy principles of socialism (ujamaa) are self- 
1. And the Tanzania News Agency Act 1976 gives monopoly to the agency to act 
within Tanzania as the "sole receiver and distributor of news and news material 
from sources outside Tanzania" (section 4(l)(C) Tanzania News Agency Act 
1976, No. 5. 
-2-- 
reliance and rural development (Nyerere 1968, Coulson 1982). 
The Declaration lays down strict controls in other areas of 
social and economic activity. For example, it lays down a stringent 
code of conduct for politicians, senior government and parastatal 
employees and public officers, none of whom may derive profits, 
benefits, inducements or salary from any activity outside his 
official employment (The Committee on Enforcement of Leadership 
2 
Code Act 1973). The conduct of all these public officers, both 
in public and private, is closely monitored by watchdogs like 
3 
the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, anti-corruption squad and 
leadership committee in addition to law enforcers like the police 
and people's militia force. 
Wages, terms and conditions of employment are regulated 
by the government. In the case of government employees it is 
the government which sets salaries (the Regulation of Wages 
Act 1961, cap 300). In the private sector wages and conditions 
of pay are regulated by an industrial tribunal - The Permanent 
Labour Tribunal. The Act establishing this tribunal - the Permanent 
Labour Tribunal Act 1967 - outlaws all traditional forms of 
industrial action like strikes, go-slow, picketing. Instead, 
it institutes a system of compulsory arbitration through the 
2. It seems the provisions of this Act have left a loophole which enables leaders 
to evade its restrictions by running businesses through trust devices such 
as owning shares in private firms through relatives, friends and children. 
It is not clear whether this was lack of foresight on the part of the draftsman 
or deliberate. Studies show that this gap is being exploited by leaders. 
See for example, the African Concorde, London, August 1986; Africa Contemporary 
Records 1976-77, B339-371. 
For a detailed enalysis of the commission's activities in curbing maladminis- 
tration in public offices. see Martin R. (1973) Personal Freedoin and the 
Law in Tanzania, (London: Oxford University Press). 
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tribunal, the Ministry of Labour and the workers' organisation 
(NUTA). The Wages and Incomes policy adoted since 1967 requires 
private companies considering a revision in employees wages 
or conditions of employment to submit to the tribunal evidence 
of increased productivity and profits (Government Paper 3 of 
1967 and Government Paper 1 1981). Even then annual wage increases 
are not allowed to go beyond five percent (Government Paper 
4 1967, Green 1974). The terms and conditions of employment 
for government employees are regulated by the Ministry of Labour 
and Manpower (the Regulation of Wages and Terms of Employment 
Act 1961, No. 41). Those for parastatal employees are regulated 
by the Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations, in consulta- 
tion with the Association of Parastatal Employees (see, SCOPO 
Directive, G. N. 1976 of 1967). 
We find in Tanzania after 1967, therefore, a highly 
regulated economy. One area that was little affected by the 
nationalisation laws was retail trade at the consumer level. 
Despite the effort taken to establish state trading corporations 
and village shops by 1981 only about eight thousand public owned 
shops had been opened. This can be compared with over f if ty thousand 
registered individual retail shops (Statement by Minister of 
Trade, Regulation of Trade Bill, First Reading, April 16,1980). 
The registered shops exclude the numerous middlemen- such as 
unlicenced hawkers, street vendors and roadside traders who 
supply the bulk of consumer goods to ultimate consumers. And 
all indications show that the position as regards retail 
trade 
is likely to remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. The 
former President, Julius Nyerere made it clear that it 
is not 
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government policy to extend state involvement in every aspect 
of retail trade. According to Nyerere the Arusha Declaration 
is a policy of "state control of the major means of production 
which leaves plenty of room for private enterprisew (The Economist, 
Intelligence Unit, London, No. 1 1978). 
In view of all these developments price control became 
necessary. For one, there was the need to protect consumers 
from abuse of dominant market power by businessmen in non-competi- 
tive situation. Because the consumer class is deficient - consumers 
are not organised, they are not well informed and possess inadequate 
resources, price control was a necessary measure to protect 
consumer interests against potential abuses such as price overcharge, 
substandard products and services and discriminatory pricing. 
Price control was also necessary as a means of achieving equity 
between various groups. Equity was sought between workers and 
peasants, between owners of capital and labour (Green 1974. Mongi 
1980) as well as between state interests, the consumer and producer. 
It may also be argued that price control was part of the general 
policy measures to influence wages, incomes, economic develop- 
ment, investment and the price level. Moreover, price control, 
was an essential adjunct to wage restraint policy. Workers are 
more likely to accept restraints on wages and incomes from a 
government that is seen to control prices since the two - prices 
and wages - have a bearing on each other. By controlling prices 
the incomes of low income-earners would be stabilised and this 
would forestall demands for increased wages and pay (Government 
Policy on Productivity, Incomes and Prices, Government Paper 
1,1981 para. 
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In response to these demands, the Regulation of Prices 
Act 1973 was passed establishing, among others, a National Price 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the ONPCO), with extensive 
statutory powers to decide each price through to the f inal price 
(section 8(l). The commision's jurisdiction is restricted to 
mainland Tanzania and does not cover the Islands of Zanzibar 
and Pemba, which though part of the United Republic, constitute 
a sovereign state (Mongi 1980: 97; section 6(b) of the Act). 
In general terms the functions of the Commission are 
w(a) to determine reasonable price structures on a national 
basis and to provide for their orderly variation when necessary; 
(b) to ensure that prices of goods and services in Tanganyika 
are compatible with and conform to the principles of socialism 
and the political, economic and social aspirations of the people; 
(c) to perform such other functions as are conferred on it by 
this Act, or as the President, may from time to time, by order 
published in the Gazette, confer upon it, (section 6). 
In specific terms, the Commission has statutory power 
to fix and enforce maximum prices at ex-factory, wholesale, 
sub-wholesale and retail levels f or any goods and services except 
where authority has been delegated to other agencies like in 
the case of water, electricity and transport. The NPC is basically 
responsible for fixing prices of manufactured goods, both locally 
produced and imported. These include food and beverages; textiles 
and clothing; household articles; building and construction 
materials; pharma'Ceuticals and other miscellaneous items like 
arms, ammunition and explosives (List of Price Controlled Items 
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as at 12th September 1984, the NPC). 
Since its inception the price control system has been 
a subject of intense controversy. Questions have been raised 
as to whether the controls work (Shimwela 1984, Semboja 1985, 
the World Bank 1975 and ILO 1977). Right from the outset, the 
Daresalaam, Chamber of Commerce voiced strong objection to the 
Act. In their representations to the government the merchants 
argued 
No price fixer can avoid working damage 
on the fortunes of individuals, if not in 
an absolute sense, then at least in relation 
to opportunity. His task consists in denying 
men income they have had or could have had. 
When such effect is wrought by the free 
market there is no one to blame. When a 
price fixer damages a man's fortune or his 
hope of one, that individual is left in 
no doubt as to who is responsible (Gazette 
of the United Republic, No. 3, vol. LIV, July 
27,1973). 
To the business community, the controls were thus seen as distaste- 
ful and harmful to their interests. 
Some economists, from within and without, have questioned 
the desirability of the controls. They have argued that the controls 
cannot cure inflation and that experience from other countries 
has shown that an effective ceiling price below the market price 
only results in excess demand (Ndyeshobola, 1980, Shimwela 1984, 
Lipumba and Mbogoro 1985), non-price rationing (Rice 1976) and 
misallocation of resources (Rice 1976, Shimwela 1984, ILO 1977; 
1982). Parastatal managers have more than once called upon the 
government to repeal the Act and allow them to fix the prices 
for the products of their firms (Sunday News, Daresalaam, February 
16,1986). The managers have blamed the NPC for losses in their 
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f irms arguing that the prices it f ixes are of ten below the market 
clearing level and that the activities of the NPC severely damage 
the efficient working of the market system (Shimwela 1984). Other 
agencies have expressed much stronger opposition to the Act. 
The World Bank and the IMF have made the repeal of this law and 
the total dismantling of price controls a necessary condition 
for any credit and loan facilities (Daily News, Daresalaam, November 
23,1984; Payer 1983, Green 1983). Other western donor agencies 
have made similar demands (Nyerere 1986: 396). On the other hand 
those who work in the Commission have strongly defended it (Mongi 
1980, Whitworth 1982). And so has the government (Budget Speech 
1986/87 para 124, Government Policy on Productivity, Incomes 
and Prices, Paper 1 1981 para. 62-65). President Nyerere (as he 
then was) persistently argued that, in the circumstances of Tanzania, 
arguably of other developing countries too, the controls are 
both necessary and desirable (Development Dialogue 1980: 8-10; 
Development and Change 1986, vol. 17 p. 397). The most important 
consideration, as Whitworth rightly points out, is that regulation 
by the market (the rich country approach to the problem) is not 
a viable solution for poor countries because, as we shall see, 
the assumptions underlying competition do not obtain in such 
countries (Whitworth 1982: 485). In developing countries a non- 
competitive environment prevails (Murray 1981 , Ghai 
1985, Helleiner 1980). Consumers are not well informed. Resources, 
especially labour are not mobile. Single firms command considerable 
monopoly (Murray 1981, Killick 1978, Kimble 1970). Furthermore 
import controls aimed at judicious use of scarce foreign exchange 
have strengthened the monopolistic tendencies (Green 1980, Helleiner 
1980) - 
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Rejecting World Bank and IMF demands that price controls 
be dismantled, the former President Nyerere countered 
Our price control system may not be the most 
effective in the world; but we will not abandon 
price control, we will only strive to make 
it more efficient. And above all, we will 
continue with our endeavour to build socialism 
(Development Dialogue, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 8). 
Explaining the reasons for his rejection of any suggestion to 
scrap the price control Act and its institutions Nyerere pointed 
out that the social and political consequences of such a decision 
would be unbearable (Daily News, Daresalaam, November 23 1984). 
Price decontrols are obviously dreaded by politicians in many 
African states. Decontrolled prices have often marked the beginning 
of political and social unrest and the downfall of the government. 
For example, several hundred people died during the food riots 
in Morocco in June 1985 in protest against increased prices. 
Protesters took to the streets in Sudan in January 1985 after 
price rises for basic commodities following price decontrols 
initiated by the IMF. In the process the political regime of 
President Numeiri fell (Africa Now, London, February 1986: 28). 
Other African states which have faced unrest associated price 
decontrols in the 1980's are Kenya 1982, Tunisia 1983, Egypt 
4 
1985, Zambia 1983 and Liberia. In view of this background the 
the government's reluctance to remove the controls is understandable. 
This study therefore takes as a starting point the 
assumption that price controls will continue to be a significant 
4. For a fuller discussion of how price decontrols 
have led to social and political 
unrest in some African states, see, 
Development and Change 1986. vol. 17, p. 425; 
The Guardian, London, December 10,1986: 8. 
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instrument of economic and social policy in Tanzania and presumably 
in other developing countries! 
Focus 
In this study my main focus is to examine critically 
the implementation of the controls as governed by the Regulation 
of Prices Act 1973 and administered by the National Price Commission 
and affiliated agencies, in terms of its successes and failures 
in achieving its objectives and to explore its constraints and 
limitations as a tool of social change and development. 
The Act, undoubtedly one of the most important pieces 
of legislation in the post-Arusha Declaration era contains a 
grand design for restructuring social and economic relations 
and the law is given a substantial directive role in this effort. 
This is evidenced by the f act that the duties of the price control 
agencies cover broad objectives like (i) promoting the social 
and economic welfare of the masses of the poorer sections of 
the community (Government Paper 1,1981, para. 63), (ii) reducing 
income inequalities among various groups in society, (iii) re- 
structuring society and the economic and political relationships 
in it towards socialist relations (Section 6(b); (iv) using the 
controls to prevent exploitation of one person by another and 
to limit accummulation of wealth by individuals (section 12(l)(e), 
5. Sone interesting studies on the extent to which developing countries have 
used price controls to solve social and economic problems can be found in: 
Thorpe R. ed. (1979) Inflation and Stabilisation in Latin America (Macmillan, 
London); The Economist, London, December 15,1986, "Hyperinflation: Taming 
the Beast", pp. 57-64; Gupta, S. P. and Srinivasam, T. G. (1984) "Inflation 
and the Role of Administered Prices in India", Economic and 
Political Weekly, 
Vol. VIX, No. 36. p. 1579. 
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(v) to enable the government to raise revenue for public expenditure 
and (vi) using the price control system to promote other social 
and economic objectives of the economy such as preserving and 
expanding employment, promoting greater efficiency in trade and 
industry (section 12(l)(g), safeguarding investments, enabling 
parastatals to operate profitably and bringing prices of basic 
commodities within the reach of the majority of the people. 
These are important objectives and their attainment 
depends on the satisfactory performance of the control system. 
Approach 
The approach I have adopted is to examine the Act and 
6 related legislation on the subject within their operational context . 
The regulatory rules will be presented, analysed, discussed and 
their operation will be assessed within the social and political 
context of the Tanzanian society. References will be made to 
the laws and legal institutions in other countries in so far 
as necessary to identify a set of potentially feasible alternatives. 
Structure 
The study is divided into six chapters. The First Chapter 
is of a General Introductory nature. I first outline the scope 
and purpose of the study. Here endeavour is made to delineate 
the problem - outlining the significance of price control to 
6. As examples of this approach in the literature on East African Law, see Ghai, 
Y. and McAuslan, J. P. W. B. (1970), Public Law and Political Change in Kenya 
(Nairobi, Oxford University Press); and Martin, R. (1974), Personal Freedom 
and the Law in Tanzania, (Daresalaam, Oxford University Press) in contrast 
to the mechanistic approach of Cole, J. S. R. and Denison, W. N. (1964), Tanganyika: 
The Development of its Laws and Constitutions, London; Stevens and Sons. 
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the Tanzanian economy and the controversy surrounding it. This 
is followed by an enumeration of the general issues to be covered. 
Then there is a section setting out some basic propositions to 
be tested. Finally there is a description of the approaches and 
methods used to collect data and information as well as the problems 
encountered and the techniques used to overcome those problems. 
In the Second Chapter I examine the theoretical aspects of price 
control. I endeavour to f ind out what price control is all about? 
Why society may impose price controls and also the reasons for 
the choice of law as a tool for price regulation, that is the 
role of law in the regulatory process. I conclude by examining 
the various regulatory methods. In the Third Chapter I shift 
specifically to the Tanzanian experience. I examine how the controls 
have evolved historically - describing the changing role of the 
controls, the motives behind them and their successes and limitations. 
In the same chapter I trace the social and political developments 
that laid the foundations of the present price control regime. 
I show that the shift to the socialist path of development 
inevitably meant changes in social and legal institutions to 
ensure they serve socialist objectives. Legal regulation was 
increasingly used during this period to cover various areas of 
social life and also to try to systematically 
influence economic 
7 
and social activity. It was assumed that the social relations 
7. As examples of such laws one can cite the regulation of 
industrial relations 
under the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act 
1964 No. 41; customary land tenure 
systems under Customary Leasehold (Enfranchisement) 
Act 1969, No. 47; prevention 
of maladministration in government by establishing an ombudsman under 
the 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act 1968, No. 2 and the Prevention of 
Corruption 
Act 1971, No. 16. 
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would follow the patters inherent in legal norms. The main conclusion 
of this chapter is that the enactment of the Regulation of Prices 
Act and the creation of the commission and allied institutions 
largely owe their origin to the socialist policies of this era. 
Having sketched the social origins of the Act, I then move to 
an examination of its implementation in Chapter Four. I first 
begin with a description of the statutory rules - outlining their 
content, goal-structure and the manner in which they are interpreted 
by the NPC. In the next section I look at the organisational 
structure of the price control agencies - the National Price 
Commission, the Assistant Price Commissioners and the Price Control 
Advisory Committees. Attempt is made to explore their respective 
functions and their functional relationship. In a subsequent 
section, I examine how the National Price Commission f ixes prices 
at the manufacturer, wholesale, subwholesale and retail levels 
both for locally manufactured products and imported goods. In 
the concluding section I show that although there are some apparent 
contraditions in the goal structure of the rules, the Commission 
have found no difficulty in resolving them. 
In the Fifth Chapter I continue with an examination 
of the other major function of the price controllers - enforcement 
of ceiling prices. First, I describe the methods and techniques 
employed. Then I investigate how the enforcers carry out their 
functions in practice. This is followed by an examination of 
the various measures instituted to assist in effective enforcement. 
Such measures include: the laws relating to distribution of essential 
commodities; those concerning rationing and consumer registration; 
prevention of hoarding and black marketeering; control of quality 
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and the calibration of measuring and weighing instruments. In 
conclusion, I argue that enforcement of these laws is made ineffective 
by vested interest groups. 
In the Sixth Chapter I discuss the impact of the law. 
I try to answer the question whether the controls are working. 
I first note that there are contradictory versions on this point. 
The differences in my view, arise from the fact that those who 
dislike the controls, in most cases out of ideological reasons, 
always emphasize the negative effects while those who defend 
them invariably produce evidence to show they are working. Taken 
together the overwhelming evidence is that they do not work. 
I also take stock of the areas where the controls have failed 
and try to explain the causes. I conclude by noting that it is 
unequal distribution of economic and political opportunity that 
reduces the potentiality of this Act to effect changes in the 
direction that would benefit the economically weaker groups as 
originally intended. 
1.5. Existing Studies 
There is a large amount of literature about price controls 
8 
in general. Much of this work - whether focussed on particular 
8. For case studies of price controls from Western perspectives. see Galbraith, 
J. K. (1980) A Theory of Price Control (Cambridge: Harvard University Press); 
US Congress (1973) Price and Wages Controls: An Evaluation of Current Policies 
(Washington, Government Printing Office); Mitchell, J. (1980) "Prices Policy", 
in Morris, D. ed. Economics of Consumer Protection, (Heinemann Education Books) 
Chapter 10. 
For Eastern perspectives, see Manove, M. (1973) "Soviet Pricing, Profits and 
Technological Choice" (Louvain: Centre for Operations Research. Discussion 
Paper 7307); Kaser, M. B. The Soviet Planning and Price Mechanism. (1950) Economic 
Journal pp. 81-91; Abouchar, A. ad. (1977) The Socialist Price System, (Durham, 
Duke University Press, North Carolina). 
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countries or more theoretical and comparative propositions - 
reveals the predominance of views from scholars from the capitalist 
block. The majority of Western scholars have examined the issue 
from either economic perspectives (Galbraith 1980, Cheung 1974, 
Cox 1980), or from management and administration perspectives 
(Stigler 1962, Campbell 1971, Mitchell 1978). These scholars 
tend to ignore social, political and equitable considerations. 
Some studies make observations on price controls in 
developing countries (Bauer 1965, Killick 1973). These studies 
suggest the need to consider the specific political and social 
forces that precede the price controls at the particular moment 
in each of the developing countries and show that the question 
of determining motives for the controls seems particularly trouble- 
some when price controls in the Third World countries are studied. 
Af ew studies have examined the Tanzanian price control 
system. The most notable are those by Kimble 1970, Rice 1976, 
Mongi 1980 and Whitworth 1982. Kimble's study contains an illumin- 
ating account of the price control system prior to the present 
regime. Her study covers the position up to 1970 during which 
the law applicable was the Price Control Ordinance 1951 and numerous 
price control orders issued under different laws. Rice's study, 
on the other hand was made a few months after the passage of 
the Act. His comments are impressionistic and most of his conclusions 
are premature. They were made only a few months after the Act 
had been passed. The accent of Rice's argument is the one commonly 
found among economists opposed to price control - that the controls 
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do not work 
9 
(Rice 1976: 95-110). The studies by Whitworth deal with 
the price fixing processes for locally manufactured goods (Whitworth 
1978,1982). Whitworth does not look at what happens to the ceiling 
prices - whether consumers in practice buy at the controlled 
prices. Subject to this limitation his studies provide an excellent 
account of what goes on at the commission. Mongi, on the other 
hand describes the objectives of the commission and the manner 
in which it carries out its functions. He does not, however, 
deal with the impact of the NPC's activities on society. Nor 
does he discuss whether the commission is achieving its objectives. 
Surely he is the person best placed to speak on these issues 
by virtue of his continuous service as Chairman of the NPC 
(since its inception up to the time of writing this thesis). 
Several other studies have been made on the NPC and the Tanzanian 
price control system in general (World Bank 1975, ILO 1977,1982, 
Shimwela 1984). These studies make a critical but passing reference 
to NPC. 
So far there is no empirical study which provides a 
coherent view from a socio-legal point of the extent to which 
the Act has been used to further varying social, economic and 
political purposes. This study attempts to help fill that gap. 
jng proponents of this view are: Stigler, G. (1962) "What 9. Some of the lead 
can Regulations Regulate: The Case of Electricity". Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol. 5, pp. 1-16; Posner, R. A. (1969) "Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation". 
in Stanford L. R., Vol. 21, pp. 548-643; Walker, M. D. ed. (1976) The Illusion 
of Wage and Price Controls: Essays in Inflation. Its causes and Its gures. 
(Vancouver B. C., Fraser Institute). 
-16- 
1.6. Hypotheses 
My discussion in this thesis proceeds from three basic 
assumptions about the relationship between law and regulation 
of economic and social activity. My first assumption is that 
the law is an instrument for the protection of the interests 
of the weak in society. This is the most popular view about the 
price control law in Tanzania. The government emphatically argues 
that price controls protect consumers from unscrupulous traders 
(Budget Speech 1986/87 para 120). Commemorating the tenth anniversary 
of the NPC, the Daily News, the official mouthpiece of the govern- 
ment, described the Act as a "dependable tool for ensuring fair 
prices to the consumer" and concluded that the "controls help 
to stabilise prices, thereby reducing or eliminating uncalled 
for fluctuations of incomes and wages" (Daily News, Daresalaam, 
Wednesday, AUgUSt 14,1985: 1). The chairman of the commission 
considers protection of the masses of the poor consumers to be 
their main duty (Mongi, 1980: 97). To test the validity of this 
proposition we need to consider whether there exists the necessary 
mechanisms to enable the weak to use the law to protect themselves. 
Some of the questions we may ask are: Do consumers have any say 
in the affairs and activities of the control agencies? Does there 
exist a machinery through which the decisions of the controllers 
can be reviewed, challenged or appealed against by dissatisfied 
consumers? And also whether the controllers do always act in 
ways that are consistent with the implications of this proposition. 
My second assumption is that for the law to succeed 
in achieving its objectives there must exist the necessary pre- 
conditions. These include: first, an economic, Political and 
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legal environment which gives room for the rules to be enforced 
and obeyed; second, a clear government policy about the objectives 
to be pursued and the means of achieving them; third, a social 
structure which is flexible enough to allow the regulations to 
operate, such as a common economic and social interest or an 
equal access to opportunities; and fourth, especially in the 
case of price controls, an adequate infrastructure including 
an education system, means of communications and transportation 
which facilitates access to the controlled goods and services. 
It is necessasry to stress that the minimum requirements 
for the effective operation of the controls referred to above 
will have to be met if the law is to work successfully. An examina- 
tion of the existing studies reveals for example, that the controls 
will work well where goods are available (Mitchell 1978, Cockf ield 
1978, Campbell 1971) and will not work in a situation of shortages 
as was the case in Chile in 1970-73 Ghana (Struthers 1981) 
and India (Gupta and Srimvasam 1984). 
My third assumption is that the controls have been 
deliberately designed to enable the government to collect money 
for public expenditure. To test the validity of this statement 
we shall look at who, among the interested parties in the controls 
- producers, consumers and government - has his interests better 
taken care of - It may be noted here that there is nothing wrong 
in the government using the controls to generate revenue. What 
is important is what happens to the money. So long as the money 
goeg, into public expenditure programmes that benefit the majority, 
the objectiveS Of the Act will still be serv6d. 
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We shall see how each of the foregoing propositions 
is affirmed, rejected or modified by the evidence presented. 
1.7. Research Methods, Data Collection, Problems and Results 
The study is a result of research conducted partly 
at Warwick University in the UK and partly in Tanzania. The f irst 
phase consisted of general reading on the subject which I carried 
out at Warwick University from October 1983 to September 1984. 
During this period I was able to make a literature review by 
examining relevant texts, journals, statutes, legal instruments, 
cases and other material, mainly on the experiences of other 
countries. The aim was to get some light on how the problem has 
been dealt with in other societies and with what success. One 
objective of the exercise was to identify a set of potentially 
feasible alternatives. 
The major conclusion I would make from my review of 
literature is that the price controls are viewed from different 
perspectives. Different views are held by scholars in market 
10 
economies, in the command economies and those in developing economies. 
The differences, as I shall endeavour to explain later on, are 
not merely of economic theory. They involve totally different 
10. For examples of views f rom market economy perspective, see: US Congress (1973) 
Price and Wage Controls: An Evaluation of Current Policies (Washington Government 
Printing Office); Walker. M. ed. (1976) supra note; Jervis, F. R. J. (1949) 
Price Control: Government Intervention or the Free Market (London: Hutchinson's 
Scientific and Technical Publications). 
For socialist perspectives, see Spulber, N. (1966) The Soviet Economy: Structure, 
Principles and Problems (New York: Random House); Kaser, M. C. (1950)"The Soviet 
Planning and Planning Mechanism, " in Economic Journal 1950 pp. 81-91. 
For developing countries, see Killick. T. (1973) "Price Controls in Africa: 
The Ghanaian Experience" in Journal of Modern African Studies 405-426; Whitworth, 
A. (1982) "Price Control Techniques in Poor Countries", in World Development. 
Vol. io, No. 6, p. 485. 
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approaches to development. At the heart of the controversy are 
three different ways of looking at economic development, in fact 
three different sets of value judgements about the purposes of 
and the ends of economic activity and three incompatible views 
on what is politically possible. 
The second part of the research consisted of fieldwork 
conducted in Tanzania from November 1984 to May 1985. Some institu- 
tions charged with the administration of the Act were visited. 
Of those institutions I planned to visit I managed to visit the 
following: the National Price Commission in Daresalaam, where 
was able to hold discussions with the Chairman of the National 
Price Commission, departmental heads in the Commission's divisions 
and price inspectors attached to the Price Commission. While 
in Daresalaam I was also able to visit and interview officials 
of the National Food Commission, Regional Trading Company, Weights 
and Measures, District Trade Office (dealing with business licensing), 
National Distributors, the Kariakoo Market Corporation, the Senior 
Resident Magistrate at Kivukoni Court, the City Council and Daresalaam 
Chamber of Commerce. I was not able to conduct research in the 
National Milling Corporation, the Bureau of Standards and the 
National Development Corporation as originally planned, due to 
time constraints. To obtain a representative view of the situation 
I visited four up-country regions: Kilimanjaro, Mbeya, Ruvuma 
and Dodoma. The same authorities were contacted in each region. 
These were the Assistant Price Commissioners (the Regional Development 
Directors); the Regional Trade Officers, the Regional Trading 
Companies, the Magistrates Courts, the Office of the Public Prosecutor 
and the Regional or District Directors. While in the regions 
-20- 
I also visited the main market areas to observe the prices charged 
on some commodities and compare them with the official price 
lists. 
The criteria used to select the regions were mainly 
three: First, the incidence of price violation. The records 
at the NPC revealed that Kilimanjaro and Mbeya regions had a 
relatively higher rate of reported violations while Ruvuma and 
Dodoma had a low rate. Second, it appeared that on national 
: i-, rerage magistrates in Mbeya and Kilimanjaro imposed higher 
penalties on violators than their counterparts in Dodoma and 
Ruvuma for similar offences. Yet, it is in the very regions 
with strict magistrates that violations are higher. Third, the 
regions selected were relatively more accessible in transport 
compared to others. On the other hand Daresalaam was chosen 
by virtue of its being the major city (and until recently the 
capital). It also houses all head offices for ministries. 
To obtain the information I used interviews and question- 
naires. Questionnaires were distributed to price inspectors, 
weights and measures officers, city council and the Kariakoo 
Market Corporation. The turn out was generally poor. The reasons 
were probably two: The first is that the officials thought the 
issue to be politically too sensitive to comment upon. The Act 
and its institutions had become a point of hot contention between 
the IMF and Western aid donor agencies on one hand and the govern- 
ment on the other (The Economist, London 1980, No. 1, Daily News, 
Daresalaam, November 23,1984: 1, Development Dialogue 1980: 
8). By December 1984 government refusal to repeal the Act had 
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become the principal stumbling block for the release of badly 
needed loans from the World Bank (Nyerere 1986, Green 1983). 
Second, the NPC had announced drastic consumer price increases 
in September 1984 (Price Control List, September 12,1984). 
This was largely due to removal of government subsidies on these 
items in addition to increased costs of raw materials, labour, 
transport and fuel (National Price Commission Working Papers 
11 1984, Nos. 116,120,148,153). This caused a stormy debate in 
Parliament (Uhuru, Daresalaam, October 19,1984). Many parliamen- 
tarians erroneously blamed the NPC for the increases and called 
for its abolition. A third factor may have been apathy on the 
part of some government and parastatal leaders to researchers. 
It has been noted by Nditi 1985 and Wambali 1985 that officials 
shy away from researchers, consider them as troublemakers or 
12 
simply as persons interested in exposing administrative deficiencies. 
Interviews were preceded by written questions to guide 
the discussions. I interviewed the Assistant Price Commissioners 
in the regions visited, Regional Trading Officers, Magistrates 
at Kivukoni and city courts and those in the regions, off icials 
in the Ministry of Trade, the Kariakoo Market Corporation, traders 
and buyers on the markets visited and public prosecutors in 
Daresalaam, Kilimanjaro and Ruvuma. The interviewees were asked 
a set of control questions: What they thought about the Act; 
11. Paper 116 Car batteries; 120 Soft drinks; 148 Edible oils; 153 EWdsheets. 
12. Nditi, N. N. (1905) "Report of Research Findings on Consumer Protection Law 
and Practice" (University of Daresalaam. Unpublished); Wambali, M. K. (1985) 
Government Liability in Tort: The Impact of the Government Proceedings Act 
1967 (Faculty of Law, Daresalaen. LLM Thesis). 
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whether the controls were necessary and desirable; their opinion, 
views and attitudes about the controls; their knowledge, awareness, 
commitment to enforcing the rules; the conditions that hamper 
the effectiveness of the controls and what changes should be 
made to improve the situation. 
The information based on the questions and subsequent 
discussion proved useful and I was satisfied that the same was 
representative of the information I might get elsewhere. 
During my visit to the courts I was able to examine 
court files on cases relating to violation of the controls. 
The analysis of the files gave me data on the statutory provisions 
that are most frequently violated. My assumption was that a 
deficient functioning of the rules would be established by an 
increase in the number of cases reaching the courts. The problem 
encountered in the courts was how to locate the files. The 
courts do not keep records in such a neat way that price control 
cases would be in any manner easily traceable. 
Finally, I consulted the indices on the National Consumer 
Retail Price Index, the cost of living index for minimum wage 
earners in Daresalaam and eighteen other urban centres. The 
indices on these subjects are compiled by the Central Statistical 
Bureau. The Marketing Development Bureau and the ILO 1982,1983 
have also compiled data on the same. The object was to examine 
the trend in retail prices and hence cost of living bef ore and 
af ter the imposition of the controls. By using the data we would 
be able to tell the effect of the controls on issues such as 
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price stability, real incomes and income inequality. One point 
which needs to be mentioned in this regard is that there is 
a shortage of up-to-date data and satisfactory information on 
many important questions. For example, the latest data on the 
cost of living in urban centres (other than Daresalaam) is that 
of 1980. The other problem is disparities and inconsistencies 
in the figures kept by the various institutions. To resolve 
inconsistencies I supplemented the data by seeking clarification 
locally from the officials responsible. In other cases I adopted 
f igures which I thought were more realistic in the light of 
what I personally saw and knew. 
The information collected from these sources has been 
supplemented by my own personal observations and knowledge of 
the Tanzanian economy. 
It is in the light of this information that the issues 
raised in the study have been posed, examined, analysed and 
discussed. The material presented is as far as possible Tanzanian. 
Non-Tanzanian sources have been used in two situations: first, 
where scholars in other countries have formulated theories which 
seem appropriate to the study; and second, to illustrate the 
way in which other countries have dealt with the situation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRICE CONTROL: THEORY, LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 
In this Chapter I shall attempt to examine four main 
issues. First, I examine the concept of "price control" - what 
it is all about and how it arises. Second, what objectives do 
the controls serve - that is the role that price control may 
play within the development policy of a state. Third, the reasons 
that may justify their imposition, and fourth, the methods used 
to implement the controls. Finally, the role of Law in the control 
process. 
The Concept of "Price Control" 
The term "price control" frequently used and defined 
in the most different ways needs some clarification. "Price", 
as ordinarily defined, is an "estimation of the value of an 
economic good or service in terms of money" (New Dictionary 
of Economics, 1969: 233). This does not mean that prices are 
not possible where there is no money involved. Indeed, as the 
Longman's Dictionary shows, prices are possible in a barter 
system where no money exists. In such a system the price of 
a product or service can be expressed in terms of another product 
- an exchange rate (Longman Dictionary, 1984: 539). "Controln 
ordinarily implies power to direct, check, regulate or exercise 
influence over another. A control system would therefore mean 
a mechanism used to regulate or influence the operation of an 
institution, agency or social activity. 
Despite the apparent clarity in the terms upriceO 
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and "control", when viewed individually, there appears to be 
no universally accepted definition of "price control". Yet it 
is significant to note that the concept is frequently used in 
the context of social and economic regulation. It is important 
therefore to take a brief look at the concept - defining it 
and examining several of what may be termed its popular definitional 
perspectives. 
Before developing a definition to be employed in this 
study, it is interesting to examine one employed in economic 
literature. According to Cheung, price control is "government 
interference to influence the price level" (Cheung, 1974: 53). 
A similar definition is given in the Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences which defines price control as Oadministrative interference 
by government statutory order in fixing the price level" (Inter- 
national Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p. 459). The 
central element of this class of definition is an "interference" 
-a focus which I find misleading. "Interference" connotes a 
restriction, a blocking off or a diversion from what would other- 
1 
wise occur without the controls. What may be faulty with this 
definition is that it looks at price control from the negative 
point of view. It tends to emphasize the notion that some harm 
or loss will necessarily be suffered by the controlled firms. 
Some authorities have argued that this is bound to be a result 
of any price control (Posner 1969, Confederation of British 
Industry, "Price Controls and Price Commission: The Business 
Vieww, London, May 1979). This definition ignores the controller's 
For a forceful exposition of the notion of Interference In the general context 
of social and economic regulation. see Mitnick, B. M. (1980) The Political 
Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing and Removing Regulatory Forms, 
(Now York, Columbia University Press) pp. 2-4. 
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positive role of guiding, assisting and protecting the interests 
of the controlled firms. Interference also seems to connote 
lack of purpose, concern or objectives on the part of those 
who are exercising the controls. Finally, interference connotes 
an intermittent, and unplanned action. It connotes meddling. 
In my view, a price control" has to be interpreted 
much more broadly than economists sometimes think. Control to 
me implies an intentional or purposive and systematic influence 
over a given area of social activity so as to make that activity 
conform to or serve defined objectives or goals. Control, says 
Heath, implies an on-going process or relation where the controllert 
goal remains consistent over time (Heath 1982). The definition 
that contains these fundamental elements- of purpose, goal, 
objective and consistency is, perhaps, that of Mitchell, who 
says, that price contrpl is "government action to influence 
prices by rules, regulations and directives" (Mitchell, 1978: 
36). Mitchell then goes on to amplify her definition by saying 
that the action that qualifies to be called "price control" 
is action which is, "carefully arranged, deliberate and purposive; 
designed to be performed over a long period of time, with long 
term objectiveso (ibid). The merit of this definition is obvious. 
For one, it is opposed to a situation where there is short- 
term meddling with prices - the kind of interventions that are 
motivated by the expediency of short-term political considerations 
such as winning an election. For the other, it looks at the 
controls from a positive point of view. 
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2.2. Why do Government Control Prices? 
This is indeed an important question as the very necessity 
and desirability of the controls is often disputed. Views differ 
on the desirability of the controls between scholars in the 
capitalist camp (Stigler 1966, Cheung 1974, Leftwich and Eckert 
1985) and those in the socialist camp (Spulber 1966, Bornstein 
1970, Barrat Brown 1984). Even within the socialist camp the 
extent and form of the controls differ between those who adhere 
to the market socialist economic model, like Hungary and Yugoslavia 
(Fortes 1970, Ramanadhan 1981) and those who follow the command 
model (Abouchar 1977, Barrat Brown 1984). 
Before I examine the perspectives from which price 
controls are viewed in the various economic systems let me attempt 
to state the theory about price controls. Simply stated, the 
purpose of price control is to protect specific special interest 
groups in the economy (Cairncross, 1975: 73, Samuelson, 1979: 
392, Leftwich and Sharp 1980: 30, Galbraith, 1974: 112). Such 
groups may be consumers, producers, distributors or the state 
itself. For example, where the government desires to protect 
consumers of a selected commodity it may set a price-ceiling 
(maximum prices) and will not let the item be sold at more than 
the prescribed price (Bauer 1965, Killick 1973, Leftwich and 
Sharp 1980). A typical case is the prices of consumer goods 
found in many control systems (Mitchell 1978, Galbraith 1974, 
Whitworth 1982). The second case is that of agricultural prices 
(Helleiner 1966, Ellis 1982, Bates 1984). Government may fix 
minimum prices (price floors) and would not 
let them be sold 
below the prescribed prices. The third case, is where the state 
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enters into industrial production through government corporations 
(institutions widely used in Tanzania and other developing countries, 
see Ghai, 1977: 15-17) or where the government provides certain 
indispensable services, which by their nature cannot appropriately 
be lef t to private enterprise, like postal services, electricity, 
rail services. The government may impose controls to ensure 
that the enterprises get the necessary minimum of earnings to 
run the services (Galbraith , 1974: 115, Mongi, 1982: 97-125 
) or 
that prices are set at a level which the majority of the people 
can afford. Where the government is the principal consumer of 
a product or service, control may be imposed to ensure that 
it gets the product at a reasonable price (Fels 1983, Steel 
1981). 
Let us now see the policy pursued with regard to the 
price controls in various economic systems. 
Price Controls in a Market Economy 
According to economists, market economies are, "those 
in which decisions about the allocation of resources and production 
are made on the basis of prices determined by voluntary exchanges 
between producers, consumers, workers and owners of factors 
of production" (Dictionary of Modern Economics, revised edition, 
1983, p. 348). Decision making in such an economy is decentralised. 
That is to say, decisions about "what, how, f or whom and where', 
to produce are made independently by groups and individuals 
in the economy rather than by central planners (Samuelson, 1979: 
41-45, Galbraith, 1974: 110). Market economies usually also involve 
a system of private ownership of means of production 
(Leftwich 
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and Eckert, 1985: 20-22 , Mitchell, 1978: 8). The economies of the 
leading capitalist states of the UK, USA and other western countries, 
although characterised by considerable government activity and 
influence, are classic examples of free enterprise market economies. 
What distinguishes them from command economies is that freedom 
from price control by government is their basic feature of economic 
policy (Galbraith, 1974: 110; Cairncross, 1966: 193). Such freedom 
finds strong support in the economic role of prices in that 
prices play a central role in organising production. In the 
words of Galbraith prices are "the intelligence network of the 
economic system" (Galbraith, 1974: 110). The "intelligence" task 
of prices, according to Leftwich and Eckert, is that of allocating 
resources among firms, distributing output, rationing commodities, 
distributing incomes among owners of factors of production, 
instilling economic efficiency in the use of resources and main- 
taining and expanding growth in the economy (Leftwich and Eckert, 
1985: 21-22). Let me brief ly examine the basic assumptions underlying 
the functioning of the market economy and the realistic limitations 
on it. The objective of the examination will be to demonstrate 
that the virtues claimed for a free enterprise economy are fully 
realised only when the complete elements of "perfect competition" 
are present. 
2.2.2. The Underlying Assumptions 
The basic assumption for the operation of the market 
system is that there is "perfect competition" on the market 
(Leftwich and Eckert 1985, Samuelson 1979). *Perfect competition" 
as used by economists is a technical term. Briefly stated "perfect 
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L; utnp e -L i i: ion" is thought to exist in the economic system when 
$$all decisions about the allocation of resources and production, 
are made on the basis of process generated by voluntary exchanges 
between producers, consumers, workers and owners of factors 
of production" (Leftwich and Eckert, 1985: 22). Implicit in this 
view lie certain fundamental assumptions: First, that there 
is a right of every individual to possess private property and 
dispose of it at their discretion. Second, every seller and 
consumer regards the price as given with none having control 
or influence over prices. Third, every consumer regards the 
products of all sellers in a particular market as identical. 
Implicit in this condition is the capacity of goods to be uniformly 
described and graded. Fourth, the consumers behave rationally 
in their choices purchasing according to their own individual 
preferences - free from any pressures, inducements, influences 
- economic or otherwise. Fifth, that there is easy and speedy 
means of communications and transport between markets locally, 
nationally and internationally. Sixth, that resources will be 
freely mobile to enter into their most profitable use without 
restrictions, delay or prohibitions. Finally, that all consumers 
and sellers possess perfect knowledge about alternative opportun- 
ities open to them to obtain similar goods. It would seem any 
departure from these conditions produces an imperfect market 
(Samuelson, 1979: 147); Barrat Brown 1984). 
The point to consider here is whether these assumptions 
obtain in real situations? If not, why. 
2. A comprehensive analysis of the concept of "perfect competition" as a technical 
term in economic literature appears in Samuelson, P. A. (1979) Economics, 
10th edition, (McGraw-Hill, New York) Chapter 3; Leftwich, R. H. and Eckert, 
R. D. (1985), The Price System and ýResource Allocation, 9th edition (London: 
The Dryden Press) pp. 39-42. 
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2.2-3. Imperfections of the Market Mechanism 
Several factors bring imperfections in the market. 
First, it is important to note, as Samuelson rightly points 
out, that in the real world, there is no economy which is purely 
run by market forces (Samuelson, 1979: 48). It is equally true 
to say that no economy is a pure command economy. Most economies 
are mixed economies in which elements of state control are inter- 
mingled with market elements in organising production and consumption. 
What makes an economy fall in either the market or command category 
is the degree of state involvement in the ownership and management 
of the economy. This difference, in my view, arises because 
of fundamental differences in the way society views the ultimate 
objective of social activity. In socialist economies, as we 
shall see, the main focus is to satisfy human needs. The state 
is supposed to ensure public interest and general welfare of 
the masses hence the direct involvement of the state in the 
allocation of resources (Dalton 1979). Second, in the real world 
competition is nowhere near perfect. For one, there is an unequal 
distribution of income and power in society. Income distribution 
is unequal due to unequal distribution of resources. This inequality 
in income results in market behaviour quite different from what 
would have been if wealth were equally distributed. Another 
fact is that allocation of resources is not really made by the 
market. The truth of the matter is that it is those who own 
and control resources, mostly multinational companies and their 
subsidiaries, who plan and determine the use of the world's 
resources (Murray 1981, Penrose 1976). Their decisions whether 
to use a given resource are primarily motivated by the desire 
to make money rather than serve human wants (Barrat Brown, 1984: 
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39, BBC1 "Day-to-Day: Do private monopolies respond to Consumer 
Interests, better than Public Monopolies", Tuesday, November 
25* 1986). Also in a competitive system many producers simply do 
not know the methods of other producers (Samuelson, 1979: 47- 
49). Moreover, as Samuelson says, in the competitive system 
one can succeed as much as by keeping knowledge scarce as by 
keeping production high (ibid) - Furthermore, the assumed freedoms 
of consumers and sellers are subject to a host of government 
regulations. For example, freedom to set up business organisations 
is restricted by laws requiring business licenses, planning 
3 
permission and registration. The costs of meeting the demands 
of such regulations may be prohibitive. Or the agencies adminis- 
tering the regulations may simply refuse to give the permit. 
Similar limitations emerge if we examine the assumed 
legal freedoms of consumers - freedom to buy commodities of 
their own choice, to move across the markets and shop locally, 
nationally and internationally; to bargain for prices with sellers 
on equal terms. Again in the real world such freedom rarely 
exists in practice. Let us take the case of prices. They are 
fixed by sellers (Galbraith, 1974: 110-120). The consumers have 
often very little choice - either to take them as given or do 
without the goods. Sometimes even governments seem powerless 
in front of sellers when it comes to fixing prices. When the 
Shell Oil Company raised prices of oil throughout the UK in 
August 12,1986, members of Parliament from all parties called 
on the government to take action to curb the excessive profits 
of the oil companies. The Parliamentarians attributed the increase 
3. For an illuminating account of these limitations, see Ulf, 13. (1960) "The 
Market Law as a Legal Discipline", Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol. 23,1953. 
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to the desire by Shell for more profits as there was no other 
plausible explanation in view of the fact that there was an oil 
glut in the world market. The industry secretary said the Government 
would not interfere in the pricing and production policies of 
the oil companies. These, according to the secretary, were matters 
of commercial judgment for the companies themselves. The Prime 
Minister went on to say that motorists could shop around to get 
cheaper prices and "competition is an important element in bringing 
price down' (The Birmingham Post, Thursday August, 14 1986: 5). 
The next morning all other major oil companies, B. P., Esso, Texaco, 
Mobil raised their prices. Several Parliamentarians condemned 
the companies. Some of them described the companies as, "bandits 
bent on price rigging" (The Evening Telegraph, Coventry, Wednesday 
August 13,1986: 6). This case demonstrates clearly how flawed 
the notion of consumers influence over prices may be. Furthermore, 
in the competitive market, consumers are supposed to have sufficient 
and reliable information about the goods and the substitutes 
available (Stigler 1966). Consumer preferences and tastes are 
assumed to dictate what should be produced, how and by whom. 
In the real world, as Galbraith never tires of pointing out, 
consumers desires are not always the genuine result of their 
wants, needs and tastes. On the contrary 
The consumer is conditioned by a clever slogan 
or association of ideas to believe in the 
superiority of one beer, cigarette, or detergent 
over another and surrenders to the will of 
the seller (Galbraith, 1974: 150).. 
Business f irms spend a lot of money on advertising to shape, 
and Samuelson insists, distort consumer demands. in Paul Samuelson's 
view 
We are terrorized into buying deodorants; 
from childhood on, we are conditioned to 
desire what business wants to sell (Samuelson, 
1979: 48). 
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p P%J-LIIL v. L view of the workers the assumed legal 
freedoms include: that of deciding with whom. one wishes to enter 
into an employment contract; that of each party supplying the 
terms of contract and of opting out of employment when and as 
one wishes. In the real life situation the case is quite different. 
What we often see are standardised terms and conditions of employment 
offered to workers. We find powerful employers associations acting 
on behalf of capital having an upper hapd when negotiating with 
trade unions. We also find that the type of training, education 
and skills we receive tend to restrict us to certain types of 
jobs. Above all, we find that labour, on account of economic 
pressure, is in the weaker bargaining position. So the state 
is called in to intervene to modify or prohibit certain forms 
of contracts considered unfair. A good example isthe UK Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977. 
The major serious deviation from perfect competition 
is probably the existence of monopol '. stic firms, private and 
public. These f irms can manipulate production and prices to their 
advantage through wrong pricing, creation of distorted patterns 
of demand by advertising and monopoly prof its (Samuelson, 1979: 
47), Cairncross, 1966: 162-169). 
Economic limitations apart one can also question the 
moral and ethical merits of relying solely on the market mechanism 
to determine production. For example, is it proper that goods 
should be produced simply because money votes and not necessarily 
human wants, have said so? Should we condone a practice in which, 
as Samuelson sees possibly happening, "John Rockefellers' dog 
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may receive the milk that a poor child needs to avoid rickets" 
(Samuelson, 1979: 46); or where, as George Bernard Shaw warned 
A New York lady, for instance, having a nature 
of exquisite sensitivity, orders an elegant 
rosewood and silver coffin, upholstered in 
pink, satin for her dead dog. It is made: 
And meanwhile a live child is prowling barefooted 
and hunger stricken in the frozen gutter 
outside (Fabian Essays, 1950: 24). 
Aware of these limitations, governments in market economies 
institute measures to redress the imbalances brought about by 
the market mechanism. For example, in times of war or other economic 
emergency situations like droughts, famine, economic depression, 
when supply difficulties would lead to exceptionally large price 
increases price controls are imposed to protect the vulnerable 
sections of the community (Jefferson 1966, Campbell 1971, Mitchell 
1978). Such was the case during the First and Second World Wars 
and the economic depression of the 1970's (Mitchell 1978, Cockfield 
1978, Galbraith 1984). Apart from such wartime periods and other 
periods of economic hardship governments in market economies 
especially those of the USA and UK, have restricted their direct 
influence over prices to a few specific areas (Pearce 1983: 348, 
Taylor, 1968: 233, Galbraith 1984: 166-168). Public utility pricing 
is a classic example. 
4 
Here because of the peculiar economic and 
physical features of the industries competition cannot be relied 
upon to produce socially acceptable results (Galbraith 1984, 
Samuelson 1979, Taylor 1969). 1 would argue here that there is 
also considerable indirect government intervention in prices. 
The establishment of regulatory commissions such as the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in the US (Galbraith 1984, Samuelson 1979) 
4. Turvey, R. (1970) "Public Utility Pricing" in American Economic Review, Vol. 3 
and Reid, G. L. ed. (1973) Too Nationalised Fuel Industries (Heinemann Educational 
Books) give reasons why government control is necessary. 
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I 
and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the UK (The Fair 
Trading Act 1973) is a clear example. The activities of such 
agencies have a lot of influence on the pricing behaviour of 
business enterprises. In the UK the Fair Trading Act empowers 
the Secretary of State to direct the commission to have regard 
to the "desirability of promoting the interests of consumers 
in respect of prices and the quality of goods and services" in 
the course of its investigations (Section 12(2)(a) Fair Trading 
Act 1973). The Secretary of State can specifically direct the 
Monopolies Commission to investigate firms to ensure that consumers 
are fairly treated as regards: terms and conditions on which goods 
are supplied; advertising labelling or marking of goods; methods 
of salesmanship methods of demanding payments and the manner 
in which terms and conditions of sale are communicated (Section 
13(a)-(f) Fair Trading Act 1973). 
2.3. Price controls in a Command Economy 
It is in the planned economies of the Soviet Union 
and other socialist states that we find pervasive and comprehensive 
use of price controls. The planned economies offer a fundamentally 
different form of economic organisation to the market model. 
The basic characteristic of the command economy is the social 
direction of priorities in place of the market indicators of 
prices and profits. A command economy is also different from 
a market socialist economy. In a market socialist economy, the 
day-to-day running of the economy is lef t to the market mechanism, 
while the major means of production are socially owned and basic 
decisions and directions of development are planned centrally. 
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In a command economy, on the other hand, all crucial 
economic processes are determined to a large extent not by market 
forces, but an economic planning body which implements society's 
major goals. For example, in the classical command model it is 
the central planning authorities who issue orders on how much 
to produce; by what means; by whom and for whom; where, when 
and by what combination of resources. The orders are made by 
central planning bodies on the basis of broader social and economic 
considerations. The planners set specific targets as the aims 
of industrial and agricultural production and use physical controls 
in the process. Resources are allocated in physical quantities 
to each enterprise, priority being given to items needed most 
by society. 
basic prerequisite of the planned model is the social- 
isation or collectivisation of production and use of surpluses 
generated by the productive forces (Dalton 1979). The state owns 
and controls the commanding heights of the economy - banks, indus- 
trial companies, land. State plants produce basic consumer goods 
as well as capital goods. The dominance of state enterprises 
in production and the increasing of state's resources in providing 
investment capital has ensured the subordination of the private 
sector to the public sector, both in industry and agriculture. 
As a result of centralised planning, the command economy 
has four implications for market relationships: First, the displace- 
ment of the market. This in turn has led to three other consequences. 
The social direction of priorities in place of market indicators 
being one. Here we find central planners and not markets determining 
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quantities and qualities of output, imports and exports, supply 
and demand, prices and wages, jobs available and labour, tax 
rates and credit. The other is social motivation to replace the 
prof It motive as the driving force in increased productivity. 
Efficiency and productivity is enhanced through workers partici- 
pation in decision making and worker's improved welfare by the 
provision of free health, transport and educational facilities. 
The third is centralised coordination and articulation of enterprise 
plans in place of market uncertainties. 
The state in the USSR, through the Planning Departments 
of Industry and Agriculture at the centre , fixes prices. The 
state-owned banking system fixes the rates of interest for different 
industries. These departments also control overall allocation 
of resources (Barrat Brown, 1984: 137). Within this framework 
enterprises have f reedom to make their own bargains with their 
suppliers and customers. The same f reedom is accorded to artisans, 
peasants and private traders (Abouchar 1977). 
An important point to note here is that the principle 
guiding the determination of prices in the USSR is Marx's theory 
of value, which sees a close link between price and value (Marglin 
1984). Marx argues that, "price taken by itself is nothing, but 
the expression of value" (Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I: 
398-457). In Marx's analysis, prices of commodities are primarily 
determined by prices of labour (wages). For example, Marx wrote 
that the market price of a product expresses 'the average amount 
of social labour necessary under average conditions of production 
to supply the market with certain mass of a certain article* 
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(Ibid. at p. 415). Implicit in Marx's view is the assumption that 
the value of a commodity is derived from the amount of labour 
time socially necessary to supply that commodity. And that value 
always reflects utility or use of the commodity to society. Marx 
distinguished prices in the capitalist market, where he said 
they reflect nothing "but the exchange value of the commodity 
expressed in a definite quantity of the equivalent in money terms", 
from prices of commodities under primitive commodity production 
where prices reflect use values. According to Marx, in an exchange 
economy prices are composed of three elements: (a) the value 
of past labour embodied in machinery, plant and material - the 
production of which has caused a certain amount of labour time. - 
plus (b) the value of current labour in the form of wages; plus 
(c) the value of that portion of labour for which the worker 
is not compensated (surplus value). In Marx's view it is incorrect 
to say that prices are determined by supply and demand. He argued: 
Supply and demand regulate nothing but the 
termporary fluctuations of market prices. 
They will explain to you why the market price 
of a commodity rises above or sinks below , 
but they would not tell you how prices are 
formed in the first place (Ibid. ). 
The hallmarks of the Marxist 
/ 
theory of price are three: One, 
that prices of commodities are regulated by the price of labour; 
two, that nothing can have value without being in social demand; 
and three, that not all labour is of productive of value. In 
particular Marx excluded the labour of the merchant and landlord 
as not of productive value (Marglin 1984). 
in applying Marx's interpretation of the theory of 
price one has to bear in mind the context in which Marx developed 
hisIviews. Basically Marx was concerned with explaining one particular 
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form of price - that of labour power. That is why he argued that 
wages were the money paid by the capitalist employer for a particular 
output of labour while some portion of the labour remained unpaid 
to generate surplus for the employer. This explanation, in my 
view, cannot account for all elements that constitute prices 
of commodities. Clearly commodities require other factors of 
production, other than labour. For example, land. This also enhances 
value and hence price. Marx also concentrated on comparing prices 
under primitive communalism and capitalism. 
The Marxist analysis remains the guiding principle 
in the pricing policy of the Soviet economy and other socialist 
states. I, for one, find its denial of supply and demand forces 
I 
as not the real determinants of prices, quite convincing. For 
example, when oil prices fell in % the world market during the 
first half of 1986 we were told there was over production. This 
would necessarily have meant cheaper prices to the consumer. 
On the contrary, it was left to the oil companies to decide whether 
to pass the benefits to consumers or pocket the money themselves. 
As a consequence, only af ew countries (Germany, France) made 
substantial price reductions. Elsewhere, the companies preferred 
to benefit themselves. And I suspect it is the oil monopolies 
which fix prices rather than supply and demand factors. The concept 
of supply and demand factors conceals the human instrumentalities 
and their interests. 
Let us now examine how prices in the command economy 
are controlled to reflect Marx's theory of value . In the Soviet 
. Union, prices as a general rule, are fixed at a level proportionate 
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to what it costs labour to produce a product (Manove 1973, Abouchar 
1977). To this, the planners make provision to enable the enterprise 
to recover costs of raw materials and generate revenue for investment. 
The actual workings of the Soviet pricing system, like some other 
aspects of the operations of its economy, as Barrat Brown rightly 
points out, have never been fully disclosed (Barrat Brown, 1984: 
140). From Bornstein's studies, it appears that prices do not 
contain elements of rent on account of scarcities or monopoly. 
Prices are strictly controlled at each point of supply (Manove 
1973). 
At the enterprise level, individual firms fix the ex- 
factory prices of their products. The fact that an equivalent 
product is available to meet the specific need means a new product 
must be slotted into the existing price structure with due allowance 
for differences in quality, processing problems and savings made 
possible by its use. The primary factor considered in the pricing 
of new products is the price of competing or substitute products 
(Abouchar 1977). However for an entirely new product considerable 
discretion is available and an enterprise can decide at what 
price the product should be introduced. For such radically new 
products the prices will be determined by the net-planned costs 
plus a percentage of profit margin. In order to provide incentives 
for technological innovation f irms may be subsidised, compensated 
or given a tax allowance on pre-production expenses. Interenterprise 
purchases and sales of inputs and other raw materials are f reely 
bargained for among individual sellers and buyers (Abouchar 1977). 
The Council of Ministers in individual union republics 
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fixes retail prices and rates for food, transport and control 
acquisition and distribution. Prices are fixed taking into consider- 
ation differences in geographical and economic factors like product- 
ivity of land, incomes, level of wages and level of development 
in the province. At a higher level, there is the special Commission 
of the Presidium of Council of Ministers. The commission formulates 
directives on the rules and procedures of fixing prices for raw 
materials, agricultural and industrial goods. It also supervises 
and coordinates the work of state agencies responsible for price 
controls. The Special Commission is responsible for recommending 
changes in the prices of basic commodities like meat, f ish, bread 
and so forth. Also it acts as government adviser on pricing policy. 
At the top of the hierarchy, there is the State Planning 
Department for Industry and Agriculture which ratifies the decisions 
of subordinate agencies. 
Bornstein identifies three functions of prices in the 
Soviet economy. First, the allocative function. Soviet planning 
authorities use prices to quantify in value terms the output 
and consumption of goods in the economy. Enterprises plan their 
purchase and sales targets on the basis of prevailing prices. 
Second, is the income-redistribution function. Here central planners 
use prices as a means of redistributing income on equitable basis. 
The objective is to achieve equality in real income and economic 
welfare. This is done through tax and subsidy elements in the 
price structure. People with relatively higher incomes pay more 
while those with little pay less for the same commodities. People 
in areas with less economic development or resource endowment 
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are subsidised by the state. In this way economic inequalities 
are evened out. The third role is the measurement role. Prices 
are used to measure the general wealth of the nation (Abouchar 
1977, Bornstein 1977). 
Apart from the human needs orientation of the command 
economy, there are also other advantages in this model. Compared 
to the pure market economy, the command economy of f ers more scope 
for implementation of needs of society. Second, there is a reduction 
of uncoordinated economic activity which may lead to inefficient 
utilisation of resources (Taylor 1969). Furthermore, there is 
greater potential for solving problems of unemployment in a planned 
than market economy. Finally, for a developing country a planned 
economy provides opportunity for faster economic growth than 
would the case with a market economy. This is because with planning, 
resources can be concentrated in certain key-sectors that constitute 
the backbone of the growth of the economy. 
2.3.1. Disadvantages of the Command Economy 
The command model requires large organisations and 
enormous resources to coordinate the activities of planning 
authorities with those of individual units implementing the commands. 
A large number of staff is needed to collect, organise, work 
out and disseminate information on matters such as input and 
output quantities, demand and supply, prices, wages and labour. 
Short of a complex, computerised information system, the model 
can only be operated by a few countries. A basic deficiency, 
noticeable in command economies, is insensitivity to consumer 
preferences. Goods not in demand by consumers may be ordered produced. 
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State agencies may insist on the production of mass, poor quality 
goods so that resources are released for other purposes, such 
as military expenditure (Barrat Brown 1984: 141, Samuelson 1979: 
878). A clear case of insensitivity to consumer wishes occured 
in 1984 in the USSR where the State Trading Corporation had 
huge stock piles of unsaleable shoes amid complaints of shoe 
shortages in the provinces (Panorama, BBC2, February 2,1986). 
The shoes would not sell due to poor quality and design. 
A further disadvantage is misallocation of resources. 
The misallocation occurs in terms of wastage in expenditure of 
time, manpower and money to administer the controls. There is 
also evidence that managers and administrators neglect the procedures 
laid down for the distribution of goods and indulge in malpractices 
like favouritism, concealment of goods, and corruption (Barrat 
Brown, 1984: 141, Samuelson, 1979: 877-880). 
2.3.2. Reforms in Command Economies 
Of late there have been reforms in many command economies 
(The Economist, London, October 11,1986: 53-55). Measures to 
avoid excessive regulation and excessive formalism which stifle 
economic initiative have been initiated in USSR and other socialist 
economies (Samuelson, 1979: 874-881, Galbraith, 1974: 215-222). 
The ref orms do not set out to undermine the principles of the 
command economy as such, but they aim at improving its ef f iciency 
by using criteria such as profit to measure factory performance, 
instituting flexible prices responding to the market forces of 
demand and supply, and charging interest on government money 
loaned to enterprises (Fortes 1970, Abouchar 1977). 
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The main changes made in the economic plan 1986 in 
the Soviet Union are: First, enterprise decisions as regards 
manufacture and marketing of consumer goods now rely more on 
market indicators than the commands of state officials (The Economist, 
London, November 11,1986: pp. 53-54). The purpose is to make 
enterprises respond to the growing demand for goods of better 
design and quality. Previous experiences, as we noted above, 
had shown factories flooded with goods that could not sell. Second, 
measures to give freedom to individual managers to allow them 
to decide what to produce and how to sell it have been taken. 
Central control is restricted to specifying targets, that is 
the volume. Third, the prof it motive is being elevated as a prime 
element. Profits instead of being surrendered to the government 
will partly be invested in the firms and partly be used for granting 
bonuses to workers and managers. Fourth, state trading corporations 
are being allowed more freedom to reorganise distribution on 
the basis of market research and economic incentives. Finally, 
f irms are no longer bound to buy and sell their products to given 
enterprises. Now they are allowed to buy and sell to any firm 
they want (The Economist, October, 1986: 53-54). 
Other socialist states have also embarked on reforming 
their economies. In Hungary and Yugoslavia they have instituted 
market socialism in which the day to day running of the economy 
is left to the market mechanism while the means of production 
are socially owned and basic decisions and directions of development 
are centrally planned (The International Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences, Vol. 12,1983 p. 459, Ramanadhan 1981). In Hungary, for 
example, prices are established in response to supply and demand 
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factors. Centralised specification of production targets for 
enterprises has been abandoned (Portes, 1970: 307). Instead, enterprises 
determine production levels and prices on the basis of contracts 
witt buyers. Second, there has been abolition of central allocation 
of resources and credit facilities. Third, profit has been restored 
as the criterion of efficient performance of the state enterprises. 
Inevitably, this means reduction in controls to which every phase 
of the enterprise had previously been subjected (Samuelson, 1979: 
875-876). There are no monopolistic or monopsonistic distributors. 
Prices of commodities are determined by average costs of production 
plus a prof it mark up. The cost elements that go into prices 
are constituted of: costs of raw materials, wages, a fixed pay 
roll tax, depreciation allowances, a fixed charge on the gross 
value of f ixed and working capital plus a margin at a prescribed 
rate (Portes 1970). The Hungarian formula for computing costs 
approaches price formation from the point of view of the supplier. 
The object is to ensure that firms do not sell at a loss. The 
state still retains overall responsibility to audit efficiency, 
indicate societal preferences or even intervene in public interest. 
In Yugoslavia the shift has been towards worker's control 
and management of f irms as opposed to central planning (Samuelson, 
1979: 875, Ramanadhan 1981). Yugoslav workers control major decision 
making processes, including the fixing of prices. The enterprises 
buy and sell to each other at arms-length on the basis of negotiated 
contracts. Decisions about production, distribution, marketing 
and technical aspects are taken by the management. Wherever the 
state feels that factors of a social nature need to be taken 
into account in the pricing of a selected product it may order 
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so. But the enterprises have a right to state subsidies if it 
turns out that the extra obligations will occasion losses to 
their operations. As a result of these reforms, the economy of 
Hungary is regarded as the most prosperous in the socialist block 
(Portes 1970). Similarly the reforms in the Soviet Union have 
significantly improved the economy in recent years compared to 
the stagnation of the early 1980's (Barrat Brown 1984, The Economist, 
London, October 11,1986: 54). 
To sum the argument, I would say there are fundamental 
differences in policies as regards price controls between market 
and command economies. While command economies consider price 
control a potent instrument for social and economic development, 
market economies prefer freedom of the market. The differences 
are not academic. They are based on dif f erences on the development 
policies and ideological - outlook of each system. We also note 
that in both economic systems there have been shifts from the 
classical concept. What we need to bear in mind is the fact that 
whereas the current tendency in planned economies is a shift 
towards indicative planning, in the capitalist economies of the 
UK and USA the shif t is towards a more orthodox view of the f ree 
enterprise system (Barrat Brown, 1984: 71, Galbraith, 1984: xviii- 
xxi). This includes minimal government intervention in economic 
affairs. Reliance is on normal market forces. This is still the 
basic approach in many of the western economies. They rely on 
the existence of a large number of entrepreneurially minded persons 
with financial resources to back up production, supply and purchases. 
In contrast, central regulation of both investment and current 
production is the characteristic of the approach of the planned 
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economies. It leaves a very limited sphere for the operation 
of the market forces. 
2.4. Developing Economies 
In considering the appropriateness of the market and 
command economy approach to price controls for developing countries 
the question which one has to ask is: Do the basic preconditions 
for such models exist in any of the developing countries? 
The most cursory look at some of the basic character- 
istics of these countries will show that they cannot take advantage 
of the market or command model. First, most of the developing 
countries, especially those of Africa, which I am more familiar 
with, were colonised (Rodney 1972). Decades of colonial rule 
did little to develop the colonies 'and the little development 
that occured was mostly geared to the interests of the colonial 
powers (Barrat Brown, 1984: 174). The overall result of colonialism 
was that the colonisers took away more than they brought leaving 
the colonies underdeveloped (Fanon 1984, Rodney 1972). The second 
characteristic is the dependent nature of the economies. They 
depend on capitalist markets for the import and export of their 
products. Production is concentrated on processing raw materials 
for export. Manufacturing depends on import of inputs - raw materials, 
machinery as well as managerial and technical skills (Stewart, 
197 6: 89 - 109 ). The third is the fact of economic 
and social problems of low incomes, poverty, ignorance, disease 
and illiteracy. The fourth, is the lack of control by governments 
over economic destiny of their countries. Multinational corporations 
based in developing countries control vital sectors of the economy 
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- manufacturing, trade and infrastructural services. And so, 
the multinationals hold a commanding influence over the market 
(Murray 1981, Penrose 1976). Even in those states like Tanzania 
and Mozambique which have tried to curb the power of multinationals 
through nationalisation the success has been only partial (Mittelman 
1981, Shivji 1976). The multinationals have made a strong comeback 
through joint ventures with public and local private firms (Shivji 
1973, Lall 1984). Because the multinationals control the foreign 
components in the ventures such as supply of machinery, technology, 
management, they have an upper hand in taking major decisions, 
including determining prices. Fourth, is the existence of a consumer 
class ill equipped to exert infuence over the market due to deficiences 
in money, information, knowledge and restricted mobility. Finally, 
as a result of colonial rule and with a view to preserving colonial 
ties, a class of petty bourgeoisie consisting of government officials, 
traders and the military that took over power af ter independence, 
controls and uses the resources to promote their political interests 
(Mamdani 1982, Fanon 1984). So, income inequalities and other 
social inequities still persist. It is clear from those character- 
istics that I find it difficult, in fact impossible, for developing 
countries to organise their economies successfully on the market 
or command model. 
2.5. Some Motives for Price Control 
Accepting the argument that all economies have experienced 
price controls of one form or another, there still remains an 
important question: What motives could justify their imposition 
in a given case? 
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There may be several different reasons that may call 
for price controls, some of which are economic, social, equitable 
and ethical. They do not necessarily exclude one another and 
are better regarded as different elements in any situation that 
requires price control. At any given time, one or the other of 
these elements may predominate over the rest or bringing the 
others into play. A good illustration of the existence of most 
or all of these factors is the UK control system set up in 1973. 
Under the Counter Inflation Programme (Cmnd 5667, para. 3-7) it 
was stated that the reasons were: to fight inflation, restore 
the balance of payments equilibrium, protect public interest, 
protect vulnerable sections of the public and also protect traders 
against unjust taunts that they are profiteers. 
I will endeavour to examine the reasons under four 
broad categories: economic, political, social and constitutional 
rights. My categorisation is purely one for convenient analysis. 
The Constitutional/Legal Rights Reasons 
The constitutions of some modern states contain clauses 
which guarantee fundamental rights. Good examples are those of 
India and Tanzania. Article 38 of the Indian Constitution reads: 
.... The State shall strive to promote the 
welfare of the people by securing and protecting 
as effectively as it may a social order in 
which justice, social economic and political, 
shall inform all the institutions of the 
national life (Article 38 Constitution of 
India 1950). 
To foster this goal the other provisions of Article 38 exhort 
the state to ensure that citizens have an adequate means of liveli- 
hood, that the operation of the economic system and the ownership 
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and control of the material resources of the country subserve 
the common good. 
The Tanzanian constitution is more explicit. It states 
that it shall be the responsibility of government to ensure that 
a all fundamental human rights are respected 
and protected; 
c) government activity is conducted in a 
manner which ensures that the ownership 
and control of the material wealth of 
the nation are so distributed as best 
to subserve the common good, in particular 
it shall be the duty of the government 
to ensure that the operation of the economic 
system does not result in the exploitation 
of one person by another; 
g) the citizens, men and women equally have 
the right to an adequate means of livelihood; 
h) there - is equal opportunity, equal pay 
for equal work irrespective of ones creed, 
religion, sex, colour or status; 
i) the country's wealth is used for the develop- 
ment of the people, and in particular 
for the elimination of poverty, illiteracy 
and disease; 
j) ensure economic justice through effective 
state control over the major means of 
production and ensure that the operation 
of the economic system does not result 
in the concentration of means of production 5 
and wealth in the hands of a few individuals 
(Article 9(l) of / the Constitution of 
Tanzania (Fifth Amendment) 1984, No. 15). 
From a reading of these clauses it appears that the 
constitution is against unequal distribution of wealth and all 
other forms of economic and social injustice. It directs the 
government to control economic activity so as to ensure it subserves 
national or public good. Presumably the constitution is directing 
its attention on the rights of the economically and socially 
weaker sections of the community (Austin, 1966: 66). 
Personal (unofficial) translation from the Swahili text. 
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The constitution leaves it to the government to decide 
what type of activity should be controlled, the circumstances 
and methods and the degree of control to be imposed. The state 
may decide to control through involvement in direct production 
of certain goods or through regulation or both. The form chosen 
will depend on the nature of the activity in question and its 
significance to the welfare of the society. 
What I can conclude is that such legal guarantees may 
constitute a justification to people demanding protection when 
they feel that there are economic injustifices. For example, 
in the debates to the Regulation of Prices Bill 1973 one member 
of Parliament asked whether the government was not breaching 
a constitutional duty by not intervening to stop price increases. 
He queried 
Is our socialist 
the preamble to 
power to preven 
consumers. Why do 
law? (Hon. Leons 
1973: 296). 
government not aware that 
the constitution gives it 
t traders from exploiting 
they want us to pass another 
Ngalai, Hansard, April 4, 
2.5.2. Economic Justifications 
In a market economy the common justification for imposing 
controls would be market failure (Leftwich and Sharp, 1980: 29- 
61; Cairncross, 1975: 73; Samuelson , 1979: 392-400). This, as we 
noted in Section 2.2.3 may relate to dominant power of certain 
firms on the market, failure to produce socially desirable results 
or informational failure (Samuelson, 1979: 49). 
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2.5.2. (a) To Curb Possible Abuses of Monopoly Power 
An obvious motive for imposing price controls would 
be to prevent abuse of monopoly power by firms enjoying domination 
of the market. Among other things effective monopolies are character- 
ised by higher price levels (Leftwich and Eckert, 1985: 362), 
extensive price discriminations (Jordan 1972), rates of return 
on investment exceeding those obtainable if the firm operated 
in a competitive market structure (Samuelson, 1979: 518, Whitworth, 
1982: 476) and resource wastage or misallocation (Samuelson, 1979: 
116; Leftwich and Eckert, 1985: 367-369). 
I 
Monopolistic enterprises are a feature found in both 
developed and developing countries; in the market as well as 
command economies (Samuelson 1979; Barrat Brown 1984). But there 
are differences in the nature and degree of monopoly existing 
in the different societies. In the developed market economies, 
monopolies are confined mainly in public utilities (Morris 1980; 
Posner 1969; Shepherd 1970). In the command economies they are 
mainly state monopolies (Samuelson, 1979: 875-881; Barrat Brown, 
1984). In contrast, in developing countries the market is dominated 
by multinational monopolistic firms (Murray 1981; Ghai 1985). 
Particularly so in the market-orientated developing economies. 
To appreciate the extent of monopoly in modern economies 
- the manner in which it may arise, the form it takes and problems 
it may cause to society, we need to understand the meaning of 
monopoly both in its classical sense and in real practical situations. 
According to Posner, a monopolistic firm is one which is "the 
only seller of a product or service having no close substitutese 
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(Posner, 1969: 548). This is a pure monopoly (Leftwich and Sharp, 
1985 : 199 ). 
Monopoly may arise for a variety of reasons. One, is 
that the firm may be in "control of the whole of a given market 
for a particular item with entrance by new f irms in the industry 
effectively blocked" (Dorfman, 1965: 78). A typical case would 
be where one f irm owns some essential patent, or controls unique 
natural resources, or is in some way able to deprive would-be 
competitors of entry. A case in point is that of the pharmaceutical 
company producing the antibiotic, tetracycline in the USA. Having 
been given exclusive patent rights, the company abused its monopoly 
position by overcharging consumers throughout the world by creating 
artificially high market prices for the drug (see: In re Antibiotic 
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 317 (S. D. N. Y 1971)). Monopoly 
may also arise because entry into the market by new firms has 
become prohibitive or difficult due to the financial and other 
resource demands required to break into the market. This would 
be the case where heavy expenditure is needed in investment, 
purchase of machinery or inputs, marketing and research. The 
same would be the case where entry is restricted by government 
protectionist policies like licensing and administrative allocation 
of resources. Furthermore, monopoly. may arise where the entire 
demand within the relevant market can be satisfied, at economic 
costs, by one firm rather than two. In this case monopoly is 
not a function of the actual number of sellers in the market, 
but of the relationship between demand and technology. If the 
market were to contain more than one firm, either the firms would 
quickly shake down to one through mergers or failures (Posner 
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1969); or production would be undertaken with more resources 
than necessary. Competition in such circumstancies would not 
be a viable regulatory mechanism. Direct governmental control 
over the f ir-11's prices becomes necessary to guard against abuse 
by the monopoly position and also to ensure efficiency (Whitworth 
1982). Controls over the rates, profits and service standards 
of public utilities in the US and UK have mainly been justified 
on those grounds (Rees 1979; Pearce 1983; Darby 1976). Finally, 
monopoly may be conferred by law - statutory monopolies. For 
example, government may want to protect a certain industry from 
competition to promote local industrial development; or the industry 
may have a special national significance like defence. Examples 
of statutory monopolies f rom Tanzania are beer, cigarette, postal 
and telephone services, water and electricity. In these industries 
monopoly has been granted to parast % atals by Acts of Parliament. 
On the other hand it can be said that even without legislation, 
monopoly would arise in some activities because of the high financial 
requirements or economies of scale or limited size of the internal 
market. For example, to allow competition would be wasteful in 
activities like railways, telephones or electricity in countries 
with small markets like Tanzania. Public interest reasons may 
also account for the grant of monopoly to state enterprises 
6 
like water, posts, production of arms and ammunition (Bonin 1984; 
Samuelson 1979). 
Besides situations of monopoly, there is also the question 
of domination on the market by a firm or group of firms. This 
6. This view is strongly reflected in the thinking of leading scholars on public 
enterprises, e. g. Robson, W. A. (1962) Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership 
London: Allen and Unwin. 
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equally constitutes a justification for control. For example, 
the British Monopolies Commission will consider a situation to 
be one of market domination and therefore as a ground for investi- 
gation, where "one firm (or closely identified group of firms) 
holds at least one quarter (i. e. 25%) or more of the total sales 
in the relevant market" (The Fair Trading Act 1973 (UK) Sections 
6 and 7). The criteria applied by the UK Monopolies Commission 
to determine market domination are as follows: First, where one 
quarter (i. e. 25%) of the market is supplied by two or more persons 
who conduct their affairs in a manner which prevents or distorts 
competition. This is referred to as a situation of a complex 
monopoly: Second, where orie quarter or more of the supply is controlled 
by a particular person or group of persons. Such a situation 
is a 'scale monopoly'. Third is where one quarter or more of 
the amount of capital invested on an industry is dominated by 
one person or group of persons. 
If we apply the definitions of monopoly and market 
domination outlined above to the Tanzanian economy, we find that 
most of the industries are dominated by monpolistic firms. First, 
there are those f irms where production and supply of commodities 
and services for the country's market are in the hands of one 
public corporation, that is "absolute monopoly". Examples are 
beer, tyres and tubes, fertilisers, corrugated iron sheets, crude oil 
refining (Table I below). Second, there are those industries 
where single firms have market shares several times larger than 
all others combined. Examples are shoes, where the Bora Shoe 
Corporation is dominant because of its technological superiority 
and marketing capability; the soap industry where the Lake Soap 
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Industries control more than 60% of the market: In such circumstances 
the dominant firm is invariably the price-leader. Third, there 
are those industries where two f irms control production and sale 
on the domestic market. Examples are radio receivers, domestic 
irons and dry cells supplied by two giant multinationals only, 
Philips (T) Limited and National Panasonic; petrol in which British 
Petroleum and Esso Limited have a duopoly. The areas where atomistic 
markets exist are butcheries, woodworking, road transport, fresh 
food and vegetable supplies. Table I demonstrates the degree 
of market imperfections in leading industries. 
Table I: The Number of Establishments Employing 50 or more 
Persons in Leading Industries in Tanzania 
Industry 
No of 
Firms 
Axes (shovels) 1 
Agricultural Mach. 12 
Aluminium ware 4 
Ammonium Sulphate I 
Baby Pram 2 
Ball Pens 4 
Bedspread 2 
Bicyles (Tyres) 1 
Biscuits 2 
Brassieres 3 
Bread 35 
Butter 3 
Canned Fruit 1 
Canvas Goods 4 
Cereal Flours 9 
Industry 
No of 
Firms 
Cement 3 
Cheese Rolls 3 
Chemicals 3 
Cigarrettes 1 
Cooking Oil 3 
Compact Cassette 1 
Corrugated Sheets 1 
Crude Ref in ing 1 
Foam Matress 5 
Fertilisers 1 
Detergents 9 
Domestic Irons 1 
Dry Batteries 2 
Electric bulbs 1 
Electric cookers 1 
Industry 
No of 
Firms 
Envelopes 
_ 
2 
Fresh Milk 6 
Gramaphone Records 1 
Grey Sheeting 1 
Hoes 1 
Laundry Soap 19 
Medicines 1 
Mosquito Coils 2 
Mosquito nets 3 
Maize Milling 18 
Match box 1 
Shoes 12 
Water Pumps 2 
Wires (Electric) 1 
Wires (Barbed) 1 
Source: The Tanzania Industrial Studies Consulting Organisation, 
Directory of Industries 1985. 
The table covers all major industries. It has been constructed 
from TISCO's, directory of industries. The industries are those 
employing 50 or more persons. This classification is in line 
with the standards laid down by the International Standard Induxtrial 
Classification. 
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The table by itself does not tell much about the extent 
of monopoly. It is only if it is read with other evidence that 
we get a fuller glimpse of the market structure. Although there 
are 35 firms in the baking industry, 6 in cooking oil, there 
is hardly any effective competition among them. For example, 
one firm, VOIL Ltd., controls over 80% of vegetable oil production. 
The six firms entered under the soft drinks industry are each 
located in a different town and each sells its products within 
its locality. It is hard to find one type of soft drink, say 
coca cola, in a zone where pepsi cola firms operate. The reverse 
is also true. Whether there is complicity among the multinationals 
running this industry to share the market on that arrangement 
or not is hard to prove. It could be the prohibitive transport 
costs of supplying a wider market that account for this situation. 
But I found the arrangement very 'unsatisfactory. Consumers in 
the northern regions are virtually captives of the double cola 
company. Those in coastal areas are under pepsi cola. In the south 
they can only get coca cola. In central regions, it is either 
mirinda (a subsidiary of pepsi) or anjari (an Indian drink). 
Although the prices are all controlled by the commission, the 
price differential between them is quite substantial. Coca cola 
in southern regions cost twice as much as pepsi cola bottled 
in Daresalaam. The price differential could be caused by differences 
in production costs. But even then I am not convinced that the 
cost differentials between the regions are as big as the prices 
would suggest. 
Furthermore there are other aspects that enhance market 
. 
domination by f ew f irms. The f act that there are several f irms 
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in some of the industries does not necessarily mean that those 
firms are producing similar products or close substitutes as 
to compete on the market. The reality is far from that. For instance, 
out of the eight firms in the textile industry, only two, the 
Mwanza Textile Mill and the Friendship Textile Mill produce 
'khanga' and 'kitengel material - the two are the most popular 
textiles for which women have demonstrated in the streets and 
in Parliament about shortages. Again, out of the eight, only 
one produces 'Khaki drill' for school uniforms. Another factor 
which enhances market domination by a few firms is government 
policy which aims at protecting domestic industry and conserving 
the meagre f oreign exchange. Under the Open General Licence Order 
1978 the Bank of Tanzania has power to restrict or ban out right, 
the importation of goods similar to those manufactured by local 
firms. Simiiarity here refers to the use or service to which a 
product can be put. The order states 
Applications for the importation of goods, 
the like of which are manufactured locally, 
shall be accompanied by evidence from the 
local manufacturer or Ministry for the time 
being responsible for industries, indicating 
that the goods are not locally available 
in sufficient quantities (Open General Licence 
Order 1978, Fifth Schedule). 
This order permits a local manufacturer to move the 
Central Bank to prohibit or restrict importation of goods for 
which they are capable of satisfying local demand. The only condition 
for the grant of the restriction is that the local manufacturer 
should show that he will be able to meet the anticipated demand. 
The order is obviously too wide and vague. It does 
not lay down criteria for determining the grant or withholding 
of import restriction Petitions. Also it does not say what should 
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happen where the firm's anticipated demand projections are overtaken 
by growth in actual demand. This is quite possible to happen 
in commodities like cloth for school uniforms where intake of 
children in schools may easily overshoot projected numbers; or 
change in the composition of the population may affect the demand 
for certain goods. 
7 
To guard against this happening some mechanism 
for adjustment should be provided for such as allowing the firm 
to import to fill the gap without restrictions. 
There are strong indications that the order is causing 
difficulties. I suspect that some local manufacturers have either 
abused this right or recklessly applied for restrictions on import 
of goods similar to those they produce without making sound demand 
projections. For example, the Bank of Tanzania, prohibited the 
importation of textile materials, both cotton and synthetics 
on the ground that local manufacturing capacity was adequate 
to cope with demand. Between 1980-82 severe shortages arose. 
Then the government eased its restrictions temporarily in 1983. 
Local industries complained to the Minister for Industries that 
they were having difficulty in selling their products. The public 
were puzzled by this bizzare development. Either the local manufac- 
turers had been deliberately withholding supplies to create scar- 
cities so as to get higher prices or there had been a dramatic 
improvement in production in local industry. The latter was not 
the case and the government expressed grave concern about the 
way this development had occured (Daily News, Daresalaam, July 
26,1985: 3). The most plausible explanation, in my view, is 
that some local manufacturers had moved the Central Bank to restrict 
7. This was the explanation given for shortage of school uniforms, Daily News, 
Deresalaam. June 20,1986: 1). 
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imports simply to enhance their dominance in the domestic market, 
misusing the privilege. Second, where the local manufacturer 
failed to satisfy domestic demand, it was not easy to fill the 
gap with imported supplies. This is because the Bank of Tanzania 
takes a long time to clear applications for imports. Normally 
it approves import permits on very rigorous criteria and at periodic 
intervals of six months. Moreover, it has been suggested that 
the policy of restricting imports of goods similar to those produced 
by local firms encourages local firms to embark on production 
of goods at costs which are sometimes far higher than those of 
imports (Shimwela, 1984: 17). 
If we stretch the analysis further, we find that market 
domination by a few f irms is also widespread in the trade sector 
- export and import; wholesale and retail trade. Under the Regulation 
of Trade Act 1980 public corporations and cooperative societies 
have a monopoly of acquisition and distribution of all essential 
commodities (Government Notice 94,1980). The Act empowers the 
Minister f or Trade to regulate or control the sale of any product 
where in his opinion it "is necessary or desirable to do so in 
, 
tst" (Regulation of Trade Act 1980, Section 3(l) public inter 
The Minister may designate any goods or services as 'controlled 
goods' and may conf ine their distribution to authorised traders. 
Village communities nominate the names of traders whom they consider 
f it to handle essential commodities and the regional authorities 
approve them. Once the Minister has issued the control order, 
no person other than an authorised dealer or trader may sell 
or offer for sale, or display such goods. Any person found in 
possession of controlled goods in quantities grossly dispropor- 
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tionate to his normal needs may be liable to prosecution under 
the Economic and Organised Crimes Control Act 1984. The Act also 
forbids manufacturers, importers or distributors from selling 
controlled goods to any unauthorised trader. Contravention of 
this provision constitutes a criminal offence. The offender may 
be liable to a fine of Tsh. 20,000.00 to Tsh. 100,000.00 (i. e. 
about E800-E4,000), or imprisonment of not less than 2 years 
and not exceeding 14 years; or both fine and imprisonment, Section 
4(2). The first list of controlled goods and names of authorised, 
dealers was issued under the Regulation of Trade Order 1980. 
The goods include agricultural chemicals supplied by multinational 
companies like Hoechst (T) Ltd.; Shell-BP; Pfiser ad Henkel. 
The companies can only sell to the Agricultural and Industrial 
Supplies Company which in turn distributes to cooperative societies 
and designated retailers. Baking powder, cheese, cooking oils 
and baby milk can only be imported and distributed by the Household 
Supplies Company. Likewise, radios, clocks, dry cells, air condit- 
ioners supplied by Philips (T) Ltd., and National Panasonic can 
only be distributed by the Regional Trading Companies. The Act 
also regulates the distribution of goods to ultimate consumers. 
Party functionaries, in collaboration with village leaders apportion 
the commodities to individual village shops. The consumers of 
certain basic commodities are given ration cards. The importa- 
tion of goods is confined to specified companies, both public 
and private, by the Imports Control (Confinement) Order 1981 
(G. N. 96,1981). What we find in the market structure is legislation 
conferring increasing monopoly on public enterprises. 
But even without legislation, it cannot be said that 
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there is any meaningful competition in activities where we have 
atomistic markets. For example, the numerous suppliers one f inds 
in the wood, shoe, soap, and retail trade in general have no 
effective competition between them (Rice 1976; Whitworth 1978). 
According to studies by Kimble 1970 and Rice 1976 each shopkeeper 
8 in the retail trade has a degree of monopoly power in his locality- 
This is particularly so in the rural areas where there may be 
one shop in the whole village (Kimble, 1970: 58; Rice, 1976: 98). 
The existence of the shop will obviously command some special 
importance to the villagers. Market domination may be aggravated 
by consumer loyalty. Consumers, says Samuelson, are creatures 
of habit. They may develop such attachment to a particular shop 
so that even if there are other shops in the same area selling 
I 
similar goods, customers tend to frequent their favourite shop 
(Samuelson, 1979: 635). 1 would alsý add that consumers tend to 
confine themselves to certain shops because of restricted mobility, 
money incomes and information. 
Accepting the argument made by economists that market dom- 
ination is the prevailing mode of economic life (Samuelson 1979: 
48; Leftwich and Eckert, 1985: 203) the question that we have 
to ask is: What are the evils of monopoly and how can these be 
remedied? 
Some of the potential evils of monopoly power tend 
to charge higher prices than would be the case if the markets 
8. Similar findings have made from studies on trade in other developing countries, 
see, Preston L. E. (1968) "Market Control in Developing Economies" in Development 
Studies, Vol. 4 pp. 481-494; Killick, T. (1973) "Price Controls in Africa: The 
Ghanaian Experience", in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, pp. 405- 
426. Rao, K. L. K., and Klaus Netter (1985) "The State and Its Modes of Market 
Intervention: Review of Methods and Institutional Processes", Paper presented 
at Seminar of International Expert Group, Penang, November 18-22,1985. 
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in which they operate were competitive (Samuelson 1979: 518; 
Leftwich and Sharp, 1980: 177). A good example is that cited by 
Samuelson involving officials of the General Electric Westinghouse 
and other electric suppliers in the USA who were sent to jail 
for colluding on monopoly price setting (Samuelson 1979: 116). 
Milton Friedman also gives a penetrating analysis of market structures 
and monopoly pricing in the USA, which covers among others, pharma- 
ceutical companies, taxi cabs and housing (Friedman, 1962: 119- 
36). Second, firms with monopoly power may be able to block the 
entry of new firms and new investments (Leftwich and Eckert, 1985: 
361). To the extent that they are able to do so output will be 
lower, prices will be higher and profits will be greater than 
they would be if the entry was open, free and easy. Third, and 
as a result of the second, the monopoly firm will not use resources 
at their potential efficiency. Fourth, on a monopolised market, 
firms may engage in price discrimination. In some cases a monopo- 
list finds it possible and profitable to separate and keep separate 
two or more markets for the same product, charging different 
prices in each. The typical cases are those of the drug multinationals 
(Leftwich and Sharp 1980: 182), oil companies and car-manufacturers 
(Samuelson, 1979: 111-114). Fifth, monopoly power in the sale 
of commodities leads to inequitable income distribution among 
economic units in the economy. Since entry by new firms is restricted 
and since prices are set too high in relation to social marginal 
costs of producing the items (Samuelson, 1979: 518) income is 
redistributed away from consumers towards monopolistic firms 
(Leftwich and Sharp, 1980: 183). Finally, monopolistic firms may 
disregard customer interests such as providing substandard goods 
or services or insensitivity to consumer complaints (Shepherd, 
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1970: 529-539). 
There is a long and wide range of suggestions as to 
what can be done to remedy the evils of monopoly 
9 
(Posner 1969, 
Comanor 1970, Shepherd 1970, Cox 1980, Whitworth 1982). 1 will 
only attempt to summarise some of those suggestions. Then I will 
examine in detail the effects of price control in monopolistic 
conditions. 
Among the solutions to remedy the possible evils of 
monopoly is that suggested by George Stigler that the monopolistic 
firms should be broken up into small pieces (Stigler, 1962: 
16). But this solution seems to me impracticable in view of the 
point made earlier that monopolistic enterprises are a character- 
istic of our economic lif e because, as Samuelson rightly notes, 
of the "inherent nature of modern production characterised by 
economies of scale, patents, trade marks research and development 
and technological innovations" which tend to restrict the scope 
f or ef f ective competition (Samuelson, 1979: 48) . The second device 
is government regulation and government anti monopoly laws. These 
are the principal weapons used in mixed economies to limit monopoly 
powers. As examples we could cite the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission in the UK whose functions include, among others, "promoting 
the interests of consumers in respect of prices and the quality 
of goods and services", Section 12, UK Fair Trading Act 1973. 
Similarly in the USA they have the Interstate Commerce Commission 
and a series of antitrust laws to curb abuses of monopolistic 
9. And internationally there is a wide variety of experience with regulation 
ot monopolies with price controls, both directly and in a host of combinations 
with other techniques. Much of this rich and growing experience can be found 
in the expanding literature, e. g. Fenn, P. ad. (1980) A positive 
Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, (Oxford University Press). 
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firms (Samuelson, 19791 525). Other countries with regulatory 
commissions are Ghana under the Price Control Act 1962 (see Killick 
1973 and 1978 for a documentation of its activities) and Tanzania 
under the Regulation of Prices Act 1973. 
2.5.2. (b) Regulation of Monopoly by Price Control 
The imposition of regulatory controls on a monopolistic 
f irm aims to curb the adverse ef f ects engendered by such f irms, 
on the market. One such objective is to curtail monopoly prof its. 
The other is to induce efficiency in production. Yet another 
one is to enhance consumer welfare. 
The manner in which price control can induce a monopolistic 
f irm to increase production and achieve maximibation of consumer 
welfare can be illustrated by a diagram 
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SOURCE: Whitworth, A. (1978) Eccnomic Research Bureau, Paper No. 78.2, 
Daresalaam. 
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In the diagram above, let us assume that the monopolistic 
f irm is attempting to maximise prof its. Let us also assume that 
the firm produces only one commodity for which there is no close 
substitute on the market. Let us also assume that this firm is 
a pure or absolute monopoly controlling one hundred percent of 
the market. It follows that the firms Average Revenue Curve (AM) 
will also stand for the demand curve for the goods produced by 
this firm. The demand curve represents the aggregate demand from 
all consumers for this product. The dotted line AN represents 
the Marginal Revenue - the firms income - and lies below the 
demand curve (AM). 
In an endeavour to maximise profits (in the absence 
of price controls) the firm will ordinarily produce an output 
equal to OQ 1 where the marginal cost equals marginal revenue. 
The firm will sell its product at a price OP V Assuming the regulatory 
agency fixes the ceiling price at OP 2' the 
firm cannot sell its 
product at a price exceeding OP per unit of output. The effective 2 
demand curve of the firm will be P2 JM and the marginal revenue 
curve is P2 JKN. Since the f irm is now restrained by price controls 
to sell its output per unit at the controlled price OP 2' 
it can 
only maximise profits by producing output OQ 2 at which the marginal 
cost and marginal revenue are equal. This is considered to be 
the level at which production is carried out efficiently. Price 
control in such a situation undoubtedly leads to lower and stable 
pricejO'It has also encouraged the f irm to increase production 
10. The leading US Acts on this subject include the Sherman Act 1890, the Clayton 
Act 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914. For a survey of their history 
see, Bernstein, M. H. (1955) Regulating Business by Independent Commission. 
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by pushing it to increase output from OQ 1 
to OQ 
2 while at the 
same time lowering the price per unit from OP 1 
to OP 
2' 
It will also be observed from the diagram that as the 
controllers strive to keep prices down, the profits of the firm 
are kept lower. This may in certain circumstances cause the f irm 
to incur losses especially where costs are rising fast or where 
there is gross capacity underutilisation in the firm caused by 
circumstances beyond the firm's control such as power cuts; inter- 
ruptions in water supply, non-availability of raw materials - 
problems which are common in many enterprises in Tanzania (Wangwe 
1977; Green 1984). These will obviously affect the welfare of 
the firms. To offset the effects of price control, the NPC for 
example, considers capacity utilisation to be optimal if the 
firm utilises 80% of installed capacity, Section 12(4) Regulation 
of Prices Act 1973 (As amended in 1981). Of course there is hardly 
any f irm which attains that level at the moment at least (Tanzania 
Audit Corporation Report 1984). Also, the commissioners award 
all firms a standard profit margin of 30%, section 12(5). This 
rate is considered sufficient to enable any firm earn a reasonable 
return on investment (Mongi 1980). 
The effect of the controls to induce welfare of consumers 
can be appreciated if we take consumer welfare as being represented 
by the amount of savings which accrue to them as a result of 
the controls imposed on the price which the firm charges. in 
Figure A above, the consumer savings would be represented by 
area P1 AC. This area would stand for the demand curve for the 
wholesale traders of the product. Assuming that the demand curve 
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for the wholesale traders also represents the total demand for 
the consumers of the product, this area would then stand f or the 
savings by consumers. The producer profits is represented by 
area P1 CDE (the area between the marginal cost curve and the 
unit price). The combined consumer surplus (savings) and that 
of producers (profits) would be represented by area ACDE. Now 
by bringing the product under controlled price OP 2 the amount 
of consumer savings will rise to area P2 AJ, while the producer's 
earnings will fall to area P2 JFE. The combined surplus of producers 
(savings) and consumers will increase to area AJFE. The overall 
effect will be an increase in consumer welfare by the amount 
equivalent to area CJFD. 
The question we should ask is: Whether these effects 
do actually occur in practice? Some economists say that these 
effects will take place provided the control agency has the power 
and ability to enforce the controlled price (Shepherd 1970: 529- 
539). All empirical studies carried out on the Tanzanian price 
control system show that this was one of the objectives of regulating 
prices and that the controls are achieving these effects (Whitworth 
1978; 1982; Mongi 1980). The effects are particularly noticeable 
at the manufacturer's level (Rice, 1976: 97). There is also some 
corroborative evidence that price controls have curbed monopoly 
pricing especially by local monopolistic enterprises, in recent 
studies by Singh, who says that because of the influence of the 
Price Commission, the level of prices has not sky-rocketed to 
high dimensions experienced - by other developing states such as 
those of Latin America (Singh, 1986: 427). In view of this over- 
whelming evidence, we can conclude that price control, in a 
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monopolistic situation is a good remedial measure. The alternative 
which is regulation by the market will expose consumers to the 
possible abuses enumerated above. 
2.5.3. Price Control as a Counter Inflationery Instrument 
common reason for imposing price controls would 
be to use them as an anti-inflationary mechanism. This seems 
to be the principal cause behind the controls found in many 
contemporary economies (Nixon 1974; Seers 1981). Evidence for 
this proposition is borne out by the fact that no matter what 
other justifications may be given, inflation constitutes the 
prelude to the controls in many societies (Cairncross, 1975: 
63-75). In Tanzania the present controls were preceeded by an 
unusually inflationary spiral during 1972-1973. A report of 
the Parliamentary Select Committee set up to investigate the 
causes of shortage of consumer goods and rising costs of living 
in 1972 observed: 
We are deeply impressed by the rising level 
of inflation in the country. It is a great 
and urgent problem that requires (Irastic 
action to be immediately applied. We think 
some form of price regulation would greatly 
help in alleviating this problem (Hansard, 
April 25,1972: 296). 
Of course what the Select Committee did not realise, or say 
why they thought it inadequate, was that there was already in 
the Statute Book the Price Control Ordinance 1951. Probably 
the causes of inflation this time were of a different nature 
and could not be tackled by the methods provided under the 1951 
Price Control law. Another good example of the link between 
price controls and inflation is the UK in 1973. Explaining the 
objectives of the Counter Inflation Act 1973 and the Prices 
Code 1973, the White Paper on the Programme for Controlling 
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Inflation stated that the government was determined to establish 
a "continuing machinery to bring inflation under control" (Cmnd 
5205,1973: 9). The White Paper went on to stress that among 
others the controls would, asteady prices; protect the more 
vulnerable members of the community and sustain a faster rate 
of economic growth" (Ibid. ) 
To see whether and how price controls can contain 
inflation we need to know what causes inflation and the type 
of problems inflation may cause in society. Knowledge of the 
causes is particularly important because the determination of 
appropriate strategies to curb inflation depends very much on 
the ability of those responsible for formulating policies to 
be able to identify correctly the real causes. 
The debate as to what causes and propagates inflation 
is controversial and endless. Economists acknowledge this fact 
(Cairncross, 1975: 65; Leftwich and Sharp, 1980: 350; Samuelson, 
1979: 270; Seers 1984). It would be presumptuous to hope that 
the question could be settled in the following paragraphs. What 
will try to do is to set out the parameters of this debate 
and to formulate the main questions on which the debate revolves. 
Economists have put forward several different explana- 
tions about the causes of inflation. The first is the quantity 
theory of money. Traditionally this is the leading view and 
one of 'its leading exponents is Milton Friedman who says that 
if the money supply increases, assuming full employment, aggregate 
demand will increase. Prices will also increase (Friedman 1973). 
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The other explanation is that inflation is caused by increases 
in costs (Cost-push inflation). According to Cairncross, increases 
in costs (of raw materials, wages or ot-er f actors of production) 
cause aggregate supply to decrease. T! iis reduces the quantity 
of goods available and increases prices (Cairncross, 1975: 66, 
Leftwich and Sharp 1980: 301). The third explanation is that 
inflation is caused by external factors (imported inflation). 
According to this view with the growth of international trade 
comes cost inflation on the side of raw materials, machinery 
and technological inputs which have a different origin and cannot 
be explained solely in terms of a single country. Small countries, 
particularly those dependent on imports, are very much exposed 
to prevailing economic climate in the major economies dominating 
the world economy (Struthers 1981, Seers 1981, Lipumba and Mbogoro 
1984). 
These explanations have been reviewed by Cairncross 
11 
1975 and Seers 1981. Their conclusions, which I very much agree 
with are worth noting. First those of Cairncross. His arguments 
are four. One, that inflation is not a purely economic disorder. 
It has its origin in social and political factors as well. For 
example it may grow out of the aspirations and expectations 
of the mass of the population. These may find political expression 
in assertion of rights, better incomes, health, education and 
employment. Second, all the economic variables considered as 
causes of inflation are merely different elements that can be 
found in any inflationary situation. They do not exclude one 
11. For a fuller exposition of the views of these authors, see, Cairncross, A. 
(1975), Inflation, Growth and International Finance, (London: Georg* Allen 
and unwin Ltd. ) Chapter 4; Seers, D. (1981), Inflation: A Sketch for a Theory 
of World Inflation (Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. Discussion 
paper 169). 
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another (Cairncross 1975: 66-75). Third, that in modern economies, 
the influence of international factors is also at work, transmitting 
inflation from one country to another. And changes in foreign 
demand, in commodity prices, in international capital flows 
or in exchange rates, exert pressure on the domestic price- 
structure. The inflationary pressure in Tanzania has been partly 
attributed to these external factors (Statement by Minister 
of Finance Budget Speech 1986/87 para. 50, ILO 1983, Lipumba 
and Mbogoro 1984). Finally, that while there is a long run relation- 
ship between money and prices in an inflationary situation, 
this does not constitute an explanation of the inflationary 
process. What is required is an identification of the factors 
leading from monetary changes to price changes. 
Seers, on the other hand, introduces a completely 
different perspective into the debate. He says that the conventional 
view of inflation (the monetarist theory) is not adequate for 
explaining the inflationary phenomenon in developing economies. 
The demand-pull view of inflation, for example, assumes that 
there will be increases in production and employment until the 
economy reaches full employment. And once full employment is 
reached, further increases in demand will cause increases in 
prices (Leftwich and Eckert, 1985: 90-93; Samuelson, 1979: 272). 
Economists say developing economies, I would say developing 
countries too, have not reached full employment (Sideri 1980, 
Struthers 1981, Killick 1978). 
According to Seers, the theory most appropriate to 
explaining inflationary tendencies in developing economies is 
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12 
the structuralist one. This theory holds that inflation is caused 
by endemic bottlenecks and rigidities in supply that exist in 
the developing economies (Seers, 1981: 2; Struthers, 1981: 177- 
85). The basic underlying cause being pressure for economic 
growth and social development, or obstacles to such change, exerted 
on an undeveloped social and economic structure which produces 
a series of developments contributing to inflation. Some of 
the structural indicators common among developing countries 
are: fast population growth, slow growth of food production, 
increased dependency on imports of oil and industrial inputs 
(UNCTAD, Report on Least Developed Countries 1984, Document 
TD/B/1027 p. 210), inadequate transport, unproductive expenditure, 
poor management of the monetary sector, export instability, 
expansion in public sector and foreign exchange scarcity (Struthers, 
1981: 177-213; Sideri, 1980: 313; Seers 1981). 
It seems to me the differences between the monetarist 
view and the structuralist one are not merely methodological. 
They involve totally different approaches to development. At 
the heart of the controversy, as Seers rightly points out, are 
two different ways of looking at economic development (Seers 
1981). 1 would add that what is involved are two different sets 
of value judgements about the purposes of economic activity 
and the ends of such activity as well as two incompatible views 
on what is politically. desirable. 
What ever the causes may be, inflation is said by 
economists to be a scourge to the society. Leftwich and Sharp 
12. The structuralist model has been used to explain inflation in Latin America, 
Ghana and Tanzania, see Thorpe, R. ed. (1979), Inflation and Stabilisation 
in-Latin Amer 
- 
ica, (London: Macmillan), Struthers, J. (1981) "Inflation in 
Ghana" in Development and Change, Vol. 12, Pp. 177-213, Ndyeshobola, A. A. (1979), 
Structure Causes of Inflation in open-dependent Economy. The Tanzanian Experience 
[Thsý 
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say it is "equal to or second only, to unemployment among the 
major economic problems facing society" (Leftwich and Sharp, 
1980: 292). Some of the" evils of inflation are: First, it affects 
the distribution of income. For one, it reduces real income, 
especially for those with fixed incomes or whose incomes do 
not rise as fast as the price level (Samuelson, 1979: 271-72; 
Cairncross, 1975: pp. 79-81). Examples of these groups are those 
on pensions, civil servants and those on public assistance. 
For a second, it induces inequitable redistribution of income. 
Some people benefit, and some are worse off due to inflation. 
Those who hold real assets that appreciate in value faster than 
inflation gain. Second, a country with a high inflation will 
find its products becoming less competitive on the domestic 
market and overseas markets. This is the argument made by the 
UK legislators in 1973 (The 1973 
ýhite 
Paper, "The Programme 
for Controlling Inflation", cmnd 5205, para. 7). A similar argument 
was put forward by their Tanzanian counterparts when enacting 
the Regulation of Prices Act (as reflected in section 12(l)(c) 
of the Act; also Hansard, April 25,1972: 294-297). Third, in 
inflationary conditions, capital formation becomes inadequate 
in real terms as costs are inflated. Fourth, a country facing 
inflation will experience growing disequilibrium in the balance 
of payments as the gap between export revenue and import expend- 
iture will increase (Leftwich and Sharp, 1980; Ndyeshebola 1980; 
Green 1983). Fif th, public expenditure tends to rise faster 
in absolute terms than the growth in real incomes (Struthers, 
1981: 177-185; Killick , 1978: 286-291; Sideri, 1979: 313-362) . 
Sixth, inf lation leads to unemployment as f irms may try to of f set 
I increased industrial costs by reducing expenditure on labour. 
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Alternatively, business firms may attempt to protect their profits 
by passing the higher costs on to consumers in higher consumer 
prices. This may lead to social unrest. Finally, increases in 
the price level may induce economic groups to react in socially 
undesirable manner. For example, consumers expecting increases 
in prices may increase current consumer spending, thus not only 
distorting their budgets but also causing a reduction in money 
savings and artificial shortages (Leftwich and Sharp 1980: 293), 
or those on f ixed incomes may indulge in anti-social and illegal 
practices to offset the loss in real earnings to make up a comfor- 
table living. Corruption, embezzlement and diversion of controlled 
goods to the black markets that are taking place in Tanzania 
have been largely blamed on inflation (Africa Contemporary Record, 
1982-83 B278; Daily News, Daresalaam, October 4,1983; Ndyeshobola, 
1980: 7-36; Nyerere 1977). It is because of these problems that 
governments give top priority to fighting inflation. 
The logical question is what are the appropriate policies 
to control inflation and what is the role of price control. 
Well, much depends on the causes. One method is monetary policy. 
This consists of control over money supply such as reduction 
in borrowing, increase in interest rates (Samuelson, 1979: 287- 
288). The other measure would be to increase output through 
increased investments or the importation of goods in short supply. 
Still, the government can use fiscal policies to withdraw purchasing 
power by raising taxes or reducing public expenditure (Cairncross, 
1975: 68; Samuelson, 1979: 314-315; Leftwich and Sharp, 1980: 
303-307). Each of these policy measures has its drawbacks. Reduction 
in public expenditure. for example, may mean withdrawing assistance 
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to the poor or contractlon in employment. Raising taxes on goods 
whose demand is relatively inelastic may inflate prices. Take 
the case of beer and cigarrettes - the natural candidates for 
tax increases almost every year in Tanzania (Budget Speeches, 
various Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Daresalaam). 
These commodities are considered as luxuries by the government. 
At the same time the government would like to discourage their 
consumption, especially among the young. But studies show demand 
for them is as inelastic as that for basic necessities (Shimwela 
1984; Semboja 1984). As a result raising taxes on beer and tobacco, 
far from deflating demand, only inflates prices (Africa Contemporary 
Record 1982-83, B278-80). The fourth policy option is price 
controls. 
opinion is divided among economists as to whether 
price controls can halt inflation. There are those who hold 
a pessimistic view (Friedman 1971, Darby 1976, Cox 1980). These 
deny that any price control is needed (Darby 1976) and insist 
that no price control policy is going to do anything but make 
inflation worse 
Freezing individual prices and wages in 
order to halt inflation is like freezing 
the rudder of a boat and making it impossible 
to steer, in order to correct a tendency 
for the boat to drift one degree off course 
(Friedman 1971, Newsweek, August 30,1971, 
p. 22). 
Another group of economists, primarily Cairncross 
1975, Galbraith 1980, Samuelson 1979 and Leftwich and Sharp 
1980, say price controls help to contain inflation. For example, 
Cairncross argues, and in my view correctly so, that 
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There are --imes when price control has a 
useful contribution to make to greater stability, 
and at a! -' : Imes the government needs some 
z machinery fzýr investigating complaints of 
excessive zrices (Cairncross 197 5: 95). 
Galbraith declares ccnclusively that price controls curb inflation 
In time c-4 war, we controlled prices and 
wages by _ý_-iposed ceilings and commands. 
Peace is no different from war. The only 
solution fc-- the creeping wage inflation 
and its c2ncomitant inflation of oligo- 
postically administered prices is permanent 
wage-price control (Galbraith 1980). 
I would agree with those who say price control can 
contribute towards controlling inflation. For example, control 
can hold down prices from rising rapidly and frequently and 
thus protect incomes f rom being eroded. This is said to be the 
case in Tanzania (Sing! -., 1986: 427; Government Policy on Productivity, 
Incomes and Prices, Paper No. 1,1981, para. 61). The controls 
may also boost the competitiveness of a ýcountry's products, 
both on the domestic and export markets (Turner 1966). Moreover, 
it can protect consumers and socially disadvantaged groups from 
exploitation by sellers (Samuelson, 1979: 822-825). These effects 
will acrue where the price control agencies have power and the 
capacity to limit prof it margins, restrict cost increases (cost- 
push inflation) from being passed into consumer prices and can 
pass over the benefits of a fall in costs to consumers through 
reduced commodity prices. Indeed these effects were officially 
acknowledged in the USA during the mandatory price controls 
of November 1971 to January 1973 (Leftwich and Sharp, 1980: 311), 
in the UK after the first year of controls 1972-73 (see, The 
Counter Inflation Programme, Stage Two, Cmnd 5267, para. 12) 
and in Tanzania af ter a decade of price controls (Mongi, 1980: 
11 20-127; Whitworth, 1982: 482-484). Finally, the controls may 
act as an inducement to savings. 
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In a situation where there are too frequent and rapid 
price increases, there is a tendency for people to spend all 
their money on consumption as soon as they get it or to hoard 
money for speculative rather than productive purposes (Turner 
1 1966, Leftwich and Sharp, 1980: 283-285). This reduces the amount 
of money required for the economy to invest in new plant and 
equipment and to grow. Investors will have to depend on increased 
borrowing from the banks. More bank lending injects more money 
into circulation, and assuming supply is fixed, this will fuel 
inflation. There will be an excess of demand stimulated by more 
spending power. In the long run this process is bound to adversely 
affect the economy. For one, it will slow down economic growth 
by reducing the proportion of output that goes into savings 
and investment compared to that which goes into consumption 
(Leftwich and Sharp, 1980: 295-298). A persistent increase in 
the general price level also sends false signals to consumers. 
Thinking that prices might rise f urther consumers may be tempted 
to purchase goods in excess of their normal requirements and 
stock pile them. By moderating the rate of price inflation, 
price control would encourage people to save rather consume 
more of their incomes. 
The relationship between the savings ratio and price 
control can be demonstrated by an analysis of the savings pattern 
in the Tanzanian economy. The pattern shows clearly that the 
controls have significantly contributed to an increase in savings, 
both private and public. For example, before the current inflation- 
ary pressure gained a strong foothold in 1972, the rate of domestic 
savings was growing impressively (Curry 1978, Kuuya 1975, Semboya 
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1984). On average, the rate of domestic savings to the GDP was 
25 per cent between lq65-1970 (Kuuya 1975; Curry 1978: 16). 
Then it began to fall sharply and averaged only 10 per cent 
between 1972-75. This decline coincided with the inflationary 
spiral experienced in the economy during 1970-1972 (Economist, 
Intelligence Unit, London, No. 3,1973, p. 4; Rwegasira 1980; 
Lipumba and Mbogoro 1984; Green 1980a) . As a result of the inf la- 
tionary pressures, many enterprises failed to save and invest 
more during this period (Green 1980a, Curry 1978). Many public 
enterprises failed to save and invest more due to the rise in 
the prices of basic inputs, especially fuel (following the first 
oil price shock in 1973) (Clark 1978: 98-201, UNCTAD Report 
on "Least Developed Countries" 1984 TD/B/1027, p. 210). Private 
savings also fell. A combination of factors seems to have contri- 
buted to this development. One, was the increase in expenditure 
on consumer goods caused by higher prices (Curry 1978, Shimwela 
1984, Ndyeshebola , 1979: 7-36). The other was the increase in 
hoarding of money. The latter is evidenced by the fact that 
vast sums of cash were unearthed in private homes in 1983 when 
the government embarked on cracking down economic saboteurs 
following the enactment of the Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) 
Act 1983 (Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-83 B284). Another 
factor that contributed to the decline in private savings, especially 
with the banks and financial institutions, is probably the low 
interest rates that savers were paid on their savings. According 
to the Bank of Tanzania reports interest on bank deposits averaged 
4 per cent only for short term deposits and 6 per cent f or medium 
term deposits during 1970-75 while the rate of inflation averaged 
30 per cent during the same period (Bank Of Tanzania, Economic 
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and Operations Report, June 1982, ILO 1982). Such low interest 
rates could not attract savings as they were far below the inflation 
rate and many prospective savers would not find it worthwhile 
to keep money in the banks (Lloyds Bank Group, Country Report, 
November 1985). Of late price controls are thought to have brought 
down inflation in the economies of Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia 
(The Economist, London, November 15,1986: 157-64). 
2.5.4. Price Control as a Mechanism for Equitable Redistribution 
of Income 
The equitable redistribution of income is an objective 
often encountered in the statements on the purposes of price 
controls (as examples, see, the UK "Price and Pay Code: A Consult- 
ative Document 1973", Cmnd 5243; the Regulation of Prices Act 
1973 of Tanzania, Section 12(l)(e); Control of Prices Act 1965 
(cap 298) of Ghana, Section 3). An inclination for equitable 
redistribution of income is a preoccupation of many societies 
(Samuelson 1979: 82-86); Bonin 1984; Galbraith 1984: 67-69). 
Just what form this redistribution should take and how far it 
should go is a value judgement. 
12 
Among classical economists, like David Ricardo, income 
inequality was presumed a matter of natural law and equity 
(Ricardo 1817). For Ricardo and his followers, the luxurious 
income of the landlords and capitalists was the inevitable arrange- 
ment of nature (Ricardo 1817, Tawney, 1952: 85). Interference 
with it would disrupt the natural order of things and make the 
lot of everyone much worse since it would prevent, "persons 
13. See, Ricardo, D. (1817), On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 
Tawney, R. H. (1952), Equality, 4th ed., rev. (London: Allen and Unwin) pp. 82- 
87). 
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endowed by nature with unusual qualities of strength, audacity 
or cunning from reaping the fruits of these powers" (Tawney, 
19 52: 85). 
The defence of inequality has continued in the thinking 
of neo-classical economists like Simon Kuznets. Kuznets argues 
that equal distribution of income is undesirable for its alleged 
tendency to lower the savings ratio and capital formation (Kuznets 
1966). His proposition, which I think some of us will take issue 
with, is that if income were widely distributed it would be 
spent. But if it flowed in the hands of few (rich men) it would 
be saved and invested. This would bring greater production, 
employment and better incomes to all. In other words, Kuznets 
sees the existence of an automatic trade off between economic 
growth and income equality, with income differentials narrowing 
down as the economy expands. In recent times this tenet has 
been revived by the conservative policies of the governments 
in the USA and UK (Barrat Brown 1984, Galbraith 1984). According 
to Galbraith, the US f ederal tax limit of 50 per cent on earned 
income is seen as an essential incentive to the rich so as to 
boost capital formation necessary for the expansion and growth 
of the economy. This, it is hoped by US officials, will reduce 
the level of poverty and income inequality (Samuelson, 1979: 
163-174, Galbraith, 1984: 67-81). 
This approach to income inequality has been severely 
criticised by other economists (Seers 1968, Leftwich and Sharp 
1980). Seers, for example, says that the pursuit of economic 
growth without a proper planned policy of income distribution 
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only aggravates econc-. ic and social inequalities (Seers 1969: 
1). Samuelson is of -i-e same view. He says that it would be 
a great mistake to thin, --', -. at inequality of income will automatically 
narrow down as the eccnc-N- grows. The truth, as he rightly points 
out, is that it is t"-e developed economies of the USA and UK 
which have the highest incidence of inequality because certain 
f ew "peers and tycoons own concentrations of land and other 
property. The price that these people can get on these property 
enhances their wealth and widens the gap in inequality" (Samuelson, 
1979 : 87 )- 
Socialist scholars, on the other hand, take the need 
for a drastic redistribution of income as the heart of socialism 
(Barrat Brown 1984, Dalton 1979, Bornstein 1970). Paul Sweezy 
sums up the socialist view very well when he says, "it is necessary 
to proclaim that equalitarianism is the most fundamental principle 
of a socialist society organised on Marxist lines" (Sweezy, 1972: 
10). 
For the time being let me just point out here that 
achieving a more equitable distribution of income is a basic 
goal in Tanzania. This goal is enshrined in the Constitution 
of the United Republic and that of the ruling political party 
(*Chama Cha Mapinduzia i. e. Revolutionary Party). Article 9(l) 
of the Constitution declares that, "all people are equal". Article 
9(1)(c) defines equality, among others, to include wthe right 
of access to an adequate means of livelihood". To achieve these 
objectives, the constitution places an obligation on the government 
to "control and own the major means of production so as to ensure 
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social and economic justice, and in particular, to prevent the 
accumulation of wealth by individuals to an extent which is 
inconsistent with the existence of a classless society" (Article 
9(1)(j) 
The existence of a classless society implies equality 
in every aspect of human life. In any case this is an ideal 
that even the Russians consider impossible (Bornstein 1970, 
Galbraith, 1984: 69). As far as equality of incomes is concerned, 
the Regulation of Prices Act 1973 seems to give a workable def in- 
ition of what the policy entails. Section 12(l)(e) reads, min 
determining prices, the Price Commission shall consider the 
need to maintain fair relationships among the incomes of different 
sectors of the community". 
Bef ore I examine the devices used in achieving a fair 
distribution of income in mixed economies, I would like to explore 
what income inequality connotes. 
Income inequality can be viewed from two angles - 
the interpersonal and the interregional connotations. At the 
interpersonal level, the aim is probably to reduce the gap in 
income between one person and another - between the rich and 
poor, rural and urban and between employees within the same 
sector (ILO 1977, Burki and Ul Hag, 1981: 167, Green 1969). At 
the interregional level, the purpose is to reduce income disparities 
between one part of the territory and another (Liebenthal 1981). 
Traditionally, the principal mechanisms employed by 
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governments to reduce income inequalities are f iscal policies 
and government expenditure (Samuelson 1979, Chapt. 8; Leftwich 
and Sharp 1980, Chapt-14; Galbraith 1984, Chapt. 7). The government 
may levy taxes on and pay subsidies to persons to redistribute 
incomes. Progressive income tax can reduce income inequality 
if it bites more on the rich. The money generated from taxes 
on the rich can then be spent on improving the welfare of the 
poor. This is particularly so if more of the public expenditure 
is focussed on measures which go into increasing the availability 
and accessibility of basic needs like food, water, housing, 
education and health to the underprivileged sections of society 
(ILO 1982, Leftwich and Sharp 1980, Liebenthal 1981). However, 
the use of tax devices and public expenditure policies as mechanisms 
to redistribute income, as studies show, are limited by certain 
factors. According to Ramanadhan, revenue from tax depends on 
the number of people in known gainful employment and company 
earnings (Ramanadhan, 1964: 392). So, taxation of incomes is 
only effective in reaching those with declared earnings. Second, 
at a certain level progressive taxation may become a disincentive 
to investors and may even be an inducement to f raud or cheating 
as firms try to look for ways and means of limiting their tax 
liability (Tixier, 1980: 387-394). Third, in the case of Tanzania, 
the effectiveness of government expenditure policies in reaching 
the poor categories of the community are said to be weakened 
by failure of government bureaucrats to identify the target 
14 
groups who deserve the benefits and to plan proper ways of effecting 
14. For examples of cases in which government officials have misused resources 
meant for the poor in Tanzania see, Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-78, 
B339-371; Mukandala, R. S. (1983) "The Bureaucracy and Socialism in Tanzania", 
in The African Review, Vol. 10, No. 2. p. 13. 
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the redistribution of income (ILO, 1982: 251; Green 1969). In 
his speech to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Arusha 
Declaration, the former President, Julius Nyerere, complained 
about the dishonest practices of the bureaucracy 
We have reached the stage where our greatest 
danger is a new one. The thing which could 
now do most to undermine our socialist develop- 
ment would be failure in the battles against 
corruption, against theft and loss of public 
money and goods and other abuses of public 
office or against slackness in fulfilling 
the duties for which people are being paid 
(Nyerere Arusha Declaration Day Speech, 
February 2,1977). 
Where fiscal and monetary policies are considered 
as the primary mechanisms f or income distribution, price control 
has a supplementary role only. one way in which income distribution 
can be pursued through price controls is by price discrimination. 
For example, consumers with different incomes could be charged 
different prices for the same commodity. A higher price could 
be charged to those with higher incomes. This method would certainly 
require a very elaborate machinery to plan and administer the 
prices. It would require a comprehensive system of identifying 
the different income groups and ensuring that the goods reach 
them at the prescribed prices. A clear case of such a system 
is that of public housing in Tanzania where rent is proportionate 
to salaries irrespective of the size or quality of the unit. 
Another method, currently in use in Tanzania, is that of f ixing 
low prices for basic necessities or goods consumed by the poor 
and higher prices for luxuries (Rice 1976, Mongi 1980). The 
third, as regards reducing regional inequalities, the same price 
may be charged for a commodity throughout the country. Examples 
are prices of electricity, water, salt, some textles, medicines 
and household items (National Price Commission, Daresalaam, 
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Price Control List, September 12,1984). The same prices apply 
pan-territorially. In this way consumers in high cost areas 
(remote rural villages) are subsidised by those in low cost 
areas. The assumption behind this policy is that since most 
of the goods are produced in urban centres, whose dwellers are 
also relatively more well-off than their rural counterparts, 
pan territorial pricing will redistribute income from the urban 
to the rural dwellers (Whitworth, 1982: p. 488; Statement by Minister 
of Trade, Hansard, June 1976, p. 7). There seems to be a strong 
case to support this policy. For one, most of the manufacturing 
and distribution firms are located in urban centres where they 
enjoy the benefits of publicly funded services like water, 
electricity, transport. These services are funded by all tax 
payers. Since all adults (men and women alike) in Tanzania pay 
a development levy (The Development Levy Act 1983) peasants 
who constitute 95 per cent ofthe population are the main contributors 
to the money invested in infrastructure (Statement by Minister 
of Finance, Budget Speech 1986/87 para. 5). For the other, in 
developing countries, peasants shoulder the burden of funding 
public services since they produce the bulk of exportable commod- 
ities. It is only fair that they should enjoy part of the benefits 
of their labour by way of cross-subsidised prices embodied in 
the pan territorial pricing system. 
2.5.5. To Improve Balance of Payments Position 
A country facing a higher rate of inf lation than that 
of its trading partners will encounter two problems: First, 
it will have difficulty in selling its high priced commodities 
on the foreign market due to higher costs of production; and 
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second, it will find its domestic market easily penetrable and 
flooded with cheap imports. Since its domestically produced 
goods are more expensive, they will be less competitive on the 
domestic market. Consequently the country will have a tendency 
to export less and import more. This leads to more expenditure 
of f oreign exchange than that earned f rom exports. It also leads 
to a balance of payments disequilibrium. 
There are three principal ways in which price control 
can help to restore the balance of payments equilibrium. First, 
it can contain a mechanism which discourages domestic consumption 
of locally produced goods that are on high demand on overseas 
markets and encourage the export of such goods. Second, it may 
contain a mechanism which discourages the consumption of imported 
goods for which local substitutes are available. Third, it can 
institute measures that will make local exporters find the domestic 
market for exportable goods less attractive than the foreign 
market. For example, in order to discourage the consumption 
of imported goods, the price control agencies could set the 
prices of imported consumer goods at a level which reflects 
the opportunity cost of the foreign exchange spent or saved 
on such expenditure. Such mechanisms would be heavy import duties 
or taxes on imported goods. Of course such a measure is likely 
to be met with retaliatory measures from the trading partners. 
Also, the usefulness of such measures will depend on government 
policies as regards trade. Where the policy is to liberalise 
trade, the measure might be challenged for contravening government 
policy. Price controls can assist in promoting exports if they 
contain incentives to exporters.. For example, if the prof it 
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margins earned by f irms selling a commodity in demand on overseas 
markets on the domestic market are more than satisfactory to 
the trader to venture into overseas markets, the temptation 
will be to divert output meant for export into domestic consumption. 
It is recognised by scholars (Lipumba 1984, Moshi 1980) and 
the government in Tanzania that to promote exports and hence 
improvements in the balance of payments position depends on 
many other factors than controlled prices (Budget Speech 1986/87 
para. 50, Lipumba 1984, Moshi 1980). For example, export earnings 
depend on ability to stimulate foreign demand for our products. 
This can be achieved by producing high quality standard products. 
This could be achieved by investments in research and development 
of high quality consumer goods and the use of modern and cost- 
efficient marketing techniques. An increase in export earnings 
will also depend on prices which exports fetch on the world 
market. In this connection we may note that countries which 
depend on the export of primary commodities have little influence 
over prices (Helleiner 1983; Curry 1978; Africa Contemporary 
Record 1980-81 B327, World Bank 1981: 83). Prices are dependent 
on external influences. For example, the prices of crops like 
coffee, cocoa, tea and cotton are fixed by international bodies 
like the International Cof fee Agreement. The volume which a 
country can sell may also be fixed. This limits the export capacity. 
Third, it has been suggested that the most crucial element to 
expanding exports is the ability to adopt a stable and realistic 
exchange rate (Lipumba 1982, Green 1980, Turner 1966). If a 
country's currency is overvalued against that of its trading 
partners, it will be unable to export more because its products 
become less competitive. Also exporters will find the risks 
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of exporting too prohibitive and the domestic market more lucrative 
(Turner 1966). Accordingly currency devaluation may be necessary 
(Green 1983). 
Empirical evidence shows, however, that currency deval- 
uation as a mechanism for improving the balance of payments 
equilibrium has little meaning in poor, primary commodity exporting 
countries. Currency devaluation as a solution to the balance 
of payments problem is based on an assumption that there is 
a free market situation in which money earned by exports and 
services has fallen short of that spent on imports. As a result 
the value of the local currency has depreciated proportionately 
against that of the trading partner. The effect of the depreciation 
of the local currency will be to make imports more expensive 
in local currency (in the absence of proportionate adjustment) 
and exports become cheaper. This will naturally lead to an expansion 
in exports and fall in imports. But this theory according to 
some empirical studies, has little applicability to developing 
economies (Singh, 1986: 427; Green 1983; Helletiner 1983). 
In Tanzania a study by the Bank of Tanzania on currency 
devaluations carried out in 1971,1973 and 1982, gives the following 
reasons on why it failed to improve the balance of payments 
position. First, failure of agricultural production to respond 
to the favourable conditions. For one the stimulus to increased 
agricultural exports is not an automatic reaction to higher 
prices. This is because climatic conditions may hamper increased 
output, or there may be domestic policy-mistakes which discourage 
peasants from expanding production (Bank of Tanzania Report 
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1982, Bates 1984, National Westminster Bank Report 1985). A 
clear case is that of coffee and tea in 1976. Due to bad weather 
in Brazil the prices of coffee and tea rose sharply and Tanzania's 
quota on coffee was raised. But farmers failed to respond and 
the country's quota had to be filled by coffee purchased from 
neighbouring states and re-exported (Statement by Minister of 
Finance, June 8,1984). The reasons given for the failure of 
peasants to respond are many and varied. One is that some 
agricultural crops take a fairly long period to be grown, processed 
and marketed. On the average, cof f ee needs a minimud: L of four 
years between planting and the first harvest under the climate 
conditions of Tanzania (Ndyeshobola 1980, Lipumba 1984). Thus, 
even if conditions in the world market were favourable today, 
farmers would need time to clear land, plant and harvest. The 
other is poor prices which f armers 'get on cash crops from the 
marketing agencies. It is estimated that on the average peasants 
get only 40 per cent of the money agricultural exports earn 
on the world market (National Westminster Bank Report 1985). 
The remaining 60 per cent is taken by the marketing agencies. 
Currency devaluation may also not be a viable solution to developing 
countries, because, as noted earlier, of quantitative restrictions 
on the markets in developing countries 
ý5 Finally, currency devaluation 
may not necessarily induce increased exports because the devaluating 
f- 
country may not havW goods that command demand in export markets. 
The commodities, as one study notes' of Tanzania may not be of 
a competitive quality (Moshi 1980). 
15. This point is discussed very well by Yeats in his chapter on "Non Tarrif 
Barriers Facing Developing Countries" see, Yeats, A. J. (1979), Trade Barriers 
Facing 9veloping Countries, (London: Macmillan Press). 
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On the contrary, the main lessons from the Tanzanian 
experience with devaluation are that it reduces the country's 
import capacity, affects the real value of incomes and provokes 
social unrest (Bank of Tanzania Report 1982). The Minister of 
Finance lamented about these effects when he told Parliament 
In 1983 the IMF pressed Tanzania to devalue 
the shilling by 20 per cent. Government 
has devalued it. To mitigate the effects 
on urban wage earners the minimum wage has 
been increased by 35 per cent, and the tax 
threshold has been raised accordingly. 
Government is aware of the problems this 
measure is going to bring (Daily News, 
Daresalaam, June 8,1984). 
Similarly, President Nyerere (as he then was) expressed grave 
reservation when the IMF pressed for further devaluations in 
1984: In his view 
Massive currency devaluations have not helped 
improve any Third World economy. If imple- 
mented these conditions would result in 
riots in the streets (Daily News, Daresalaam, 
November 23,1984; Development and Change 
1986, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 387-394). 
While it is true that devaluation has not helped improve 
the Tanzanian economy (Lipumba and Mbogozo 1984, Bank of Tanzania 
Report 1982) recent studies by the Economist show that a combina- 
tion of tight monetary and f iscal policies, that included control 
on prices and incomes and devaluation, have contributed to a 
dramatic improvement in the economies of Argentina, Brazil, 
Bolivia and Israel. The f our were countries that had the highest 
rates of inflation in 1985 in the world (The Economist, London, 
November 15,1986, pp. 57-64). This seems to contradict Nyerere's 
sweeping generalisation about the efficacy of devaluation. 
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2.5.6. Price Control as a Mechanism for coordinating the Pricing 
Policies of Enterprises in the Economy 
In an economy with a large and diverse public enterprise 
sector like Tanzania, price control may be necessary to coordinate 
the pricing policies of the enterprises in the different sectors 
of the economy. The International Centre for Public Enterprises 
says this is the principal reason why many governments in developing 
states need to instigate price controls ( ICPE, 1981: 8). Coordination 
of pricing becomes necessary because certain aspects of the 
enterprises raise issues of general concern to the public and 
the state itself. These issues are well illustrated by Tanzania's 
experience. But before I turn to the Tanzanian case, let me 
say that public enterprise is a pervasive phenomenon in many 
countries (for the US, see, Shepherd 1970, for UK, see, Redwood 
1980, for developing countries, see, Ghai 1977, ICPE 1982). 
Governments use public enterprises for a variety of purposes: to fill gaps 
lef t by private entrepreneurs in certain sectors of the economy, 
which are either unprofitable or require larger investments 
(Wilson 1984: 3-27; Ghai, 1977: 15-30), to provide basic infra- 
structure in the economy (Tierney 1984: 73-92), to promote greater 
national economic independence/ (Clark, 1978: 98-200), to ensure 
a balanced distribution of industry (Kanesalingam 1972) and 
as a means of state participation in industry to attain certain 
social, political i ind economic goals (Ghai, 1977: 206; Bonin 
1984), What is significant about public enterprise in almost 
every society is that these firms occupy a commanding influence on 
the welfare of the people. This is because they tend to concentrate 
in the sectors that create wealth in the economy such as energy, 
power, communications, transport and water (Pryke 1971, Baldwin, 
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1984: 25-27). In the case of Tanzania public enterprises cover 
every conceivable business - manufacturing, mining, agriculture, 
communications, transport, banking, insurance, export and import, 
trade, wholesale and retail trade as well as social, educational 
and health services (The Nationalisation Acts 1967). The prices 
of these services are vital to consumers as these products or 
services constitute the major percentage in the household expendi- 
ture (The Economic Survey 1984 says they constitute 75 per cent 
of the expenditure of minimum wage earners in Daresalaam. Economic 
Survey 1984-84, Ministry of Finance, Daresalaam). For the other, 
the majority of these enterprises have monopoly power over the 
supply and sale of their products. This point was discussed in 
detail in Section 2.3.2. Third, the activities of public enterprises 
often embody large elements of social objectives and other objectives 
16 
of public policy. Statutes creating public enterprises invariably 
impose on them social functions. Kreacic and Shio have catalogued 
some of the social objectives of the Tanzania Cigarette Company 
as: the generation of employment, income redistribution, provision 
of medical health, sports and recreational facilities to employees 
(Kreacic and Shio 1985: 193-194). 
The relative importance of social objectives to the 
overall objectives of an enterprise will largely depend on the 
nature of the enterprise. 
16. A study by Kreacic and Shio enumerates the objectives of the Tanzania Cigarette 
Company, a public enterprise as: (a) providing substantial funds to the Govern- 
ment (by sales tax, tax on profit and dividends) for use in other areas. W 
providing constant training and development for all categories of employees, 
(c) providing new employment in rural areas (through expansion of tobacco 
farms). For details see, Kreacic, V. and Shio, M. B. (1985) "Public Enterprise 
Study: The Tanzania Cigarette Company Ltd. ", in Public Enterprise, Vol. 5, 
No. 2, pp. 193-194. 
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Social objectives raise two problems relevant to pricing. 
First, they place an additional demand on the resources of the 
enterprise. Secondly, they create a dilemma when it comes to 
establishing efficiency criteria for the enterprise. For example, 
social objectives increase the costs of the enterprise - costs 
which may lead to losses or reduced prof its (Fernandes, 1982: 
13). This is likelY to take place where the social costs are 
not fully accounted for in the price of the product or service. 
A familiar example is that cited by the ICPE about developing 
countries. 
The ICPE notes of cases where, "conscious governmental 
policies of low pricing, deliberate subsidisation or development 
of backward areas" may be pursued, or " deliberately artificial 
price controls which compel the enterprises to sell below costs 
are imposed" (Fernandes 1982: 13). 
It may be thought that the argument on the distinction 
between social and commercial objectives is unwarranted. That 
so long as the statute has laid down objectives for an enterprise 
they should carry the same weight. That to view some objectives 
as imposing a burden on the enterprises and others as commercial 
is to obscure the intention of the legislature. It is also to 
ignore that these enterprises are, by and large, instruments 
of social policy. This distinction between commercial and social 
enterprise objectives is largely derived from the private enterprise 
sphere. Its adoption by the public enterprise sector may be 
questionable. Furthermore, even in the private enterprise sector 
social objectives are established practice in the activities 
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of private companies (Galbraith 1974, Chapter 1; Backman, 1963: 
25-43) - 
However, if we look at the actual expectations of society, 
we find that the distinction between commercial and social objectives 
cannot be avoided in the public enterprise sector. 
The fact that the enterprises are set up as business 
undertakings, with commercial objectives ranging high on the 
list of functions and that they are bestowed with traditional 
instruments of commercial criteria like balance sheets, profit 
and loss accounts suggests that there is still a case for such 
a distinction. 
But more important is the f act that they are primarily 
expected to pursue profitability. Failure to earn profits is 
seen by scholars as a sign of inefficiency (Eltis 1974, Redwood 
1980, Moshi 1980, Ahmed 1982). Expressing his views on what criteria 
of performance he would use to judge the success of public enterprise 
in a developing country, John Keneth Galbraith says 
If I had to lay down a measure f or perf ormace 
of the publicly owned corporations in a develop- 
ing country, it would be that the earnings 
that it is able to put into its own expansion. 
The most successful firm would be the one 
which by its efficiency and drive finds the 
earnings that allow it the greatest growth 
(Galbraith 1961). 
In Tanzania, the making of profits is now a dominant theme in 
the debates on the efficiency of the public enterprises. President 
Nyerere argued that the views propounded by earlier socialist 
thinkers that public enterprises should operate on the basis 
of Ono-profit-no-loss' principle are outdated and inconsistent 
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with socialist economic rules. According to him the proponents 
of this principle confuse the profit-motive and the purpose of 
profits. He argues that profit making is an essential aspect 
of a socialist enterprise system. What is required is that the 
profits should be used for the benefit of the majority of the 
people. He argued 
Our parastatals are not producing sufficient 
surplus to finance investment. For profit 
is necessary whether an enterprise is privately 
or publicly owned. Public ownership affects 
what happens to profits, not the necessity 
for them (Africa Contemporary Record 1976- 
77, B346). 
In his Budget Speech 1985/86, the Minister for Finance 
told the National Assembly that all non-prof it making enterprises 
in the industrial and commercial sector faced the risk of dis- 
solution. That the Government would not intervene to rescue them 
and that they must look for ways of reducing expenditure on non- 
profitable activities. He warned that the managers and employees 
of such corporations would not be transferred to other public 
corporations, as has hitherto been the practice (Budget Speech, 
July 1985). 
It follows from those views that public enterprises 
are expected to operate profitably and to generate incomes and 
surpluses just as their counterparts in the private sector (Kreacic 
and Shio 1985: 196-197, Ahmed 1982, Eltis 1974). This does necessarily 
raise possibilities of conflict. There is a likelihood of confront- 
ation between their competing status as instruments of social 
policy (their role in fulfilling social hopes and aspirations 
of the people) and as business entities. This multidimensional 
nature of objectives raises problems in pricing. For instance, 
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what are the relative weights to be accorded to each set of enter- 
prise objectives? In event of contradiction or conflict between 
them, which one should prevail? 
One possibility of resolving such possible conflicts 
in objectives would be for the corporate and investment plans 
of the enterprises to spell out clearly what the social objectives 
are, the targets to be achieves by them and to quantify them 
in terms of financial expenditure. This would help in identifying 
and remedying losses incurred from social objectives beyond the 
limits of those charted in the corporate plan, or an account 
of externally imposed objectives. It would also help the enterprise 
and members of the public to be aware of the social and commercial 
targets and the requirements of meeting them. The enterprise 
could then be compensated by the government wherever the social 
objectives imposed could not be met by the financial resources 
of the enterprise itself. The compensation could take the form 
of a government subsidy, low interest loan, grant, exemption 
from taxes and duties, capital write off or price discrimination. 
An example of an enterprise with elaborate and quantified social 
objectives in its corporate plans is the Uraf iki Textile Mill 
in Daresalaam. Its annual plans contain detailed projected revenue 
and expenditure on social objectives like: worker's educttiop, 
sports, recreation, subsidised meals, nursery, free transport 
to factory employees (National Development Corporation Annual 
Report 1982). 
The other method of resolving apparent contradictions 
between social and economic objectives and of keeping a proper 
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balance between them is through the control activities of the 
Price Commission. The price control system was seen as a mechanism 
which would enable the enterprises earn sufficient profits without 
jeopardising the implementation of the social and other public 
policy objectives. 
It is contended that while there may be little to 
debate on the need for public enterprises to make profits, the 
manner in which the prof ilEs are made may be objectionable. One 
objection revolves around the cost-plus formula of price formation. 
Under this formula profits are treated as a matter of public 
enterprise right and not as something that they have to work 
for and be earned through efficient performance. According to 
Rice, under this f6rmula the instinctive reaction for an enterprise 
operating at low prof its or at a loss. is to seek for price enhance- 
ment (Rice 1976). Unless a high degree of vigilance is exercised, 
by the Price Commission (in auditing the efficiency of the enter- 
prises) the formula leaves ample scope for abuse. Consumers 
may be paying for costs that have been improperly or negligently 
incurred, such as through mistaken policies, short term political 
pressures, poor management, inorfficient marketing, technological 
and sales practices (Shimwela 1984, Semboja 1984). 
It is imperative to note that public enterprises are 
a major source of revenue for government expenditure (Clark, 
1978: 98-200, Semboja 1984, Budget Speech 1986/87, Ministry 
of Finance, Daresalaam, para. 5). Price control ensures that 
they generate sufficient profits which can be used for their 
own expansion and for financing public expenditure (Mongi, 1980: 
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125-127). Inability to generate sufficient revenue for the repayment 
of loans, for payment of dividends, profit tax coupled with 
low capacity utilisation and poor management are some of the 
problems affecting the revenue of public enterprises (Wangwe 
1977, Lipumba and Mbogoro 1984). For example, since 1972, says 
the auditor's report, debts to the value of Tsh. 70 million 
have not been paid to the Tanzania Rural Development Bank. As 
its loan portfolio is Tsh. 350 million, this means about 20% 
of the loans have not been repaid (Tanzania Audit Corporation, 
Annual Report 1982). President Nyerere expressed his concern 
about declining revenue from the public enterprises 
Certainly our parastatals are not producing 
sufficient surplus to finance new investment. 
In eight years between 1967-74, only about 
20% of new productive investments was financed 
from resources of existing publicly owned 
corporations. They were not, in common terms 
making sufficient profits (Africa Contemporary 
Record 1976-77: B346). 
The government gets revenue from the public enterprises through 
numerous means. The principal ones are: Firstly, the goods and 
services produced are taxed. Secondly, the profits earned by 
the enterprises are surrendered to the Treasury Registrar by 
way of dividends. In most of the public enterprises, the Treasury 
Registrar is the majority shareholder. Thirdly, that part of 
the profit retained by the enterprises is also liable to tax 
as corporate income-tax under the Income Tax Act 1973 (Kreacic 
and Shio 1985). 
In these circumstances, President Nyerere's concern 
with falling revenue from the public enterprise sector is under- 
standable. This is because as Mlamali says, the public enterprise 
sector is the economic lever - the necessary economic back up 
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for the political regime in post-colonial Tanzania. And any 
other explanation or rationalisation for its existence only 
I obscures this reality (Africa Events, London, November 1985, 
P. 64). 
Fourthly, the public enterprise sector pricing behaviour 
requires controls because of the nature of the commodities provided 
by these enterprises. As noted earlier the goods constitute 
a large element in the expenditure of the individual consumer. 
They also constitute inputs, primary and intermediate, in the 
consumption of other public enterprises. This interdependent 
nature of the enterprises required coordinated and uniform pricing 
policies, approaches and strategies. Uncontrolled pricing would 
have made it difficult to institute price stabilisation strategies 
in one sector while other sectors raise or lower prices at will. 
In particular the welfare of the consumer would suffer. 
Finally, the control of prices is necessary for purposes 
of securing a minimum level of earnings - for ensuring that 
uncontrolled prices do not plunge the firm (and industry) into 
loss (Whitworth 1982, Mitchell 1978). The control agencies fix 
the prices at a level which, while ensuring the necessary level 
of earnings, has the primary ef f ect of sustaining and expanding 
sales (Cockfield 1978, Mongi 1980). Having established a generally 
satisfactory level of prices, the practice in most control agencies 
is to leave them unchanged for a prescribed period of time (Cockf ield 
1978, Mongi 1980). However, the level of prices may be further 
adjusted by the need to ensure a necessary minimum earnings 
for the enterprises (Mongi 1980, Whitworth 1982). For example, 
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price adjustments may be made to offset increases in costs that 
are not under control. Wages, raw materials, transport and energy 
prices are the most important examples of uncontrolled costs 
(Mitchell 1978, Whitworth 1982). The ability to offset these 
cost increases with price increases is of great importance for 
the protection of the firms. When prices are not fully controlled 
the enterprises would be compelled, initially at least, to absorb 
some or all of the uncontrolled cost increases. In a controlled 
situation in contrast, increased costs can readily be passed 
on to the public. 
2.5.7. Price control as a Mechanism for Revenue Collection 
Government control over prices may serve as a mechanism 
for generating revenue for the state. This may take several 
forms. In some cases, as in Tanzania, the government issues 
direct orders to the Price Commission to put up prices by a 
specific amount. A typical case occured in April 1981 when the 
government announced that it was finding it difficult to raise 
revenue from the traditional methods (sales, tax, dividends 
and profits tax) to cover planned expenditure. Accordingly, 
it instructed the Price Commission to raise prices as follows: 
bepar sh. 4.10 per litre, spirits sh. 25.00 per litre, juices 
sh. 0.50 per litre, soap and detergents 50 per cent per unit, 
textiles (kitenge and khanga) sh. 6.00 per metre (Statement 
by Minister of Finance, Hansard, April 10,1981 p. 150). The 
Price Commission announced the increases the next morning (Daily 
News, Daresalaam, April 11,1981). In the UK, the government 
uses its price control powers over public enterprises to raise 
revenue in an informal way (Steel 1984: 34, Likierman 1979: 
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16-32, N. E. D. O. Report 1976: 31). Traditionally departmental 
ministers have no statutory powers in determining prices, but 
in practice the government has always exercised its influence 
either through the practical way in which pricing decisions 
in the public enterprises are reached or through informal persuasion 
(Millward 1976: 226-242; Rees 1979: 5; Garner 1983: 62) . First, 
departmental Ministers have to be consulted by the industry's 
boards on prices and ministers are entitled to ask for a price 
adjustment (Redwood 1976, N. E. D. O. Report 1976, Paper No-5, 
p. 23). Second, under a 1978 White Paper, Ministers have power 
to issue specific directions to public enterprises in their 
departments (The Financial and Economic Obligations of the National- 
ised Industries, Cmnd 7131, HMSO 1978). The extent to which 
these procedures may enable the government to use its price 
control powers to collect revenue is illustrated by the case 
of the electricity industry in 1984. In March 1984 the energy 
Minister asked the electricity board to raise charges by 2 per 
cent with ef f ect f rom April 1,1984 (The Times, London, March 
1,1984, p. 1) . In their evidence before a Commons Select Committee 
on energy both the management of the electricity industry and 
the Minster concerned admitted that the price rise was not needed 
by the industry since it was operating profitably at the then 
prevailing price. The government's case was that this profitable 
industry should contribute finances to the government to reduce 
public sector borrowing and to provide funds for investment 
in other sectors 
17 
(The Economist, March 17,1984, pp. 31-32). 
17. The increase was unsuccessfully challenged by the London Electricity Consumer's 
Council. The Council raised three objections: First that the grounds for 
the increase were not one of those stipulated by the Electricity Industry 
Act 1982, second, that the motives for the increase were political, namely 
to reduce governownt borrowing, and third, that the increase amounted to 
taxation without Parliamentary approval (The Economist, March 17,1984, Vol. 
290, No. 7333). 
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Studies by Webb 1976, Eltis 1979, Redwood 1980 and Garner 1983, 
show that successive governments in the UK have used their price 
control powers over public enterprises to raise revenue. 
The other device, commonly found in the agricultural 
sector in developing countries, is the creation of public monopsonies 
(Bates 1984, Ellis 1982). Governments establish marketing boards 
with monopsony to buy and market cash crops. The crop authorities 
purchase cash crops from the peasants at administratively determined 
domestic prices and sell them at the prevailing world market 
prices. The difference in price between what the authorities 
get on the world market and that paid to primary producers is 
accumulated by the marketing boards as trading revenues (Bates 
1984, Seidman, 1972: 42-57). Government control over prices of 
agricultural products is primarily designed to secure revenue 
for the crop authorities. The money generated may be used to 
subsidise agricultural inputs (fertilisers, insecticides and 
farm implements) and to establish price stabilisation funds. 
But in most cases, as Bates rightly concludes, governments have 
always found means of diverting funds from these agencies to 
the treasury (Bates, 1984: 93) . That the marketing boards serve 
as instruments of peasant taxation is a conclusion also reached 
by Gerald Helleiner in his studies on pricing of peasant crops 
in Nigeria, by Ann Seidman's studies in East Africa and by Robert 
Bates on agricultural pricing policies in some African states 
(Helleiner 1966, Seidman 1972, Bates 1984). 
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2.6. Political Motives 
In trying to gauge the political motives for price 
control - what the motives are and how they are achieved through 
price control, one faces an obvious problem: The motives are 
rarely publicly admitted by the politicians nor do they form 
a distinct and easily identifiable group. This problem has been 
well summed up by Stigler's observations on the relationship 
between price controls and political purposes in the USA where 
he says that "the political process def ies rational explanation. 
Political reasons are an imponderable, a constantly and unpredict- 
ably shifting mixture of forces of the most diverse nature" 
(Stigler, 1971: 3). 
By political motives I assume that the motive for 
imposing price controls, and hence the role of the price control 
agencies, is to maximise political support for the government. 
The evidence in support of this contention, for reasons stated 
above,. is largely indirect. We have to draw inferences from 
the experiences of various countries to identify the possible 
political motives in each. 
Broadly stated, the political considerations include: 
mollifying political conflict; rewarding political supporters; 
weakening the power of commercial groups and as an adjunct to 
wage restraint policies. The ultimate objective being to enable 
the government of the day to stay in power. 
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Mollifying Political Conflicts 
In Africa, as in many other developing countries, 
people are very sensitive to prices. Rising prices create a 
potentially explosive political atmosphere. The keeping of consumer 
prices low and stable, therefore represents a form of political 
settlement designed to bring peaceful relations between the 
government and its urban and rural constituents. In this settlement, 
says Bates, peasants are the main losers (Bates, 1984: 39). Similar 
conclusions have been drawn by Ellis in his studies on Tanzania 
(Ellis, 1982: 263) and Sobhan 1980 on Bangladesh (Sobhan 1980, 
Chapt. VII). Empirical studies show that in the majority of 
developing countries, the rural-urban terms of trade weigh heavily 
in favour of urban dwellers (Bates 1984, ILO 1982). The question 
is why? The reason is that government policy as regards commodity 
prices deliberately favours manufactured, compared to agricultural, 
products. The explanation for such policies is partly political. 
For one, urban consumers constitute a relatively literate, informed 
and more vigilant group. They are spatially closer, more organised 
and constitute a strong pressure group demanding low prices 
for basic necessities like food. Since most of them depend on 
fixed wage earnings - the earnings are often low, and food consumes 
a large percentage of their earnings (about 75 per cent of the 
household budget in Tanzania according to the Economic Survey 
1983) any increase in food prices is bound to have a big impact 
on their economic well-being. 
Urban consumers also constitute a strong political 
pressure group. They are geographically concentrated, more mobile, 
and strategical-lY located. They are easy to mobilise. Moreover, 
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most of the groups which constitute the state's Political allies 
- the young pioneers, the military, the civil servants and other 
government bureaucrats, live in urban areas. Furthermore, urban 
unrest forms an important prelude to change in government (Singh, 
1986: 427-430). And in this process, especially in the experience 
of African states, rising consumer prices constitute an important 
prelude to political unrest and subsequent change of government, 
bringing the downfall of one regime and ushering in another 
political leadership. Some of the cases cited by Singh are that 
of Egypt where the Cairo f ood riots led to bloody street battles 
between the army and protesters. In Sudan an increase in food 
prices sparked weeks of political unrest culminating into the 
downfall of the Numeiri regime in April 1985 (Singh, 1986: 427). 
In December 9,1986 several people were killed in Zambia when 
thousands took to the streets in violent protests over price 
increases for basic food imposed by the government to conform 
with IMF economic adjustment plans (The Guardian, London, Wednesday 
December 10,1986 p. 8; The Financial Times, London, Wednesday 
December 10,1986, p. 48, The Times, London, December 10,1986, 
p-1). Other African states which have faced this problem are 
Morocco, Tunisia and Kenya (Africa Now, London, April 1986: 
15). Controlling prices has, therefore, become necessary not 
only for purposes of peace, unity and political stability, but 
also for the survival of the ruling groups. President Nyerere 
frankly acknowledged this fact. He admitted that if the government 
decontrols prices there will be "riots in the street. This will 
force the government to turn the police force against the people 
**9 Then I will 
lose everything that I have" (Daily News, Daresalaam, 
November 23,1984). 
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Obviously many political leaders in developing countries 
aware of the threat and political consequences that are associated 
with uncontrolled prices want to be seen to be doing something. 
It can be argued that the political argument made here applies 
to developed countries as well. For example, in the United Kingdom 
the price controls initiated by the Labour Government in the 
1960's and 1970's were largely a political mechanism to defuse 
confrontation with the powerful trade unions on whom the government 
depended for support to stay in power (Millward 1976, Pearce 
1983) . 
2.6.2. Concealing Government Inefficiencies 
The existence of price control agencies may equip 
the government with a ready-made answer to fight criticism and 
may ease the burden on the government to explain some of the 
policies that are responsible for pri-ce inflation. This is happening 
in Tanzania where the price controls seem to divert public attention 
and criticism for rising prices away from government policies 
which propagate inflation such as unproductive expenditure and 
taxes (Semboja 1984, Shimwela 1984). Instead, the public, press 
and National Assembly concentrate their blame on the price control 
agencies. For instance, every time there is a price increase 
or violation of ceiling prices, it has become customary for 
all the blame to be shifted on the price controllers. As a matter 
of fact there is hardly any parliamentary session since 1974 
where rising prices are not blamed on the National Price Commission. 
During the 1984/85 budget session leading Parliamentarians blamed 
the sharp rise in food P-rices that were announced in July 1984 
on the commission (Uhuru, Daresalaam, October 29,1984), while 
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in actual fact the cause lay in removal of food subsidies and 
inefficiencies of the National Milling Corporation. The National 
Milling Corporation, the main food procurement and distribution 
parastatal, had accumulated huge deficits due to poor management. 
To recoup the losses it has been raising prices of grain and 
other foodstuffs (Ergas 1981: 286; Africa Contemporary Record, 
1981-82: B272). The Commission acted only as a legitimising 
agency for the decisions of the government. Looking at what 
has been happening over the recent years, the price commission 
has greatly relieved the government of the burden of explaining 
to the people the real causes of high prices - government policy- 
mistakes, declining productivity and an unfavourable international 
economic environment. I do not think this situation should remain 
unremedied. To me it is a clear case of violation of the principle 
of proper government accountability. 
2.6.3. Rewarding Political SuP2orters 
The extent to which the control systems can be used 
to benef it groups f rom whom governments draw political support 
is well documented by Killick's studies in Ghana 1973,1978, 
18 
Milward's on UK in 1976 and Sobhan's study on Bangladesh 1980. 
In Tanzania the evidence is indirect. We have to draw inferences 
f rom the way in which the price control system taken together 
with the distribution and rationing of scarce commodities, have 
created opportunities for some groups to accumulate wealth. 
18. Killick. T. (1973) "Price Controls in Africa: The Ghanaian Experience", in 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, pp. 405-426; Killick, T. (1978) 
"Price Controls" in Development Economics in Action, London, pp. 286- 
Sobhan, A. R. (19W), Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime (Bangladesh 
Social Studi0s) Chapter VII; Millward, R. (1976), "Price %straint, Anti- 
Inflation Policy and Public-Private Industry in the UK 1949-73", in Econoinic 
Journal, Vol-809 pp. 226-242. 
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First, as we noted earlier, in Tanzania the control 
of distribution and consumer rationing means that for many basic 
consumer goods shops have become specific to residents of given 
areas. As a result people in urban areas with better access 
to the distribution system have their own shops of price controlled 
goods which dif f er f rom those of their rural counterparts. Entry to such 
shops is largely a function of residence which is often determined 
by ones occupation. For example, employees in sensitive areas 
like the army, police, hospitals and institutions of higher 
learning get supplies in cooperative shops at their places of 
work. These are assured of regular supplies because they get 
their allocations directly from the distributing or manufacturing 
firms. Since 'they are better equipped financially and in terms 
of transport, they can always afford to pay for their allotted 
quantities and sell it to their employees on credit. The case 
is different with rural dwellers. These depend on private shop- 
keepers to deliver their supplies. The commodities go through 
a long chain of distributors bef ore reaching them. In the process 
the prices keep on escalating beyond the reach of many peasants 
or simply get diverted into the black markets (Lipumba and Mbogoro 
1984, Shimwela 1984). 
Factory workers in vital industries are given special 
11 
allocations for the 
! 
goods they produce. This gives them opportunity 
to indulge in black marketeering. Managers of public enterprises 
are given certain quantities of goods produced by their firms 
for promotional purposes - gifts, samples. They in turn use 
such privileges as bases of political and economic power to 
accumulate financial gains by selling the goods on the black 
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market; offering bribes to departmental heads; establishing 
relations with heads of financial institutions and to press 
for reciprocal treatment from other public enterprises (Africa 
Events, London, November 1985: 63-68). When he was invited to 
present awards to the best workers at the Friendship Textile 
Mill in 1985, the Minister for Trade and Industries openly complained 
that the gifts and party which the management had given him 
bore no sensible proportion to what the workers were being given. 
The Minister was particularly disturbed to hear that the best 
worker had invented spares for the spinning mills which had 
saved the government a lot of money in foreign exchange and 
had earned the factory a lot of profit. To his dismay, he was asked 
to present the workers with ebony carvings and a handful of shillings 
Most importantly, the employees were not invited to the grand 
beer party. The management was more,. concerned with entertaining 
the minister and his departmental officials because theirs is 
the parent ministry of the firm. 
Influential personalities are given special permits 
to get the controlled goods directly from supplying firms. This 
enabled them to bypass the established machinery. There is nothing 
to stop them from auctioning their permits to the highest bidders: 
Seen in this context, the price control system has become an 
instrument of awardl ng privileges to influential social groups. 
In the eiid it is the weaker groups who bear the brunt of the 
burden. Those who have privileged access to the controlled goods 
obtain in excess of their consumption needs and sell the rest 
to their underprivileged cousins at exorbitant prices. 
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2.6.4. Moderating Wage Increase Pressures 
Price controls are an important adjunct to wage restraint 
policy. We have seen how government policy and legislation have 
imposed a brake on wage increases. Under the Permanent Labour 
Tribunal Act 1967 workers in the private sector can only obtain 
an annual wage increase of up to 5% irrespective of the rate 
of inflation. Employees in public enterprises, party and government 
are barred from running commercial and business activities by 
the Leadership Code Act 1973. of course the provisions of this 
Act can and do easily get evaded through trust devices - running 
business through friends. Notwithstanding this loophole, the 
restraints imposed on workers as regards wage demands required 
corresponding measures to restrain price increases. In this 
way price controls were seen as an instrument to pay-restraint 
policy. It is an attempt to give a guarantee not to workers 
only, but also to the public as a whole that if they accept 
less in pay, then what they have given up will be reflected 
in lower prices of goods and services than would otherwise have 
prevailed (Mongi, 1980: 116). It is interesting to note that 
when the UK price commission was established in 1973 it was 
clearly stated that one major aim for controlling prices wasto 
moderate cost inflation caused by escalating increases in wages. 
The document containing proposals to moderate the rate of cost 
and price inflation was jointly worked out and agreed between 
the government, trade union congress and industrialists (White 
Paper 1973, cmnd 5267: 7). This shows that price control was 
an adjunct to wage restraint policy (Millward 1976, Jones 1973). 
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2.6.5. Price Controls and Employment Generation 
The reduction of unemployment is an objective that 
figures high in the development programmes of many countries 
(Mitchell 1978, Fels 1972, Leftwich and Sharp 1980). Price control 
policies are also expected to contribute towards reducing unemploy- 
ment. The expansion of employment usually implies the creation 
of new jobs and the preservation of existing jobs as the economy 
grows (Samuelson 1979; Leftwich and Sharp 1980). To that extent 
the contribution of price controls to job-creation is not a 
direct one. Rather, it is the effect of the controls on savings, 
investments and preventing business failure which create jobs. 
The role of the price control agencies is to ensure that f irms 
earn profits for investment; that ailing enterprises do not 
go bankrupt and that the controlled prices will be sufficient 
to induce firms to remain in prodution (Galbraith 1974: 110- 
121). In Tanzania this is indirectly taken care of by the wcost- 
plus" formula which, as we shall see in Chapter 4, enables enter- 
prises to recover fully costs and earn a profit (Rice 19791 
Whitworth 1982). 
2.6.6. Curtailing the Power of Traders 
In the economies of developing countries, traders 
constitute a very influential group in politics and the economy. 
In Sudan the grain barons - grain importers and distributors 
- were the decisive factor in the elections in 1986 (Africa, 
London, May 1986). In Nigeria, one wealthy trader controlled 
the rice warehouses that were enough to feed the population 
for months and was the election campaign manager for deposed 
President Shehu Shagari (Africa Now, London, October 1984, p. 59). 
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By using his wealth the Nigerian trader held the power to determine 
the popularity and unpopularity of government. 
In the majority of African countries trade is controlled 
by foreign enterprises. And these are a force to reckon with 
whenever government policy on trade is made (Murray 1981; The 
Economist, Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Surveys of African Economy 
1984). This overwhelming dominance of foreign trading enterprises 
in the economy naturally raises some concern to political leaders. 
The first concern is the need to ensure fairness to 
the indigeneous population especially in rural communities from 
exploitation and price discrimination (Green 1980). The second, 
is the need to reduce excess prof its accruing to these traders, 
especially in conditions of scarcity on the market. The third, 
is to dispel unwarranted feelings of suspicion that members 
of the public may hold against traders - that they are profiteers, 
or that the government is conniving with traders to increase 
prices. Although the power of traders has greatly diminished 
in Tanzania due to the establishment of state trading corporations, 
cooperative societies and communal shops, the bulk of retail 
trade remains in private retailers. For example, by 1980 there 
were a total of 50,000 registered private retailers compared 
to 8,000 communal and cooperative shops (Statement by Minster 
of Trade, Regulation of Trade Bill, Hansard, April 1980). Rich 
traders and industrialists are among trustees of the party. 
The first secretary general of the party (TANU) is now an influential 
businessman in Daresalaam. At the local level, shop owners constitute 
strong party members and leaders. To me the party umbrella shields 
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these traders (party leaders) against public criticism that 
they are exploiters. Of course this in itself a contravention 
of the party manifesto and the Leadership Code Act 1973. But 
the question is who can raise af inger against them when these 
traders fund party activities - donations and provide office 
accommodation in their premises for party activities. 
Price controls also reduce the amount of money which 
traders would accumulate on the free market. The government 
imposes tax at every stage of distribution and sales to skim 
off any scarcity premium. By regulating the profit margin, the 
controls limit the prof its accrued to retailers. By supplementing 
price controls with controlled distribution the government can 
also limit the political influence of traders. 
These examples suggest the importance of examining 
the political motives or purposes served by the controls. Govern- 
ments want to stay in power. They must appease their political 
supporters. This study stresses the role of such factors in 
the operation of the price control agencies. 
2.7. Social Considerations 
The social- motives 
price' system; redressing 
relate to: ensuring a 'just 
imbalances between social groups; 
redistribution of real wealth; as well as rectifying inequalities 
in regional development. 
The notion that there is something called a ujust 
price" is one often encountered in many traditional African 
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societies. Writing about exchange of goods between Tanganyikan 
people who had no established markets, Bohannan says that the 
exchange of goods was made on the basis of moral judgements 
of what was considered 'reasonable and fair' equivalents. Of 
the Wahaya of North western Tanzania he notes: 
It appears the exchange of goods is recipro- 
cative. The bananas that change hands in 
Buhaya are material and therefore economic 
items. But one cannot understand why they 
change hands in recurrent patterns without 
considering the structure and political 
obligations (Bohannan 1968, Chapter 1). 
And he concludes that 
In all such societies in 
principle is not dominant 
tutionalised methods in 
converted from one sphere 
conversion, unlike the pric4 
moral judgment (ibid. ) 
which the market 
there are insti- 
which items are 
to another. This 
e mechanism excites 
Gulliver supports this view. He observes that among the Arusha 
of northern Tanzania there was a strong notion that there is 
a fair and stable price for each local commodity bartered. As 
a result, the rate at which goods were exchanged between the 
Arusha and their neighbouing tribes, the Meru and Masai, remained 
fairly the same over very long periods (Gulliver, 1968: 431). 
The existence of the notion of an equitable price 
system permeates every society. In Europe the idea is said to 
have existed as early as the beginning of the exchange of goods 
itself. It is associated with the notion of natural law - that 
there is a natural price (Chalk, 1951: 332-347). In medieval 
times the churches in Europe used to preach, "Whatever ye would 
that men should unto you, do ye also unto them" (The Holy Bible, 
St. Matthew, VII, Verse 12). The interpretation of this command 
was that since commodities are freely given of God, a person 
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must not charge a price higher than what it has cost him to 
acquire under normal circumstances (Hollander, 1965: 615). Similar 
findings are made by Hall in his studies on pricing in traditional 
communities in India. Hall says, although there were no fixed 
money prices, there are several cases reaching traditional rulers 
from people complaining about unjust prices (Hall, 1977: 208). 
These notions of a just price system find expression 
in modern statutory provisions and policy documents in phrases 
like "equitable" or "fair" prices. The UK White Paper on the 
"Counter-Inflation Programme" stated the objectives of price 
control to be "to maintain fair prices" between producers and 
consumers (Counter Inflation Programme 1973, cmnd 5267: 12). 
The Tanzanian Government Paper 1981 states that price controls 
will remain as part of government economic policy instruments 
to "create a juster pattern of society" by reducing differences 
between producers and consumers. And the Regulation of Prices 
Act 1973 provides that the goals of the controls shall be, inter 
alia to "maintain fair prices" between peasant producers and 
industrial producers. Accepting the argument that 'fairness' 
is one of the primary objectives of price controls the question 
that is often overlooked is who should be fair to whom and by 
whose standard of fairness are we to judge whether the controllers 
are acting in due fairness? It seems to me that the concept 
of fairness has no objective criterion. What firms may consider 
to be fair prices may be regarded as unfair by consumers. We 
shall see in detail the sort of difficulties this concept has 
generated in Chapter 4 when we examine the nature of the regulatory 
rules in Tanzania. 
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2.8. Conflicts in Goals 
The list of goals usually expected to be achieved 
through price controls discussed in the foregoing sections is 
by no means exhaustive, but by and large, it covers the main 
thrust of thinking and popular expectations. It will be noted 
that there is apparent conflict in the goals. For some goals 
the more one is achieved the less the others can be achieved. 
For example, the need to ensure the continued ability of government 
to finance development programmes and recurrent expenditure 
can hardly be pursued without affecting the price level and 
hence people's incomes. Likwise the need to prevent prices from 
rising rapidly and frequently may conflict with that of ensuring 
that the enterprises operate profitably especially where costs 
of production are rising fast. Moreover, the imperative to keep 
prices low to appease the urban electorate is incompatible with 
the need to maintain a fair relationship between urban-rural 
terms of trade. Furthermore, the more the controllers put pressure 
on productive enterprises to keep their prices low so that they 
remain competitive on the market and to prevent price increases 
on consumers, the lower their prof its will be. This will impair 
the capability of firms to generate resources to expand their 
business and to pay taxes to the government. Also, there will 
be stagnation or even reduction in job-creation. 
In practice these inconsistencies seem to have been 
resolved by price control agencies without much difficulty. 
In the UK the Commission resolved the conflicts by treating 
some goals as being of a basic character and others as merely 
instruments and strategies for the achievement of the basic 
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objectives (Cockfield 1978). For example, the basic strategies 
were three: to steady prices; to be fair to consumers and producers 
and to sustain a faster rate of economic growth (Controlling 
Inflation, Cmnd 5205: 4). The rest were considered as not objectives 
but instruments. Admittedly, If ind the distinction rather hard 
to draw. 
In Tanzania, the National Price Commission draws 
distinction between objectives that it should pursue and those 
it should not interfere with. For the commissioners, the Act 
contains objectives and limitations. For example while the commission 
Can pursue any of the stated goals, it has to make sure that 
it does not impair government revenue needs or business prosperity. 
The Act thus contains objectives and caveats (restraints). While 
such an interpretation may be questionable on all principles 
of statutory interpretation, the commissioners seem to have 
overcome the apparent contraditions in the goal structure of 
the Act. In practice, therefore, the National Price Commission 
attempts to keep the prices charged by producers as low as possible 
subject to the constraint that enterprises are permitted to 
make up to a certain maximum margin on their products (Price 
Control Order 1984, September 12,1984: 76-91). 
It seems to me the resolution of the conflicting goals 
- the relative weight to be given to one over another will in 
the f inal analysis, depend on the political, social and economic 
pressures at a given moment rather than on preconceived principles 
of conflict resolution that some of the control agencies will 
have us believs. 
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To sum up the arguments in this Chapter we note that 
the motives for controlling prices are mixed. Governments institute 
price controls for a variety of reasons. These may be ideological 
- the belief that certain forms of economic organisation, and 
therefore socio-economic controls, are naturally preferrable 
than others. Others may impose controls out of economic and 
political expediency - to redress imbalances in the economy. 
We also note that the announced intentions may sometimes conceal 
the actual intentions. In addition, the government may impose 
price controls with a perfectly honest intention but with time 
social forces may alter the situation and the controls may end 
up serving the interests of powerful groups. 
Finally, it is the alignment of social and political - 
forces at a given period which influences the relative predominance 
of one goal over the others (Bates 1984; Ellis 1984). This is 
because the decision whether to pursue, neglect or diverge f rom 
one objective is not made in a vacuum. The controllers are agencies 
for advancing defined interests as determined by the socio- 
economic forces in society. 
2.9. The Role of Law in the Regulation of Economic and Social 
Activity 
In the preceding sections I have tried to examine 
the theory and motives for price control. Now I think it is 
appropriate to make a brief discussion about the role of law 
in the regulatory process. But before I do that I would like 
to point out that since dif f erent f orms of regulation are directed 
at different problems (Mitnick 1980) it is not really possible 
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to produce a generalised description of the role of law that 
fits every regulatory situation. For that reason I will restrict 
my observations to price regulation. 
The law lays down legal rules to regulate the conduct 
of economic units in the society - businessmen, producers and 
consumers. For example, in the Tanzanian case, the law specifies 
in detail how prices are to be formed (Section 12(2) the Regulation 
of Prices Act 1973). The Act imposes limits of various kinds 
on the activities that individuals or institutions in the economy 
can do. For instance, it f ixes the maximum price at every stage 
of sale - ex factory, retail, wholesale, subwholesale, retail 
and consumer level. This is done by Price Control lists issued 
annually by the Price Commission under section 16(l). All persons 
(producers, distributors and consumers) are required to comply 
with the legal prices. Breach of the price orders renders them 
liable to penalties (sections 20 and 26) which may consist of 
a "fine not less than two thousand shillings or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding five years or to both" (section 26). 
The effect of these regulations may be to bring about a price 
that in certain circumstances may be dif f erent, f rom the one which 
would emerge from the spontaneous operation of market forces. 
The law also provides a mechanism to enforce the regula- 
19 
tions. In the case of the UK and Tanzania this was by the establish- 
ment of independent regulatory agencies of the commission type 
(The UK Counter Inflation Act 1973, The Regulation of Prices 
19. The UK Price COMMission and the controls erected in 1973 were abolished in 
19W under the Competition Act 19W, Section I and Schedule I (S. I. 19W 
Nos. 497,978. c. 20). 
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Act 1973, Tanzania). Where the law calls into existence a regulatory 
body it will give it a definite organisational form, a legal 
status, allocate rights and duties to it, state the patterns 
of permissible conduct and indicate the specific activity that 
is not allowed despite the judgements of those in charge of 
the agency that the activity might serve to achieve other goals. 
These points will become clearer when I examine the structure 
of the rules in the Tanzanian Act in Chapter Four. Suffice it 
to note here that this set of regulatory rules gives the framework 
within which pricing decisions have to be made. It also modifies 
the direction of the functioning of pricing policies. The assumption 
being that the legal rules will have a systematic influence 
on social and economic behaviour. 
2.9.1. Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Legal Regulations 
Whether the law will be effective, that is, whether 
social and economic activity will conform or comply with the 
law depends on many factors. Economic political and social factors 
may exercise a key influence on the law (Kurczewski and Frieske 
1976-77: 489, Diver , 1980: 257; Mitnick 1980, Chapter 1) . For 
example, the structure of the economy, that is the manner in 
which the process of production is organised - the ownership 
of the means of production, the mode of distribution of the 
products and the way in which society is stratified tell us 
a great deal about the effectiveness of the law. A good illustration 
of this point is the relatively successful observance of price 
controls in Poland (Kurczewski and Frieske 1976-77) and Hungary 
(Fortes 1970) both of which are command economies compared to 
4 
the violations that we hear from Ghana (Killick, 1973: 405-426; 
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1978: 286-293), India (Gupta and Srivasan, 1984t 1579). These 
two are market-based, regulated economies, in which the economy 
depends on a multitude of decisions by many private parties. 
The effectiveness of the law, especially in price regulation, 
may also depend on the market structure. The two principal aspects 
of market structure worth noting here are the relationship between 
supply and demand and the geographical size of the market in 
relation to distribution. The latter is a function of transport 
and communication factors. Where there are shortages, as Galbraith 
correctly observes, the legal prices are unlikely to be observed. 
Efforts to control prices in scarcity conditions, as empirical 
studies in the US, the UK and Af rican states, show (see e.. g. 
Campbell 1971 for USA; Mitchell 1978 and Fels 1983 for the UK; 
Killick 1973, Bauer 1965, IMF Surveys 1972-74, for Africa) are 
impaired becaused both consumers and sellers may seek to satisf y 
their self-interest. This apparent failure of price control 
has thus been summed by Galbraith 
The given supply can be sold at higher prices 
- it can be sold because buyers, however, 
unhappily, would prefer to pay the higher 
price than to accept their alternative oppor- 
tunity which is to do without. The sellers, 
it can readily be assumed, prefer the higher 
price to the lower one ....... 
An incentive thus exists for a coalition 
on behalf of higher prices between sellers 
and at least some buyers (Galbraith 1980: 
3-4). 
Finally, and very important indeed, the effectiveness 
of the law may depend on the behaviour of the regulators or 
at least the officials employed by the regulatory agencies. 
Once an institution has been set up it is subject to various 
pressures and pressure groups which affect its operations. 
The 
manner in which it develops and operates subsequent to 
its establish- 
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ment is fashioned by a complex set of institutional relationships, 
hierarchies of decision-making, interest groups and the changing 
political and economic complexion of ruling elites in the society 
( &ielman 1964, Chpt-8; Mitnick 1980). Empirical studies show, 
for instance that officials employed by regulatory bodies will 
act in ways that pursue their own interests rather than those 
of the agency (Stigler 1971 L). Studies on the 
regulation of insurance in the Sudan and Tanzania show that 
civil servants look at the regulated companies as potential 
employers should they be dismissed from government (El Mighani 
1981). This pursuit of individual ambition is one goal that 
weakens the effectiveness of regulatory bodies in their role 
as controllers. Other empirical studies show that regulators 
get captured by the regulated interests (the "Capture" theory). 
This is the conclusion made by Stigler in his studies on the 
regulation of the electricity industry in the USA (Stigler, 1962: 
1- 16; 1971: 3-21) and Bernstein in his surveys on regulatory 
commissions in the USA in general (Bernstein 1955). Similar 
conclusions emerge from studies on regulatory agencies in the 
UK (Baldwin, 1983: 25). According to this theory capture may 
occur for a variety of reasons. one, the regulators may lack 
independent sources of information and data and may have to 
depend on the regulated bodies' version of events (Posner 1969: 
548-693). Second, as the regulator gets continuously involved 
in the af f airs of the regulated, there is a tendency to develop 
presumptions in favour of the regulated interests or to reach 
decisions by compromise (Adams, 1953: 469)o - 
This is likely to be the case where employees of the 
regulatory agency are assigned or permanently attached to oversee 
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a certain firm. Third, where the regulated interests command 
overwhelming importance in the economy and are well organised, 
they may simply thwart any restrictions which are not in their 
favour. Apart from the "capture" theory, there is the question 
of the life-cycle of the institution which also influences its 
performance. There is evidence to show that whilst the agency 
may begin by putting into effect the wishes of the government 
(or protecting the interests of the public), in time it falls 
under the influence of producer groups whose interests it comes 
to safeguard at the expense of either the public or the wishes 
of the government (Bowles, 1982: 176). According to Adams regulatory 
agencies suffer from the effects of old age, just like human beings. 
Adams notes for example, that "when the evil which gives rise 
to a regulating agency has been somewhat alleviated, the initial 
dynamism disperses. There develops a slackening in energy* (Adams, 
1953: 469). Jaffe goes further and concludes that the older 
an agency gets the less responsive it may become (Jaffe 1965). 
All these factors may impose severe limits on the effectiveness 
of the law. 
2.9-2. The Administration of/ Legal Regulations: The Choice 
of Institutions of Control and Control Techniques 
Regulatory controls are exercisable by different insti- 
tutions using different techniques. What considerations affect 
the choice of such institutions depends on the constitutional 
and political set up of each country. At first sight I would 
identify four different methods of adiministering statutory 
controls. The first case is where the government sets up voluntary 
guide-posts on prices while allowing varying degrees of liberty 
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to firms to effect them. Examples are that of the USA during 
January 1973 to June 1973 when the government set up price guidelines 
to be adhered to voluntarily, with a threat of government action 
in event that they were ignored (Leftwich and Sharp 1980: 310). 
The controls completely broke down necessitating a mandatory 
scheme in July 1973. Under the latter scheme price increases 
on certain commodities had to be justified and approved by the 
government. The record was good (Samuelson 1979: 393-396; Leftwich 
and Sharp, 1980: 311). Voluntary guidelines is the current policy 
in Ghana. (West Africa, London, September 2: 1800) and Zambia 
(The Times of Zambia, Lusaka, September 2,1986; News from Zambia, 
London, September 2-11,1986: 2). In the case of Zambia, the 
breakdown in the controls that led to violent riots, on December 
7 to 8,1986 were partly blamed on failure by businessmen to 
follow the guidelines (The Guardian, London, December 10,1986: 
The Financial Times, London, Wednesday, December 10,1986: 
48). The second approach is where there are general legal powers 
vested in the goverment to control prices when and where necessary. 
The exercise of the powers is vested on executive organs such 
as a Minister, the President and so forth. A good example is 
that of Kenya. The Kenyan Price Control Act 1964 (cap. 504) gives 
power to the Minister to fix maximum prices of certain goods 
and services, "f rom time to time" by ministerial orders (Section 
Implicit in this provision is the notion that the controls 
are not of a continuous nature. They have to be invoked only 
where necessary. This Act also provides that the Minister "shall 
not delegate to any person any of these powers", section 9. 
There are safeguards to the exercise of the minister's powers 
in that, '*all orders made under section 5 shall be laid before 
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the National Assembly" which may pass a resolution to annul 
the order (Legal Notice 303 of 1964, Kenya Gazette Supplement, 
June 1964). The annulment of the order will not invalidate anything 
done under it prior to its invalidation by the National Assembly 
(section 8). The third case is where, as we saw in previous 
sections, the controls are administered comprehensively and 
in a tight manner by agencies which work in close connection 
with the government. A case in point is the planned economies 
of Poland, USSR and Hungary (Fortes 1970, Manove 1973). The 
fourth method is that of establishing independent regulatory 
agencies as was the case in the USA 1971-74 (Darby 1976, Leftwich 
and Sharp 1980), the UK in 1973-79 (Cockf ield 1978, Pearce 1983) 
and the current situation in Tanzania (Mongi 1980, Whitworth 
1982). The agencies in these countries were independent in the 
sense that they have their own constitution and are not normal 
government departments headed by a Minister. I would like to 
devote more attention to this fourth category because of its 
relevance to my study. What I would like to consider is what 
considerations govern its choice and how valid are the assumptions 
underlying its choice. 
2.9.3. Assumptions underlying the choice of Regulatory Commissions 
Some light on the considerations that af f ect the choice 
of independent regulatory agencies in regulatory administration 
can be gathered f rom the debates that preceded the establishment 
of the price commissions in the UK and Tanzania. First, let 
us examine the UK statement. The 1973 White Paper on the "Programme 
for Controlling Inflation: The Second Stage stated 
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And in considering methods for implementing 
the policies they have looked for those which 
are as straightforward as possible, require 
the minimum of administration and allow flexi- 
bility in operation to meet different circum- 
stances (The Programme for Controlling Inflation, 
cmnd 5205,1973 para. 9). 
Arguments of a similar kind were made by the sponsors of the 
Tanzanian legislation. Introducing the Bill to the Regulation 
of Prices Act, the Minister for Commerce argued: 
The government has given careful consideration 
to all requirements of the Act..... The 
commission shall be a continuing machinery, 
with a full-time chairman assisted by a staff 
of experts. It shall be independent in character, 
free from external control which is necessary 
for its proper functioning. The members will 
be protected and privileged in case of any 
action or suit just like judges. And having 
regard to the nature and purposes of its 
adjudication, the government proposes that 
its decisions should not be subject to review 
by any court. To allow inquiry into its decisions 
will lead to thwarting delays and will frustrate 
the commissions functions (Statement by Hon. 
H. Jamal, Minister for Commerce, Bill Supplement 
No. 7, June 27,1973). 
From the two statements above it would seem that the 
choice of regulatory commissions is designed to meet the following 
basic conditions: First, the need to have a specialised institution 
- specifically designed to meet the demands of the particular 
regulated activity. Second, to secure speedy, cheap, flexible 
and understandable decision making procedures. Third, the need 
to obtain independence and impartiality - freedom from external 
control, pressures or political patronage. This element, as we 
shall see, is important f or two reasons. For one, regulation 
by its very nature implies the existence of conflicting interests. 
In the case of prices, there is likely to be competing and conflicting 
interests between producers, distributors and consumers. For 
a second, in a situation with many Political parties who hold 
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different views and policies independence is needed to protect 
the machinery from becoming a party instrument (Fels 1983). An 
independent agency might be able to act much more fairly than 
one directly controlled and managed by the government of the 
day. Fourth, the need to obtain continuity. That is to say that 
the agency must have power to plan, to promote and to adjust 
the regulations to changing circumstances as well as to issue 
orders, police and enforce the regulations. Finally, that the 
agency should have sufficient discretionary powers and that possible 
abuses of the discretionary power can be controlled by the imposition 
of rules, limiting standards or checking the activities of the 
agency with reviews of the initial decisions by higher level 
officials like Ministers (Davis 1969: 4, Zander, 1984). 
Let us take a closer look at each of these assumptions. 
2.9.3. (a) Suitability for Policy-Implementation 
According to Street 1975 and Davis 1964 statutory 
regulations are fundamentally different from other laws in that 
they emanate from defined social and economic policy objectives 
(Street, 1975: 4-10; Davis, 1969: 4). Often the regulations are 
of the welf are type. In the case of price regulation, says Jordan, 
the driving force is the need to assert government responsibility 
to protect the well-being of those socially and economically 
weak - those whose welf are may be adversely af f ected by the market 
mechanisms (Jordan, 1972: 151). It is, therefore, of primary importance 
that those entrusted with the implementation of the regulations 
should look at the policy behind the regulations. They must take 
a sympathetic view of the policies. In particular, they should 
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operate flexibly and freely - free from the inhibitions of judicial 
and executive processes. 
This argument has been used to discourage the use of 
judicial processes in implementing legal regulations. A leading 
proponent of this view is Jaffe who says that courts administer 
the law and not policy, that is to say they are not policy-orientated 
(Jaffe 1965). It is also thought that effective implementation 
of regulatory rules demands minimisation of legalism - legal 
technicalities and procedures. According to Street, since the 
object of regulation is to achieve social and economic justice, 
this may well require that considerations not of the letter of 
the law, but of the administrative policy should take paramouncy 
over legalism. On this point, Harry Street, a leading exponent 
of this argument, observes 
Ministers and top civil servant advisers 
frequently come to doubt whether the courts 
are the appropriate body to decide many of 
the cases. They see that many of these disputes 
are not merely about private rights; the 
public good on the one hand and the interest 
of the particular citizen on the other must 
be weighed in the balance. They look at many 
decisions in the courts..... and find them 
wanting in that they appear to disregard the 
social element in a problem (Street, 1975: 
5). 
While I agree with the view that entrusting the adminis- 
tration of the legal regulations to judicial-type agencies and 
procedures may subject the regulations to unnecessary legalism 
which may thwart the effort to effect the policy objectives of 
the statute, I certainly do not accept that courts do not administer 
Policy. To me the distinction between law and policy is not so 
distinct. Behind a rule or regulation there is often a policy- 
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consideration and when interpreting legal rules judges overtly 
or covertly look at the policy behind them. Indeed, when they 
try to discover the intention of the legislation or the objects 
of the law or the mischief sought to be eliminated by the law 
they are invariably looking at policy considerations. In fact 
Lord Denning's decision in the case of Seaford Court Estates 
Ltd v. Asher (1949) suggests that the distinction between law 
and policy is illogical since in their creative role - what Lord 
Denning described as, "ironing out any creases" in the law, judges 
take on themselves the taks of ascertaining the purposes of an 
Act and do not remain hidebound by the dictates of formal procedures 
and strict rules of interpretation ([19491 2 ALL. E. R. (C. A. )155). 
It is, in my view, unrealistic to assume that judges are aloof 
from the social and political policies in the given community. 
At least we saw earlier on that in Tanzania judges are of necessity 
required to administer the laws in accordance with the social 
and political aspirations of the people indicating that they 
must administer both law and policy (Nyerere 1973: 258; James 
1976: 63) - 
2.9.3. (b) Specialisation 
Jaffe 1965 and Wade 1982 have argued and I would entirely 
agree with them, that the task of administering statutory regulations 
is differnt from ordinary work of judicial and executive departments 
(Jaf f e, 1965: 3-5, Wade 1982: ). It requires specialised agencies 
- agencies equipped with the skill and expertise necessary to 
deal with the special problems raised by the particular regulated 
activity. Take the case of price regulation. The price controls 
deal with numerous conflicting interests - those of consumers 
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for low prices; of producers for high profits and those of the 
state for revenue. The enterprises regulated differ in size; 
in corporate structure; in degrees of intergration; in diversity 
and quality of products; in equipment, processes and costs and 
with changing technology and tastes. For the controls to be effective 
they necessarily have to be extended to every aspect of business 
policy; to volume and quality of output; to expenditures, earnings, 
pricing practices and distribution of profits. Obviously the 
agency exercising the regulatory powers must contain an assemblage 
of expertise from all the relvant disciplines needed by the controller. 
The need for such an admixture of interdisciplinary 
expertise hardly needs any emphasis. For example, in price control, 
economists would undoubtedly be the most important element. But 
lawyers and political scientists are also highly relevant. I 
will endeavour to explain why. 
It seems to me that while economists would tell us 
what in principle the control process should require of firms 
to ensure efficient performance, they may not be able to tell 
us whether the desired controls are practical, bearing in mind 
the political and other environmental limitations of institutions. 
Here we will probably need a political scientist who can give 
us a more realistic understanding of the regulatory process, 
and in particular, the degree to which the process is linked 
with politics. On the other hand, I think neither the economist 
nor the political scientist can feel comfortable with highlY 
legalistic documents as statutory regulations. Moreover, statutory 
regulations usually contain matters of legal rights, legal obligations 
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and legal remedies - issues whose judgment require legal knowledge. 
Looking at this requirement, we find that neither executive 
nor judicial agencies can provide the specialised expertise needed. 
For one, judicial agencies are ordinarily staffed by lawyers 
and always face the danger of excessive legalism. Lawyers are 
usually not technical experts in commercial and industrial matters. 
Frequently the issues raised by price control regulations are 
purely factual commercial disputes and rarely involve law. In 
the same view executive agencies do not contain the admixture 
of expertise needed. They are often staffed by people with a 
civil service background, ill-suited to the needs of commerce 
and industry. 
To conclude the argument on this point, let me brief ly 
evaluate the basic assumptions that underly the argument on expertise. 
First, it is assumed that the agency will beable to recruit the 
people with the right skills and experience. Second that, once 
recruited, there will be facilities provided for training and 
updating the skills. Third, that the agency will be able to retain 
the skilled personnel. Finally, that the problems handled will 
remain fairly the same to allow application of the expertise. 
My examination of the National Price Commission's position 
shows that these assumptions are not realised. An examination 
of the distribution of employees in the departments, as we shall 
see in Chapter 5.8-2., shows that none of the divisions has been 
able to recruit the required skilled personnel. One contributing 
factor has been the unattractive salaries and terms of employment. 
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Workers are remunerated according to the civil service scheme 
- which are less attractive than those in the parastatal sector. 
Salaries and wages vary among employees such that they reflect 
length of employment rather than skills, education or experience. 
The Commission's recommended scheme of service aimed at long 
term retention of employees in the commission - with a clear 
succession (career path) plan for the workers has been on the 
shelves for the past five years awaiting government approval. 
There are no comprehensive plans to develop employees by providing 
knowledge and skills on the job and by sending them for both 
short and long courses as found in parastatals. There are no 
incentive or motivation schemes for employees like free transport, 
tea and lunch while at work, bonus at the end of the year and 
subsidised house rent. These factors have resulted, not only 
in the f ailure to recruit expert personnel but also in retaining 
labour. In the course of discussion with some employees I was 
told that employees, especially accountants, leave the commission 
in search of higher salaries elsewhere in the economy. These 
facts discount the notion that administrative agencies provide 
ideal environment for the convergence of interdisciplinary expertise. 
2.9.3. (c) Independence 
According to Jaffe, regulatory agencies often resemble 
the government. They exercise an assemblage of powers, judicial, 
executive and administrative. They are therefore expected to 
act with more autonomy than executive bodies (Jaffe 1965). Jaffe 
further argues that since the agencies are often given the task 
of resolving conflicting and competing interests, it is important 
that they should not be interfered with by any other organ or 
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should not be used to further the interests of any particular 
group. They should act impartially. That is why the agencies 
need to be established outside the main stream of government 
departments. But the argument about autonomy ignores that the 
administrative agenc-les have interlinkages with the government. 
They are instruments of implementing government policy. For example 
my discussions with the chairman of the National Price Commission 
in Daresalaam and senior departmental heads, revealed that problems 
often arise due to the ill defined chain of command between the 
Commission and the departmental Ministry and between the Commission 
and other interested ministers. I was told that some degree of 
interference exists, but of a type which in the Tanzanian environment 
20 
also applies to other agencies, including the judiciary. 
It seems that although the Act establishing the commission 
envisaged an element of autonomy in its operations the specific 
relations it has with the government and the departmental ministry 
erodes that autonomy. We shall discuss this point in greater 
detail when we examine the legal background, competence and composition 
of the Commission in Chapter 4.8.1., how the notion of autonomy 
is being undermined. Furthermore, the notion of independence 
is not wholly true in view of the earlier point that an agency 
can be perverted by powerful interests (Eldelman 1964; Stigler 
1964). 
2.9.3. (d) Cheapness 
Social and economic justice demands that there should 
be easy access by those affected by the regulations to the agencies 
20. For some cases of executive interference with Judiciary, see, Martin, R. 0973) 
Personal Freedom and the Law in Tanzania (Oxford University Press). 
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set up to ensure justice is done. This is thought to be best 
achieved where the methods and processes adopted are simple, 
non-technical, informal and less rigid (Zander 1984; Whitworth 
1982). One reason for favouring administrative agencies in regulatory 
implementation is their relative cheapness. For example, those 
wishing to make complaints or get redress f rom the National Price 
Commission are not required to forward their claims in any specified 
form. They pay no fees and can make their representations orally 
in writing or be represented by any person, not necessarily a 
lawyer. Members of the public can set the processes of the Commission 
in motion without any fear of huge bills. For example, if a member 
of the public complains about a violation of any of the statutory 
rules and an inquiry is made as a result of which the complaint 
is found to be false, malicious or unwarranted, there is no threat 
of costs, let alone of disciplinary proceedings. This can be 
compared with the situation in courts where hearings are conducted 
in prescribed form, complaints may not be made without reasonable 
and probable cause and the entire proceedings are designed in 
such a way that services of lawyers become indispensable. But 
cheapness, in my view, should not be looked at in terms of financial 
outlay only. We also need to look at how close to the people 
are the agencies: Do they really use procedures which can realis- 
tically be called cheap, taking into account the conditions of 
the particular society - peoples' incomes, level of literacy 
and communication standards? Are the control agencies ready to 
entertain every complaint that the ordinary consumer may make 
or are there any practices which make the control agencies alienated 
from the people? Some of these issues will become clear when 
examine the enforcement of the controls in Tanzania in Chapter 5.3. 
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2.9.3. (e) Speed 
Closely allied to the argument on cheapness, is the 
view put forward by Wade that adjudication through administrative 
agencies is speedy and efficient (Davis 1969, Wade 1982). It 
is thought that administrative agencies meet speedily, act 
expediently and cut bureaucratic procedures or red-tape. This 
in turn cuts delays often encountered in litigation. And this 
is an important consideration for business organisations for 
whom time means money and to whom delayed decisions could impose 
disastrous consequences on their firms. In court processes, for 
example, one often finds that disputes are settled by adhering 
to court lists; proceedings are held within court premises and 
there is always the possibility of a party seeking a long adjournment. 
This not only delays justice but also subjects the parties involved 
to unnecessary tension, anxiety and expense. But this argument 
implicitly assumes that speedy decision-making accords justice 
more than delayed decisions. It fails to acknowledge the fact 
that delays may be caused by the need to weigh the evidence more 
properly or to give the parties ample time to bring forward all 
the relevant facts necessary for a just and fair decision. The 
argument also assumes that the administrative agency will always 
be equipped to act expediently - an assertion which is very doubtful 
if we consider the evidence from studies about the resource and 
manpower constraints f acing institutions of this nature (Mitchell 
1978, Cockfield 1978, Mongi 1980). 
2.9.3. (f) Flexibility and Convenience 
With regard to these two conditions it is commonly 
thought that administrative agencies operate flexibly in that 
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they are not tied down to procedural formalities and technicalities 
such as rules on relevancy and admissibility of evidence and 
that hearings may be held at any time, place and date suitable 
to all parties concerned. In this connection we find that the 
Tanzanian National Price Commission has been given discretion 
to regulate its own proceedings (section 4, The Regulation of 
Prices Act 1973). We also find that the rules on admissibility 
of evidence are less stringent for prosecutions mounted under 
the provisions of that Act. For example, section 31( 1) states: 
a) In any proceeding under this Act, the production 
by the price inspector of an original invoice 
or duplicate invoice purporting to have been 
found in possession of the seller or a copy 
of such invoice certified as true copy by 
the Price Commissioner or price inspector, 
shall be admissible in evidence and shall 
be prima facie evidence of a sale by the 
seller and of the correctness of all facts 
contained in such invoice ..... and the burden 
of providing that any sale did not take place 
or that any fact contained in the original 
invoice or copy thereof is not what it purports 
to be, shall be upon the accused; 
b) In any prosecution under this Act, the court 
shall not be entitled to reject the evidence 
of any person or require any corroboration 
of the evidence given by him on the ground 
only that such person participated in the 
offence by purchasing a price controlled 
article at more than the maximum price, section 
31(4). 
Administrative processes are also said to be flexible in the 
sense that, unlike the courts which deal only with cases brought 
before them and cannot initiate inquiries or cases on their motion, 
an administrative body can embark on investigations of its own, 
can rely on its own knowledge of the facts and can choose its 
sources of information. In this vein, for example, the National 
Price Commission is empowered by the Act: 
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a) to conduct a review of prices on its own 
motion; 
b) to secure, notwithstanding any written law 
to the contrary, access to relevant data 
concerning production, importation or trade 
of or in any goods or services f rom any person 
or firm; section 13(l)(c) and (d). 
In comparison with trial-type of processes we see that 
a judicial tribunal would depend on the parties to the proceedings 
to develop the facts in controversy. The tribunal would have 
no independent means of investigations and could exercise little 
initiative in discovering relevant facts. In addition, judicial 
processes are tied to precedents. Most of these limitations are 
thought to be overcome in administrative regulatory processes 
(Bernstein 1955; Jaffe 1966). 
The argument about flexibility and convenience, however, 
has been questioned by Zander who says it is more of a myth invented 
by advocates of the administrative processes to extol the virtues 
of the processes than a reality (Zander, 1984: p-42). Indeed, 
according to the theory of rigidification, as set forth by Bernstein 
1955 and restated by Posner 1969, administrative processes develop 
rigidities with time. Once the evil which gives rise to a regulatory 
agency has been somewhat alleviated, the initial dynamism of 
the agency wanes. There develops a slackening in energy. Problems 
get handled on a routine, stand-by basis (Freedman 1975). Rigidifi- 
cation undermines the notion of flexibility and responsiveness 
which is said to exist in the administrative processes. 
To conclude the discussion in this section, I would 
say that the question whether these advantages will obtain in 
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a given regulatory agency, depends on many factors. The question 
of expertise depends on whether the agency is manned by people 
who are skilled enough in that area of regulation. This in turn 
may depend on whether the agency is able to attract, train and 
retain competent personnel. The notion of cheapness depends on 
whether the agency is readily accessible to its clients. In the 
case of Tanzania, as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, communication, 
transport and locational barriers undermine the notion of cheapness. 
The argument on independence is only forceful if we compare 
administrative processes with executive ones. Otherwise, it is 
a question of degree - whether the agency is staffed by persons strong 
enough to assert autonomy. But in a situation like Tanzania, 
where there is a close relationship between the NPC and the govern- 
ment, where executive officers and senior managers of the commission 
depend on the Minister for employmeA, I think to talk of inde- 
pendence is to ignore the real practical situation. On balance, 
I should think judicial type agencies are more independent from 
executive interference and pressure, than administrative agencies. 
/ 
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CHAPTER 3 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF PRICE CONTROL LAW IN 
TANZANIA: EARLIER FORMS, METHODS AND THEIR INADEQUACIES 
Introduction: 
In Chapter I we defined price control. In Chapter 2 
we examined the motives. We now ask: What is the historical experience 
with price control in this country - how has price control developed 
over time? Why was a Price Commission established to replace 
the existing institutions? 
In attempting to answer these questions we begin by 
looking at how price controls evolved in the precolonial period. 
Next we discuss some earlier forms of statutory price regulations 
and describe some general problems 4nd inadequacies encountered. 
We end the chapter with an examination of the social forces that 
brought about the present control system. 
It is submitted that, although the colonial period 
is usually regarded as the most important period for the growth 
of legal price controls (Kimble 1970; Mongi 1980), the period 
does not mark the origins of the controls. The colonial period 
only signifies a change in the scale and nature of the controls. 
Some undeveloped and unwritten norms - regulated by customs and 
social attitudes - already existed before the coming of colonialism 
to regulate the rates at which the exchange of commodities took 
place. But the development of these norms was interrupted, and 
have virtually been supplanted, with the arrival of advanced 
, 
forms of exchange relations. It is also submitted that the definition 
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of development adopted af ter the Arusha Declaration in 1967 marks 
a critical stage in the social and economic policies -a stage 
which also brought changes in Political thinking about the role 
of the market place and market principles in the economy. The 
period ushers in a more coherent government policy about the need 
for change in the role of law and legal institutions from that 
of maintaining law and order to the implementation of the political 
values of government. It is thus clear that to that extent the 
nature of the controls in this period would vary f rom the earlier 
periods. 
3.1. The Evolution of the Controls 
Marx once made some observation, which I find highly 
relevant here, about the development of law and legal institutions. 
He said: 
There is no history of politics, of law, of 
science, of art, of religion, etc. (Marx, 
Collected Works, Vol. V, 1976: 92). 
Indeed, legal development cannot be explained solely within law 
itself. What is often considered the history of law in general, 
or a given piece of legislation in particular, is usually a re- 
counting of successive rules on a given activity, whose cause 
and effect are derived from the social, political and economic 
developments. To that extent legal analysis can only make sense 
and bear fruit if it is joined to a study of the social environment 
within which the legal norm arises and operates. The validity 
of this proposition is well demonstrated by the developments 
in price control laws, as I shall endeavour to show in this chapter, 
whose, linkage with the development of the exchange economy is 
uneradicable. This can be illustrated by the changes in the motives, 
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forms, techniques and objectives of price control in Tanzania 
during the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial period - changes 
which reflect changes in social and Political environment. 
3.2. The Precolonial Period 
Precolonial Tanganyika was inhabited by heterogeneous 
communities. Historical scholarship groups them into 120 different 
tribal categories (Ogot, 1974). However, these were not discrete, 
compact and identifiable tribes in the sense of having a markedly 
different culture, language or territory and political system. 
On the contrary one group merged imperceptibly into another. 
The country's varied environment supported many agricultural 
systems (Iliffe, 1973: 6). Production was predominantly for use 
within the community. Whatever little exchange that took place 
seems to have arisen naturally as a result of the geographic 
differences in climatic conditions - on account of differences 
in soil fertility, rainfall and other climatic conditions. Although 
the varied environment supported many agricultural systems, from 
grain growing to animal husbandry (Gulliver, 1968: 431; Coulson 
1982: 10) these systems had one thing in common - they depended 
on family labour with simple technology (digging sticks, crude 
hoes, axes and other hand tools) for production (Iliffe 1977). 
Despite similarity in farming methods there was some amount of 
specialisation in the agricultural systems. Specialisation was 
largely dictated by differences in natural endowment rather than 
technological advancement. For example, the Wamahenge who lived 
in the fertile Ruaha Valley were a diligent and skillful farmers 
in an exceptionally good climatic area. These produced surpluses 
Of grain - maize, millet and vegetables which they used to barter 
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with their neighbouring Masai and Gogo pastoralists 
for meat, hides and weapons like spears and matchets. Similarly 
the mountain tribes of the north, the Chagga, Meru and Sambaa, 
had constructed irrigation schemes which enabled them to produce 
stable food reserves (Iliffe 1973) which they exchanged for live- 
stock with the Masai. 
It was the skilled crafts that provided the basis of 
economic specialisation. The most important of this was iron 
smelting. This art was a specialised craft among a few families. 
The notable groups were the Pare in the north, Bahaya of Kagera 
Region and Fipa in the Southern Highlands. Iron smithery was 
confined to distinct families or clans and the technology was 
strictly guarded. Other specialised crafts included pottery; 
bark-cloth making and mat production among the Nyakyusa and Kisii; 
salt produced from burning grass among the Nyiha in the West. 
In terms of the role which the market place and market 
principles play, the precolonial societies can be grouped into 
three major categories: those which had no market place; those 
in which markets were peripheral and those with a market place 
and developed market principles. 
Societies without a Market Place 
An example of a Tanganyikan tribe which had no market 
place in precolonial times is the Sandave in the central part 
of the country. This people were characterised by a multi centric 
economy in which several transactional spheres existed. They 
had no fixed market place for transacting the exchange of goods. 
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Yet they had some well established mechanisms of bartering their 
products. The major element governing exchange of goods was to 
distribute commodities from those with surplus to those in need. 
Therefore exchange was governed by the notion of a gift and not 
a gain. For example, if one person harvested less grain - inadequate 
to meet the consumption needs of his immediate family - due to 
failure of rains, poor soil fertility or use of bad seeds, he 
could make up for the gap by assisting those with a rich harvest 
in gathering their produce and get a gift of grain bags from 
them. The grain given was not considered as payment for services 
rendered but simply as a sociable gift. There was no obligation 
to repay. The second mode of social distribution was through 
the leaders. Under this method people surrendered part of their 
produce to a central authority - headmen, chiefs or a king - 
in form of tithes, tributes. The central authority distributed 
them to those in need. Again there was no fixed rules of how 
much a person should donate to the central authority. However, 
there was also exchange of goods between the Sandawe based on 
commodities of different nature. For example grain could be exchanged 
for livestock. Such exchange was conducted within the context 
of the local social system. There were no fixed measure of values. 
It would be true to say that the exchange rate was accidental. 
What guided the participants to the transaction was a sense of 
reciprocity. Reciprocal treatment dominated because the people 
came from the same community. Of course where it was felt that 
goods had been exchanged at unjust rates other members of the 
community would protest to the offender. It seems there had developed 
certain standards of local tradition which could be used to judge 
whether a particular transaction was fair to the parties or not 
(090t, 1974: 151-167). 
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3.2.2. Societies with Peripheral Markets 
The majority of the tribes had developed some recognized 
market places, but had not developed concepts of market principles 
(Gulliver 1968). For them the market existed but only peripherally. 
The bulk of necessities of life were not acquired on the market. 
On the contrary each family was almost self-sufficient - producing 
its own food, shelter and clothing. Therefore, if the market 
were to disappear from the society, it would not cause major 
hardships to the people. Their basic livelihood came largely 
from non-market spheres of the economy. 
Although there was a high degree of self-sufficiency 
within a family, no family could produce all of its requirements. 
Also there were products of craft and art whose technology and 
skill were the monopoly of few families. Furthermore differences 
in natural endownment produced differences in products from one 
area to another. Consequently there was considerable exchange 
of goods intra tribally as well as inter tribally (Marsh, 1961: 
One form of exchange involved surplus agricultural products 
and the other was of specialised. crafts, minerals and natural 
products. For example, the Fipa iron smelters exchanged iron 
tools for food with their Nyasa and Nyakyusa neighbours. The 
Pare bartered iron tools for bananas with the Chagga and livestock 
products with the Masai. In this inter tribal trade some insti- 
tutionalised methods at which goods exchanged hands were established. 
The rates however did not depend on a fixed formulae. Rather 
they were governed by a variety of social considerations - kinship, 
traditional notions of justice and morality, and by the desire 
to use the market place as a forum for social intercourse. Most 
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important of all, the market was considered as a means of redressing 
imbalances caused by variations in the availability of certain 
types of goods from one area to another. As Kiekshus observes: 
The exchange provided variety in diet and 
disposed of perishable surpluses. Thus the 
traditional food market was oriented to distri- 
bution not profit. The importance of the 
traditional market rested, however, in the 
fact that women met as partners in a total 
economy to equalise, through exchange, the 
differences arising from individual production 
methods (Kjekshus, 1978: 14). 
There were no fixed values at which goods were exchanged. The 
prices were not determined by costs of production. The producers 
did not buy their ingredients. None of the tribes involved seems 
to have reached the stage of establishing a universal measure 
of value. When the Fipa iron smiths exchanged -their tools f or 
food from the Nyakyusa the goods seem to have been exchanged 
at accidental but acceptable values. We should also add here 
that in societies in which the market was peripheral, there were 
no developed specialised groups of professional traders or middlemen. 
We, therefore, see that in the majority of the pre- 
colonial societies production was not specialised. There was 
not a developed system of private property. The level of technology 
was low. As a result of undeveloped production, minimal exchange, 
and the lack of specialisation, production was carried out primarily 
for use and not exchange (Gulliver 1968). There was no demand 
for regulation on the market. At most, the market was loosely 
supervised by the age-group spokesmen as was the case with the 
Arusha or a council of elders drawn from different tribes involved 
in the trade (Gulliver 1968). But even on such instances the 
supervision was slight, intruding only when particular difficulties 
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arose (e. g. defaulting traders) rather than maintaining a continuous 
management or control over the market. 
3.2.3. Societies with a Developed Market 
Some tribes had already reached developed forms of 
exchange long before formal colonialism. These were the coastal 
people whose long contact with the Arab and Asian traders had 
exposed them to the exchange economy as early as the First century 
(Marsh, 1961: 3). The Zaramo of the coastal belt, the Yao in the 
South and Nyamwezi in central areas were introduced to long- 
distance caravan trade by Arab merchants. The spread of this 
trade to the interior brought profound consequences to the partici- 
pants. First, caravan trade expanded the rudimentary commodity 
exchange and introduced new commodities - ivory, slaves, guns. 
Second, it introduced money as a medium of exchange. Third, it 
replaced 'gift exchange' based on reciprocity with the commodity 
exchange based on profit motive. Moreover, it introduced new 
forms of transport and communication - pack animals, human porters, 
wharfs and canoes as well as Swahili as a common language. Finally, 
it promoted the emergence of a specialised class of traders. 
This novelty had both beneficial and disruptive consequences. 
Among the disruptive consequences noted by Rodney are: First, 
it destroyed the development of indigeneous technology and manu- 
facturing skills through the influx of new, commodities. Second, 
it depopulated vast areas through wars for slaves. Third, as 
Rodney points out "The most dynamic groups over a great area 
Of Af rica became associated with trade .... and trading groups 
could make no contribution to technological improvement because 
their role and preoccupation took their energies away 
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from production" (Rodney 1972). 
Long distance trade also gave impetus to slave trade. 
Although slavery had existed for many centuries among some 
Tanganyikan societies, it was only with the advent of Arab and 
European traders that slave trade emerged (Turnbull 1977). European 
demands f or labour in their plantations and mines in colonies 
like America, West Indies and Mauritius gave a massive boost 
to slave trade. And the consequences were obvious 
It drew from the continent human beings at 
their most productive ages. Worse still, 
it encouraged tribe to fight tribe. Finally 
and perhaps most importantly, any advantages 
that Africa derived from the contact with 
the rest of the world - the learning of skills, 
the introduction of new foods ..... were more 
than offset by the slave trade plunging vast 
stretches of Africa into anarchy (Kamarck, 
1971: 8). 
The ultimate consequence of European arrival was a step by step 
extension of military and political domination that culminated 
in colonisation of Tanganyika first by the Germans and later 
by Britain. 
3.3. The Colonial Period 
German Rule 
German colonisation of Tanganyika lasted from 1891 
to 1916. The reasonj for this colonisation, in common with the 
f 
colonisation of other countries by European powers at this time, 
can be found in social and economic developments in capitalist 
states. Lenin and Mandel give a detailed analysis of these develop- 
ments (Lenin 1964; Mandel 1972). The two authors say that by 
the late 18th century production in leading capitalist states, 
namely Great Britain, Germany and France, had reached a crisis 
-150- 
stage as characterised by excess accumulation of capital, over- 
production in industries, falling rates of profit and growing 
unemployment. This inevitably led to a search for new investment 
areas, sources of raw materials as well as more lucrative markets. 
Rivalry ensued among companies f rom those states as they competed 
for the new markets. This precipitated the two World Wars with 
the consequent division of the world among the capitalist powers 
(Mandel, 1972: 441-484). 
In the case of East Africa the rivalry between the 
Imperial British East Af rica Company (IBEA) and the German East 
Africa Company (DEA) was settled under the Anglo German Agreements 
1886-1890 (Iliffe 1973). Following these agreements, the Germans 
declared formal colonisation over Tanganyika and proceeded to 
establish an administrative apparatus. The system establishing 
institutions for legislation were finally constituted by a series 
of legal instruments issued by the German King (Kaiser). The 
principal law was the Protectorate Law 1886 (Extract of German 
Decrees, National Archives, Daresalaam) . Under this law the Kaiser 
appointed a governor and delegated to him authority to legislate 
locally by way of decrees, orders, directives, circulars, or 
administrative memoranda. The governor appointed military officers 
to head administrative districts while traditional chiefs were 
retained at the local level (Iliffe, 1973: 8-9). This system of 
indirect rule helped to reduce the burden on government since 
the chiefs were non-paid officials while at the same time it 
helped win the confidence of the local population. 
-15 1- 
It seems the German administrators adopted a policy 
of non-interference in economic affairs. Indeed throughout the 
thirty years of German rule only one decree was issued by the 
governor seeking to regulate prices. The decree of 1898 simply 
declared it illegal to overcharge any native or resident of the 
territory. Any consumer who thought that he had been overcharged 
could complain to the district military commander. The decree 
was prompted by complaints mainly from African consumers against 
exorbitant prices charged by Asian and Arab businessmen. The 
increases had been caused by shortages as a result of interruption 
of the flow of supplies from the Asian continent following wars 
fought by the Germans against Arab slave traders. The decree 
made it obligatory for traders to refund consumers for any price 
overcharge if convicted of overcharging. It provided that in 
passing penal sanctions against any trader 
the sum is to be immediately returned to 
the person injured. If the injured party 
is not present or difficult to find, the 
judge (often the district military commander) 
trying the case shall fix an ample period, 
two years, in which claims to be notified 
and must request the chief of the station 
of the locality of the injured party to issue 
a public notice (Circular No. 118, January 
8,1898. Extract of German Decrees). 
Many consumers, Africans being the majority, probably 
derived little benefit from this decree. For one, there was as 
yet no fixed maximum prices for the goods. It was left to the 
district administrators to determine whether there had been an 
overcharge in the transaction complained of. This meant that 
much depended on the consumer to prove his case. The majority 
of the consumers were illiterate and probably knew very little 
Of the existence of this circular. Even if they had known about 
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it most of them would probably have found it difficult to prove 
they had been overcharged. For example, they would need to show 
that the price was unreasonable. The administrators compounded 
the problem by insisting that a complainant wishing to avail 
himself of the benefit of this decree had to show that he was 
commercially inexperienced or had bought the goods under pressure, 
deceit or fraud. There were other difficulties confronting potential 
claimants. There were no impartial judges to adjudicate. The 
district administrators exercised all functions - to apprehend, 
try and punish violators (Shivji , 1984: 3; Ilif f e, 1973: 9). The 
administrators resided in towns while the victims were living 
in the rural areas. A major problem was the alliance between 
administrators and traders. The administration depended on traders 
to act as a political link between itself and the rural population. 
This naturally prevented the administration f rom taking any action 
that would antagonise them from the traders. 
In sum, I would say the Germans lef t economic activity 
to market forces. In essense this meant prices were determined 
by traders. For these had the upper hand on the market since 
the necessary conditions for the operation of the market principles 
did not exist in Tanganyika's circumstances. 
Two reasons seem to explain for this non-interference. 
First was the availability of goods in comparison to the level 
of demand. The majority of the consumers were Africans. Most 
of these had not yet entered the money economy. The market was 
to them perepheral (Rweyemamu 1973). Reliance on the market for 
essential goods like food, cloth or housing was confined to a 
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few urban dwellers (Ogot 1974). By and large supplies shipped 
f rom Asia and Europe were suf f icient to meet the demand. The 
second was the ideology of laissez f aire dominant at this time 
tended to discourage interference in economic activity. The 1898 
decree was repealed in 1919 by the British administration (under 
the Defence (Control of Prices) Regulations 1919). 
3.3.2. British Rule 
3.3.2. (a) The Controls During Emergency Times 1916-1950 
It was during the British administration that we find 
extensive state regulation of the economy. It is during this 
era that the foundations of the present price control regulations 
were laid. 
Tanganyika passed into Kritish administration under 
the terms of the treaty of Versailles signed in June 28,1919. 
Under this treaty the Germans, who had been defeated by the allied 
forces in the First World War, were compelled to relinquish all 
their colonies in favour of the allied powers. Under British 
rule Tanganyika acquired a different international legal status. 
It was no longer a colony as ýt had been under the Germans. it was 
a mandated Territory under the League of Nations (Coulson 1982). 
This was a significant change because, unlike colonies which 
were treated as ov4ýrseas districts of the colonial power (see 
Mittelman Ml on Mozambique under the Portuguese, Fanon 1984 
on' French colonies) , the terms of the mandate 
from the League 
of Nations imposed an obligation on Britain to prepare or nurse 
the territory for independence. No time schedule was fixed. The 
terms of reference simply stated that Britain should administer 
the territory in such a manner that the material, social and 
moral well being of the inhabitants would be promoted. The article 
read 
the mandatory shall be responsible for the 
peace, order and good government of the 
territory, and shall undertake to promote 
to the utmost the material and moral well 
being and social progress of the inhabitants. 
The mandatory shall have powers of legislation 
(Laws of Tanganyika 1928, Revised, Vol. 111). 
British constitutional law theory drew a sharp distinction 
between colonies, protectorates and dominions. In the case of 
Protectorates and Trust territories the British government recognised 
that the territories would eventually get their independence. 
This would necessarily have meant a different approach in social 
and economic policy since, as stated in the terms of the mandate, 
there was an obligation to prepare the inhabitants for independence. 
The question is whether the British did make the same distinction 
in terms of their economic interests as they did in constitutional 
theory? On this point Brett has made the following observations 
which seem to me quite f air. He says 
any difference was one of style rather than 
substance. It lay in the manner in which 
the fundamental assumptions of colonial rule 
were articulated (Brett. 1973: 54). 
Andrew Coulson supports Brett's views. He argues that 
in economic terms Britain pursued the same objectives in all 
its overseas territories irrespective of their individual legal 
status within the international community (Coulson, 1982: 29). 
The objectives were summed up by Baldwin, a leading conservative, 
in his 1929 address to the party conference where he said 
If you sum up what our ideal is to find permanent 
employment, you may sum up in this wayt I 
think that is the modernisation of industry 
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at home and the multiplication of markets 
overseas ...... And that has caused us to 
look once more at the development of our 
colonies (Brett 1973: 74). 
In official thinking, the overseas territories were thus seen 
as areas of immense economic potential; as markets for UK manufactures; 
as sources of cheap raw materials and cheap labour; and as job 
centres for absorbing the unemployment from the colonising states. 
These views were instrumental in shaping British colonial 
policy in Tanganyika, as in other colonies, and in modelling 
the socio-legal institutions that were set up during this period. 
In the early days of British rule, the country was 
administered by a military governor. This was inevitable because 
the territory had just changed hands from the defeated Germans 
to the British and peace and stability had not yet been fully 
restored. Authority to legislate locally lay with the General 
Officer commanding the forces. Using his powers under the Supplies 
and Services (Transitional powers) (Colonies) order in Council 
1915 the governor issued a decree, the Def ence (Control of Prices) 
Regulations 1916 empowering military commanders to control prices 
in their areas of command. 
On the establishment of civilian administration in 
1918 authority to legislate was transferred to the civilian adminis- 
tration. Primary authority to legislate lay first and foremost 
With the British sovereign. This was provided under the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act 1890. Under this Act, the sovereign could legislate 
by such instruments as: " Orders- in-Council, proclamations, letters 
patent warranty and instructions to the governorO (Laws of Tanganyika 
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1928, Vol. 111). 
Accordingly, the Tanganyika Order-in-Council 1920 was 
promulgated on the 22nd July 1920. It established a system of 
courts and prescribed the laws applicable to the territory. Article 
20 of the Order-in-Council stated the applicable laws to be 
the substance of common law, principles of 
equity, Statutes of General Application, 
Ordinances and proclamations passed in and 
for the territory. (Laws of Tanganyika, Vol. 111 
1928: 6-19). 
Under this Order- in-Counc il the Governor issued the Price Control 
ordinance 1920. The price control proclamation was issued under 
emergency powers as part of defence measures to restore law and 
social economic order following the end of the First World War. 
During the war Tanganyika in common with many other countries, 
suffered from acute shortages due to disruption of foreign trade. 
Import deliveries were infrequent and irregular. The Germans 
had blockaded the east coast during 1914/15 thus closing the 
colony to external trade. Trade in the territory was severely 
affected by war. With the exception of a few shipments of foodstuffs 
for the consumption of the civil population, obtained by sea 
from the British colony of India, Tanganyika had to depend on 
supplies from neighbouring territories with cargoes conveyed 
by dhows. The trading position of the territory was further hampered 
by the existing German currency which was not accepted as legal 
tender in the other British colonies of Kenya, Uganda, Malawi 
and Zambia. Agriculture had almost ground to a standstill. Locally- 
grown foodstuffs were requisitioned for troops. 
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The blockade and lack of shipping facilities meant 
that the few essential commodities available could be sold at 
exorbitant prices. Legislation was necessary to control prices 
in such an abnormal economic situation. 
Brief ly that was the socio-economic context under which 
the Control of Prices Ordinance 1920 was passed. It is appropriate 
to analyse the content of the law, the machinery that it set up 
to control prices and the extent to which it was possible to 
solve the problem. 
The ordinance consisted of ten clauses. Under the f irst 
clause the governor delegated powers to district administrative 
officers to fix maximum prices for their districts (section 1). 
An administrative officer could also by public notice 
a) restrict the sale and delivery either by 
wholesale or retail, or 
b) restrict the movement of any merchandise 
in his district; Section 2(a), (b). 
Any person found selling, delivering or exporting from a district 
any commodity under control without a written permission from 
the administrative officer committed an offence. The penalty 
was a fine not exceeding Sh. 1500.00 or imprisonment not exceeding 
six months or both. In addition, depending on the seriousness 
of the of f ence, the merchant could have his licence revoked. 
In Karioki s/o Gachohi v. R( 1950) the East Af rican Court of Appeal 
held that the Traders Licencing Ordinance (cap. 279) conferred 
discretionary powers to the court to make a licence cancellation 
order, in addition to any other lawful punishment imposed under 
the Price Control Ordinance. Under the 1920 Ordinance the district 
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administrators could fix and publish the maximum prices from 
"time to time", section 3. They could also restrict the number 
and nationality of traders allowed to import or deal in specified 
commodities, section 2. Implicit in these provisions is the fact 
that the controls were ad hoc. The controllers could intervene 
any time they thought it necessary. It was an offence to "offer 
for sale or purchase any article at a price exceeding the fixed 
maximum", section 4. The ordinance also made it illegal for any 
person, "having possession or control in the course of trade 
or business of any article for which a maximum price had been 
fixed to hoard or attempt to hoard or refuse to sell the same 
upon tender of the maximum price fixed or impose any condition 
in respect of the sale", section 5. 
Clause six empowered the administrative officers to 
call any trader to "produce his books of account or other trading 
records for inspection". Clause seven authorised administrative 
officers or such other persons they might authorise to, "enter 
into or upon any shop, store or other premises of any trader 
for the purpose of obtaining any information he may require in 
relation to any imported food stuff or other merchandise", section 
7. Clause Eight exempted from control merchandise for military 
consumption. Clause Nine was a general penal provision. It read 
Any person who contravenes, or 
contravene, refuses to comply, 
or produces false statements sha 
to imprisonment not exceeding 
or fine not exceeding one thousand 
shillings, or both. " 
attempts to 
obstructs, 
11 be liable 
six months 
five hundred 
it is now appropriate to examine how these regulations 
were enforced. It was comparatively easy to control prices through 
ad hoc administrative orders during this time. Several factors 
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made this possible. The demand for imported consumer goods was 
low, restricted to a small fraction of the Population. Import 
and retail trade was in the hands of a few businessmen. This 
made the task of policing simpler. Moreover, the increases in 
pr-4ces that occured this time were caused by a few identifiable 
factors such as transport, freight, shipping and insurance. 
Price increases were not complicated by factors that are found 
in modern economies like wage pressures, capacity underutilisation, 
government expenditure and so forth. Some considerable measure 
of price stability was achieved after the imposition of these 
controls. In a 1940 report from the Member of Finance and Commerce 
it was acknowledged 
The controls 
we would have 
time. But the 
Regulations c 
international 
for Finance 
1940). 
have been so affective that 
liked to preserve them in peace 
draconian provisions of Defence 
annot stand the criticism of 
opinion (Statement by Member 
and Commerce, Hansard, March 
Price stability was assisted to a significant extent 
by the importation of goods facilitated by Tanganyika's agricul- 
tural and mineral exports, especially the export of sisal f or 
which Tanganyika was in the lead and diamonds (Coulson 1982). 
However, it could be argued that the effectiveness of 
the 1920 Price Control regulations in curbing unnecessary and 
unjustified price increases was reduced by a host of interconnected 
factors: One factor was the lack of a formal enforcement machinery. 
This was a shortcoming in the law itself . As noted above, there 
was no adequate and independent enforcement staff. All functions 
- of determining the maximum prices, publishing them, inspection, 
apprehension and prosecution of offenders, lay with the administrative 
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officer. The administrators did not have the resources in terms 
of sufficient manpower, transport or money to carry out all these 
functions. There were only twenty District administrative officers 
in an area of 364,900 square miles and a population estimated 
at seven million (Coulson 1982, p. 10). Second, the absence of 
detailed rules and provisions to guide and control the exercise 
of the powers of administrators meant they had wide discretion. 
They had discretion to establish standards and procedures to 
be adhered to by businessmen, to dispose of cases of disputes 
and to revoke licences. The administrators exercised important 
functions in the process of law: quasi legislative and quasi- 
judicial as well as administrative and managerial. These were 
formidable powers linking the process of law with the process 
of economic regulation. Third, great reliance was placed on 
voluntariness f rom and cooperation f rom traders and consumers f or 
compliance. For example, Kimble 1970 notes of the reluctance 
of District administrative officers to prosecute violating traders 
(Kimble, 1970: 15-25). Two reasons accounted for this attitude. 
One being that the traders were an important political ally to 
the colonial administration. They provided a mechanism through 
which the administration got informed about the popularity or 
resistence to its policies. The other being the concentration 
of powers which made it impossible for an aggrieved party to 
appeal. The only organ of appeal was the High Court. Finally, 
even if prosecuted the traders, as we shall see, often got acquitted 
on one or other technicality of the law. As a result, there was 
virtual immunity from penalties for violation. Some examples 
of cases decided during this time will help illucidate these 
points. 
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The Ordinance stated that the administrative officers 
"may from time to time fix and publ'sh maximum prices for the 
sale of any foodstuffs or other merchandise", section 3. It did 
not lay down the factors that would be taken into account in 
fixing the prices. No procedure of making the orders was prescribed. 
No method or language of publication was specified. The question 
of the adequacy of the publication of the orders and the procedures 
led to difficulties in the prosecution of offenders. This is 
demonstrated by the cases of Takars Hirji v. R [19501 and Mwangi 
Githigi v. R [19501 in which these two aspects were tested befored 
the courts. 
In Takars Hirji v. R., the appellant had been charged 
and convicted in the subordinate court for selling maize at a 
price in excess of that fixed by the District Commissioner for 
Maswa District. There was nothing to show that the price-fixing 
order had been displayed by the relevant body to bring it to 
the notice of the appellant. The order was, however, referred 
to in the court by the prosecutor, but no certificate was f iled 
as to its contents. The trial magistrate took judicial notice 
of the administrative acts of making such price control orders 
and convicted the appellant. The conviction was quashed on appeal 
on two grounds: First, that there was no acceptable proof that 
the order had been made; and second, that the notice had not 
been duly published. Hamlyn, Ag. J. held: "It is an essential 
requirement of the law that the maker of the order shall display 
to the public notice of what regulations he has made, '. " and further 
that aDelegated legislation affecting the subject without his 
knowledge must be duly published. The Magistrate is not entitled 
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to take judicial notice of matters within his personal knowledge 
without proper proof by admissible evidence. " 
There was another ground on which the conviction in 
this case could have been quashed. That is failure by the admin- 
istrator to disclose to the affected party the relevant evidence 
on which he had fixed the prices. 
In Mwangi Githigi v. R. [19501 the issue concerned 
the method of publishing the price control order. The initial 
order fixing fees or service charges, for a hair-cut was published 
in the government Gazette. A subsequent order which fixed lower 
charges was not published in the same government Gazette. The 
accused was charged with contravening the amending order. It 
was held that n since the amending order was not published in 
the same medium as the original order, no conviction could be 
sustained. " 
The problem of prosecuting offenders was particularly 
great where the price control order had been signed by a person 
other than the District Commissioner himself. 
In the case of Shamii Harji v. R. [1941], the appellant 
was convicted of selling goods at an excessive and unjustified 
price. The price control order was not signed by the governor, 
instead it was signed by the financial secretary of the colony 
on behalf of the governor. The court accepted that the order 
was valid in this case and upheld the conviction. In upholding 
the conviction the court seems to have taken into account the 
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the status of the person who signed the order. Obviously, a person, 
such as the Financial Secretary of State is one who could exercise 
the functions of the governor. The law did not intend the governor 
to exercise all the powers personally. To hold so would slow 
down the business of government. It is doubtful, however, if 
a similar liberal interpretation would have been accorded to 
orders signed by the secretary to the District Commissioner. 
There is a general rule that subdelegation to subordinate staff 
of rule-making powers must be within the law. Strict proof of 
the legal authority to subdelegate is needed (Bayne 1969, Wade 
1982: 719). In this context the holding in Shamji's case seems 
of limited authority - an exception to the general principle 
on subdelegation. 
The provisions regarding hoarding and conditional sale 
imposed a formidable burden on the prosecutors. The case of R. 
v. Dharamsi Jesang [1945] is a good example of the technicalities 
involved. The accused was charged with hoarding in that he had 
stored in his premises goods not in his "normal course of business". 
The goods in question included bag loads of sugar of which there 
was severe shortage in the open market. The accused was acquitted 
on two grounds: one, being that he was not a licenced businessman 
and hence there was no dealing in the goods; the other was that 
no offer to purchase the goods had been made. The judge went 
on to hold that for a successful prosecution for the offence 
of hoarding, the prosecution need to simultaneously establish 
the following elements: (i) that the person charged was carrying 
on the business of selling the goods in question, (ii) that he 
had such goods in stock, (iii) that an offer to purchase the 
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goods or some of them had been made, and ( iv) that he had refused 
to sell them. The ordinance itself gave no definition of hoarding. 
But it seems to me the interpretation put by the courts on this 
provision defeated the object of the legislature, which was to 
curb hoarding. By imposing a condition that hoarding could only 
be committed first and foremost, by a person whose business was 
to trade in goods, the law allowed traders to hoard in premises 
of their friends, family members or even their own premises, 
not normally used for trade. It also seems illogical to require 
that there be an offer to purchase, as one of the essential conditions 
for the commission of the offence. By its very nature, "hoarding"ý 
implies hiding of goods. Nobody would be expected to offer to 
purchase hidden goods. 
The regulation giving administrators powers to order 
any trader to "produce his books of account or other trading 
records for inspectionn, was equally vague. This prompted the 
High court to hold that no offence could be committed if the 
inspecting officers failed to specify their requirements. This 
was the holding in the case of R. v. Jagiinan Patel where the 
interpretation of this rule arose. The apppellants had been convicted 
of "failure to keep books of account or other records appropriate 
to their businessft. The charge alleged that the appellants failed 
to produce their stock-books when required to do so by the price 
controller. Instead they had submitted a cash-book and an invoice- 
book. The conviction was quashed and appellants were acquitted. 
The appellate court decided that the keeping of a separate stock 
book was not necessary provided a trader kept records; and that 
1. The Longman Dictionary defines a "hoard" as an often secret supply, e. g. of 
money or food. stored up for preservation or future use (Longman Family Dictionary 
1984 (Chancellor Press) p. 330. 
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it was up to the prosecution to prove that the price controller's 
requirements as regards the production of books were made clear 
and to show in what ways the records produced could not satisfy 
the requirements of price-controller. 
The stock-books in Patel's case were required by the 
price controller to monitor the movement of respondent's stocks 
of goods. Cash books and invoices would not reflect, for example, 
how much of the item was in stock or from where was it imported. 
Legal technicalities apart, there were numerous other 
problems, connected with measures, weights, standards and quality 
that rendered evasion of the Price Control Ordinance easy. One 
device of evasion was short weighing. Many commodities were being 
sold by measure rather than by weight. The instruments used to 
measure were tins, cans and mugs. One mug or can could weigh 
anything between 15 to 30 ounces, depending on the way it was 
filled. For example, a 15-ounce tin designed for cooking oil 
would be used to measure salt, sugar, karosene or cotton wool. 
The traders erroneously thought that a tin of a given size would 
weigh the same irrespective of the nature of the commodity. Obviously 
the same tin full of salt would weigh more than one filled with 
cotton wool. When the government introduced and tried to enf orce 
the use of special standardised tins and cans, which, when f illed 
with grain, gave the correct weight, the marketeers devised new 
ways of evasions. They cut round pieces of wood of the same colour 
as the cans or tins and fitted them as shelves some inches up 
the bottom of the mugs, tins or cans. When the authorities stopped 
this, the marketeers switched to beating up the bottom of the 
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tins or cans. And when this was also stopped, they switched to 
another method. They cut down the tops gradually and over a long 
period of time so as not to be immediately noticeable. The effect 
of all these shrewd practices was that none of the measuring 
tins bore any relation to the original sizes (Report on Tanganyika 
1940-47, London, HMSO, p. 47). 
Then the government tried to halt the practices by 
legislating on compulsory use of weighing scales under the Weights 
and Measures Ordinance. The marketeers resorted to scratching 
out the figures on the scales or using broken weighing stones. 
This they did despite the court holding that possession of a 
defective weighing instrument for use in trade was an offence 
per se. 
This was the holding in Attorney General v. S. Patel 
[1939] where possession of a weighing stone, with a piece broken 
off, was held to be wrong per se since the stone could be used 
by an unsuspecting employee. 
Despite all those shortcomings, the Price Control Ordinance 
1920 remained unaltered, and unamended until 1943 when the Defence 
(Price Control) Regulations were passed. This was followed by 
the Defence (Price Control) Regulations Consolidation Order 1946. 
Before analysing changes introduced into the law by 
these amendments, it is appropriate to sketch out, briefly, the 
developments on the socio-economic scene that necessitated these 
changes. 
-167- 
Between 1920 and 1939 there was considerable stability 
and growth in the economy. This was a period when the colonial 
administrators adopted much more actively deve lopmen t -orientated 
policies in an effort to intergrate the territory's economy into 
that of the metropole. Sir D. Cameron, the governor of Tanganyika, 
acknowleged that 
The first object of the Government is to 
induce the native to become a producer directly 
or indirectly, that is to produce or assist 
in producing something more than the crop 
of local foodstuffs that be requires for 
himself and his family (Document No. 215/121/148 
dated August 5,1926, National Archives, 
Daresalaam). 
Two sets of policies were pursued towards that objective. 
One set of policies related to inducing peasants to produce enough 
food crops and cash crops for export. The other set, related 
to encouraging settlers to invest in Tanganyika, where, with 
the help of cheap Af rican labour, they could produce raw materials 
needed by industry in the metropole. 
As regards the f irst set, peasant-cultivation of sisal, 
rubber, coffee and cotton was encouraged. New crops were propagated 
in areas where the climate was suitable. A start was made with 
public health facilities to control diseases. Schools were built 
by the government with Missionary schools taking the lead. Above 
all, restoration of peace and order provided the minimum of public 
security necessary for development. 
As regards the second set of policies, all German property 
- plantations, mines, banks - was expropriated. These were auctioned 
to British nationals. The German nationals were not allowed to bid. 
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All land within the territorial boundaries of Tanganyika 
was declared government property. Land under occupation by Africans 
was treated as being occupied under "Deemed Rights of Occupancy" . 
It could be revoked any time by the Governor in the "public interest" . 
People. could only possess limited interests in land, termed "leases", 
granted by the government for period of varying duration. This 
law ensured that f ertile land could be available to the government 
for distribution to those who could develop it. In some areas 
Africans, lacking in resources and skills, were pushed to the 
2 
marginal land under this law. Railways and roads were constructed. 
This made access to the hinterland possible and boosted agriculture. 
For those companies or persons wishing to invest in 
mining or plantation agriculture, but who lacked resources, loans 
and grants were made available by Britain under the East African 
Loans Act 1926. 
To ensure a constant supply of labour to the mines and 
plantations, the poll and hut tax system was retained. In addition, 
the Master and Native Servants Ordiance 1923 was passed to regulate 
the terms of service. Under this Ordinance an employee was obliged 
to "carry out the service he has agreed to perform". The law 
introduced a ticket (called 'kipandel in Swahili) system of work 
whereby a workman guaranteed to complete a specified number of 
-2. This is shown clearly by the Meru Lands Case 1957. In that year the government 
moved 3000 Meru from their land and replaced them with Europeans. The Meru 
appealed to the United Nations, but the British ignored its resolutions. The 
best general account of this case is, Liebenow, J. G. (1963) "Responses to 
Planned Political Change in a Tanganyika Tribal Group". in American Polit. 
Sci. Rev., Vol. 50,442; Iliffe, J. (1972) "Tanzania under German and British 
Rule" in Clifte, L. and Saul J. S. eds. (1972). Socialism in Tanzania. (East 
African Publishing. House) pp. 8-24 at p. 19. 
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pieces of work to be determined by the employer (Lawrence, 1971: 
112). At the time of signing the contract, the workman would 
not know the nature of the work. The work was payable on the 
basis of 30 days, but most workmen took longer to complete the work. 
As a result they were not paid for the extra days spent. At the 
end of the work some of the workmen returned home with only a 
few possessions more than they took away with them (Coulson, 
1982: 45). A workman who, for one reason or another, gave up 
the employment could be arrested by the employer and charged 
with a criminal offence - "decoying". 
To facilitate the exploitation of resources, Britain 
invested in infrastructural services - harbours-construction, 
communications, road and rail transport and provided finance 
for military and administrative expenditure. 
Efforts were also made to organise African farmers 
in the productive and distributive trades into cooperative ventures 
under the Cooperative Societies Ordinance 1932. Expenditure on 
African-orientated agricultural support services was increased. 
Consequently, the period 1920-1940 was one of relatively 
stable economic position. Supply and demand conditions rarely 
changed so rapidly as. to bring about sudden and sharp increases 
either in retail prices or in the profit margins of traders. 
There were no substantial short period fluctuations in the conditions 
of supply of imports. Fluctuations in demand did occur. But such 
fluctuations were often small, depending on small changes in 
the flow of money incomes. Elasticity of supply of goods was 
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relatively high and increased supplies of imports were readily 
forthcoming. And whatever rise in the prices of imports did occur, 
these were part of the general rise in the prices of these commodities 
and did not result in significant increases in the profits of 
traders. Again such increases in the prices of imports were on 
the whole gradual and they did not impose serious strain on the 
community. There was thus a slackening in the demand for strengthening 
the price control regulations. This recovery was interrupted 
by the Second World War. 
After the Second World War there arose frequent, rapid 
and substantial changes in the supply and demand for goods in 
the country. These changes brought about discontinuous and sharp 
increases in prices. There was a sharp contraction in supply 
caused by the closure of some of the sources of supplies; by 
high costs of supply due to war or shipping restrictions; by 
longer and delayed delivery for imports and by the drafting of 
the actively-productive force into the military. Black marketeering, 
hoarding and sharp increases in prices became rampant (Kimble 
1970). 
A report of the Committee on Rising Prices in 1946 
showed widespread profiteering. The report notes 
Goods were being sold at exorbitant prices 
whenever there was a slight shortage and 
that one man had made 75,000 rupees in two 
days f rom a canteen business in Tabora because 
the (government) troops did not get their 
ration in time (Hansard, March 21,1946: 
189). 
The Committee concluded that there was an urgent need to strengthen 
price controls so as to protect the consumer and the community 
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in general. 
Accordingly, regulations were drafted. The Defence 
(Price Control) Regulations Order 1946 were then presented to 
and got approval of the Legislative Council. Explaing the reasons 
for the order the Member of Railways, stated the reasons and 
objectives as 
To give statutory power to the existing price 
control orders and to give the government 
powers that would be necessary if circumstances 
arise in which it becomes essential to extend 
the controls and concluded that the ameasure 
is essential for the defence of the economy 
during the times through which we are passing 
at present" (Hansard, March 1946: 560). 
The regulations introduced two measures: one, was the imposition 
of a freeze on all prices to the level prevailing on or immediately 
before the outbreak of the war (i. e. August 1939); and two, the 
establishment of a regulated system of distribution. When a committee 
was set up in 1947 to examine complaints of rising prices it 
noted that the prices had not been publicised and compliance 
depended very much on cooperation from traders. It said prices 
continued to rise because sellers had also switched to products 
with new brand names, new styles or relabelling of products to 
make them slightly different from those sold on the date when 
the freeze came in force (Report by Hon. Wakefield, Hansard, 
June 1947). 
In 1948, the Defence (Price Control Consolidation) 
Order was proclaimed. It broadened the scope of products covered 
by price controls; established the prof it-margin system of pricing 
and required all shopkeepers to display price lists. A detailed 
schedule set up the percentage margins which could legally 
be 
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added to the costs of the goods at various points of sale to 
arrive at prices. For example, the wholesale, subwholesale, and 
retail margins for clothing, bedding, drugs, chemicals, foodstuffs 
and furniture, were fixed as follows: 
First seller margins 7ý% - 30% 
Second seller margins 2ý% - 10% 
Third seller margins 2ý% - 10% 
Seller to Final consumer 10 %- 25% 
Under this price-fixing methodology, the cost of the product 
was first calculated and then the permissible profit margin was 
added to arrive at the maximum selling price. All traders were 
required to mark the prices: on the containers, or on the item 
or by af f ixing a price tag. 
The profit margin system of fixing prices had several 
disadvantages. First, the base period (i. e. August 1939) was 
particularly good for merchants. Many of them were already selling 
goods at unusually high prof its. Secondly, it is unlikely that 
the schedule of profit margins was based on detailed knowledge 
of the trade in the diverse commodities covered. Thirdly, the 
wide range of the permissible margins covered wide opportunities 
for profit in individual products. Fourthly, when the landed 
costs of imports on the domestic market rose due to local factors, 
the importers received windfall bonuses from the automatic corres- 
ponding rise in the margins. This was the case where there had 
been no rise in costs at the source of supply f or the commodity. 
Furthermore, control by margins removed the traders' incentive 
to reduce costs or look for cheaper sources of supply. On the 
other hand, the system offered temptation to traders to fiddle 
with invoices in attempt to inflate the cost figures. 
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The 1948 regulations established the office of the 
Price Controller. The Price Controller was an appointee of the 
Governor. He was not an executive officer. The Price Controller 
could be appointed for a specific product or range of products. 
His functions were exercisable under the "general and special 
directions of the Economic Control Board" . S. 3(4), Price Control 
Regulations 1948. 
The Price Controller was empowered to fix wholesale 
and retail prices of any goods "irrespective of the cost to the 
seller of the goods sold, or by prescribing that the sale price 
shall not exceed the price at which they cost the seller..... 
plus a stated sum or a stated percentage of that cost price" 
S. 4(1)(f) . 
Thus in fixing prices, the Price Controller was not 
bound to adopt the costs as submitted by a merchant. He could 
depend on his knowledge. In practice, however, the Price Controller 
would not f ix prices below their costs, since otherwise there 
was a danger that the commodity might not be forthcoming. The 
section was largely meant to prevent traders from challenging 
the prices fixed by the controller on grounds such as failure 
to disclose information on the basis of which prices had been 
f ixed; or the prices being unreasonably low compared to costs 
and also as an incentive to cost effectiveness. 
The Price Controller had discretion to publish the 
price-control orders in the "government Gazette or in such other 
manner as he may consider necessary to bring the matter to the 
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notice of the public". S. 4( 1) . The courts put a restricted interpre- 
tation on this provision. They held that although there is "no 
statutory obligation on the price controller to publish orders, 
it was incumbent upon the crown to prove that prices had been 
fixed by the price-controller and by what means the controller 
apprised the public and those affected by his orders". This was 
the holding in Jesang Popat v. R. [19491. Thus where the price 
controller fixed the prices and displayed them at the District 
headquarters, the publication was held inadequate, as was in 
Gulabchand s/o Ramji v. R. [1950]. To forestall the unhappy results 
that might have arisen from the holding in Gulabchand's case, 
an amendment was made to the section in 1949 which read that 
the "list of prices fixed shall be displayed at such places in 
the territory as the price controller may consider necessary to 
bring the matter to the notice of the public and such prices, 
shall, when so displayed, be deemed to be sufficient notice to 
all persons". .. S. 4(l)(3). 
In the case of Abdulla Kanji v. Rex [19501, the accused 
was charged with profiteering, in that he had sold maize at a 
price greater than the maximum controlled-prices fixed by the 
price controller for the area. The list of controlled prices 
was not displayed anywhere near the appellant's premises. Sheridan, 
C. J. held that under the new provisions of the price control 
law 
Othe display or non-display of the price 
control order was immaterial to the commission 
of the offence* since "the publication of 
the price list did not depend on the display 
of the list at the trader's premises". 
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With regard to the keeping of records, the 1948 Price 
Control regulations were more specific than the corresponding 
provisions in the 1920 ordinance. The 1948 regulations required 
every manufacturer, producer or trader, to keep such books of 
accunts or other records as would clearly show: 
a) his stock of goods on hand; 
b) a reference to source of supply of the stocks; 
C) the cost, quantity and quality of the goods; 
d) expenses incurred in carrying them; 
e) a detailed record of cash sales to customers. 
This provision not only remedied the inadequacies in the law 
consequent upon the decision in R. v. Jagjiwan Patel [1948], 
but also helped price controllers to get the information needed 
to fix prices and monitor distribution. 
Appeals by persons dissatisfied with decisions of the 
Price Controller lay to the Appeals Committee, whose decisions 
were final. 
Not much can be said in general terms about the finality 
of the decisions of the Appeals Committee due to the lack of 
decided cases. But Clause 27(2) providing that the decisions 
of the Appeals Committee "shall be final" tended to restrict 
judicial review. It should be noted that the thrust of the regulations 
during the war period was to extend executive discretion. The 
regulations were couched in a manner that restricted judicial 
review. The courts resisted this legislative tendency. Through 
the device of interpretation they could always f ind ways of reviewing 
the acts of the price controllers. For example, the courts did 
entertain appeals f rom decisions of price controllers if the 
decision was based on improper or inadmissible evidence: Takars 
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Hirji v. R. (1950-1; or offended the rules of natural justice 
as was in the Sheikh Brothers v. Members of Control Hotels; 
or failure to observe procedural requirements as regards publication 
as was in Mwangi Githigi v. R. [19501, or where there had been 
a subdelegation as was in R. v. Mitha [19601. 
Despite this judicial attitude, the finality clause 
was by no means completly ineffective. It still acted as a deterrent 
to potential plaintiffs. This is reflected by the small number 
of cases reaching the courts from appeals against the decisions 
of the price control administrators. 
Several problems arose in the course of implementing 
the Defence (Price Control) Orders 1948. One problem was that 
of translating the provisions of t6e orders into workable and 
effective regulations. For example, sellers were required to 
fix prices on the basis of those which they had charged for the 
asame or similar commodity" on or before August 1939. There was 
no definition of what constituted usimilarity" in commodities. 
Was it to be determined by the use to which the commodity is 
put? Or by its content or quality? If it were to be determined 
by the use, would a change in style or design, that substantially 
affected the use, render a product dissimilar to others where 
their chemical composition was the same? The interpretation of 
this provision was brought to the test in the case of R. v. J. H. 
Gidoodmal 19441. The appellant had sold "Van Heusen" shirts 
at the same price as English or American shirts, on the ground 
that they were similar. The court held that the words "similar 
or like" in the regulations did not mean identical, but meant 
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substantially similar in quality. 
If a seller possessed a new commodity for which there 
was no similar product under the above definition, he was instructed 
to peg his price to that charged by the most closely competitive 
seller of goods of the same class. S. 2(l) Defence (Price Control) 
Regulations 1948. 
It is clear that maximum prices of goods could not 
easily be determined f rom the rules prescribed in the regulations. 
Changes in style, grade or specifications automatically put the 
determination of maximum ceiling prices into the subjective consider- 
ations of the traders. When faced with the pricing of items that 
they did not handle in August 1939, many traders resolved their 
doubts by deciding that they could not find similarity nor a 
closely competitive seller. In this way they were allowed to 
set prices by the cost-plus method. The traders were given a 
formula on which they could set prices on the basis of costs 
and a permitted margin. The formula of ten gave room to continuous 
escalation of prices as costs rose. To stop this, it was provided 
that once price-ceilings had been f ixed on the basis of the f ormula, 
the prices remained fixed and could not be altered without the 
approval of the price controller, 
Evasion of the controls became frequent as soon as 
suppliers and sellers discovered that by simply switching styles 
or making minor changes to their products they could escape readily 
f rom the price-f reeze. By concluding that the modif ied item was 
not similar to the August 1939 product, traders could then be 
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left free to fix prices that were higher without being brought 
to book. A good summary of the evasion is that given by Tanganyika 
Trade Report for 1950. It observes 
New brands of manufactured foods appeared 
daily on grocers shelves at ever-increasing 
prices. In clothing the style alone was enough 
to make the item new. Where style was stable 
new names were put on familiar products (Annual 
Trade Reports 1950, para. 21). 
To curb this tendency the government took action to institute 
remedial measures through complementary measures such as strength- 
ening controls over distribution, vigorous enforcement and exhortation. 
The price freeze technique also suffered from problems 
of enforcement. A price freeze, in conditions of excess demand 
over supply, perpetuated black markets. Administratively, the 
resources of the price controllers were stretched to the maximum. 
The vagueness of the legal rules meant the controllers had the 
task of constantly working out guidelines for the pricing of 
new commodities. On the other hand, the controls were resisted 
by traders who saw in them a restraint on opportunity to earning 
super profits. For the conditions in the market were clearly 
shifting in their favour. 
Immediately after the war there were demands to relax 
the controlls. The wartime emergency regulations were scheduled 
to expire in December 1951. But renewed pressure to dismantle 
the controls began as early as 1950. In the course of the Legislative 
Council debates of that year, the Member f or Finance and Economics 
Pledged that government policy since the war had been to reduce 
actual control as much as possible as the controls were no longer 
necessary (Tanganyika Legislative Council Debates, Hansard, 1950, 
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29th Session, para. 241). Two reasons seem to account for this 
demand. One was the administrative factor. The other was international 
opinion - freedom of commerce. With regard to the first, experience 
had shown that enforcing the controls could only be effective 
where there is either full cooperation of consumers or a very 
large enforcement staff or control of distribution. Unfortunately 
these conditions did not obtain in the colony, as I am afraid 
in practically every other colony. 
Full cooperation from consumers could not be relied 
upon since there was no organised consumer class. There was, 
and indeed there still is, no consumer organisation behind which 
consumers could exert influence as an organised pressure group. 
The majority of individual consumers, due to deficient knowledge 
and lack of means, were ill equipped to exercise their rights 
on the market. 
With regard to a large enforcement staff, the government 
was in a usually difficult position. No competent personnel could 
be recruited locally. And since the controls were seen as temporary 
there was no incentive to open local training institutions. Recruit- 
ment f rom overseas was expensive. Control of physical distribution 
was equally difficult to effect. The territory was large with 
too many points where goods entered. There was also transport 
and communication barriers which made it difficult to police. 
Apart from the administrative bottlenecks, it was strongly 
held that the retention of wartime controls was an affront to 
freedom of commerce. In the words of a leading member of the 
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legislative council, the controls were "indefensible to criticism 
of international opinion" (Hansard, 1951, para. 118). 
Demand for decontrolled prices were further enforced 
by the steady economic recovery in the colony facilitated by 
the boom in mineral and agricultural exports. Tanganyika was 
the world's leading exporter of sisal which was in demand by 
shipping companies. It also exported rubber, cof f ee and cotton. 
Gold, diamonds, tin and cobalt were the principal minerals exported. 
Consequently, the import capability was enhanced. From 1949 the 
government began speedy decontrol. The price control ordinance 
was rarely invoked during this period. The paucity of control 
orders stands as clear testimony. By early 1950 there were only 
30 items officially subject to control in the schedule. In practice, 
says Kimble, none of them was controlled (Kimble 1970). This 
can be compared with 50 classes of goods under control in 1946 
(Legislative Council Debates, Hansard 1951: 120). 
However, the policy move towards decontrol was shortlived. b 
An interplay of several factors combined to revive the controls in 1951. 
Let us examine these factors. These were: the outbreak of the 
Korean War 1949-53; expansion of government expenditure; publication 
of the cost of living report 1950 and the drought 1949. 
The Korean war interrupted the smooth f low of goods 
from Asia where a substantial amount of imported goods came from. 
The commodities affected by the war were textiles, leather goods, 
baby foods, household utensils and other imported foods. 
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The launch of the first Five Year Development Plan 
and the grant of substantial wage increases to civil servants 
in 1948 under the recommendations of the Holmes Commission increased 
government expenditure by a substantial amount. The drought of 
1949 impaired local food production and led to a terrible famine 
(commonly known as Okinjala" in Kiswahili i. e. year of famine). 
As a result of these developments there was a significant 
build up of inflationary pressure by 1951. A select committee 
was set up to examine the cost of living among Af rican manual 
workers. When the committee was first mooted there was a big 
movement among dock, railway and plantation workers in rousing 
public opinion about the cost of living. The report on cost of 
living was produced in 1950. This report and the details are 
so good and the suggestions were so comprehensive that the government 
was left in no doubt that controls had to be reintroduced. 
The select committee mentioned several instances of 
what had contributed to the cost of living. First, they established 
that the wage increases granted to workers were minimal and were 
not enough to pay for the cost of living. They found that while 
the price index of goods consumed by urban dwellers had gone 
up by 40% between 
'December 
1948-1949, the f igures of salaries 
J, 
and wages had risen by 4% only. A similar result could be derived 
from the general cost of living index compiled by the statistical 
department. While the general price index rose by 18% between 
1949-50 per capita incomes had risen by 10% only. The second 
aspect was rent. There was no rent control and, to borrow the 
words of the committee itself "there seemed to be no end to the 
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rise in rent* - Landlords raised rents every time there was a 
wage increase irrespective of the state of the premises. The third 
was prices of fresh foodstuffs and vegetables. The government 
did not control prices of these commodities. The problems brought 
by lack of control were bluntly summed up by the committee: 
The recent rise in coconut prices is very 
high indeed. Laymen who do not know the cost 
of producing coconut can certainly not understand 
how all of a sudden such big rises can take 
place and be justified (Legislative Council 
Debates, Motion of Price Control Bill, Hansard, 
1951: 241). 
Another point is that there seems to have been no coherent govern- 
ment policy on agricultural prices. In some cases prices were 
guaranteed whereas in others prices were allowed to fluctuate. 
It was difficult for consumers to find how some of the prices 
were fixed. Take the case of maize which was an essential item 
in the family budget. While the retail price to the consumer was 
Tsh 5.00 per tin the producer did not get more than f if ty cents 
per tin. The difference between the two prices was quite substantial. 
3.3.2(b) The Controls in Peace Time 1950-61: Changes in Policy 
and Institutions of Control 
The committee recommended the reimposition of price 
controls. The committee found that there was a link between rising 
prices and labour unrest especially in sisal plantations and 
urban areas. introducing the Second Reading to the Price Control 
Bill 1951 the Member for Finance did not specifically mention 
this fact. But there is no doubt he had this in mind when he 
said 
Hitherto price control has been effected 
by emergency legislation. It has been government 
policy since the war to reduce control of 
prices. Unfortunately world conditions are 
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such that it will not be possible to do without 
price control and it looks as if at the moment 
price control will have to be increased in 
scope rather than the opposite (Price Control 
Bill 1951,2nd Reading, Hansard, August 29 
1951). 
The publication of the report on rising costs of living among 
manual workers which blamed the problem on rising consumer prises 
was instrumental for the reimposition of price controls in 1951. 
There were several differences between the earlier 
ordinances and the 1951 ordinace. First, unlike the earlier orders 
and ordinaLnce, the powers of the price controller were this time 
limited to goods and services declared by the schedule. In the 
earlier legislation the necessity of control varied from time 
to time according to whether there was shortage of supply. That 
shortage of supply could be territory-wide or purely local. Second, 
there were detailed rules on the price-fixing methodology for 
imported, locally manufactured good and retail sales. The idea 
was to link prices to cost. The methodology was called "cost- 
price*. The government's reasons for changing from the control 
of traders' margins to the Ocost-price" rule were that control 
by percentage margins was a disincentive to traders to cut costs. 
Since traders were guaranteed profit irrespective of costs the 
consumer could be unfairly made to shoulder the burden of costs 
which were avoidable. Also, the percentage margins method offered 
temptations to traders to tamper with invoices to inf late costs - 
Moreover, the system of ad hoc controls was considered undesirable. 
It could lead to discriminatory and arbitrary decisions (Statement 
by Member of Finance, Hansard, August 29,1951). 
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A new system of fixing maximum prices was legislated 
under the 1951 ordinance for imported, locally manufactured goods 
and retail sales. 
In the case of imported goods, the "cost-price" was 
constituted by, "the f ree on board price at the port of shipment 
plus charges actually and necessarily incurred on shipping, freight, 
insurance, commission, import duties, handling and wharfage, 
clearing and forwarding and railage, or porterage, charges necessarily 
incurred", section 2(1) Price Control Ordinance 1951. 
The price controllers had power to disallow any cost 
item if they thought it had been unnecessarily incurred by the 
importer. The duty was on importers to guard against unnecessary 
costs. This provision was a big improvement compared to the 'cost- 
plus' rule in earlier legislation (i. e. under the 1948 regulations). 
For locally-manufactured goods the "cost-price" would 
comprise: the cost of "material plus wages and salaries, fuel 
and power; rent, rates and taxes incurred on the premises; plant 
and machinery maintenance incurred in the manufacture of that 
unit and duties", section 3. Again the costs had to be at a rate 
acceptable to the price controller; section 3(2). 
In the case of retailers (where goods changed ownership 
by sale f or the second or subsequent time) the "cost-price" to 
the seller consisted of "the net price paid for the unit plus 
the costs of transport ordinarily incurred on such unit plus 
cOst Of packing together with loss (if any) due to breakages 
-185- 
in transit", section 4. It seems to me that the 1951 Ordinance 
had a very rigorous cost criteria to guard against inefficiencies. 
The Principal Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce 
became the price controller. This took away the Governor's powers 
to appoint ad hoc price controllers. The idea was to equip the 
government with continuous price control powers. 
A National Price Control Advisory Board was also set 
up. It consisted of representatives from different sections of 
the society: the Chamber of Commerce (for whites), the Indian 
Merchant Chamber, the African Retail Merchants; one Liwali (chief), 
the Confederation of Labour and two members of the Legislative 
Council (to represent consumers). In the provinces, Regional 
Price Control Advisory Boards were established to advice the 
regional administrators. Some of the more stringent provisions 
in the preceding regulations were dropped. Those omitted included 
the provision which required traders to preserve their books 
of account for a fixed period; the rule compelling traders to 
give notice before ceasing to carry on business or ceasing to 
deal in price-controlled goods; the rule compelling traders to 
trade in essential commodities and also the regulation which 
made it criminal for traders to store price controlled goods 
in any place other than licenced premises. 
Overall, most of the provisions in the earlier legislation 
were retained. Some new provisions were enacted. The most significant 
ones were those which aimed at improving and strengthening the 
enforcement machinery. These were: Clause 4 which made it compulsory 
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for all traders (not just those supplying price controlled goods) 
to issue purchase receipts or invoices to customers. The object 
of this requirement was to enable the price controllers collect 
the necessary information in case any product came under their 
investigation. (There is no such rule under the Regulation of 
Prices Act 1973. ) There was also an incidental advantage in such 
a requirement in that where a large amount of cash trading had 
taken place there would be some records of that transaction and 
this acted as a safeguard to revenue. 
Clause 20 was another important addition. This clause 
empowered the price controller to certify as to what he considered 
to be the true cost-price where there was a dispute. Similarly, 
where a price overcharge had been alleged, but no proof was forthcoming, 
the controllers certificate as to What he considered to have 
been the amount of overcharge was admissible in a court of law 
as proof of the facts stated. Above all, a certificate of a price 
controller could be used as evidenct7--, sufficient to sustain a 
conviction on a charge of contravening the controlled prices. 
An authority to that effect is the cae of Jesang Papat v. R. 
[1949]. In this case the appelant had been convicted of selling 
goods at prices above those fixed, and published by the price 
controller. There was),,. no evidence that the order had been published 
'A 
L 
and publicly displayed as required by the rules. The price controller 
issued a certificate confirming the existence of the order and 
the fixed price. The price certified was lower than that charged 
by the appellant. It was held that the certificate of the controller 
I 
constituted sufficient proof of the matters certified. 
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Clause 16 of the regulations imPosed restrictions on 
the power to delegate authority for issuing control orders. For 
example, no junior officials could sign the control orders. That 
is not to say that the powers could not be exercised by persons 
other than those named in the Act. There is authority in the 
case of Shamji Harji v. R. [1941] for the proposition that a 
price control -order signed by the Secretary of the territory 
on behalf of the governor is valid and that the courts must take 
judicial notice of all laws and orders having the force of law 
([ 194 11 L. R. K. 77 (H. C. )). Therefore delegation of powers is 
permissible to some extent. Clause 16 introduced another important 
element in that the price controllers could only validly issue 
orders after consultation with and approval of the relevant Minister. 
There was no such safeguard in the earlier legislation. 
Clause 19 abolished the controllers' powers to conduct 
searches without a search warrant. Now a search warrant was essential. 
But exception was made in that if the controllers reasonably 
believed that the delay in obtaining a search warrant would defeat 
the purpose of the law such as giving an opportunity to traders 
to interfere with evidence e. g. removal of goods under investigation, 
they could conduct a search without a search warrant. In practice, 
however, the exception became the rule. Inspectors could always 
justify a search carried out without a search warrant on one 
or another reason (Legislative Council Debates, Prices of Goods 
Bill 1951, Hansard, 21 March 1951). 
The recommendation of the Select Committee on initiating 
"a policy of full physical control of the distribution of selected 
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consumer goods was rejected by the Legislative Council on the 
grounds that such control could only be effective where there 
is a very large enforcement staff -a resource which was not 
easily available locally and that the costs of implementing such 
a policy were prohibitive (Legislative Council Debates, Hansard, 
September 13,1951). 
With these amendments the Price Control Ordinance 1951 
was passed to replace the Price Control Ordinance 1920. A number 
of control orders were issued under the 1951 law covering a variety 
of incidental matters. These related to the procedures of publishing 
and bringing to the notice of the public the control orders. 
According to the case of Mwangi s/o Githigi and Another v. R. 
[19501, the price controllers had a duty to cause notice of the 
orders to be given to all persons who in their opinion ought 
to have such notices ([1950] L. R. K. 72). 
Other subsidiary legislation made under this ordinance 
covered the cost-price pricing system; the use of imperial measure- 
ments, etc. 
In conclusion we may note that the 1951 Ordinance relied 
heavily on administrators for implementation. An important aspect 
of this price control law was the wide discretionary powers it 
conferred on the administrators. The Price Control Ordinance 
1951 conferred on the controllers powers, which according to 
the words used, were limitless. Section 5 is a classic example 
of that wide discretion. It read: 
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The controller may from time to time by order 
published in the Gazette or displayed in 
a prominent position in the district headquarters 
of the district to which such order applies, 
prescribe the type of packing, weight, size, 
quality and the processing and ingredients 
of any goods manufactured in Tanganyika (Price 
Control Ordinance 1951). 
When a statute does not indicate any limits on the power, the 
courts are rendered incapable of controlling its exercise. The 
courts can only limit the exercise of a particular power within 
the boundaries set by the statute granting the power. Since in 
the common law tradition courts are required to f ind the meaning 
of a piece of legislation from the words used in the legislation 
itself, it would be difficult to see how they would be able to 
place limits on the exercise of a power which is plainly limitless. 
,. m 
The other marked feature of the price control legislation 
and administration during this period was the lack of formal 
machinery; the absence of detailed rules and provisions and reliance 
on voluntariness and cooperation. All powers under the Ordinance 
- of issuing control orders, apprehending and prosecuting violators 
and adjudication, were concentrated in the hands of administrators. 
And the courts, it seems, were prepared to entertain this anomaly 
under the pretext of giving priority to law and order. The case 
of Masumbuko s/o, Marida v. R. [19501, is instructive. The appellant 
had been convicted of selling meat with bones at a price in excess 
of the maximum fixed for the area. The price order was not published 
nor displayed. The prosecution was conducted by a District officer. 
The trial magistrate took judicial notice of the administrative 
acts of making such orders and convicted the accused. On appeal 
the conviction was upheld. The judge regretted that the magistrate 
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had not recorded that there had been no f ormal proof of the order 
and that a District officer had been permitted to conduct the 
prosecution but considered these infringements not enough to 
quash the conviction. 
Now this decision is obviously questionable in the 
light of the principles enumerated in an earlier case on similar 
facts in Takars Hirji v. R. [1950]. Here the court held that 
where the price of an article has been controlled by a local 
order and a contravention of that price restriction is alleged, 
there must be acceptable proof of the making of the order. Although 
the decision in Takars Hirji [19501 did not specify what would 
constitute acceptable proof, I think it would have been sensible 
to require that the maker of the order should display to the 
public what orders he had made. No magistrate or court is entitled 
to take judicial (or rather official) notice of a legal order 
whose existence has not been established. At least the court 
should have insisted evidence should be laid before it to show 
that the notice f ixing the price of meat of that grade had been 
duly displayed. It is paradoxical to note that although such 
principles were well-established in other common law jurisdictions, 
some judges in Tanzania chose to ignore them. 
We should also note that enforcing the control orders 
was difficult. For one, the government had no specialised agency 
for the control task. The controls were ad hoc. Also there was 
lack of cooperation f rom traders and consumers. Traders resorted 
to devices such as substandard measurements and lowering of quality 
to evade the controls. Consumers were not an organised group 
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and could not easily be mobilised to assist in enforcement due 
to deficiencies in education, mobility, communication. It is 
only a small section of the literate urban community who benefitted 
from the controls. This is probably why only a few cases reached 
the courts during this period. 
On the other hand, there was no mandatory duty on the 
administrators to enforce their control orders. Much dependend 
on the enthusiasm of individual district administrators. The 
position was therefore that virtually all enforcement, either 
under the general controls of the principal ordinance or in relation 
to specific local orders, was undertaken by few administrators. 
This is borne out by f ew prosecutions in respect of price controls 
and probably af ew hundred cautions meted throughout the country. 
The main regret is that the majority of administrative officers 
paid little regard to the plight of consumers. The law, according 
to Martin, was left to be observed or unobserved as traders wished 
(Martin, 1974: 114). 
3.4. The Independence Period 1961-1967 
The trends in price controls instituted between 1961- 
67 can best be appreciated if we examine the nature of the social- 
economic relations obtaining in the economy on the eve of independence 
and the attempts that were made by the political leadership to 
readjust inequities inherited from the arrangements constructed 
in the past. In this regard we need to examine: First, the f orces 
. 
that were instrumental in pushing f or changes; second, the nature 
of the economic and Political conflicts that emerged after inde- 
pendence and the manner in which they interacted to produce the 
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legislative response that characterises. this period. 
It will be argued that although the main stimulus for 
the current law lay in the unusually inflationary pressures of 
the 1970-72 period, the long term or basic cause lies in the 
socialist policy adopted since February 1967. Socialist ideology 
has one of its basic principles a belief in social and economic 
control. It will be shown, for example, that while the controls 
imposed between 1961-1967 emerged chiefly in response to specific 
needs as they arose, little attempt being made to formulate a 
comprehensive and coherent policy designed to control the general 
price level, a clearer policy, with distinct objectives was adopted 
in 1973. 
3.4.1. The Social Context 1961-67: -The Search for Readjustment 
within the Inherited Patterns of Economic Operations 
On the eve of independence in 1961 Tanganyika is said 
to have inherited a thriving capitalist economy (Rweyemamu 1973, 
Coulson 1982). The impressive economic growth recorded successively 
during the first five years of independence are cited as evidence 
of that (Acharya 1982). It is I'said for example, that the annual 
rate of growth in the total GDP averaged 5 per cent between 1961- 
1966; agricultural production grew at 3 per cent; gross domestic 
.1 10 
investment at 15 per cent and gross domestic savings at 17 per 
cent (Acharya 1982: 120). 
What is important to note is that the economy was controlled 
and managed by foreign business interests (Shivji 1976). That 
.. 
is to say, political independence, and indigenous political leadership 
0 
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for that matter, had not brought with it economic independence. 
For economic independence to exist, there has to be effective 
national ownership, control and management of the economy - the 
sort of situation where there is effective public control over 
the key sectors of the economy like manufacturing, commerce, 
banking, transport and agriculture as well as a diversification 
of external economic links. More importantly, economic independence 
requires the establishment of af irm local industrial structure 
leading to a self-generating and self-sustaining growth. These 
conditions did not exist in Tanzania (Rweyemamu 1973). On the 
contrary, the thrust of policy during the first five years of 
independence was to maintain and preserve colonial ties. Such 
a policy was considered necessary for three main reasons: The 
first was the belief that good relationship with the former colonial 
powers would help bring about political stability and economic 
development. Thus military links and economic ties with the UK 
and West Germany were f irmly kept. This relationship was expected 
to create the conditions necessary for the second aspect - the 
attraction of foreign investors. It was then assumed that the 
combined effect of political stability and foreign investment 
would establish in the territory conditions needed for economic 
growth. This would give the government a guaranteed and easily 
collectable revenue from local industries which would forestall 
the political risks of increased taxation on the people. 
The policy documents outlining the economic development 
strategy for 1961-1966 heavily reflect this thinking. The government's 
three year development plan 1961-1963 (derived from the World 
Bank Report 1960 and the Arthur D. Little Report 1961) assumed 
-194- 
that the impulse to economic development would come primarily 
from foreign investors and that all that was needed was to create 
a local environment hospitable to foreign interests. Thus the 
Foreign Investments Protection Act 1961 was passed guaranteeing 
the security of foreign investments from nationalisation. Moreover, 
the Development plan left foreign investors to operate freely 
without even regulating ownership patterns, production techniques, 
pricing, or product mix. On top of that, the government established 
the Tanganyika Industrial Development Corporation (the predecessor 
of the modern National Development Corporation) to serve as an 
agent through which f oreign investments could be channelled to 
private enterprises. It was hoped that the corporation would 
promote the emergence of an indigeneous capitalist class (Coulson 
1982). 
As a result of these policies we see that the institutional 
arrangements inherited on independence were preserved. Because 
of historical links, British firms had a dominant influence. 
Domination of the economic and social institutions by the UK was 
further enhanced by habits and acquaintances; commercial, educational 
as well as other semi-institutionalised heritages which made 
local firms continually biased towards Britain for exports and 
imports. The Commonwealth preferential system of trade and the 
sterling exchange facility which converted the shilling into 
the pound tended to conf ine trade links to Britain (Rweyemamu 
1973) . 
on the political front, the control of the state machinery 
. 
was handed over to a local petty bourgeois -group comprising 
the -,.. * 
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educated elite, small businessmen, chiefs and the military (Shivji 
1976). This class of political rulerswas economically weak as 
it constituted, what Fanon has described as an, mundeveloped 
middle class with practically no economic power". Consequently 
it continued to rely on the "mother country to defend its interests" 
and is thus a "client class in the service of imperialism" (Fanon 
1984: 120). The main preoccupation of the political leaders in 
the immediate post-independence period was consolidation of political 
power. 
Legal institutions inherited from the colonial structures 
were also preserved. In the constitutional sphere, the Independence 
Constitution 1961, embodying the Westminster system of parliamentary 
democracy an independent judiciary and a system of checks and 
balances between organs of the stateý- was retained. The continued 
application of the law enacted during the colonial period was 
ensured by Article 5 of the Republic Act 1962. The existing law 
as defined in that article included: "the substance of common 
law; the doctrines of equity and Statutes of General Application 
in force in England on August 22,1920" so far as these were 
appropriate to the local circumstances (Juidicature Act 1962). 
Hiller and Sawyer say the common law applicable was English common 
law (Hiller and Sawyer 1971) and not local law. Also, in practice, 
English law was taken as applicable in all circumstances. The 
proviso limiting application to local circumstances was in most 
cases redundant. It is significant to note that although the 
content of English law applicable has now diminished to a consider- 
able extent due to local legislation and localisation of judiciary, 
-the influence of English 
decisions has not altogether ceased. For one 
the reception clause 
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has been left intact by each of the constitutional amendments 
since independence. The f if th amendment 1984 has preserved the 
reception clause (The Constitution, (Consequential Transitional 
Provisions) Act 1984, Article 5(l)). Moreover, other conduits 
like use of English texts and manuals; statutes modelled on English 
law and personnel trained in English institutions make the influence 
of English law unavoidable. 
These economic, social and legal arrangements, says 
Shivji, put Tanzania in a neo-colonial situation (Shivji 1984). 
According to Mamdani, the essential characteristics of a neo- 
colony is a state of dependency on, and domination by economic 
interests in the imperialist centres. Mamdani argues: 
How again are we to understand an independence 
which leaves the key-economic life lines 
of a country in the hands of imperialist 
interests, which leaves intact the instruments 
of colonial repression and leaves the colonial 
army untouched simply changing its title 
from Kings African Rifles and gives them 
national titles. Such an economy is a neo- 
colonial economy. Such a state is a neo- 
colonial state (Mamdani 1982: 22). 
This situation was not acceptable to some radical elements 
especially in the ruling party (TANU), the trade union and youth 
organisation to whom independence carried the promise of a better 
future for the majority. The government came under increasing 
pressure and criticism for its failure to bring about rapid African- 
isation of the economy; to create more employment opportunities; 
to develop backward areas and improve the social welfare of the 
workers. The dissatisfaction with government policy on these 
matters assumed a confrontational approach when a group of radical 
Parliamentarians disagreed openly with the Prime Minister over 
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the slow pace of indigenisation of the economy and the civil 
service (Rweyema, 7, u 1973, Wambali 1985: 32). At the same time harmony 
within the government was threatened as the six Parliamentarians 
who had taken the government to task were stripped of their party 
membership and lost their seats in parliament. It seems these 
disgraced members had support from radical elements in the trade 
unions and the army. For their dismissal was followed by an attemptd 
coup and nationwide labour strikes. 
The trade unions had three grievances against the political 
leadership. First, the wage differentials that existed between 
categories of employment and between the private and public sector 
(Acharya 1982). What annoyed the leftists most was the emergence 
of a class of senior civil servants who were accorded the salary 
structure inherited from the Europeans. A characteristic of the 
salary structure was that it bore no sensible relationship to 
the average standard of living. Kamarck points out that the salary 
gap between the top civil servant and that of an unskilled labourer 
in the same government department in 1964 was 90: 1. The gap f or 
similar categories of employment in USA and the UK was 5: 1 (Kamarck 
1971: 74). Senior civil servants also enjoyed other privileges 
like housing allowances, car subsidies and access to credit facilities 
from financial institutions which enabled them to enter into 
property earning activities. These privileges were attacked by 
trade union and political party activists who argued that the 
new leaders had just stepped into the shoes of the colonial masters 
grabbing privileges for themselves and were doing nothing to 
evolve policies that would cater for the real needs of the majority. 
According to Babu (an ex-cabinet minister) the privileges which 
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the new political elite established for themselves had little 
to do with improving their efficiency. Babu argues 
these unheard of privileges of every kind 
were all designed to instill subservience 
among the people. And the new rulers topped 
it off with enormous state powers, easily 
open to abuse in the hands of political novices. 
These were the things that contributed to 
the widening gulf between the leaders and 
the people; and the less they understood 
the real needs of the people and gradually 
evolved policies which had no relevance to 
the masses (Babu 1981: 6). 
These social and political pressures set the tone and tempo of 
the legislative responses of this period. To contain opposition 
the government strengthened executive powers and tried to weaken 
trade union autonomy. 
The f irst target in the governments move was to weaken 
the Westminster type of Parliamentary democracy. First, there 
was an increase in the number of Parliamentarians whose election 
lay directly or indirectly in the hands of the President. According 
to Shivji the proportion of members appointed to those democratically 
elected was 2: 3 (Shivii 1984). But even among those elected, 
the President's influence in their ultimate nomination was immense. 
For the President was also Chairman of TANU. He could influence 
the National Executive Committee which had the final say in vetting 
Parliamentary candidates. 
Parliament also lost its sovereignty to the executive 
when the then Prime Minister declared that *Parliament belongs 
to TANU' and the notion that "Parliament is supreme is an unacceptable 
Colonial hang over" (Hansard 1968: 2534). Of course many experts 
an the constitution were surprised by this anouncement and were 
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prepared to dismiss it as a piece of political sloganeering at 
that stage. For all purposes the Interim Constitution 1965 made 
clear demarcations between the scope of government and that of 
the political party. But the final nail in the coffin of Parliamentary 
sovereignty was hammered in 1977 when an amendment to the Constitution 
instigated by the party declared that the "Party (CCM) is supreme 
and all organs of state" must conduct their activities in line 
with party policies (Article 3(2), Constitution 1984). The long 
term implications of this provision on the operations of Parliament 
and the judiciary are yet to be seen. But there can be no doubt 
that the political party is determined to stamp its authority 
on all state institutions. 
To reduce areas of conflict the government also rejected 
any suggestion that it legislate a Bill of Rights into the ConstitutioA 
The government's explanation was that such a Bill was no guarantee 
that the rights proclaimed would actually be uphead. On the contrary 
such Bill according to the Government's view would invite conflicts 
between the executive and judiciary and would block rapid imple- 
mentation of government programmes. As an alternative to such 
a charter the government's view was that adequate safeguards existed 
in the judiciary: 
the rule of law is best maintained not by 
formal guarantees in a Bill of Rights .... 
but by an ' independent judiciary administering 
justice free from political pressure (Report 
on Establishment of One Party State, 1965: 
30-32). 
Clearly one can question whether such an independent judiciary 
does exist within the political framework of this country, as 
3. The position has since then changed. A Bill of Rights was legislated into the 
' Constitution 1984, Articles 12-26, Part III, by Act 15,1984. 
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I am afraid of developing countries, as a whole. Take the case 
of judicial appointments. All appeal and high court judges are 
appointed by the President, with advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission. The members of the commission are also Presidential 
appointees. In these circumstances it is difficult to avoid the 
instinctive inference that preference will be given to those 
sympathetic to government Policies. The president has also power 
to remove judges. But since removal is subject to stringent consti- 
tutional procedures, reassignment to non-judicial functions is 
device commonly used to get rid of less compliant judges (Peter 
1980). It should be added that direct executive interference 
of the judiciary is not an unknown phenomenon. In Lesinoi Ndeinai 
v. Regional Police Commander (Arusha) [1979] a High Court judge 
complained publicly about executive interference to try to force 
him to make a decision favourable to the government. President 
Nyerere himself personnaly dismissed a magistrate in Mwarnza 
(Martin 1974). 
On the trade union front, the government introduced 
a series of laws to break the power of uniopists. It was firmly 
beIieved that the trade union structure as influenced by the 
British experience, was undesirable. With a total loss of 417000 
man days through stoppages (i. e. four times higher) in 1962 compared 
with 113000 man days lost in 1961 and a threat of more strikes 
coming the government acted swiftly, but harshly, to curb trade 
union autonomy. The most notable laws were: the Regulation of 
Wages and Employment Act 1961 which gave the government power 
to prescribe minimum wages and determine wage increases in the 
civil servicel the NUTA Establishment Act 1964 which abolished 
all independent trade unions and established one union under 
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the supervision of the party; the Trade Union Act 1965 which 
placed union funds under government control and the Permanent 
Labour Tribunal Act 1967 which removed the right to organise 
and take industrial action and instituted a system of compulsory 
arbitration. 
With these laws trade union autonomy ended and workers 
had lost their spokesman. Opposition and radicalism on university 
campuses was dealt a blow in 1970 when student unions were abolished. 
All student activities are conducted under CCM-Youth - the youth 
wing of the party. Above all, graduates from colleges and other 
institutions of higher learning have to undergo one year of compulsory 
military service where they are taught, among others, party ideology 
and socialist ethics. 
It was clear that the government would find it difficult 
to convince the public about the justification for its harsh 
measures without taking corresponding action to improve their 
welfare. Accordingly programmes to redress imbalances and inequities 
in the inherited political, social and economic patterns were 
initiated. The objective here was to achieve short term changes. 
The principal ref orms included: the Af ricanisation of the economy 
-a process which saw simple school teachers becoming managers 
or top civil servants; expansion of employment; more equitable 
redistribution of public expenditure and public investment in 
health, education and social services. A housing programme f or 
low income workers was started by establishing the National Housing 
Corporation in 1962. The aim was to accelerate the construction 
of low cost housing and social centres. Health and medical services 
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in government hospitals were made f ree. The provision of health 
centres in every village and clean water became state responsibility. 
Education was made free at all levels. Subsidies to the agricultural 
sector as well as to basic consumer goods were instituted. 
These measures inevitably led to an unprecedented growth 
in public expenditure and earnings. The impact was partly reflected 
in the acceleration in the price level. There can be no doubt 
that the measures generated imbalances in the existing economic 
variables - that is between money supply, the volume of production. 
the level of employment and state budget. The imbalance caused 
by changes in the relationship between these variables caused 
distortions in the price level. 
3.4.2. The Incomes, Wages and Prices Policy 1967-1972 
By 1967 it became clear that there was need to have 
a clear and comprehensive policy that would constitute a blue- 
print f or wages, incomes, prices, productivity and investment 
programmes. The tensions generated by the policies pursued between 
1961 and 1966 were threatening to throw the political situation 
into chaos, especially the labour strikes, the attempted military 
coup 1964 and student protests. The government also faced pressure 
from the powerful business community for not taking action to 
curb trade union militantism. 
The government sought assistance of the ILO in formulating 
a policy that would accommodate these various interests reasonably. 
The ILo entrusted its mission to Professor H. Turner, a CaT-, ', -Iridge 
University economist, who had undertaken a similar assignment 
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from the Zambian government. Professor Turner's assignment by 
the ILO seems to be a natural choice. He had published a leading 
article on the question of 'Price, Wages, Incomes and Productivity' 
and their interlinkages. The findings of that paper seemed to 
contain solutions relevant to the problems f acing many developing 
countries at this time on the above issues (see Turner, H. (1966), 
Incomes, Wages, and Price Policies, ILO Reports Series 70). 
The terms of reference given to Turner by the government 
were: "to advise the government in the formulation of a national 
policy in regard to incomes, wages and prices" (Government Paper 
1967: 1, hereinafter referred to as the 'Turner Report'). 
The terms went on to emphasize that the policy must, "give due 
consideration, on one hand, to the requirement of economic growth 
and the national plan; and on the other to the desirability of 
making sure that the present restraints on money incomes and 
future increases in incomes made possible by economic growth 
are shared equitably among different groups" (Turner Report 1967: 
2). 
From a reading of these guidelines, the mission was 
required to work out a policy that would strike a balance between 
the need to raise productivity; to keep the price level stable, 
to keep money incomes in line with increases in real national 
output and to maintain an equitable distribution of social and 
economic welfare, without jeopardising the country's social and 
political strategy of development. This last condition was a 
serious limitation since, as the mission complains in its report, 
it "prevented us from broadening our scope of inquiry into the 
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political and administrative practicability of our policy proposals" 
(Turner Report 1967: 2). This remark by the mission suggests 
that the policy proposals they put to the government were not 
properly evaluated in terms of their viability within the context 
of Tanzania. 
In the course of their inquiry the mission found out 
that there were wide disparities of income between various groups 
in the economy. Income inequalities existed between manual and 
skilled labour; between people of similar qualifications in different 
enterprises; between employees in the same department; between 
workers and peasants as well as between public and private sector 
employment. Moreover, they found that there was no clear cut 
government policy to bridge these gaps. In addition, the report 
noted that there was no relationship between pay policies and 
productivity. For example, while wages had risen by 80 per cent 
between 1961-1966, labour productivity had risen by 15 per cent 
only in the same period. 
on prices, the report established that there had been 
a fast increase in consumer prices between 1961-67. These 
fast 
increases had been caused mainly by increases in labour costs, 
in prices of raw materials and in transport and energy costs. 
But the report also pointed out that the percentage increase 
in the price level bore no sensible proportion to the mild 
increases 
in the costs recorded by those factors suggesting that some elements 
of a non-economic type might have aggravated the situation. 
This 
was interpreted as meaning that unscrupulous 
traders were raising 
prices (Kuuya 1975, Curry 1978). 
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In the peasant sector, the Turner report concluded 
that by 1967 peasant producer-prices had fallen in real terms 
below their 1961 level. It noted that peasants were being paid 
less for their produce compared to the money the marketing boards 
were making f rom the same products by way of administrative and 
marketing deductions -a conclusion also shared by studies from 
other sources (Temu 1971). Furthermore, it was pointed out that 
peasants were paying more for industrial products than workers 
did for peasant produce, thus tilting the urban-rural terms of 
trade in favour of urban dwellers. 
On the basis of these findings, and with a view to 
redressing the imbalances, the Turner report put f orward several 
recommendations. The most relevant ones f or purposes of our study 
were those touching on wages and prices. 
On wages, and incomes, the report recommended a period 
of restraint except where increases could be justified by particularly 
compelling reasons. It urged that all wage increases should be 
linked to productivity. But even where productivity had increased, 
a wage increase should not exceed 5 per cent per annum. The report 
recommended a system of compulsory notification of all proposed 
pay increase claims. 
With regard to prices, the report suggested a piece- 
meal approach. It proposed a restricted regulatory framework 
whereby there would be legal control of prices of, "monopolistic 
enterprises or of items of normal requirements for low income 
groups" (Turner Report 1967t 94). Any suggestion for comprehensive 
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price controls was completely discouraged. The report warnods 
It would seem best to proceed first in a 
way which does not involve great administrative 
operationsl and which attempts to enlist 
the cooperation of buyers as far as possible 
(ibid. 94). 
Looking at the recommendations on wage controls and those on 
prices one can notice a clear imbalance in the author's approach. 
They seemed to take a tough line to wage increases and a rather 
soft stand on price controls. I find it hard to explain the rationale 
for this difference. Both wages and prices are linked since they 
have a direct impact on each other. 
Suffice it to note that the Turner report could by 
no means offer adequate solutions. For one, it was based on inadequate 
data and information. For example, the mission was given four 
months within which to present its findings. I doubt whether 
such a time would be enough to collect adequate and detailed 
information on all the social and economic aspects mentioned 
above, especially considering the fact that the mission was undertaken 
by foreigners. For the other, the authors of the report relied 
solely on government sources for information. Their primary sources 
like the Bureau of Statistics; the Ministry of Commerce and Industries 
and other government agences have been severly criticised for 
keeping outdated, incomplete, inconsistent and unreliable information 
by World Bank staff (World Development, 1981: 167-170). Overall, 
the report did not address itself to basic issues like the changes 
in the social and political environment brought by the Arusha 
Declaration; the nature of social stratification; the level (low) 
of economic information; the weaknesses in the consumer class 
(unorganised, illiterate, poor and immobile) and the nature of 
production. All of these elements needed to be properly evaluated 
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against their proposals on a limited price regulatory system. 
Nevertheless, the government accepted most of the recommen- 
dations and incorporated them in Government Paper 4,1967. It 
took immediate action to put into ef f ect. the recommendation on 
wage restraint. A law was passed to establish the Permanent Labour 
tribunal (under the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act 1967). The 
function of the tribunal was to examine particular pay claims 
and productivity behaviour and advise the government on whether 
or not such pay increases should be granted. Enterprises were 
required to register productivity targets with the tribunal at 
the beginning of every year. The registration of such productivity 
targets has always been a contentious issue. It is possible, 
for example, for employers to register a target far higher than 
employees can achieve and thereby effectively block any wage 
increase. It is also possible to register a target which can 
easily be surpassed. On the other hand, a target can be exceeded 
by occurence of unexpected circumstances. A typical case was 
that of the Bank of Tanzania in 1980. The employees surpassed 
their targets by several hundred per cent due to increased government 
borrowing to pay for war. When the employees demanded a pay increase, 
in addition to bonuses, the nation was outraged and the employees 
were condemned for exploiting the public. 
Surprisingly, the recommendation on controlling prices 
even on its moderate terms was completely ignored. Instead the 
government opted for a casual approach. As an interim measure 
the government set up an interministerial task force called the 
National Price Control Advisory Board. It comprised representatives 
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from trade industry, parliament, the party, the State Trading 
Corporation and the goverment. Its main duty was to create conditions 
favourable to sustained economic growth by monitoring increases 
in wages and prices. 
Noticeably absent in the Task Force were consumer repre- 
sentatives. The fact that this important partner had been left 
out of the team was hardly acknowledged at all, still less regarded 
as an af f ront to society. Particularly so since there was already 
a movement in Daresalaam, especially among house wives, through 
the women's organisation (U. W. T. ) in rousing public opinion about 
the cost of living. But since then the movement seems to have 
deteriorated into rather what one might call ineptitude because 
very little has been done by this group except to publish af ew 
views and articles in the papers (Sunday News, Daresalaam, December 
29,1985) . 
The specific role of the board was to act as adviser 
to the Ministry of Commerce on the consumer items that needed 
to be brought under control. Presumably the control was exercised 
under the provisions of the Price Control Ordinance 1951. The 
board set up some defined criteria on price increases. Firms 
were permitted to increase prices where: (a) business could not 
restrain or absorb increased costs; (b) receipts were inadequate 
to maintain efficiency and undertake investment; (c) output per 
employee could not rise fast enough to keep pace with justif iable 
rises in pay; (d) there had been unavoidable increases in non- 
'labour or capital costs which could not be absorbed, and (e) 
if the enterprise was not able to secure suf f icient capital (Green 
1980). The government would refer cases to the board and use 
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the delaying powers under which price settlements could be delayed 
for up to six months to maintain a stable price level. 
In some cases the board managed to promote legislation 
to control the prices of specific commodities. These included: 
the Soft Drinks Act 1968 which fixed the prices for soft drinks; 
the Sales Tax (Prevention of Price Increases) Acts 1969 and 1970 
which prevented traders from automatically transferring the burden 
of taxation on to consumers unless the criterion set above was 
satisfied; the Textile (Prices Stability) Act 1970 prescribing 
maximum prices for selected textiles and the Locally Manufactured 
Goods (Prices) Act 1972 which controlled the prices of some industrial 
products. Meanwhile the prices of certain basic items of low- 
income earner's consumption (maize meal, sugar, salt, bread, 
rice) were controlled by individual marketing boards (Temu 1971). 
The pricing policy for such items was regulated by statutory 
rules in the Acts establishing the specific commodity boards 
such as the National Milling Corporation Act 1968 which handled 
and controlled the prices of grain. 
The prices of export commodities considered vital sources 
of f oreign exchange earnings were placed under the Economic Committee 
of the Cabinet which fixed prices in- consultation with the relevant 
marketing boards and the cooperative societies. Among the crops 
falling within cabinet control were coffee, cotton, tea and sisal. 
Public corporations rendering services in transport, 
shipping, banking, communication, water and electricity, were 
WVowered to fix charges for their services subject to approval 
-210- 
by government. Local price control committees were set up in 
each province to control prices of fresh produce - meat, fish 
and vegetables. In some instances, price increases were halted 
through direct administrative intervention of political leaders. 
An example is the case of meat and coconut prices in Daresalaam 
in the Christmas of 1968 when the Regional Commissioner ordered 
these goods to be sold at pre-Christmas level (Kimble 1970). 
What we find in the 1961-67 period is, therefore, a 
dispersal of price control powers and the mushrooming of control 
agencies. 
In conclusion we may say that the Turner report 1967 
laid the foundations for the modern wages, incomes and prices 
policy in Tanzania. 
3.4-3. The Arusha Declaration 1967: Social and Economic Control 
In February 1967 a comPetely new development came. 
President Nyerere formally declared socialism through the Arusha 
Declaration in a very unexpected manner. The public did not know 
in advance and there was no public debate on the relevance of 
socialism to Tanzania. It can be taken from the mass support 
that the declaration received that there was no opposition to 
this declaration. One authority has suggested that the reason 
for the lack of prior public debate was to forestall any possibility 
of foreign interests sabotaging the policy (Martin, 1974: 48). 
The Arusha Declaration's major propositions were: national- 
isation of basic wealth (hitherto mainly under control of f oreign 
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imperialist capital) - industry, commerce, banks, insurance, 
foreign trade and infra structural sectors. On the whole it concen- 
trated on attacking private ownership of the major means of production, 
the establishment of a predominantly state-ownership and a controlled 
private sector. The policy was given ef f ect by a series of pieces 
of legislation commonly known as the nationalisation laws 1967. 
In passing these laws, Parliament had barely any more than a 
purely formal role in enacting what the party had worked out 
behind closed doors. In such a short period members could not 
have considered, let alone, debated the details of the Acts involved. 
This position illustrates the weakening in the position of Parliament 
(Martin 1974). 
With this declaration came the process of structural 
transformation of the economy. First, came the change in the 
type of ownership of the means of production between the private 
sector and the public sector - with a high degree of concentration 
in public sector. Second, there was an increase in the direct 
role of the state in the economy, both as a producer and consumer 
-a role acquired in its capacity as owner, manager and administrator 
of the nationalised industries. The economic role of the state 
also expanded through its control of import procurement, distribution, 
purchase of agricultural products and provision of inf rastructural 
services. Third, there were attempts to assert economic independence 
- to diversify the relations of the domestic economic sectors 
to the international economic system. Trade relations with socialist 
countries were improved. 
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These changes brought disequilibrium in the economy 
with profound consequences on the price level. First, although 
the state sector had been transformed into a dominant sector 
it was incompetent. It had not been adequately prepared to face 
the challenging job of running the economy. This was clearly 
seen in the State Trading Corporations. Studies conducted in 
the State Trading Corporation - which was largely blamed for 
the shortage in consumer goods and rising prices, showed that 
the corporation had been created with a weak financial structure. 
It had been started without equity capital. Its sole shareholder, 
the Treasury, floated it without capital. It was left to commence 
its operations by inheriting assets and liabilities of nationalised 
businesses. Most of the owners of the nationalised enterprises 
had managed to transfer their assets out leaving the corporation 
to inherit the liabilities. A repott by McKinsey, an American 
consultancy firm, found the management of the state trading corporation 
sorely lacking and inefficient (The Economist Intelligence Unit 
1972: 7). The corporation's accounting records were described 
by Cooper Brothers (UK Ltd) as in a mess. A Parliamentary probe 
committee concluded that the corporation had no experience in 
export and import trade. For example, there were stocks of unsaleable 
qoods worth Tsh 700,000.00, and quantities of one item had been 
imported to the value of Tsh. 60 million enough to last ten years. 
f 
This suggested a lack of market research. The problems of the 
corporation were compounded by government policy which insisted 
that the corporation should offer cheap services regardless of 
profit. Second, there was a near collapse in private capital 
investment caused by abandonment of projects in progress, flight 
. of 
foreign currency, lack of reinvestment and price speculation. 
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Third, there was a breakdown in the distribution network caused 
by direct sabotage of production and transport as those who stood 
to lose in the changes tried to hit back by interfering with 
the distribution system by hoarding of commodities and to a signifi- 
cant extent, blocking imports. In most cases the state enterprises 
continued to depend on sources established by the former owners 
of the businesses for imports. Where the owners happened to be 
subsidiaries, the holding companies could easily interfere with 
the supply. 
The state sector also faced other problems. One was 
failure to establish a functional unity within itself. The other 
was its inability to control and guide the dwindling, but strong, 
private sector, especially in construction, road haulage and 
retail trade. 
The inefficiencies of the public sector together with 
other constraints imposed by the economic and political environment 
both internally and externally, resulted in a completely different 
type of economic behaviour with immense influence on the inflationary 
spiral. The situation was aggravated by other policy measures 
such as disruption in peasant production caused by the villagisation 
programmes, escalation in government expenditure and to a significant 
extent by adverse weather (Kuuya, 1975. - 8; Curry, 1978. - 16). 
The degree of imbalances generated in the economy by 
these developments were partly seen in the rise in consumer prices 
as well as the cost of living index. From Table 2 it is clear 
that the level of prices in general, and for specific commodities 
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TABLE 2: Retail Price Index of Goods Consumed by 
Minimum Wage Earners in Daresalaam (July 1969: 100)_ 
YEAR ALL ITEMS FOOD 
1966 93.0 98.2 
1967 95.4 99.9 
1968 98.9 101.3 
1969 100.0 100.0 
1970 103.7 103.3 
1971 107.4 108.5 
1972 118.6 120.1 
1973 129.3 135.1 
1974 169.0 177.2 
1975 248.5 265.8 
1976 306.7 328.0 
1977 358.4 386.3 
1978 418.7 463.1 
1979 437.3 473.0 
1980 669.2 560.1 
1981 815.3 888.5 
1982 1007.0 1061.0 
1983 1184.0 1162.0 
1984 1220.0 1207.0 
SOURCE: Central Statistical Bureau Daresalaam. 
in particular began to acquire a persistent upward swing in 1968 
gained acceleration in the 1970 Is and showed no signs of abating 
throughout the early part of the 1980's. For example, the retail 
price index for food consumed by minimum wage earners in Daresalaam 
rose sharply. From a bare 93 points in 1966 it shot up to 129.3 
in 1973. The index of prices for food also rose sharply from 
98.2 points in 1966 to 135.1 in 1973. The cost of living index 
also went up rapidly. Statistics for middle grade civil servants 
show that the cost of living for goods and services consumed 
in urban centres went up from 96.0 points in 1966 to 225.7 in 
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1976. For high income earners the cost of living rose from 90.8 
points in 1966 to 113.0 in 1973. 
Statistical evidence also shows that there 
are significant differences between the inflationary tendencies 
before 1966 and those after. While the price rises that occured 
before 1966 were relatively infrequent and small in magnitude 
those after 1966 have been rapid and remarkably longer. Also 
the causes were quite different. If we examine the inflationary 
trends over the recent past the following subperiods and the 
causes of the inflationary pressures emerge: 
From 1961-1966 there was relatively low inflation estimated 
to be 5% on annual average. Prices were stable (Green 1980). 
From 1967-1972 we find a high build up of inflationary pressure. 
Prices rose rapidly and quite frequently. The period 1961-1964 coincided 
with the first Five Year Development Plan. The plan 
necessitated massive public expenditure in infra-structural and 
social services - road and communication network; education and 
health; the end of the sisal and coffee boom (whose prices began 
,, 
f diplomatic relations with major to plumet) ; and the break down o 
western investors - Britain in 1965 and West Germany 
in 1966 
(Hoskyins 1968: 446). This knocked off a substantial inflow 
of economic aid. It' also coincided with national isatidn. The 
uncertainty in the atmosphere for foreign investment created 
by nationalisation laws reduced the inflow of foreign capital. 
By 1971/73 inflation had accelerated. This was compounded by 
the oil price ris. es of 1973 which meant more expenditure on oil. 
Then followed -devaluation of the shilling 
in 1974. The situation 
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was worsened by the inefficiencies of the State Trading corporation 
which became the focus of condemnation by Parliament and other 
agencies (Hansard, April 25,1972: 296; Economist, Intelligence 
Unit, June 1972). The period covering 1974-78 saw unusually high 
inflation. The contributing factors were a decline in peasant 
production caused partly by forced removal into new village settle- 
ment to speed up the building of socialism, the abolition of 
cooperative societies in 1976 and their replacement by costly 
crop authorities, the breakdown of the East Af rican community 
in 1977 which necessitated huge investments in transport and 
communication to provide services hitherto provided by the community 
using facilities located mainly in Kenya. From 1979 to date the 
upward trend persisted. There was no significant reduction in 
prices. In general the period was characterised by a sharp decline 
in prices of primary commodities (Helliener 1983); the war with 
Idi Amin 1978 and 1979; floods in 1979 followed by drought 1980/81 
and to a significant measure, economic mismanagement (Nyerere 
1986, Budget Speech 1986/87, para. 41; UNCTAD Report 1984, Document 
TD/B/1027, p. 210). 
The degree to which the rising prices eroded the incomes 
of various sections of the community is clearly shown by the 
cost of living index. The losses of incomes in real terms varied 
from one group to another, but in all cases they were substantial. 
For example, between 1968 and 1971 the real value of the income 
of the minimin wage earner fell drastically from 100.00 points 
in 1969 to 93.0 in 1971 despite wage increases. The incomes registered 
a substantial increase in real terms between 1972 and 1974. This 
period coincided with the imposition of price controls in September 
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1973 in particular their vigorous and enthusiastic enforcement 
and wage increases granted in July 1974. However, there was a 
steady decline in real earnings after 1976. This was probably 
due to escalation in consumer prices caused by scarcities and 
ineffectiveness of the price control organs: For the top salary 
earners, the official government policy since 1967 was a freeze 
on salaries. At the same time income tax was made progressive 
and duties on consumer luxuries were raised. Assuming that they 
consumed most of the commodities classified as luxuries - beer, 
cars, fridges, cigarettes and wines - the tax duties on these 
ranged from 30% on beer to 500% on television sets under the 
Sales Tax Act 1969. As a result of the salary freeze, income 
tax and taxes on luxuries, the real value of incomes and hence 
standard of living declined steeply. For example, their incomes 
lost by 20% between 1968-1972 and then by 79% between 1968 - 
1980 (Table 3). 
TABLE 3: Indices of Real Disposable Income for Different 
Categories of Income (1969: 100) 
Year Minimum Wage 
Earners 
Average Wage 
Earner 
Middle Grade 
Civil Servants 
Top Salaried 
1968 90.0 97.0 95.0 102.0 
1969 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1970 96.0 103.0 102.0 93.0 
1971 119.0 99.0 105.0 88.0 
1972 109.0 102.0 106.0 75.0 
1973 135.0 133.0 96.0 67.0 
1974 103.0 108.0 91.0 56.0 
1975 83.0 104.0 68.0 44.0 
1976 71.0 98.0 64.0 39.0 
1977 61.0 86.0 58.0 33.0 
1978 58.0 72.0 57.0 30.0 
1979 63.0 65.. 0 45.0 26.0 
1980 70.0 69.0 37.0 21.0 
SOURCE: Semboja, J. "Taxation, Government Activity and Inflation" 
(Daresalaam E. R. B. Papers 1984). 
Although the statistical evidence suggests that all 
categories suffered a reduction in real earnings it would be 
misleading to think that all individuals in these groups suffered 
to the same extent. 
Some groups managed to cushion themselves by negotiating 
for higher wages and bonuses. Others like pensioners were helpless. 
Their benefits are fixed by law and rarely get reviewed to adjust 
with inflation. In fact the benefits paid by the National Provident 
Fund and Parastatal Pension scheme are f ixed. Economically and 
politically powerful groups had more than one way of cushioning 
themselves. One, they could run businesses - like city buses; 
retail trade; estate development through members of their families 
(Semboja 1984). Others, especially senior officers in the parastatals 
tried to recoup their losses by exploiting gaps in the official 
system. One common ploy used by parastatal managers to compensate 
for the fall in real income caused by the rise in the level of 
prices and cost of living, was to accumulate night allowances. 
They could make official trips up country- spending an increasing 
number of days outside their working stations to accumulate per 
them allowances which, according to Rwegasira, are neither taxed 
nor accountable except by showing the number of days that one 
has been away from his station (Rwegasira 1980). others still 
used public resources - government cars, tractors, employees 
and other property f or private business. In some cases, managers 
simply indulged in corrupt practices - the existence of numerous 
agencies like the anti corruption squad under the Prevention 
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of Corruption Act, the Committee on the Leadership Code Act 1973 
and the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, seem to have had little 
deterrent ef f ect (Sunday News, Daresalaam, February 6,1986; 
Africa Events, London, September 1986: 45). As probable indications 
of corruption and other malpractices one could cite how critical 
managerial decisions such as choice of investment projects; purchase 
of machinery; award of management contracts; award of government 
tenders and the distribution of essential scarce commodities 
were made on dubious criteria. The most naked examples of such 
dubious deals, with disastrous consequences on the nation, were 
the purchase of obsolete aeroplanes by the state-owned airline, 
Air Tanzania Corporation, to launch international flights in 
1980 (Africa Contemporary Record 1980-81: B325). The aircraft 
purchased from a Palestinian businessman, were declared not airworthy 
by the International Air Travel Association (IATA) and were not 
allowed to f ly out of Gatwick airport af ter their inaugural f light 
there. The other case is the nationwide shortage of stationery 
and educational material from the shops of the Tanzania Elimu 
Supplies Ltd., who were the sole importers of the items amidst 
abundance of the same items in private shops. In both cases, 
the government was forced to dismiss the top managers of the 
parastatal concerned and overhaul their management structures. 
It is reasonable to assume that these undesirable practices were 
partly motivated by the desire to compensate for the loss of 
earnings brought about by increases in the price level. 
The government, aware of the hardships brought about 
by the escalating prices, commissioned two studies in 1972. The 
f irst was carried out by a Select Committee of Parliament, under 
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the chairmanship of Hon M. Baruti (Hansard, April 25,1972). 
The study by Parliament was very thorough and detailed 
in identifying problems and solutions. The other study was by 
the Bank of Tanzania with participants from government and parastatals. 
At the outset, the Select Committee saw the need to 
consult widely with all those who might be affected by its recommend- 
ations, both in the public and private sector. It advertised 
publicly for submissions, and wrote to educational institutions, 
organisation and government departments and agencies requesting 
them to make submissions. Some members of the Committee also 
travelled to major cities where scarcities of consumer goods 
were reported to be more acute and the price level unusually 
higher. These were: the Coast, Arusha, Mbeya, Mwanza, Mtwara, 
and Kilimanjario regions. Meetings were organised with a wide 
range of representatives of trade, industry and consumer institutions. 
Submissions were received from 148 leading retailers, 35 individual 
consumers, the State Trading Corporation, cooperative societies, 
marketing boards, industries and the National Milling Corporatior. 
On the basis of the submissions which it received, the Committee 
published a report which presented the major issues which it 
saw as important and tabled it before the National Assembly (Hansard, 
April 25,1972). 
The Committee pointed out several shortcomings in government 
Policy in the trade and pricing areas. First, it noted that there 
were widespread scarcities in certain basic consumer goods. Some 
Of the shortages were purely caused by inef f iciencies in the 
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State Trading Corporation. For example, goods were stockpiled 
at the headquarters of the corporation in Daresalaam while its 
branches in the regions were empty. Also there was lack of communi- 
cation between the corporation's departments, nepotism, corruption 
and poor accounting records (Hansard, April 25,1972: 297). The 
Committee recommended decent rali sation of the corporation into 
specialised companies to enhance efficiency. 
4 
Second, the Committee 
noted that there was no comprehensive national policy in pricing 
to ensure that "prices of goods and services were compatible 
with and conformed to the principles of socialism and the political, 
economic and social aspirations of the people" (Ibid. 298). The 
pricing policy and its administration, the committee observed, 
"had encountered many changes which have at times been confusing, 
inef f icient, or bothu . 
In reply to the Committee's observations, the Minister 
stated that the government had already established an expert 
group to advise the government on the reorganisation of the State 
trading corporation and on the creation of an agency that would 
regulate prices on a national basis and would provide for their 
orderly variation when necessary. The agency, said the Minister, 
would ensure that prices comply with our policy of socialism 
(Hansard, February 21,1973). 
The expert group referred to was headed by the Bank 
of Tanzania. Its members were drawn f rom the government, Treasury, 
Industry, State House, the Ideological College, and the Ministries 
4. This was effected through the State Trading Corporation Dissolution Act 1973. 
Several specialised companies were carved out of the State Trading Corporation. 
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of Agriculture, Commerce and Cooperative Societies. The terms 
of reference for the expert group's task were broadly adopted 
from the Select Committee. The expert group (called Interministerial 
Task Force) conducting a review of reorganising state trade and 
devicing an appropriate price control agency was required: 
to examine the extent to which efficiency 
in the State Trading sector could be improved; 
to recommend changes in the pricing area 
which will have the effect of achieving govern- 
ment objectives including the prevention 
of unduly rapid or frequent variation in 
prices; ensuring fair prices for basic essentials; 
maintaining fair relationships among incomes 
and providing circumstances conducive to 
a healthy and orderly development of industry 
and commerce in rural as well as urban areas; 
to examine and report on the appropriateness 
of current policies and procedures f or deter- 
mining prices and recommend changes if necessary 
having particular reference to: 
a) the proportion of production costs to 
be borne by producers and consumers (including 
the possibility of full cost recovery); 
b) the basis upon which maximum prices should 
be fixed bearing in mind inter alia matters 
of distributional equity and ways of 
encouraging industrial efficiency; 
C) what criteria can be adopted in fixing 
prices (whether priority should be given 
to consumers in particular areas); 
d) the need for a permanent advisory or 
coordinating agency; 
e) the need for administrative simplicity. 
In conducting its enquiries the Task Force was also required 
to consider the implications on relations with foreign firms 
including modifYing the controls to accommodate the operations 
of foreign f irms. 
The Task Force was given f our months, February - May 
1973, to report. The Task Force commissioned a number of research 
studies on particular issues. This was important because very 
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little information was available on questions such as the causes 
of the inflationary spiral - the relationship between government 
activity and price inflation and the influence of external factors. 
Some members of the Force also travelled overseas to principal 
trading partners and to some other countries which had imposed 
price controls to study the systems in those countries. 
The Task Force was able to compile a list of about 
1000 consumer items with the recommended maximum prices for each 
item. The items were picked from the 1968 household budget survey. 
It is possible that by 1973 the relative importance of these 
items in the consumer's budget had changed due to factors such 
as tastes or changes in the composition of the population or 
availability of the goods. In June 1973, the f irst comprehensive 
list was published under the Price Control Ordinance 1951. Copies 
were circulated to all institutions and Regional Commissioners 
were given responsibility for enforcement. 
The success of the Task Force in working out this list 
was seen by many people as a clear indication that the controls 
could be undertaken on a large scale. What many observers did 
not realise was that much of the success was due to the country's 
ability to import more consumer goods to meet shortfalls in domestic 
production - an ability that was made possible by a temporary 
rise in prices of coffee and tea in the world market as a result 
of bad weather in Brazil. Brazil was the major coffee exporter. 
Nevertheless the inspiration from the Task Force's 
success prompted the government to introduce legislation to establish 
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a permanent body to control prices of all commodities and services 
listed by the Task Force and add on the list should need arise. 
In the course of drafting the Bill the price control laws and 
agencies of several countries were studied. Among those iZeferred 
to were that of Yugoslavia (socialist), Sweden (welfare), Ghana, 
Trinidad and Tobago (developing socialist-orientated) and the 
United Kingdom. The objective was to examine how other nations 
had attempted to deal with similar problems. 
In June 1973 the Regulation of Prices Bill was introduced 
in the National Assembly. The Bill went through all stages in 
one day. The writer could not trace any debates by members on 
the provisions of the Act. It is probably one of those tabled 
to the House under a certificate of urgency. 
The National Price Commission came into being on September 
1,1973. Its chairman had played no part in the formulation of 
the policy and indeed knew nothing about it other than what he 
had read in the newspapers. But some members of the Task Force 
were appointed to serve in the commission. 
A close analysis of the Act shows that most of the 
statutory provisions are in pari materia with the UK Counter 
Inflation Act 1973 indicating heavy borrowing from the latter. 
This is evidenced not only by the arrangement of the provisions 
but also by their actual content. Moreover, many administrative 
documents - instruction manuals used by the UK agency, are used 
by departmental staff at the National Price Commission. It seems 
rather paradoxical that reliance was placed on the UK model. 
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No reasons were given for rejecting the socialist models. The 
Ghanian model, to me the closest to the Tanzanian environment, 
was rejected probably because it had falle, n into disrepute (Killick 
1978) and had been partly responsible for the downfall of Kwame 
Nkrumah, its political architect. 
It is submitted that the appropriateness of the UK 
model to the Tanzanian environment is highly debatable. There 
can be no doubt that there are vast dif f erences between the social 
and political environment of the UK and Tanzania that make uncritical 
adoption of the institutions of one economy to another inappropriate. 
In conclusion we note that price controls between 1961- 
1972 emerged chief ly in response to specific needs as they arose, 
little attempt being made to formulate a comprehensive programme 
designed to control the general price level. Consequently there 
were numerous agencies in one way or another regulating prices 
of specific commodities. These included the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Trade, Cooperative Societies, Crop Marketing boards and the Of f ice 
of Price Controller. Of these only the Ministry of Agriculture 
and that of Trade were agencies whose principal function was 
price control. In this regard the role of others was relatively 
minor and on the whole they relied on the office of the Price 
Controller for price management. Second, we find that the changes 
in the structure of the economy -a large public sector enterprise 
- brought about by the adoption of socialist ideology also called 
for establishment of social-legal institutions that would facilitate 
the building of socialism. In this respect, price control was 
needed not only to deal with the immediate problems of controlling 
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inflation but of shaping the role of prices to serve social needs 
so as to bring about the development of the people. The prof it 
motive was replaced by social considerations. The autonomy of 
the price mechanism was replaced by a government agency that 
would shape pricing policies to cater for social demands. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE REGULATION OF PRICES ACT 1973: THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction: 
In Chapter 31 have outlined the social background 
to the Regulation of Prices Act 1973. In this Chapter I will 
examine in detail its legislative and administrative framework, 
focussing on the statutory rules, the agencies for implementation 
and the way in which they operate. 
4.1. Overall Scheme of the Act 
The Act sets up a system of price controls intended 
not merely to resolve a temporary problem but also to respond 
to the requirements of a changing social-economic situation. 
It establishes a National Price Commission and related agencies, 
as a permanent machinery to control prices (Section 3,6 and 8). 
The commission is under obligation to exercise its powers to 
ensure the provisions of the Act are implemented (Section 7). 
The Act formulates the principles to be applied by 
these bodies and lays down detailed statutory guidance. It provides 
for an effective enforcement machinery and prescribes rules to 
facilitate the prevention, prosecution and punishment of offenders 
(Section 16,17,18,19,20 and 26). It is reasonable to assume that 
the provisions of the Act are obligatory on all persons in so 
far as they apply to them. All those concerned with the determin- 
ation of prices should have regard to them (Sections 20 and 21). 
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The Act, like preceding legislation on the subject 
(e. g. the Price Control Ordinances 1920 and 1951), does not regulate 
the price of every commodity or service in the country. It covers 
only those items specified in the control orders. The orders 
are issued annually by the commission by notice given to sellers 
and consumers in the government Gazette. The orders may be revised, 
varied, or replaced with fresh orders by the NPC without need 
for fresh legislation. The government has so drafted the Act 
as to avoid the need for fresh legislation in that 
Where in the opinion of the Minister, it 
is in the national interest that the prices 
of any goods or services, or class of goods 
or services be controlled on a national basis... 
or that the prices of any goods so controlled 
be reviewed he may direct the Price Commission 
to determine or review such prices ....... 
section 9(2). 
The Act, in common with previous legislation, does 
not impose a blanket prohibition on all forms of price increases 
to render them automatically illegal. It does however, unlike 
earlier legislation, stipulate in detail the allowable costs, 
that is the costs that firms can recoup through consumer prices 
(Section 12(2)(a)). Unlike previous legislation, the Act has 
no time limit. Also, in contrast to previous legislations, the 
control agencies are not merely advisory. They exercise an assemblage 
of powers: quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial as well as adminis- 
trative and managerial functions. 
4.2. Structure of the Provisions 
The Act is divided into eight parts. Part I is a 
def initional one, containing the definition of key words and 
phrases as used in the context of the Act. Part II establishes 
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the National Price Commission at the national level (the NPC), 
Assistant Price Commissioners at the regional district and town 
levels and Regional Price Control Advisory Boards, defines the 
powers and functions of these organs and makes provision for 
the principles applicable in the exercise of the controllers' 
functions. This Part also stipulates the goals to be pursued 
by the controllers (in Sections 6 and 12(l)(a) to (i)) and lays 
down the criteria to be adopted. The object of the rules in this 
part is to limit the manner in which the commissioners exercise 
their discretion. This Part, furthermore, provides for the principles 
to guide the determination of interwholesale, and interretail 
prices so as to prevent price increases being made on the series 
of such transactions (Sections 8 and 12(2)(a) to M). Part III 
provides for methods of enforcement. It prescribes the procedures 
of publication (Section 16), the marking and display of both 
price-controlled and non-controlled, goods (Section 17,17A), 
the keeping of records and books of account (Section 18) and 
supply of invoices (Section 19). Part IV prescribes methods of 
packaging, labelling and weighing (Sections 20A, 21). Wide powers 
to enter premises, inspect documents and obtain information are 
conferred on the controllers (Section 18). There is no limit 
to the amount of information which a controller can demand provided 
it is required for purposes of implementing the Act. In particular, 
price controllers can examine, among others, books of accounts; 
invoices; balance sheets; prof it and loss accounts and inventory 
records. These powers support the point made in Chapter 2.9.3. (e), 
that administrative agencies are not bound by procedural 
technicalities and formalities, as judicial bodies, when it comes 
to methods of gathering relevant evidence. 
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The commission is empowered to issue regular listings 
of price controlled goods and the maximum prices for each. Traders 
are compulsorily obliged to display those lists in their shops. 
The method of display is prescribed in the Act. With ef f ect f rom 
January 11,1974 all traders are required to display prices of 
price controlled goods in blue or black ink, and those of non- 
controlled items in red (G. N. 21, January 11,1974). The marking 
must be, "on the goods or on any container in which they are 
exposed or offered for sale or a price ticket securely attached 
to the goods or container and the figures must be clearly visible 
and legible to customerS" (Section 17(l) and G. N. 22, January 
11,1974). All transactions in which there is a price overcharge 
are valid for all legal purposes (Section 20). 
Part IV stipulates the varius contraventions of the 
Act that will amount to offences and the appropriate penalties. 
The penalty may be a fine, imprisonment, or both, depending on 
the nature of the offence, frequency of violation, seriousness 
of the damage and to a large extent discretion of the court (Section 
27). 
The rest of the principal provisions simply assist 
in the mechanics of administration. 
4.3. Virtues and Deficiencies in the Legislation 
What improvements does the Act introduce over previous 
legislation on this area? What gaps or weaknesses does it leave 
open? An answer to the f irst question will help tell us why the 
previous legislation needed replacement; while that to the second, 
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may enlighten us on areas that require rectification. 
The Virtues 
The principal improvements sought to be introduced 
by the new legislation were: First, the range of goods, and hence 
firms brought under control, was extended compared to those under 
previous legislation. Second, the consolidation of control orders. 
Under previous legislations (the Price Control Ordinances 1920 
and 1951) the control orders were scattered among local adminis- 
trative officers and government departments. This led to the 
existence of numerous control orders issued under different legis- 
lations covering the various industries. Under the present law, 
the Commission has virtually all the control powers. Where the 
powers are conferred on other authorities the Commission is invariably 
consulted, and sometimes the control orders are issued in its 
name. For example, hotel charges f ixed by the Hotels Board; taxi 
fares fixed by the Transport Board and prices of chemicals fixed 
by the National Chemicals Corporation are issued in the name 
of the Price Commission. Third, an improvement in the machinery 
for enforcement. The absence of such a provision in the old Acts 
was their greatest defect. There was no general mandatory duty 
to enforce imposed. Although the district administrators had 
permissive powers the use of the powers, certainly by those authorities, 
was negligible. Fourth, is the addition of a modern regulation- 
making machinery. The procedure under the 1920 and 1951 Price 
Control Ordinances which made not only the making, but also amendment 
Of an order to control prices rely on Parliamentary inquiries 
and scrutiny was clearly too imcompetent for modern needs. It 
was considered that any new law should include such powers to 
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make regulations for appropriate specific purposes (The Regulation 
of Prices Bill 1973, Statement of Objects, Bill Supplement No. 7, 
dated June 29th 1973). There is obviously practical need for 
such provision in all legislation of this type to enable control 
to keep pace with trade practice, so as to gear the controls 
to the changes of commerce. This supports the notion of the need 
for flexibility which the former laws so expressly lacked. 
4.3.2. Deficiencies 
Some clauses in the Act raise problems of interpretation 
and compliance. Section 17(l) requires traders dealing in price 
controlledgoods to "mark in plain figures in Red the prices at 
which they are offered for sale", and all non-controlled goods 
must have prices marked in blue or black and the price marked 
shall be the one at which the item is exposed or offered for 
sale", Section 30(l) (G. N. 21, November 1,1974). The provisions 
are apparently clear. In practice however, traders put a different 
interpretation. According to studies by Nditi, for price controlled 
goods, traders adhere to the marked prices. But f or non-controlled 
items they do not (Nditi 1985). Here they seem to follow the 
principles enunciated in the well known English case of Pharmaceutical 
Society of G. B. v. Boots Chemists [19531. In that case the Court 
of Appeal held that the display of goods with prices marked on 
them does not amount to an offer to sell. It is an invitation 
to offers 
1 
([19531 1 Q. B. 401 (CA)). My observations of the behaviour 
of traders and consumers in Daresalaam conf irm this view. Prices 
for non controlled goods are dictated orally on request. The 
marked prices never seem to bind anybody. Instead, customers 
I. The rule was cAmsidered beyond argument in Fisher v. Bell 
119611 19. B. 394. 
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and traders enter into negotiations, making offers and counter 
offers, that is bargaining freely, until an agreed price is reached. 
There is one major danger in this practice. Traders tend to pitch 
the initial off er at a higher, price so that the agreed price, 
which may appear lower to the customer, leaves the trader with 
a big profit margin. To remedy this situation, the Act could 
provide that all prices marked on a product shall bind the seller. 
The other problem is about compensating victims of price overcharges. 
Section 20 states: 
Any person who sells any price controlled 
goods at a price or charge which exceeds 
the maximum price or the maximum service 
charge shall be guilty of an offence. 
The penalties (as stipulated in Section 26) consist of a fine 
or imprisonment. there is no provision that requires the price- 
controllers or courts to order a refund to victims. The Price 
Commission does not order refunds. The courts can use their general 
powers to order compensation to victims of criminal offences 
2 
under Section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is authority 
that these powers can be used to order a price refund in the 
decision of R. v. Gulabkhan Haji Walimohamed [1946] E. A. C. A. 
89. In some jurisdictions, notýably the USA, this has been done 
quite successfully. The leading case is Re Antibiotics Antitrust 
Actions (333 F. Supp. 317 ( S. D. N. Y. 197 11 ). In this case consumers 
the world over wer4 adjudged to have been overcharged by the 
monopolistic drug company supplying tetracylene. For those still 
using the drug, the company was ordered to sell at a low price 
for a period enough to compensate for the amount overcharged 
until then. For those institutions and governments who could 
substantiate their purchases for that period, compensation was 
2. Cap. 20, Laws of Tanzania. 
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ordered. The price which should have been charged by the company, 
by taking into consideration the price prevailing for similar 
products, was worked out. Then the price actually charged was 
determined. The price differential was the amount owed to the 
claimants. Still in other cases the company made offers of compen- 
sation to the affected to be distributed on an agreed formula 
by the claimants (for more information, see Bartsh 1978). The 
task of organising and effecting the compensation where violation 
is on such a large scale is obviously enormous. But in the case 
of Tanzania it should be possible because the consumers are 
registered with shops. The other alternative is to order an immediate 
refund as and when a complaint is proved true. 
Section 21, which enables the controllers to insist 
on specific particulars like labelling, quality specification, 
details of weight, size and chemical composition, to be included 
on the labels, containers or packets, as the case maybe, does 
not specify what action to be taken to deal with misleading descrip- 
tions. The price controllers should have power to order their 
immediate removal. 
There is no provision in Part III of the Act, as indeed 
in the entire Act, to prevent traders marking up prices on goods 
already in their shops when a new price increase, on similar 
, goods. is announced. This leads to speculative hoarding and artificial 
shortages, especially on dates close to the annual price reviews 
as goods go underground to await a new higher price. The phenomenon 
of empty shelves on the eve of price reviews and abundant supply 
on the morning of the increases which has become common in the country 
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is indicative of that. In some jurisdictions, particularly the 
UK, it is an offence for any person to give a false indication 
that a price is equal to or less than the price at which such 
goods or goods of the same description were previously sold or 
offered for sale. The provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act 
1968 which could be relevant in our case states, "if any person 
offering to supply goods of any description gives, by whatever 
means, any f alse indication to the ef f ect that the price at which 
the goods are of f ered is equal to or less than (a) the recommended 
price; or (b) the price at which the goods or goods of the same 
description were previously offered by him or is less than such 
a price by a specif ied amount, he shall be guilty of an of f ence" 
(Trade Descriptions Act 1968, Section 11(l), UK). Traders there 
try to comply with this provision by indicating on the products, 
both the recommended retail price or old price and the new price 
side by side. 
With these remarks in mind let us look at the scope 
of the Act. 
4.4. Field of Application 
The Act is the principal instrument for controlling 
practically the prices of all goods and services in the country 
since the Act empowers the Commission to control prices of "any 
goods and services supplied on the domestic market" (Section 
For legal and practical reasons, as we shall see, the 
Commission have never been able to exercise all the powers. Limit- 
ations on their scope of activity have been imposed by the express 
exclusion of some commodities f rom their jurisdiction and by 
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resource constraints. For example, the prices of the following 
commodities are not within their jurisdiction 
Producer prices ffor export commodities. Because 
of the sensit-ve nature and their overall 
importance to the economy, the prices of 
all major exports are determined by the Economic 
Committee of the Cabinet in consultation 
with the Marketing Boards, Cooperative 
Societies, Ministry of Agriculture and Bank 
of Tanzania. Crop marketing boards have also 
power to fix prices of certain by-products 
of the crops they handle (see, The Coffee 
Marketing Board Act 1984, section 4(2)(f); 
and the Cashew nut Marketing Board Act 1984, 
section 4(l)(c). 
Prices of fresh foods - meat, fish and vegetables. 
Due to perishability and seasonal fluctuations 
in supply, the prices of these commodities 
are left to the market forces of supply and 
demand on each individual market. However, 
some bodies have been set up to monitor seasonal 
price variations and supervise the pricing 
of these products to prevent chaos in the 
market. Such bodies include the Kariakoo 
Market Corporation in Daresalaam and District 
Development Corporations in other urban centres. 
Service charges and rates for all public 
utilities. Transport, water, electricity 
and telephone rates are fixed by the boards 
of directors of the parastatals running these 
services. The Price Commission is consulted 
by some and only given the rates by others. 
The Commission have no influence over the 
decisions of the management boards and have 
to accept the rates and use them as part 
of the inputs in consumer prices. 
iv) All prices and service charges for goods 
subject to international agreements. Included 
in this group are air fares, shipping and 
freight charges. 
V) Insurance premiums, bank rates and interest 
charges are fixed by the relevant financial 
institutions. The Bank of Tanzania and the 
Treasury then examine the rates in the light 
of the prof it margins earned - by insurance 
and banking corporations. The Bank and Treasury 
may consider what corrective act-ion is necessary 
to bring the rates into line with government 
fiscal policies. 
The excluded categories contain some important items. 
For exwVle, a great deal of public concern centres on prices 
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of f resh f oods, rent and transport rates. An analysis of the 
Commission's working papers for 1984-1985 indicates that it is 
the prices of the excluded commodities which constitute the main 
reason for seeking price increases for consumer goods. In approximate 
percentage terms, about 80% of the price review applications 
gave increased transport and electricity charges as the main 
cause. 
Despite these exclusions, the Commission does still 
have a large number of items under its jurisdiction. As of September 
1985 the control list covered about 2000 items (Price Control 
List, September 12,1984). These include: manufactured, intermediate 
as well as finished goods; locally produced as well as imported 
and of several processed basic food stuffs such as milk, sugar, 
bread, butter and cooking oils (Price Control Order, September 
12,1984, pp. 1-87). According to the chairman of the Commission, 
the goods covered have been carefully selected and account for 
about 60% of the total expenditure in the ordinary household 
consumer's budget (Personal Interview, March 1985). The products 
specifically mentioned in the control list are: food and beverages; 
household articles; construction materials; textiles; farm implements 
and pharmaceuticals (Price Control List, September 12,1984). 
On the whole the Act provides the potential for a very 
comprehensive control system. It covers many other activities 
related to the controls such as distribution of goods, quality 
and standards, weights, measurement, packaging and labelling. 
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4.5. The Administrative Structure 
Primary responsibility for the implementation of the 
Act has been placed on the National Price Commission, the Assistant 
Price Commissioners and the Price Control Advisory Boards. Let 
us see how these bodies operate. 
4.5.1. The National Price Commission: Composition, Structure 
and Organisation 
The NPC consists of a Price Commissioner, who is the 
chairman and its chief executive officer, plus, not less than 
seven and not more than ten other members (Section 3(b)). The 
chairman is appointed by the President (Section 3(a)). The other 
commissioners are appointed by the Minister (until 1982 Minister 
for Trade, but since then Minister for Finance). At present there 
are nine commissioners drawn from the University of Daresalaam, 
the Party (CCM) headquarters, the Party (CCM) Ideological College, 
Kivukoni, the State House, the Treasury, the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industries, the Ministry of Agriculture and two Parliamentarians. 
It is usually the Permanent Secretaries or heads of these institu- 
tions who sit in the commission. The chairman makes recommendations 
for national price structures to the commissioners who then proceed 
to determine prices (Section 6(a)). The commissioners are not 
bound to follow the recommendations of the staff of the commission 
and may reject, modify or demand for more explanations. A good 
example is the case of prices of edible oils, which were rejected 
3 
in the review period beginning October 1984 (Commission Working 
Paper No. 148, October 1984). The commission regulates its own 
3. The staff were asked to investigate why the price sought was so high (Working 
Paper No. 148, October 1984). 
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procedures (the Schedule, S. 5(1)). Decisions are made by a majority 
of the members present and voting. In event of equality of votes, 
the chairman has a casting vote in addition to his deliberative 
vote. A quorum is constituted by the chairman and five other 
members. 
The chairman has served continuously since the inception 
of the NPC. The other commissioners have been changing f rom time 
to time especially because of shifts in departmental ministries 
responsible for the commission. There are no formal qualifications 
for appointment. 
At the regional level the Regional Development Directors 
are the Assistant Price Commissioners, (Section 7(2)). At the 
district level, the District Development Directors are the Assistant 
Price Commissioners. In addition, every City Municipal and Town 
Director is an Assistant Price Commissioner for his locality 
(Act 2 of 1981). There are no price commissioners at the ward 
or village level. However, the wards and villages are represented 
in the regional, district or town price control advisory boards 
by their chairpersons. 
Strictly speaking, the Assistant Price Commissioners 
do not fall within the administrative structure of the NPC. They 
are not regional branches of the NPq. The officials are not employees 
of the NPC, not answerable to it and not controlled by it. They 
are answerable to the Prime Minister's office. 
However, we can discern an ill-defined relationship 
between the NPC and the Assistant Price Commissioners. For example, 
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where the NPC has fixed prices which seem unrealistic to the 
circumstances of a given district, it can direct the Assistant 
Price Commissioner to adjust the prices to accommodate local 
costs (Section 10(5)). The NPC may review prices fixed by Assistant 
Price Commissioners if requested by an aggrieved party (Section 
10(4)). In this way the NPC acts as an appellate body for the 
decisions of Assistant Price Commissioners. Otherwise, the Assistant 
Price Commissioners perform the same functions as the NPC in 
respect of goods not controlled nationally like fresh fruits, 
fish, meat, taxi hire charges and hairdressers' fees. They are 
required to follow the same principles as the NPC. 
One problem in coordinating the activities of the NPC 
and regional price controllers is that the officials are accountable 
to different departmental ministries. For example, the NPC is 
answerable to the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Affairs (Budget Speech 1986/87, para. 120). However, some of 
its employees are seconded f rom other institutions. For example, 
the head of the cost accounting department is an employee of 
the Ministry of Trade. District and town directors are under 
the Prime Ministers off ice. Regional and District Trade officers, 
who are price inspectors, are under the Ministry of Trade. No 
serious conflict or stalemate has yet arisen. This has been partly 
avoided by the closeness with which these officials work together. 
Also the regional political leaders coordinate the functions 
of all these officials in the regions. But problems are likely 
to arise where local traders wish to challenge the 
decisions 
of local controllers. It is not clear to which Minister they 
should send their complaint. There is need to def 
ine the position 
on this point. 
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4.5.1. Staffing 
The NPC has a total staf f of 960. Most 'of them are 
recruited from the civil service. Some of them are full time 
employees of the commission, others are seconded f rom ministries. 
There is a wide mixture of professionals - economists, accountants, 
sociologists, lawyers and management scientists. There are no 
engineers or chemists. The staff are organised into two major 
departments: the Imports and Locally manufactured goods 
departments. Each department has the following divisions. 
The Administration and Finance Division 
consists of generalists concerned with internal administration, 
public relations, general policy information and liaison with 
the departmental ministry. Its members are seconded from the 
departmental ministry and are therefore strictly speaking not 
employees of the commission. 
The Statistical division is responsible for collecting 
data and information on costs of raw materials; trends in prices 
of inputs on the local and world market; cost structure in f irms; 
and keeps records of production trends in firms. For data on 
local prices they rely on data collected by other sources. Many 
institutions collect statistical information from different firms, 
at different times, for a range of different reasons and frequently 
using different definitions. The leading sources include, holding 
parastatals; the Central Statistical Bureau; the Audit Corporation; 
the banks; independent researchers and from data in questionnaires. 
For data on prices on world markets, the statisticians use established 
publications like the Financial Times; the 
Economist and the 
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Times. The availability of these publications is not always regular. 
Where this leaves an information gap the statisticians use their 
forecasts or projections. At most these forecasts are guesses 
whose accuracy is questionable. 
The third is the Cost Accounting division. This branch 
is responsible for financial analysis; scrutinising costs and 
allocating costs between joint products. It is staffed with two 
academically well qualified accountants. The two are its only 
staff. It, however, gets assistance from the Statistical personnel. 
This division constitutes the nerve centre of the Commission. 
Its function is to examine financial statements, balance sheets, 
returns on investment, profits and inventory records. It determines 
the allowable costs. It also prepares the Commission's working 
papers with recommendations whether or not a firm should be awarded 
a price increase. The recommendations are not binding on the 
Commissioners. On a number of occasions, the commissioners have 
rejected, modified or called for a revision of the recommendations 
(Working Papers on "Edible Oils", No-148, October 1984; on Soft 
Drinks, No. 120, August 1984). 
The other division is Transport. Its function is to 
assess rates and charges for transport, shipping, freight and 
cartage. It also recommends how much of the transport factor 
should be borne by consumers and enterprises. 
The final divisiOn is the Legal and Inspectorate. It 
is the biggest branch since every member of the Commission invariably 
belongs to it. It is responsible for policing and enforcing the 
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maximum prices; detecting and apprehending violators; reviewing 
the regulations and coordinating with regional enforcement agents 
and the police. 
4.6. The Functions of NPC 
Fixing of Maximum Prices 
The main functions of the Commission are three: to 
fix maximum prices; to enforce them and to act as government 
adviser on prices. 
Here we will examine the price determination processes 
for locally manufactured goods; imported goods and retail prices. 
Enforcement will be examined in the next chapter since it is 
an aspect important enough to deserve detailed examination. 
4.6.2. (a) The Principles Applicable 
The general principles relating to prices - what costs 
should go into the consumer price, are those in sections 2( 1) 
and 12(2). Section 2(l) defines "Price" as "what a purchaser 
pays" as determined by the Knet costs of production plus incidental 
expenses*. Section 12 enumerates in detail the costs at every 
point - manufacturing, wholesale and retail levels. The object 
of these provisions is to demarcate the cost-elements that can 
lawfully be recouped through consumer prices. 
One problem raised by these provisions is whether the 
costs stated are exhaustive or whether they are only indicative 
(illustrative) of what is and what is not permissible. 
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A similar provision in the UK Counter Inflation Act 
1973 gave rise to similar problems. Its interpretation by the 
UK authorities may help throw some light on possible ways of 
solving the problems. Sir Arthur Cockfield, who chaired the Commission, 
interpreted this provision to mean that the duty of the commission 
is to ensure that the cost elements given by enterprises as a 
justification for a price increase fall squarely within the four 
corners of the rule. The Commission, he said, "cannot reject 
an application because it thinks that in social or economic terms 
it would be wrong to approve an increase; or because the Commission 
feels that on general grounds the costs are unjustified or that 
they could be avoided with ordinary diligence. The Act is a legis- 
lative instrument and the function of the Commission is to administer 
it" (Cockfield 1978: 3). 
The UK Commission's view shifted in favour of industry. 
Once af irm could establish that the costs were within the terms 
of the Act, they discharged their burden. The Commission would 
not question how they were incurred. 
The NPC has not adhered to such a restricted view. 
It considers that the costs specifically named are not exclusive, 
nor do they give an automatic right to compensation by way of 
consumer prices. That the costs are not exhaustive is obvious. 
For example, the enumerated costs do not cover cases where an 
increase is necessary to compensate a firm for pre-production 
expenses, or to encourage investment, or to prevent it f rom bank- 
ruptcy. The latter consideration is particularly important where 
protection of employment is the priority. Also, the provisions 
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of the Act do not indicate how price reductions should be made 
to adjust with changes in quality or size which normally imply 
a fall in costs. 
The National Price Commission has set itself the following 
guidelines: First, prices may not be increased unless there is 
an increase in total costs per unit. Where there is an increase 
in total costs per unit, only those increases allowed by the 
Act will be taken into account. Firms must show that the costs 
were necessary or unavoidable. A cost increase will be regarded 
as permissible if it has been incurred for one of the following: 
Labour; raw materials; rent; fuel and power; interest charges; 
bought-in-services (transport, storage and insurance) and equipment. 
In the case of labour the standard allowable costs are: wages 
and salaries; payment to pension funds; training; subsidised 
services (meals, transport, health care) and insurance contributions 
(Working Paper No-148 of 1984). Cost increases arising from increased 
pay are only allowed to the extent that they are consistent with 
government income policies, e. g. minimum wage legislation, awards 
by the Permanent Labour Tribunal. Second, price reductions should 
follow whenever there is a fall in the allowable costs. In addition, 
price reductions will be ordered where a firm has exceeded its 
pi7ofit margin reference level. Third, the commission will modify 
its policy if necessary to boost investment. Bef ore it can depart 
from the policy it has to be shown that if the increase is granted 
the investment will take place (the enterprise must produce evidence 
of the specific investment plans); that the firm is unable to 
raise funds f rom any other source and that the increase is necessary 
to cover costs likely to arise from the investment. These conditions 
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are alternatives and not cumulative. Firms can convince the 
NPC by showing, for example, that without an increase in prices 
there will not be an adequate return on investment or inadequate 
minimum of earnings necessary to enable the firm to remain in 
business. Finally, where the costs are joint, they will be allocated 
to products either in proportion to the volume of production, 
or to the value of sales, or time taken, or any other basis which 
represents a fair and consistent distribution as established 
by standard accounting practices (Mongi, 1980: 115-125). 
It is significant to note here that although the provisions 
of the Act, which I shall discuss in a subsequent section, and 
the NPCIs guidelines seem to insist on cost efficiency, a number 
of factors undermine the attainment of this goal. One is the 
general escalation in the costs of industrial production - of 
fuel, transport, power, raw materials and so forth, for which 
the firms are not responsible. The other, is social costs for 
which no appropriate method of evaluation is provided. The articles 
of incorporation of the Friendship (Uraf iki) Textile Mill contain 
the following social objectives, which the auditor's report says 
are partly responsible for its financial losses in recent years: 
Social welfare (subsidised drinks in the worker's canteen), travelling 
subsistence, entertainments, uplifting sports standards in the 
mill, Party (CCM) meetings expenses, gif ts (Tanzania Audit Corpora- 
tion, Report 1982). Third, the need to achieve other broader 
social and economic objectives such as preserving employment, 
providing services and goods at uneconomic rates in high cost 
areas. These may call upon the NPC to tolerate costs otherwise 
not permissible by the law. 
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4.6.3. The Factors to be Taken into Consideration 
The overall objective of the Act is to establish a 
price structure, which, in the language of the Act, will ensure 
that prices of goods and services in Tanganyika 
are compatible with and conform to the principles 
of socialism and the political, economic 
and social aspirations of the people (Section 
6(b). 
Towards this objective the Act lays down criteria for price deter- 
mination. By adhering to these standards, it is assumed, the 
objective will be realised. The criteria are: 
4.6.3. (a) The Need to Determine Reasonable Price Structures 
on a National Basis and to Provide for their Orderly 
Variation when Necessary, Section 6(a) 
This provision does not def ine what a reasonable price 
structure would be, nor does it lay down any criteria f or reason- 
ableness. According to a senior legal adviser to the NPC, a reason- 
able price structure is one which is fair both to consumers and 
producers (Personal interview with Miss Rose Mafuru, March 1985). 
It is a price that enables Producers to recover their costs of 
production and secure a reasonable, not excessive, margin of 
profit. For example, if the price fixed by the NPC falls below 
that of the cost of production, it cannot be described as reasonable. 
It will not be in the consumer's interests either if the price 
fixed were so grossly inadequate as to threaten the production 
of the item. What this rule prohibits is the making of exorbitant 
and unconscionable prof its. To ensure prices are reasonable, 
the commission applies the acost-plus" pricing formula (Section 
12(2)) and limits profit margins to a maximum of 30 per cent (Section 
12(5)). This margin is considered a sufficient margin to give 
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firms, operating efficiently, an adequate return on investment. 
Despite the apparent clarity in defining a reasonable 
price structure, there seems to be a lot of difficulty in satisfying 
this requirement. This is because consumers tend to associate 
reasonableness with cheap prices while suppliers would want higher 
prices. In the f inal analysis reasonableness must depend on social 
economic and political circumstances. For example, while some 
people may doubt the reasonableness of charging the same price 
for an item to a person in a low cost area, like Daresalaam, 
as a person in a remote up country village, the government considers 
this to be fair (Budget Speech 1986/87, para. 121). 
4.6.3. (b) The Need to Ensure Availability of Commodities and 
Services Essential to the Community, Section 12(l)(a) 
The Commission is required to give top priority to 
the control of essential goods. That is to say control must begin 
with those items identified as essential. By looking at the periodic 
household budget surveys compiled by the Central Statistical 
Bureau, the NPC has been able to pick the basket of basic commodities. 
This section can also be interpreted as requiring the Commission 
to keep prices of such commodities as low as possible. This can 
be' gathered f rom the government policy which insists that every 
person should have access to basic needs like food, clothing, 
water, housing, health and education (ILO 1982: 2, The Constitution 
1984, Article 9(l)(g)). The Commission has deviced several techniques 
to achieve this goal. One is that it f ixes lower prices on basic 
consumer items - food, textiles, soap, sugar, shoes, cooking 
oils, milk, fuel, tyres, tubes, medicines, building and construction 
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materials. For one, these items constitute the basic necessities 
for every citizen. Because the demand for them is inelastic they 
are potentially a fertile ground for traders to earn monopoly 
rent and indulge in other undesirable social practices like price 
discrimination. 
To ensure a reasonable supply of these commodities 
at fair prices the government has instituted a number of legislative 
measures. The leading Acts are: The Duties and Taxes (Prevention 
of Price Increases) Act 1970 which prevents traders f rom raising 
prices of goods already in their premises when new tax and duty 
increases are announced. The Act forbids sellers, wholesalers 
and retailers f rom taking into account new taxes - excise and 
customs duties, sales tax, export tax and consumption taxes, 
consequent upon increases imposed, unless such tax is actually 
payable (Section 3(l)). The Locally Manufactured Products (Price 
Stability) Act 1972 forbids traders and manufacturers from raising 
prices of specified products, manufactured locally on or after 
June 15,1972 at a price higher than the one prevailing on that 
date, without written consent f rom the price controller (Sections 
4(l) and 6(l)). The products covered are tubes, tyres, hoes, 
pangas, ploughs and similar implements used in agriculture (The 
Schedule to Locally Manufactured Products Act 1972). The Finance 
Act 1985 abolishes import duties on soap, fabrics, cooking oils, 
baby foods, wheat flour and on all ingredients used to produce 
these commodities. Above all, the Regulation of Trade Act 1980 
establishes the machinery to ensure the orderly distribution 
and trade in all essential goods. Under this Act, the Minister 
for Trade can declare any product or service as a controlled 
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item if "he is of the opinion that it is necessary or desirable 
to do so in public interest", (section 3). 4 The public interest 
here is presumably that of maintaining equitable distribution 
and availability especially in conditions of shortages (Statement 
of Minister for Trade, Budget Speech, 1980/81, Hansard, June 
1980). Other measures instituted in the effort to ensure availa- 
bility of essential commodities at reasonable prices include 
transportation of the commodities using vehicles owned by state 
trading corporations and cooperative societies to keep down costs 
and rehabilitation of industries producing essential commodities 
to raise production levels (Budget Speech 1986/87, para. 122; 
Regulation of Trade Bill 1980, lst Reading, Hansard, April 16, 
1980). The combination of these measures, it is hoped, will achieve 
this goal. In this sense the activities of the price controllers 
are to me only one and not the decisive factor in attaining this 
objective. 
4.6.3. (c) The Need to Avoid Unduly Rapid and Frequent Variations 
in Prices, Section 12(l)(b) 
This requirement has two main dimensions. First, to 
halt frequent variations or increases in prices. Second, to limit 
the margin or rates of price increase (Statement by the minister 
for Trade, June 30,1980). 
The first requirement is met by the legal regulation 
which restricts applications for the review of prices. It provides 
that the prices Of locally manufactured items shall be reviewed 
4. The Regulation of Trade Act 19M as read together with the two orders: 
The Regulation of Trade (Confinement of Goods) Order 1981. and the Regulation 
of Trade (Control of Sale of Specified Goods) Order 19W. 
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once in a year - between the f irst day of January and the last 
day of February in any calendar year. And the prices of imported 
items can be reviewed twice in each calendar year. The period 
between March and April and that between September and October 
are the periods during which applications for review of prices 
of imported goods may be made (G. N. 143 of 1979). The Commission 
does not entertain applications for price reviews outside these 
periods unless it is satisfied that special circumstances exist 
5 
to warrant the review (Mongi 1980). Applications outside the 
official review period are inevitably due to frequent changes 
in world market prices of inputs to domestic industries or changes 
in prices of local inputs. In order to minimise the frequency 
of such applications, the Commission uses a system of contingency 
reserves. When a price increase is approved during the regular 
reviews the increase is deliberately made larger. So, initially 
profits will be larger enabling the firms to build up a contingency 
reserve. When cost of production subsequently rise the firm uses 
the surplus to cushion itself against losses. Only af ter the 
reserve is exhausted is the f irm allowed another price increase 
(Mongi 1985 Personal interview, March 1985). In this way the 
price controls avoid frequent variations in prices. 
To avoid rapid inCreases, the Commission, as a rule, 
passes increased costs to consumer prices only as a last resort, 
after exhausting several other methods of covering increased 
costs without increasing prices (Whitworth 1982). The most commonly 
5. Prior to 1979 prices of imported goods were reviewed every three months while 
the Commission could review prices of local manufactures more than once a year 
if it was "satisfied that special circumstances exist", section 140). Political 
concern at the frequency of price reviews resulted in the present restrictions 
(Speech by Minister of Trade, 19W-81 Budget Session, Hansard, June 1980 p. 7). 
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used methods are: First, the manipulation of margins at various 
levels of handling the goods, i. e. margins at the wholesale, 
subwholesale and retail levels. An example is how the Commission 
handled an application for an increase in the price of imported 
salt in 1984. Bearing in mind that salt is an essential commodity, 
the Commission resolved to maintain the same price to consumers 
but at the same grant the request for an increase in the importer's 
price. At the same time it reduced the margins given to packers, 
wholesalers and retailers. The importers margin was retained 
at 10%; the packers margin was reduced f rom 20 to 17 per cent; 
the distributors' (wholesalers) margin was reduced from 11 to 
9 per cent and the retailers margin was also brought down to 
15 per cent f rom 20 per cent (Price Control Order, September 
30,1984). Second, is by reducing the chain of handling agents. 
A good example is the case of cement. Here the Building and Hardware 
Corporations and the Regional Trading Corporation were de facto 
effectively extinguished when the Commission managed to persuade 
the Government to allow users to buy directly from the manufacturing 
firms (Budget Speech 1986/87, June 20,1986). As a result these 
State Corporations wound up business with considerable loss of 
jobs. But consumers got relief. They can now buy directly from 
the firms at reduced costs. The principal limitations in using 
these methods to avoid the frequency and incidence of price increases 
are two: One, as we shall see later, is the cost-plus pricing 
rule, which to me seems to stand in the way of the Commission's 
efforts in fulfilling this goal. The other is the external environ- 
ment. When costs of inputs increase, considering the dependent 
nature of domestic production (see an excellent discussion on 
I 
this point by Clark 1978 and Coulson 1982) then costs of production 
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are bound to rise and ex-factory and retail prices must increase 
too. It is difficult to see how the Commission can guard against 
these factors. 
4.6.3. (d) The Need to Prevent the Income of Peasants and Workers 
from Being Affected Adversely by Unnecessary and 
Unjustified Price Increases, Section 12(l)(d) 
The notion that some price increases are unnecessary 
and unjustified is often encountered in the country. President 
Nyerere publicly complained that the prices charged by some private 
importers are not wholly justifiable: "They are shockingly high. 
I am not convinced that they could not be lowered without traders 
incurring losses" (Daily News, July 5,1985). The Daily News 
has aptly summed up the concern: 
Of late we have all witnessed manufacturers 
and traders often raising prices of goods 
with no justifiable reasons, much to the 
suffering of consumers and the economy. We 
are convinced most goods can be sold at cheaper 
prices without traders incurring losses (Daily 
News, Daresalaam, August 14,1985: 1). 
Since its establishment the NPC has been subjected to strong 
pressure to prevent unnecessary price increases. To achieve this 
goal, the NPC has evolved a number of techniques. Some of these 
techniques are derived from the provisions of the Act others 
have been devised by the NPC itself 
The main statutory provisions in this regard are those 
regulating costs that can be passed into consumer prices and 
those giving the NPC the unrestricted access to relevant 
data 
concerning production and distribution of any goods, not 
just 
price-controlled goods (Sections 12(2) and 13(l)(d)). 
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The Act lists the factors that need to be considered 
in determining the price structure (in Section 12(l)) such as 
the cost of production of the product, taxes, transport charges 
and the rate of turnover. Section 12(2) provides specific guidelines 
on the "necessary" costs. Essentially it states that in setting 
maximum prices, for domes t ical ly-produced items, the controllers 
should take into account all the costs of producing and supplying 
the goods including taxes, duties and other levies plus a margin 
in relation to turnover and the capital employed (Section 12(2)(a)). 
For imported goods they should take into account the cost (i. e. 
landed) of importing and clearing plus a margin in relation to 
turnover and the capital employed (Section 12 (2) (b) ). These points 
will become clearer when we look )at the process followed by the 
commission in evaluating applications for price reviews. Suffice 
it to note here that the commission only accepts cost which are 
necessary for production and supply. To check on fictitious or 
inflated costs the NPC looks at the firm's efficiency in the 
use of its capital and other resources (labour, raw materials) 
in the production f ormula. If ef f iciency in the use of one f actor 
of production has declined (as revealed by an increase in the 
value of that factor in the production formula) the firm is put 
to strict proof that the expenditure was necessary and justified. 
A lot of control is exercised here as a result of cost data accumu- 
lated over the years for the various firms. 
Another part of the Act which facilitates the attainment 
of this objective is the provisions of sections 13(l) (d) and 
27(l). These empower the controllers to enter and inspect any 
premises and to secure, *notwithstanding any written law to the 
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contrary, access to relevant data, concerning production, import- 
ation or trade of or in any goods or services from any person", 
(Section 13( 1) (d) ). Using these powers the NPC requires each 
producer to supply information, through a questionnaire, on the 
costs of production during the previous year of operation, supported 
by invoices and other relevant documents detailing the costs. 
The data are examined by the controllers, the documents are verified 
and comparisons are made with previous year's data. Finally, 
the prevention of monopolistic and oligopolistic pricing at ex- 
factory, wholesale and retail level, which we discussed earlier 
on, also attains this goal. By these methods, the price controls 
do to a certain extent prevent unnecessary costs f rom being passed 
to consumers and hence prevent unnecessary price increases. This 
is particularly significant in Tanzania where in recent years, 
with the cutting back in the imports of consumer goods, only a 
rapid increase in prices in the absence of the controls, could 
bring supply and demand into equilibrium if the market were left 
to determine prices. Pressure for private gain by trading companies 
would have pushed prices unnecessarily high. But as a result 
of the controls we f ind that despite the quantity demanded being 
greater than the quantity supplied for many of the goods, consumers 
pay lower prices than what would otherwise have been the case 
(Rice, 1979: 101; Singh, 1986: 427) - 
4.6.3. (e) The Need to Maintain Fair Relationshi2s among the 
Incomes of Different Sectors of the Community, Section 
12(l)(e) 
This goal presumably concerns income distribution. 
To see how price controls can contribute towards a fair income 
distribution in society, we need to know the income distribution 
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policies of the economy in general. Scanning through available 
documents and policy statements one clearly finds that the policy 
objective is greater equality in income. In the Act, for example, 
the controllers are required to ensure, "prices are compatible 
with and conform to the principles of socialism.... " (section 
In the Constitution of the United Republic there is a 
call for "human equality" and "an even distribution of the nation's 
material wealth; the prevention of exploitation of one person 
by another and the prevention of wealth accumulation by private 
individuals in amounts grossly disproportionate with socialist 
ideals" (Article 9(c) Part II and Article 12(l) Part III, Consti- 
tution 1984). 
From these provisions, the goal of price control is 
to either ensure that the distribution of real income will become 
more even or it will not become more uneven on account of the 
controls. Looking at its practices the NPC seems to pursue its 
income distribution objectives in three ways: First, by concen- 
trating control on goods commonly consumed by low-income groups. 
What the Commission does is that where a firm produces a range 
of products or services, it awards the firm a relatively low 
profit margin on products consumed by low income groups thus 
k6dping prices down and awards high prof it margins on the less 
essential goods thus permitting their prices to increase. Assuming 
the hypothesis that people with higher incomes buy a higher per- 
centage of the luxury goods is valid, this method operates to 
make distribution of real income more even. Second, the NPC usually 
f ixes prices which are unif orm throughout the country. In this 
Way the relatively favoured. urban dwellers who live close to 
-257- 
the supplies subsidise their rural counterparts. Third, manufacturers 
and wholesalers are responsible for the distribution of their 
products to regional centres. The NPC adds a 11pan territorial 
freight allowance" to the ex-factory prices so that transport 
costs are shared equally by all consumers irrespective of where 
they live (Price Control Order, September 12,1984: 76). This 
policy is likely to encourage sellers to divert their sales 
from up country markets to low cost, urban areas. To curb this, 
sellers are closely supervised to ensure that they deliver goods 
to regional centres in prescribed quantities as required by the 
Regulation of Trade Act 1980. 
4.6.3. (f) The Need to Preserve and Promote the Competitive Position 
of Local Products in the Domestic Market as well as 
in Foreign Markets, Section 12(l)(c) 
This regulation raises the question of what techniques 
the Commission uses in promoting the competitiveness of local 
products? One could ask whether there is any competitive market 
in the economy at all? 
We pointed out earlier on that in strict terms there 
is no sector of the economy which is fully competitive in the 
sepse of there being a large number of sellers and buyers of f ering 
various similar and easily substitutable commodities on the market. 
There are usually very f ew domestic producers of a given product 
in Tanzania (Rice, 1979: 98). Competition with imports is restricted 
by quantitative import restrictions as well as shortage of foreign 
exchange. And because of the combination of the small size of 
the domestic market for manufactured goods, the need for economies 
of scale, goverrunent import controls and the importance of keeping 
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a balance of payments equilibrium, permitting competition from 
imports is not viable. As a result, says Rice, this provision 
has little relevance to the current functions of the commission 
(Rice, 197 9: 103 ). 
Assuming that there was competition in the domestic 
market, then this requirement would entail two things: The first, 
is that the Commission should fix prices at a level which will 
attract more firms into an industry. If the prices are so low 
as to discourage new entrants then those already in business 
might opt out and this would affect consumers. The other possible 
interpretation is that the Commission should not fix the prices 
of imported goods at a level whose effect is to price-out local 
firms f rom, the market. In any case the ability of local products 
to compete would not ordinarily depend on price controls. I think 
the best way to achieve this would be to use other policy instruments. 
For example, setting up a realistic exchange rate, giving export 
subsidies, imposing import duties and import controls to prevent 
dumping, easing sales tax and improving labour legislation. Or 
the government may make special provision to all f irms in export 
business to purchase local inputs at reduced prices from local suppliers. 
A case in point is the Bukoba Cof f ee Plant which has been granted 
special permission to buy raw cof f ee f rom the Cof f ee Marketing 
Board at a reduced price so that it can sell processed coffee 
on overseas markets at competitive prices (Bates, 1984: 23). 
4.6.3. (g) The Need to Ensure the Continued Ability of the 
Government to Finance Development Programmes and 
Recurrent Expenditure, Section 12(l)(f) 
This requirement requires the Commission not to hamper 
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government revenue needs. This interpretation emerges f rom express 
provisions in the Act and from some events that have actually 
taken place. By an amending provision enacted in June 1975 it 
is stated that the, "Price Commission shall vary price structures 
where such changes become necessary because of tax changes or 
Government decisions" , (Section 16A, G. N. 26, June 27,1975). 
At the same time, the President "may give the National Price 
Commission or an Assistant Price Commissioner directions as to 
the performance by it or him of its functions under this Act 
and all such directions shall be given effect to accordingly" 
(Section 2M ). 
To fulfill this objective - to ensure it is not hampered, 
the following measures have been instituted. First, the Price 
Commission is supplied with tax rates by the government. Af ixed 
percentage is given to the Commission (e. g. 50 per cent on a 
kilo of cement or 500 per cent on a litre of beer at the ex- 
factory price with effect from July 1,1985). The tax rates are 
issued through legislation such as the Finance Acts; the Sales 
Tax Act 1969 and the Duties and Taxes Act 1970. These taxes are 
automatically passed into consumer prices (Mongi 1985) with very 
little, in fact none at all, absorption by enterprises by way 
of reduced profits. it is rare for the Commission to ask the 
governinent to reconsider its tax rates so that prices to the 
consumer may be reasonable. In its role as adviser to the government 
on prices policy the Commission has such an opportunity (Government 
Paper 1,1981 para. 64). Apart from the tax statutes, government 
revenue needs may be realised through the Commission by direct 
Presidential orders. One such case was in October 1978 when the 
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President ordered the Commission to increase prices of basic 
commodities: sugar, petrol, textiles and soft drinks as well 
as those of beer, spirits and cigarettes to raise money for the 
war with Idi Amin of Uganda. In addition, two other organs have 
sometimes used the Commission to generate funds. First, government 
ministers, and second the political party (CCM) . In April 1981 
when it became clear that government expenditure would exceed 
revenue and the traditional sources of income would not generate 
enough money to bridge the gap, the Minister f or Finance directed 
the Commission to raise prices of several consumer goods (Hansard, 
April 1981: 10). In February 1982, in totally different circumstances, 
the Minister for Agriculture, who was also chairman of the National 
Sugar Corporation (SUDECO) ordered the Commission to raise prices 
of sugar on account of increased costs of production. A Select 
Committee of Parliament set up to investigate the activities 
of the Sugar Development Corporation f ound that the increase 
was unnecessary and unjustified. The costs had been caused by 
inefficiency of management, the purchase of decrepit go-downs 
and dubious contract payments to private hauliers. The Committee 
recommended a reduction of the price to its previous level. The 
goverment refused to order the reduction on the ground that 
consumers were already used to the new prices. Instead, it ordered 
the sacking of the Minister concerned and senior executives of 
the Sugar Development Corporation (Africa Contemporary Records 
1981-82, B 278; Daily News, Daresalaam, February 2,1982). In 
February 1985 the political party (CCM) ordered the Commission 
to increase prices of textiles produced by local firms. The increase 
was for an indefinite period. The aim was to raise funds for 
the prestigious party headquarters in the new capital, Dodoma 
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(Daily News, Daresalaam, February 6,1985). Similar orders have 
been made by Assistant Price Commissioners in the provinces and 
districts in respect of prices of goods and services under their 
control. The aims for which the money is to be spent vary from 
province to province and district to district. In Ruvuma Region, 
the regional authority needed the money for a complex sports 
stadium, in addition, to a District party head office. In Kilimanjaro 
Region, the money raised will be used to build a modern party 
complex containing premises for renting. The order in February 
1985 was issued by the Party chairman in his capacity as President 
of the United Republic. It was an exercise of his legal powers 
but certainly for questionable motives. What the politicians do in 
these cases is simple. Suppose the NPC f ixes the price of a shirt 
at Sh. 50.00. in its annual review. The Party (CCM) chairman 
will instruct them to put the price at Sh. 55.00. per shirt. 
Since all firms will have indicated their annual production targets 
they will be required to remit to the party a sum of money calculated 
by the total volume of production times f ive shillings. The case 
is the same with the regional authorities. Once the prices have 
been adjusted to the local costs, the authorities instruct the 
distributors, often State Trading Companies, to raise the price, 
Say by two shillings for every piece of soap. The distributors 
will pay the money calculated in the same manner as above, and 
pass to consumers. The control system is thus used for political 
purposes. 
It is significant to stress here that there is no authority 
under the Act to raise prices f or purposes other than those stated 
in Section 12(2). But in the political arrangements of Tanzania, 
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where the political party (CCM) is said to be supreme (Article 
3(2) of the Constitution 1984, No. 5) anything done in the name 
of the party seems to be beyond question. Also senior officials 
seem to be allowed too much power to the extent of abusing them 
or exercising powers not legally vested in them. 
4.6.3. (h) The Need to Provide Circumstances under which Local 
Manufacturing, Processing, and Service Industries 
are Able to Maintain Efficiency and Expand Business, 
Section 12(l)(g) 
The key factors under this goal are "efficiency" and 
"business expansion", which are interrelated. Business expansion 
normally follows efficiency. Let us examine the meaning of 
"efficiency" as employed under this Act, the criteria the Commission 
uses to measure ef f iciency and the adequacy of the NPC 's ef f iciency 
appraisal techniques. 
4.6.34 h) (j) Methods used by the Commission to Judge Ef f iciency 
"Efficiency" as used in this Act, according to Rice, 
does not mean the "efficiency of allocation of resources in the 
economy" but simply Othe efficiency of production of the plant" 
(Rice, 1979: 103). Viewed from this perspective, the role of the 
pripe controllers is to see that the costs of production, in 
terms of real resources used to produce a given product, fall 
over time, that is f irms should be able to produce the same output 
with a lesser expenditure of labour, capital, fuel and raw materials 
(Rice, 1979: 103). The commission's manuals do not define efficiency. 
However. we can infer the criteria they use f rom their working 
papers (e. g. Nos. 116,120,148,153 August to October 1984) which 
reveal certain standard techniques of assessing efficiency. 
These 
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papers concerned the review of prices for soft drinks (coca cola, 
pepsi cola, mirinda), Yuasa Car batteries, edible oils and fats 
and bed sheets and pillow cases, respectively. The first step, 
in all cases, consisted of a financial analysis. This involved 
looking at the profit and loss accounts of the firms for that 
product at the level of prices f ixed over the preceding year. 
If the firm earns a profit at the prevailing price, then it is 
taken to be operating efficiently. So, the first criterion is 
profitability. The second stage was analysis of the costs of 
raw materials. The production formula for each product states 
the proportion of each type (in money terms) of raw materials 
needed. If less of a given resource has been employed -in producing 
the same or more quantity of a given product, then efficiency 
in the use of that resource is said to exist. Efficiency in the 
use of raw materials is also judged by the arnount of local raw 
materials, compared to imported components (Working Paper 16, 
September 1984 for car batteries). The policy here is to encourage 
more utilisation of domestic resources to conserve the use of 
foreign exchange. The third stage, is analysis of the marketing 
and distribution system. The commission looks at the volume produced 
in relation to the size of the market, the nature of distribution 
(whether handled by private businessmen or public firms), forms 
Of transport and communication employed as well as the record 
of the firms as regards compliance with government policy on 
controlled distribution. Fourth, the commission examines capacity 
Utilisation. They compare the installed capacity to actual capacity 
used. Here there is a standard rule that af irm will be considered 
efficient if capacity utilisation reaches 80 per cent of the 
installed capacity (Section 12(5)). According to studies many 
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firms never attain this level 
6 
(Wangwe 1977, UNCTAD Report 1984, 
Africa Contemporary Record 1981-82, B272). Fifth, the commission 
look at the administrative and managerial structures of the firm. 
Attention is focussed on selling and administrative overheads 
per unit product. where there are many f irms supplying a product, 
the commission compare performances between them. Sometimes, 
performance comparisons are made with firms producing similar 
products in neighbouring states. A good example is that of cement. 
Since most of the firms in the East African States produce Portland 
cement, presumably under similar patent and technological licencing 
arrangements, the performance of the cement firms is compared 
with those in Kenya and Mozambique. 
With regard to trading firms, the commission uses two 
techniques to instill efficiency. First the NPC (through the 
costing department) tries to ensure that costs used to justify 
price increases are actually incurred. The cost delineating procedures I 
provided in the Act, if strictly enforced are adequate to ensure 
that costs included in prices are not created out of thin air 
(Section 12(2)). The Commission permits all labour costs to be 
included in the cost-price. The aim is to give incentive to f irms 
to use more labour intensive methods to absorb the growing labour 
force. But 'not all capital costs can be passed to the cost-price. 
Only the interest costs can be automatically included (Whitworth 
1982). The second technique is the fixing of percentage prof it 
margins at each stagg of distribution or sale. For example, 
the margins for a bottle of coca cola fixed in September 
1984 
were: (added to wholesale price) 15 per cent retail margin 
in 
stores, 20 per cent in hotels and 25 per cent in consumer 
On the extent and reasons for capacity underutilisation. see, 
Wangwe, S. M. 
(1977) "Factors Influencing Capacity UtilisatiOn in Tanzania's Manufacturing", 
Vol. 1, International Labour Review 115. 
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cooperative societies (Working Paper No. 116, August 1984). The 
object of controlling the margin mark up is to give traders incentive 
to use economies of scale in transport and storage. By transporting 
and stocking in bulk the fixed and semi-fixed costs would be 
spread more thinly over the products. Retailers are forbidden 
in principle to include in the cost-price expenses on account 
of renting buildings, air conditioning and maintaining large 
inventories without the permit of the commission (Rice, 1979: 
98). It has been suggested by Whitworth 1982, that a better method 
of incorporating incentives to retailers to cut costs would be 
to fix an absolute, and not a percentage profit margin, which 
would remain in force for several years. This is thought would 
force the traders to reduce unit overhead costs so as to obtain 
a high margin (Whitworth, 1982: 484). It is clear that the commission's 
efficiency appraisal techniques seem to omit certain important 
aspects. For example, efficiency in satisfying consumers (redressing 
complaints), in punctuality in the delivery of goods, quality 
of services; in the choice of technology, that is exploiting 
new technological and production processes; in the training of 
personnel and in the departmental arrangements. These are matters 
which the government has called upon all industries to consider 
seriously (Governemnt "Policy on Productivity, Incomes, Wages", 
Paper 1,1981, para. 6). 
4.6.1(h)(ii) Methods used to enable Firms Expand their Business 
The cost-plus pricing formula permits firms operating 
reasonably efficiently to make surpluses which can be used to 
OxPand their businesses. Other methods include the prof it margins 
given to traders; price increases j9pecif ically given to enable 
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a firm to raise money for investment -a point we shall see in 
detail in a later section and the pan territorial freight allowance 
given to all distributors of a given commodity. The freight factor 
means if a firm has the majority of its clients in the urban 
areas it will be able to raise enough money to subsidise its 
operations in rural, high cost areas. 
It seems to me the question whether the controls give 
incentives to enterprises to expand business should not be confused 
with the real question which is whether the investments actually 
do take place. Do the firms actually use the money to expand 
business? According to Rice, despite the accommodation which 
the controls have made to induce firms to generate money for 
investment all indications are that investments are stagnating. 
The shortages in basic essentials like cooking oils, some textiles, 
beds, mattresses, soap, detergents, bread and stoves are evidence 
of that (Government Paper No. 1,1981: 4-5). A critical factor 
in determining investments is who makes the investment-decis ions 
and what are his priorities when making the decisions. In those 
sectors in which private investments are dominant, as is the 
case with most of the commodities cited above, investors may 
have withheld investments not necessarily because the controls 
leave no prof it f or them but because they f eel they could maximise 
profits if the controls were removed. In contrast, in those sectors 
in which the sta-te is the investment-decision maker, as in the 
case of shoe production, cigarette and tea leaves processing, 
shortages are minimal. 
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4.6.4-A Point in Conclusion 
To conclude the discussion on the goals placed on the 
price controls the appropriate question would be to ask: How 
effective are the Commission's methods and approaches in attaining 
these goals? This in turn raises a number of other questions: 
How clear and consistent are the goals? Are these goals the kind 
that would ordinarily be achieved by price controls? Is the Commission 
adequately equipped in terms of resources, skills and manpower 
to deal with the problems that arise in the course of pursuing 
those goals? What adverse effects is the Commission likely to 
cause to firms in pursuing the goals? How are possible conflicts 
in the goals resolved and in whose favour? 
I will attempt to comment briefly on some of these 
issues in the light of the Commission's performance. First, on 
the definition of essential goods, goal 12(l) (a). Although a lot 
of essential goods have been brought under control of the Commission, 
there are a number of basic consumer goods that have not been 
covered. Those not under control includes products of the Tanzania 
Shoe Company, a major shoe producer; Sunflag Ltd., producing 
T-shirts; Ubungo Garments producing uniforms and garments; African 
Metals Ltd., producing aluminium buckets, pans, crockery and 
Tanganyika Enamelware Co. Ltd., producing enamel products. On 
the other hand, non-essentials, like tape recorders, records, 
refrigerators, sarees are controlled (Price Control List, September 
12,1984). The basket of "essential" and "non-essential" goods 
will require constant adjustment to conform with changes in living 
standards. With regard to halting rapid and frequent variations 
in prices, goal 12(l)(b) the policy is that a large once 
for 
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all annual increase is preferrable to small periodic increases. 
My view is that when the annual increases are made the margin 
seems so big that people f ind it hard to believe they are genuine 
(Daily News, Daresalaam, July 1985: 1) let alone to adjust their 
expenditures. The fact that they can tell when the increases 
will come with reasonable certainty does not yet seem to prepare 
them for the big increases at all. The flood of complaints found 
in the newspapers immediately price increases are announced suggests 
that more research needs to be done on the relative merits of 
one big price increase compared to periodic small increases. 
As far as preventing unjustified costs from passing 
into consumer prices is concerned, goal 12(l)(d), I would say 
much depends on whether the Commission's costing staff will be 
able to detect costs inefficiently, negligently or artificially 
included in the firm's application for a price increase. This 
in turn depends on several factors. It depends, for example, 
on the competence of the costing staf f. Italso, depends on the 
working relationship between the enterprises and the Commission. 
Some of the considerations here would be whether the enterprises 
are prepared to tell the Commission about areas of operations 
in which they are weak or inef f icient or whether they are willing 
to remedy inefficiencies brought to their attention by the Commission. 
My impression is that they are not. For one, many firms tend 
to inflate costs (Mongi 1980). For the other, to reduce chances 
of critical reports the data the enterprises submit always give 
as good an impression on the validity of costs as necessary to 
convince the commissioners that all the costs have been actually 
and necessarily incurred. Some enterprises I contacted agreed 
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that this was a common practice. They argued that the practice 
is a business ploy because of the public relations effect (the 
public will frown at inefficient managers) of the reports when 
they are published; and also because the management sees it 
their duty to minimise, the chances of their applications for 
price increases being rejected on grounds of inefficiency. With 
the firms determined to force the Commission to accept their 
version of costs, the Commission's task becomes even more demanding. 
And experience shows that sometimes the f irms manage to get away 
with it. A few examples will help illustrate this point. According 
to the 1982/83 reports of the National Development Corporation, 
several of its subsidiaries were granted price increases during 
1982-83 to cover shortfalls in revenue. For example, the Friendship 
Textile Mill which was partially closed due to shortages of imported 
inputs, water and energy interruptions and the breakdown of machines 
as well as a protracted go-slow among employees, continued to 
keep in employment the entire work force. The firm produced only 
24m. metres of cloth instead of the 28M metres installed capacity. 
The price increase was granted to cover loss of revenue from 
the 4m metres. The oil refinery (TIPER) suspended production 
during the early part of 1983 due to lack of crude. It continued 
to keep in employment and pay the workforce throughout the period 
of-' stoppage. On resumption of production prices of fuel were 
raised. Surely these cases show that part of the price increase 
covered elements of cost-inefficiency. This is contrary to the 
spirit of the Act. Yet, it is an illustration of the discrepancy 
between the rules in the "black letter law" and the practice. 
For in all the above cases the political and social environment 
favoured keeping employees in their jobs. 
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The establishing of fair relationships among incomes, 
goal 12(l)(e) would imply that the controls should alter the 
distribution of income between manufacturers, retailers and consumers; 
and also that between agricultural and industry. Due to failure 
to enforce controls at the retail level especially in rural areas 
(Whitworth, 1982: 477; Rice, 1979: 106) the controls redistribute 
income f rom the poor to the rich traders. It is also submitted 
that if the objective is to maintain a fair balance between incomes 
in the agricultural and industrial sectors the logical conclusion 
is that the Commission is perhaps not the appropriate institution. 
It has no control over agricultural prices. 
To sum up we can say that the goals in this part of 
the Act are in many places ambiguous, or silent or simply susceptible 
to no clear cut interpretation. The Commission has tried to develop 
a coherent and consistent set of guidelines. It has worked out 
policy to guide the exercise of its discretion. For example, 
it has determined the priorities and the relative weight to be 
given to each goal. It has devised some methods and -techniques 
employed in pursuing these goals. Some of these methods are effective 
while others are not. 
4.7. The Price Commission and Price Determination 
The NPC applies different methods for fixing ex-factory, 
wholesale and retail prices. I propose to examine each in that 
order. 
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4.7.1. Fixing the Prices for Locally Manufactured Goods 
The law governing the fixing of maximum prices for 
locally manufactured goods is contained in section 12(2)(a). 
The section regulates the maximum ex-factory prices. The prices 
are formed by a simple process of adding up costs - the 'cost- 
plus' formula. The section provides that in fixing maximum prices 
for the sale of goods by the manufacturer, the cost price shall 
include, "the direct costs of production, the general overhead 
expenses, the normal wear and tear of capital assets, the cost 
of holding stocks of goods and materials, a margin in relation 
to turnover and the capital employed, the level of excise duty, 
sales tax and other similar duties payable by or collected from 
the manufacturer". 
I 
Taken literally this section seems to allow firms to 
recover every cost item no matter how wasteful, improper or avoid- 
able it may have been. But such a construction would contradict 
the terms of section 12(l)(c) on preventing unjustified incýeases 
and those of section 12(l)(g) on instilling business efficiency. 
The commission's task is therefore to identify what costs are 
genuine and estimating what their level should be if the firm 
were operating efficiently. To carry out this task the Commission 
considers ef f iciency,, to be optimal where a firm utilises 80 per 10 
cent of the installed capacity, section 12(4). Second, it sends 
a detailed questionnaire to every firm whose products are controlled. 
The questionnaire seeks to obtain information 
and data on costs of production giving a breakdown of each cost 
element, substantiated by invoices and other relevant documents. 
I The information is then closely scrutinised by the statistical 
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and costing departments to ensure that it is consistent with 
data on the audited records (audited by external auditors). The 
data is then compared with that of previous years questionnaires 
to see areas in which changes have taken place and the possible 
causes. Wherever possible intra firm comparisons are made. 
4 
A rough indication of how unit costs are estimated 
can be gathered from the commission's working papers (Working 
Paper 153 of 1984) on prices of locally produced bed sheets. 
The unit costs are divided into three major headings: Direct 
costs of material, overhead costs; and costs of labour. The direct 
costs of material vary in proportion to increases in production. 
All direct expenses of labour, material and others constitute 
'prime costs'. All indirect costs of material, labour, rent, 
electricity are overhead expenses. Overhead expenses cover fixed 
and semi-fixed costs. Overhead costs increase with, but not directly 
proportionate to the volume of production. Prime costs are directly 
allocated to the product. Indirect costs are apportioned to each 
product on equittable basis - according to anticipated sales 
volume, product weight or machine and labour time used in production. 
The commission usually accepts the firm's preferred basis of 
allocation of joint costs. 
The computation of direct costs is facilitated by the 
production formula for the product. Each firm must specify the 
production formula i. e. the physical quantities of raw materials 
required in the production of a given quantity of output. The 
formula also stipulates the amount of labour needed. The costs 
of labour may fall under direct or indirect costs depending on 
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the firm's accounting methods. All wages and salaries incurred 
in the manufacture of the item are direct costs. Wages paid for 
handling of goods from the production floor to warehouses and 
distribution centres are also direct costs. 
The costs of materials that become part of the finished 
product are direct costs. The costs are verified by suppliers 
invoices or purchase orders. The Commission also counterchecks 
the prices quoted with those published in papers like the Economist, 
the Times and the Financial Times. In addition, the Commission 
gets expert advice f rom institutions like the banks, the Marketing 
Development Bureau and the General Superintendance Company, a 
Swiss firm commissioned by the government to monitor importers. 
Once the costs of raw materials and labour are established, 
they are multiplied by the physical quantities in the production 
formula. The sum total gives the prime costs. And when this is 
divided by total output, the costs per unit are established. 
The next step in the cost delineation exercise is to 
determine unit overhead costs. This is done by estimating: (a) 
the total overhead costs per a given period (based on actual 
costs incurred in the recent past as reflected in the firm's 
loss and prof it account), and (b) the volume of production (as 
given in the firm's estimates of production and provided the 
estimates are consistent with recent performance). Finally all 
the costs are added up - the direct, overhead and unit costs. 
A prof it margin is added to the costs to arrive at the ex-f actory 
price. 
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The law provides that the profit margin given must 
be in relation to the turnover and capital employed, section 
12(2)(a). There is no definition of the term "capital employed", 
or the nature of the relationship between the level of profit 
margin to the turnover. Once again it is for the Commission to 
def ine these terms bearing in mind the need to strike a balance 
in all the goals enshrined in the Act. 
According to the Commission, capital employed consists 
of the "net-fixed assets valued at historical costs less depre- 
ciation plus current assets; minus current liabilities averaged 
over a year" (Mongi 1980: 720). By valuing the fixed assets at 
historical (rather than replacement) cost, the Commission only 
allows a firm to earn a return on capital actually employed in 
the business and not on capital gains resulting f rom the revaluation 
of the assets. As a result of adopting this definition we find 
that: First, where a firm has to purchase new machinery at a 
higher cost to replace existing ones, it will be forced to raise 
most of the funds from external sources as opposed to retained 
profits. Since borrowing from external sources is not always 
possible the Commission exerciset its discretion to allow a price 
increase to enable firms in such a situation satisfy their needs 
of- funds for investment. Second, all loans taken out for a period 
exceeding a year are treated as part of capital. Those taken f or 
less than a year are considered as current liabilities. Third, 
current investments for future production, e. g. capital work 
in progress, are excluded from the definition. 
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In determining a reasonable rate of return on capital 
employed the Commission looks at the special circumstances facing 
each industry. But no f irm can be permitted more than 30 per 
cent rate of return. Any local firm earning a pre tax rate of 
return exceeding 30 per cent per annum will be presumed to have 
abused its position on the market, section 13(5). 
After computing the turnover on investment a return 
on sales is worked and added to the costs of production. To this 
are added taxes and these cumulatively make up the maximum ex- 
factory price for a given product. 
4.7.2. Some Observations 
It is clear from the description of the method used 
to fix prices above that the task facing the Commission is enormous. 
It requires competent and adequate personnel. Moreover, it requires 
data and information which is accurate and detailed. The question 
is whether the Commission is adequately equipped for this task. 
On the personnel side, I found that as of December 1985, the 
Commission had been able to recruit only two qualified cost- 
accountants. One of them is an expatriate. Most of the staff 
in this section had to learn the subject on the job. Given the 
magnitude of the task involved in identifying what the firms 
costs actually are and given the heterogeneous nature of firms 
under the Commission's jurisdiction, I find the Commission 
inadequately equipped to carry out this function competently. 
The second problem is defining "allowable" costs. The 
Commission makes an allowance for Ounavoidable wastageo. 
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There are, however, no guidelines as to what levels of wastage 
would be considered unavoidable. So far the Commission relies 
on the f irm's experiences in the past. But this approach can 
lead to mischief if proper scrutiny is not made. A good illustration 
is the case of the Sugar Corporation. In 1982 the National Sugar 
Corporation (SUDECO) obtained a price increase to cover, inter 
alia losses on account of unavoidable wastage. Press reports 
revealed that a lot of sugar lay spoiled in the corporation's 
warehouses due to poor storage and exposure to rains. A special 
Parliamentary team was set up to investigate the allegations 
following a private members motion that the government had no 
justification in allowing the prices to go up. The team found 
out that the losses had been caused by negligence by the management 
for purchasing descrepit go-downs. And concluded that these losses 
were avoidable (Daily News, Daresalaam, February 19,1982). 
The third problem relates to the methods of allocating 
costs to products produced jointly but which are sold on the domestic 
and overseas markets, or where af irm, uses the same equipment 
and labour to produce price controlled and non-controlled products. 
The Commission has devised f our techniques to overcome this problem. 
One technique is apportionment of costs in direct proportion 
to the wage bill. This technique is employed for enterprises 
where labour is paid by the piece of work done. The assumption 
being that money spent on wages will vary in direct proportion 
with output. But this is not always true. The money cost of labour 
spent on different products may not necessarily vary in direct 
proportion to the time taken to produce that product. The other 
technique is apportioninent by the percentage of cost of raw materia z 
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used for each product. The third is allocation by the amount 
of machine-time spent on each product. The fourth, is allocation 
in proportion to the amount of prime costs. This method, however, 
does not distinguish between variable and fixed costs incurred 
on each product. It is arbitrary. 
One other problem is that of delays in submitting data 
or enterprises not submitting any data at all. This is a very 
common problem to institutions set up to control industry. The 
audit corporation's experiences illustrate this problem very 
well. In the 1982/83 accounting period, the corporation got accounts 
f rom 280 enterprises only compared to its 400 clients. Out of 
the 280 only 85 submitted auditable records. The others had haphazard, 
inaccurate or poor accounting systems for which the auditor could 
not form any opinion. The Commission, as we noted earlier, relies 
on audited accounts for its decisions. 
Where enterprises do not submit data or accounting 
records the Commission sets the prices of their products at the 
same level as those of the most ef f icient f irm in the industry. 
This may, of course, cover elements of cost-inefficiencies in 
some enterprises. Alternatively, the Commission postpones price 
reviews until it gets acceptable data. This necessitates price 
reviews outside the time laid under the Act. 
4.7.3. Fixing Prices for Imported Goods 
The methodology for fixing prices of imported goods 
regulated by section 12(2)(b). The prices are determined by 
the gross margin technique. Under this rule, the costs of production 
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at the point of export are first identified. To this are added 
local costs of distribution. Thus when the goods whch have been 
imported change ownership by way of sale for the first time in 
the territory, the cost price to the seller consists of the "free 
on board price at the port of shipment, plus the following charges 
in respect of such unit: insurance, freight; the landing, handling 
and clearing charges; the customs duties and similar taxes payable 
by the importer; inventory, carrying and storage costs and a 
margin in relation to the turnover and the capital employed". 
Buying agent's commission and shipping agent's fees 
are determined by the rate customarily charged by the importers 
agents on like or similar goods. In most cases the function of 
the Commission is only to specify the profit margin at each point 
of distribution. The NPC has no effective or detailed control 
as is the case with locally manufactured goods. It is left to 
the importers to compute and compile the price and forward it 
to the NPC for announcement. The role of the NPC is purely one 
of legitimising. A good illustration is the guidelines issued 
by NPC to the Agricultural and Industrial Supplies Company, importers 
of machinery, agricultural inputs and consumer durables like 
refrigerators and deep freezers. The importers of refrigerators 
are directed to arrive at the retail prices by summing up: "the 
CIF value, customs duty, sales tax, wharf age and handling charges 
(but excluding demurrage charges), clearing and forwarding charges, 
bank charges, superintendence levy and transport f rom port to 
depot go down" (Price Control List, September 12,1984: 88). 
From this a margin of two per cent was calculated for the pan 
territorial equalisation fund. The total of all this forms the 
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basis for calculating the various margins that will be awarded 
to the importer 17%, the wholesaler (Regional Trading Companies) 
13% and retailer 15% in order to set the maximum prices at each 
level - 
The NPC exhorts importers to make sure that the costs 
are carefully and properly established. Regulating prices of 
imported goods seems to be an area where the NPC's authority 
is minimal. It was probably felt that since most of the firms 
involved in this activity are state-owned and are f ew in number, 
they could be left to set prices on their own. Their public ownership 
would be enough to ensure that they protect the interests of 
the public. It was also felt that the pricing of goods in this 
area is too complex and would be enormously expensive and well 
beyond the Commission's capability. For instance, the NPC would 
have to obtain information on price quotations for every imported 
product (e. g. for every model of an imported dress) and from 
every potential supplier to compare prices. One problem would 
be whether the quotation should be sought f rom a country which 
produces dresses or one where dresses are freely imported. The 
other problem would be whether such information will be freely 
available. Would the cost of obtaining it be worth the trouble? 
Suppose the firms from which quotations are sought realise that 
the Commission is simply seeking information and has no intention 
to place any order, will they supply the information? Furthermore, 
effective control over imported goods requires cooperation. Only 
through intergovernmental cooperation would the Commission be 
able to find out how much, say, Kenya is paying to import a particular 
model of a tractor, would require the existence of some international 
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body which collects information on world prices and disseminates 
the information freely to interested parties. 
Since July 1984, the government adopted a policy of 
liberalising the importation of some specified goods. The objective 
of this measure was to enable businessmen, with their own foreign 
exchange savings, to assist the government to import basic consumer 
goods to alleviate shortages (Daily News, May 7,1985). Among 
the list of decontrolled items are textiles, machinery, commercial 
vehicles, soap and detergents and cooking oils. 
While the government's decision was welcomed by all 
sections of the community, the dangers that it poses do not seem 
to have been reaiised by those who have commented favourably 
for this decision (Sunday News, Daresalaam, December 29,1985). 
one noticeable problem is that importers sell cheap imported 
commodities at the same price as locally manufactured commodities. 
The reverse is equally true. Local manufacturers sell cheap local 
commodities at the same price as those of expensive imported 
substitutes. The second problem is that local firms, which are 
subsidiaries of foreign multiAtionals, are allowed to siphon 
out of the country A lot of profits through transfer pricing. 
The subsidiaries as we noted earlier, are often engaged in assembling 
and last-stage processing of intermediate inputs purchased from 
the parent company for resale on the local market. As such, they 
act as marketing agents for the parent company in a captive market 
since competing imports are kept out by import controls and the 
industrial licencing system (Whitworth 1982). Since the invoices 
that the subsidiaries forward to the importer to substantiate 
the costs of the inputs are supplied by the holding multinational 
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companies there is no guarantee that the prices reflected in 
those invoices are the correct prices or are based on the "arms- 
length" transactions. Indeed, there is ample evidence, in the 
Commission's records, showing that in the invoices tendered by 
some companies the cost of importing components is higher than 
the cost of importing finished goods. This in my view is an 
indication of over-invoicing in the prices of components. A third 
problem is that companies may sell a product (for which they 
hold a licence to manufacture locally) cheaply imported from 
their subsidiaries located in a neighbouring country rather than 
manufacture it on the domestic scene. This may in the long run 
wipe out local manufacturing and stifle the development of indust- 
rialisation in the country. Some realisation of the problems 
posed by import liberalisation and decontrolled price structures 
for imports is indicated by President Nyerere. Nyerere argues 
that the initial period of experimentation with the liberalisation 
policies shows there is a need to review and restrict the concession 
made. He remarks: 
Although the objective of the arrangement 
was to entice individuals who might have 
siphoned hard currency out of the country 
to plough it back, allowing the relaxation 
to continue under the same terms amounted 
to sanrtioning unlawful practices (Daily 
News, Daresalaam, July 5,1985: 1). 
The unlawful practices referred to are presumably those relating 
to unconscion7able prices of imported goods and transfer pricing. 
4.7.4. Retail (or Consumer) Prices 
The law relating to the determination of the price 
that the ultimate consumer pays, is contained in section 12(2)(d). 
It requires retail traders to take into accounts 
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..... the relevant manufacturer's, importer's, 
wholesaler's and subwholesaler's maximum 
price in relation to such goods, the cost 
of transport to the point at which the retail 
price applies, the inventory carrying and 
storage costs and a margin in relation to 
the turnover and the capital employed. 
Price control at the retail level presents a difficult 
problem to the Commission. The Commission has to deal with numerous 
traders differing: in the size of their business; in the diversity 
and quality of products they handle; in the location of the estab- 
lishments; in costs; in market structures and in the price-structures. 
The retail sector is characterised by a high degree of market 
domination. Almost all the firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic. 
They are predominantly organised along family lines, using family 
labour. This raises the question of quantifying cost of services 
rendered by family members. The Act lays down six factors which 
traders should take into consideratioD in fixing retail prices 
(Section 12(2)(d)); but it does not say in what priority. Each 
trader thus deals with cases as he thinks f it. It is here that 
the task of Assistant Price Controllers and local price control 
advisory committees come into play. The National Price Commission's 
control of prices to ultimate consumers takes two forms: 
the f ixing of maximum prices which apply pan territorially; and 
control of profit margins after manufacture (as the goods 
pass through the various distributive outlets). The profit-margin 
is set at a level which enables a trader to recover the costs 
of distribution and selling. Selling and distribution overheads 
consist of variable costs (i. e. those which vary directly with 
the quantity or value of the articles sold) and fixed costs (i. e. 
those that are incurred irrespective of whether the product is 
sold or not). Expenditure on variable costs is added to the cost 
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of manufacture of the product. Expenditure on fixed costs is 
apportioned on the products sold. The apportionment must be carried 
out equitably, on the basis of either an estimated rate per article 
or volume of sales, or a percentage in work costs. The retail 
profit margins are prescribed in two forms: in the form of stipulated 
percentages (say 5 per cent on the costs of bringing the commodity 
to the consumer), or in the form of a fixed sum per a given quantity 
or volume of goods (say, twenty shillings on every ton of sugar). 
The profit margin technique has certain disadvantages. 
one disadvantage is that it gives no incentive to traders 
to reduce costs by adopting cost-efficient trade practices. A 
trader is allowed to recoup all costs of distributing the commodity 
and is guaranteed a profit margin. One area of concern where 
traders tend to be inefficient is transport. The tendency to 
order goods in small quantities obviously adds to costly transport 
since the same volume of traffic in small loads is more costly 
to handle than bulk transport. The other is that the implementation 
of the profit-margin would require traders to hire qualified 
personnel such as cost, management, and financial accountants. 
Due to the limited availability of such personnel and the expenses 
of hiring them, many small traders simply don't employ any. It 
only the large corporations which can af ford them. The third 
disadvantage is that it is administratively expensive to implement. 
The traders have to continually engage with the price controllers 
in debates as to what should, and what should not, constitute 
a permissible cost item. Furthermore, there is the expense incurred 
by traders trying to f ind loopholes in the system so as to evade 
it; let alono the cost of bribing the price-controllers to try 
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to convince them to accept the traders version of the subject 
matter. A further disadvantage is that, in view of high demand 
compared to supply for most of the items under control, the controlled 
prices are not followed by traders. The tendency is for traders 
to charge the price that the buyers are willing to pay on each 
occasion. The fact that the system of control over retailing 
is different from that applying to manufacturing has some important 
repercussions. It makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
the National Price Commission to give clear guidance about the 
effect of its decisions on individual retail prices. 
The great majority of the traders have to operate the 
Act themselves and are only subject, in greater or less degree, 
to subsequent scrutiny by the Price Commission. In this respect 
they are expected to follow the policy spelled out in the Act 
(Section 12(2)(d)). 
Despite spelling out the policy on price increases 
examination of applications from the trading enterprises reveals 
a considerable number of misinterpretations or misunderstandings 
of the Act. For example, one such common misunderstanding of 
the Act is that many enterprises overlook the f act that if total 
costs have increased less than the allowable costs, any price 
increase must be limited to the amount justified by the increase 
in total costs, or the benefits of reduced costs must go to the 
consumer in for form of reduced prices. Where there is a fall 
in costs of production, either due to increased productivity 
Of labour or to the f all in costs of inputs, consumers are denied 
the benefits of reduced costs because once maximum prices have 
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been prescribed the tendency of the enterprises is either to 
continue charging the same price or looking for price increases. 
Traders look at the prescribed maximum price as the legal one 
to be charged even when conditions under which they are trading 
call for reduction. The second noticeable misinterpretation is 
that businessmen assume that every cost incurred in the course 
of their business is an allowable cost, and that the allowable 
cost item spelled under section 12(2) (d) of the Act are only 
illustrative. That is not correct at all. In fact the cost items 
specified in the Act are exhaustive. Any item not specif ied cannot 
be included in the price, save with the express consent of the 
Commission. Therefore cost items such as entertainment, donations 
and demurrage charges, which the majority of businessmen currently 
pass to the consumer, are not permissible. Thirdly, some business- 
men assume that evidence of losses in recent past automatically 
justifies a claim to raise prices. That is an erroneous view. 
The law is concerned with current losses. Finally, most enterprises 
anticipate cost increases in their applications. Again this is 
a contravention of the spirit of the Act. Prices may not be increased 
in anticipation of cost increases except with the express permission 
of the Commissioner. And the Commissioner should not grant a 
price increase which takes account of future cost increases, 
unless the increased costs are known as both to date and amount. 
In conclusion, we note that the nature of price f ixing 
processes depend on the kind of business. The prices of manufacturers 
are only permitted to rise if there is an increase in total allowable 
COsts. Allowable costs are categorically stated in the Act. Retailers 
and wholesalers are allowed to increase prices without regard 
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to costs, provided they do not exceed the profit mark up. It 
was not considered feasible to apply the allowable costs to retailers 
and wholesalers because they stock large numbers of different 
commodities and cannot easily quantify the costs applicable. 
4.8. Procedures and Methods of Inquiry 
There are three main procedures for obtaining the infor- 
mation and data necessary in f ixing the maximum prices: the pre- 
notification of proposed price-increases; regular reporting by 
enterprises to the Commission and record keeping, subject to 
spot-checks by the Commission. 
All business enterprises, subject to control, are required 
to apply to the Commission f or any price increase. The application 
must be made in advance, in a prescribed form and must be justified. 
The Commission has issued a data sheet. The layout of the data 
sheet is meant to facilitate the collection and sorting out of 
the information. Once the data sheet are submitted to the Commission 
the staff try to identify the key points, assemble the necessary 
information and evaluate it. Investigations are centred, on the 
particular firm applying for an increase and not the whole industrial 
sector. 
The investigations follow one standard format. First, 
there is a general summary. Then a section describing the aGeneral 
Background% the "Market Structure and Competition", and *Pricing*. 
Then follows a section on the firms operations describing *Financial 
Operations" (i. e. margins, cash flow, rate of return and the 
like); finally, there is a section on "Conclusions and Recommendations". 
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During the course of a reference for a price review, 
the Commission maintains contact and consultation with interested 
parties: the government, and the enterprise concerned. Such consult- 
ation enables the Commission to inf orm the parties of the issues 
involved to get their view points, andalso to obtain detailed 
knowledge of the enterprise. The enterprise management may be 
heard. The nature of the hearing is not specified. All contacts 
are made in private. There are no public inquiry procedures. 
The main source of information are the records and 
reports of the enterprises, submissions by the management and 
the Commission's own studies. The financial data that the Commission 
collects from the enterprise, for purposes of fixing prices, 
centres on four main aspects: The first, is the costs of production 
(including unit costs) broken down into components such as costs 
of labour, material and fuel. Second, is on capital employed 
and profit margins. Third is on current prices of the product. 
And fourth, is on the quantity of production; volume of sales 
and price indices of the components. 
To prevent abuses inherent in cost-plus pricing, the 
Commission uses the following methods to investigate efficiency. 
One, is comparisons of costs, performance and management practices 
made between similar firms in the same industry. Comparisons 
are made in their invoices if the firms are using the same raw 
materials. Managers may be called upon to explain any discrepancies 
or variations in productivity. Obviously, this method ignores 
differences in location, tYPS of technology used and market structure 
of the firms compared. Another method is comparisons with firms 
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producing similar goods or services in another industry or another 
country. The other, is comparisons made within the same firm 
over a chosen period of time. 
The efficiency audits carried by the Commission are, 
however, limited in their scope. They do not go into the details 
of the issues. For example, the efficiency studies do not probe 
into efficiency in labour deployment; capacity utilisation; appraisal 
of investments; marketing practices or utilisation of plant and 
machinery. 
Apart from the question of efficiency audits, there 
are other areas of concern raised by the Commission's methods 
of investigation. One area relates to a fundamental question 
of justice. The Commission does in practice, sit as a judge. 
But unlike most other judicial tribunals, it is not required 
to def ine the charge against the enterprise; nor to allow a cross- 
examination of the evidence it takes; nor even to allow the presence 
of the parties or to allow an appeal during, or af ter, the various 
stages of its process. If the Commission reaches an erroneous 
conclusion, there is little that the enterprise can do. The 
enterprise does not know the Commission's conclusions before 
they are announced, and it has no opportunity before that to 
discuss them with the Commission. The Commission, under the Act, 
is the only competent authority to hear appeals from its own 
decisions (Section 15). 
These deficiencies in the Commission's hearing procedures 
do evidently raise a lot of concerns for those firms whose products 
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are subject to price controls. Take the case of the price freeze 
that takes place during investigations. There is no provision 
for the grant of an interim price increase order during an investi- 
gation into the application for a price increase. If the Commission's 
investigations conclude that the increase is justified, it is 
not possible to sue the Commission for damages or recovery of 
revenue lost during the investigation. In strict legal terms, 
the freezing of prices during the period of investigations amounts 
to presuming the guilt of the enterprise concerned, until it 
can prove innocence. For it implicitly assumes that there is 
no justification in the proposed price increase unless the enterprise 
establishes a clear case. Yet, the damage to the cash f low, on 
account of a price freeze, when costs are increasing, could be 
critical to the enterprise and may lead to a failure to meet 
the enterprise targets. 
Delay in making decisions, is another point of concern. 
There is no specified time limit within which the Commission 
must complete its investigations. Delay results in considerable 
losses of revenue to the enterprises. It acts as a break on their 
f reedom of reaction needed to respond to market f orces. Af actor 
which has made the effects of delay so serious in recent years 
is simply inflation. Often the enterprise's costs rise after 
the submission of the application, but before the announcement 
of the award. By the time the prices fixed are published the 
enterprise will inevitably continue to make losses for reasons 
quite outside its control unless either the Commission allows 
the inclusion, in the price fixing formula, of an allowance for 
future inflation, or the costs submitted by the enterprise are 
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exaggerated and this is not detected by the Commission. There 
are strong indications that the Commission does make an allowance 
for the effects of inflation on costs. But this is seldom announced. 
It would be embarassing to the government for anything precise 
to be stated publicly. 
The other aspect of concern is the absence of systematic 
and continued communication between the Commission and the manage- 
ment of the enterprises concerned. Af ter receiving the data from 
the enterprises, the latter are largely ignored in the crucial 
stages of evaluating the data; interpreting the information and 
coming to conclusions. This raises a fundamental question of 
justice. The enterprises are denied the right to a fair hearing 
on aspects that constitute the most elementary principles of 
natural justice. 
There is, as in previous price control regimes (e. g. 
Price Control Ordinance 1920 and Price Control Ordinance 1951) 
no consumer representation in the inquiries. This according to 
the Price Commissioner, is not a shortcoming in its legal processes, 
nor is it an oversight on the part of the legislature. The consumer's 
interests are taken care of by the spirit of the Act which is 
geared at fair prices to consumers, but within the political 
environment of the country. Fairness to consumers is enshrined 
in the country's policy and Constitution which has proclaimed 
absence of exploitation of one person by another. Moreover, all 
the Commissioners, who make decisions on the amount of prices, 
are consumers themselves. They will always put the consumers 
interests in the forefront (Nditi, 1985: 2). This last argument 
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is debatable. It assumes that the Commissioners, perceptions 
of consumer interests are congruent with those of the consumers. 
That may not be necessarily the case always. The very fact that 
the Commissioners are bureaucrats, appointed by the government 
seems to me to be a strong indicator of the interests that they 
are expected to safeguard. 
An analysis of the Commission's practices, as a machinery 
for consumer-protection, reveals some fundamental weaknesses 
in its structure, terms of reference and composition. The terms 
of reference conf erred on the Commission under section 6 do not 
specifically mention the word Nconsumer"; and there is no statutory 
provision in the entire Act which mentions the concept of "consumer 
protection". A casual reference is made to the consumer in section 
13(l) (b) which provides the Commission with powers to hear appeals 
from its own decisions or from decisions of allied agencies: 
"the Price Commission shall have power to receive and view applica- 
tions in respect of prices from any user or consumer 
There is no real effective consumer influence upon 
the Commission. The Commission is not in touch (in the absence 
of machinery for consultation) with the consumers whom it is 
supposed to represent and protect. And yet we should note that 
there is a strong case for such representation. The case arises 
f rom the removal of consumer sovereignty as a result of the creation 
of public monopolies, and from the lack of consumer power over 
the producers of these goods and services. There are no established 
consumer equivalent of the Chaipber of Commerce (spokesman f or 
traders interests). There are no consumer consultative councils 
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to provide consumer representation in the running of the public 
monopolies - to sit in the boards of the enterprises. This gap 
must be compensated for in some other way. The limited experience 
of other countries who have big public corporations may help. 
Many countries have instituted devices such as advisory committees, 
directorates of consumer affairs, public relations officers or 
appointments of consumer representatives on the boards of the 
enterprises. 
In France the situation has been more developed. The 
governing bodies of French public corporations are formed with 
equal representation of workers, consumers and the state. This 
assemblage of diverse interests has lead to problems in forging 
a coherent policy and efficient management in some of the enterprises 
there. 
In the United Kingdom, the nationalising statutes set 
up special machinery for representing the views of consumers. 
The precise titles of these institutions vary from industry to 
industry. They are titled as wArea Consultative Councils" in 
water and electricity industries; or "Advisory Council" in air 
transport; or "Consumers Councils" in the coal and gas industry 
(National Consumer Council, Report No. 1,1976: 14-52). 
The principles on which all these consumer organs are 
constituted in the United Kingdom are the same. They are statutory 
in character and their members are appointed by Ministers in 
consultation with the representatives of the interests concerned. 
Their functions and powers include obtaining information from 
-293- 
industries, bringing consumer complaints and opinions before 
the enterprises. They publish their views and make annual reports 
to the Ministers. However the scope of their powers is limited 
by their terms of reference and other practical difficulties. 
For example, details of working costs of the enterprises are 
not disclosed in full by the enterprises. Excepting such limitations, 
the councils are useful. They can appeal to the Ministers on 
behalf of consumers, to have price increases blocked. They provide 
a forum for the expression of consumer complaints and grievances. 
They act as a consumer watchdog. 
A further basic weakness with the Price Commission 
is that it has a dual role to play - representing consumers to 
the enterprises and enterprises to the consumers. It is important, 
in my view, that the consumers interests be given more weight. 
This element of divided loyalties raises a problem of how much 
can the Commission act as an independent and unbiased machinery. 
All indications are that it is becoming increasingly a staunch 
protagonist of the enterprises than of the consumers. 
The other weakness is the information gap. The Commission 
does not consult consumers. Public opinion is only sought with 
the objective of providing information to the government so that 
they may increase their position in the Commission. It does not 
publish the reasons for its decisions. where it does, the information 
is brief and selective. It does not explain how it arrives at 
the decisions on the level of th maximum prices for individual 
commodities. This deprives the consumers of a vital element (i. e. 
information) necessary for effective representation. Lack of 
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information disables consumers from commenting on the issues that 
touch upon them. This also acts as restraint to judicial review 
of the discretion of the Commission. 
An efficient and effective system of consumer represent- 
ation should at least meet certain minimum basic conditions. 
First, it must be representative of, and in touch with, the ordinary 
consumer. To do that it must be close enough to the locality 
to have real contact and communication with the consumers. At 
the same time it must be close to the enterprises to be able 
to influence them on matters of consumer welfare. This aspect 
is all important in view of the fact that consumer protection 
is not restricted to escalating or unjustified price increases 
only. It also incorporates product or service quality, design, 
perf ormance, safety from hazards and additives, promptness in 
deliveries and redress of consumer grievances. Furthermore, there 
should be an element of democracy in the structure of consumer 
representation to ensure that the machinery itself is responsive 
to the needs of consumers in a given industry. The present structure 
of consumer protection in the Commission and its allied organs 
is neither comprehensive nor democratic. For example, the National 
Price Commission has no regional or local branches. All its activities 
are carried out from the capital city in Daresalaam. Only 
occasionally it sends it members to hold public talks in the 
regions. And even then the talks will be held in the regional 
or district headquarters. The vast majority of the consumers 
have no access to it. Equally, the Assistant Price Commissioners 
are the regional or district Development Directors. These are 
the senior administrators in their districts. They dwell in urban 
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centres and are not easily accessible to the rural population, 
which constitute the bulk of the ultimate consumers. The fact 
that they exercise powers that embrace executive, legislative 
and judicial functions tends to alienate them from the people. 
Secondly, the machinery must be independent of the 
public authorities it is set up to advise and criticize. This 
is necessary to avoid capture. What is required is an independent 
institution whose members are experienced in fields like production, 
finance, marketing, procurement and administration. It should 
have its own research facilities capable of investigating all 
industries. Its main duty would be to develop arguments supporting 
or criticising the policies and attitudes of the enterprises 
in the light of consumer interests. The machinery should be able 
to exert effective influence in the decision-making process of 
the enterprises. Wherever necessary, the body should use outside 
expertise or consultancy in areas in which its resources are 
lacking. External expertise will also bring to it the wide practical 
experiences accumulated by others in different occupations or 
specialised areas. Currently the Price Commission does not involve 
outside consultants in its activities. 
There is another area of specific concern. That is 
the scope and quality of investigations of the Commission. The 
general impression one gets from the records and working papers 
is that there is no specific focus, say on a particular aspect 
of the business enterprise on which the inquiries concentrate. 
The inquiries tend to roam over wide areas of business activity. 
Consequently, a lot of major issues that would require detailed 
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scrutiny are glossed over or treated in a partial fashion. Some 
of the notable issues which are casually treated by the Commission 
are efficiency of the managers, the correctness of the data; 
utilisation of labour, exaggerated costs, capacity underutilisation, 
propriety of investment decisions; to mention a few. These areas 
have consistently drawn criticism from audit institutions 
in their reports, especially the Tanzania Audit Corporation Report 
1983, the Coopers and Lybrand Ltd Report 1982 and the Comptroller 
and Auditor Generals Report 1984. 
This problem seems to be accentuated by two other related 
factors. The first being the involvement of some investigations 
by the NPC into areas of business and industrial activity in 
which the NPC have little knowledge. The second is the Commission's 
apparent unwillingness to enlist the assistance of outside consultants 
and experts. 
An aspect of final concern relates to confidentiality 
of the information which enterprises provide to the NPC. The 
information firms disclose to the NPC obviously touches on issues 
of vital importance to the protection of the commercial welf are 
of the firms involved. Matters like costs, prof its, manufacturing 
processes, and research into new products may be of benefit to 
competitors. It could be argued that such information should 
be made more available to the public to elicit efficiency and 
competition. In my view, it is more important f or the protection 
of the f irms concerned, to exercise greater caution and selectivity 
on the type of information that is disclosed to outsiders. It 
seems the main safeguard on this point is the civil service back- 
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ground of the majority of the Commission's staff who share a 
tradition of wariness in disclosing information (Mongi 1980). 
4.9. A Critique of Cost-Plus Pricing 
Proper pricing is an important ingredient of satisfactory 
operation of the economic system (Dorfman 1965; Samuelson 1979). 
There appears, however, to be no agreed definition of what proper 
pricing is. There is still considerable debate among economists 
and leading political economists about this subject. Adam Smith, 
for example, perceived of proper pricing in the following terms: 
The real price of everyting - what everything 
really costs to the man who wants to acquire 
it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring 
it (Adam Smith, the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 2). 
His view still finds support among modern economists. Take the 
UK White Paper 1967, which set out guidelines on the pricing 
policies for public corporations. It stated that the, "aim of 
pricing should be that the consumer should pay the true costs 
of providing the goods and services he consumes in every case 
where those can sensibly be identified" (The Economic and Financial 
Obligations of Nationalised Industries, Cmnd. 3434,1967). 
/ 
These statements have been taken by economists to mean 
that prices should be determined according to long run marginal 
costs (Crosland, 1956: 51). 
The merit of marginal cost pricing is said to lie 
in 
its efficiency in allocating economic resources - land, 
labour, 
capital and raw materisl (Rees, 1983: 13; Samuelson 
1979). Accordingly, 
all other pricing formulae like full cost pricing, average cost, 
cost-plus or break even, which 
do not lead to optimal allocation 
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of resources, are deficient (Leftwich, 1985, Chapter 3). 
The main weaknesses and problems of cost-plus pricing 
are: distortion of economic activity (Rice 1979), a disincentive 
to costs, and failure to prevent transfer pricing (Whitworth 
1982). 
4.9. (a) Distorts Allocation of Resources 
One of the inherent disadvantages in cost-plus pricing 
is the tendency to misallocate resources. This happens because 
an industry may persist in the production of a commodity that 
does not command a high demand on the market since the firm producing 
the product is guaranteed of recoupment, of all of its costs of 
production. The argument here is that cost-plus pricing is 
insensitive to market indicators (consumer responses). Resources 
may go into the production of goods whose priority is not wanted 
by consumers. An example of this would be the case of indigo 
cloth (black textiles commonly called 'kanikil in Swahili) in 
1984 
1 
which the government ordered to be produced by local textile 
f irms so that peasants could get some clothing material at cheap 
prices. The f irms produced and sold them to the Regional Trading 
Companies. So the firms were able to recover their costs of production. 
But the Regional Trading Companies had difficulty in selling 
the textiles to consumers since the peasants, for whom the material 
had been specifically made, were not impressed by its quality. 
To solve the problem the Regional Trading Companies decided not 
to sell other essential items like sugar, soap or cooking oil 
to consumers unless they agreed to purchase a given quantity 
of the unwanted textile. 
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The argument on resource allocation should not, however, 
be stretched. too far. In a country with a large element of 
administrative allocation of resources, as is the case with Tanzania, 
it has little force in practice. 
4.9. (b) A Disincentive to Cost-efficiency 
The other disadvantage with cost-plus pricing noted 
by Rice 1979 and Backman 1963, is that the formula results in 
there being (a) little or no incentive to business firms to cut 
costs; (b) an incentive to lower efficiency. Another disadvantage 
related to these two, is that cost-plus methodology can easily 
result in prices being higher than the market will permit or 
lower than the market is willing to accept in relation to the 
I 
value offered (Backman, 1963: 25). It has been suggested by Rice 
I that the persistent shortage of commodities like cooking oil 
and sugar is an indication that the price is lower than what 
the market is willingto clear. If left to react to the market 
forces, prices would have been higher than the present level 
(Rice 1979) and this would have curtailed excess demand. Such 
an argument would be valid only if one assumed that there is 
enough supply of these items to meet normal demand. Statistical 
evidence shows that this is not the case. Production of many 
commodities has declined over the years, as we shall see in Chapter 
6. Thus even if demand were the same (assuming no increase in 
population, or incomes) there would be shortages. What the critics 
of cost-plus often assume is that every cost incurred by a firm 
will be passed into the price of the product. This notion is 
rejected in our case for two main reasons. First the Act itself J 
prescribes the cost items that can lawfully be passed into prices. 
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Second, the Commission try to examine the propriety of each cost 
item in the individual firms seeking a price increase (see Chapter 
4.7. )- 
4.9. (c) Transfers Monopoly Prof its or Scarci ty Premia from 
Manufacturers to Traders 
Another criticism of cost-plus is that it has a tendency 
to transfer monopoly rent or profits from manufacturers to traders 
or black marketeers (Backman 1963). This may happen where there 
is a shortage of supply for the commodity in relation to actual 
demand. Instead of the scarcity premium created by demand pressure 
going to the manufacturing firms, as would be the case if the 
market were to determine prices, the manufacturers get only what 
is determined by the cost-plus price. This leaves traders or 
black marketeers to benef it f rom the scarcity premium (Whitworth 
1982: 482). This in my view is a question of enforcing the formula. 
So f ar the control of costs permitted into prices is much stronger 
at the manufacturer's level than at the retailer level (Nditi 
1985). Consequently, retail traders do benef it from the monopoly 
rents than the manufacturers. 
4.9. (d) Failure to Prevent Transfer Pricing 
Cost-plus pricing as practiced by the NPC assumes that 
manufacturers purchase their intermediate inputs at arms length 
prices (Mongi 1980). Firms verify their materials costs by supplying 
the NPC with their suppliers' invoices. However, we noted earlier 
on (Chapter 2.3. ) that a number of multinationals have established 
subsidiaries which assemble products locally to avoid exclusion 
rom the Tanzanian market arising f rom import restrictions. These 
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subsidiaries assemble inputs purchased from the parent companies. 
As such local agents of the multinational operate in a captive 
market since imports, for instance in the case of radios and 
dry cells produced by Philips (T) Ltd., National Panasonic (T) Ltd., 
or heavy duty trucks assembled by Tanzania Motor Corporation 
(a subsidiary of SCANIA) are prohibited. Since the invoices that 
are sent to the price controllers by these subsidiaries are supplied 
by the parent companies there is a possibility that the prices 
they show are not 'arms-length' prices (Whitworth 1982: 483). 
With the relatively high rate of profit tax such firms may well 
pref er to take their prof its in the f orm of above normal prices 
in the inputs sold to the subsidiaries rather than declare them 
in the country. Cost-plus thus fails to prevent multinationals 
from transfer pricing their profits out of Tanzania. This is because 
cost-plus assumes that the product is fully produced locally. 
Accepting that all the weaknesses of cost-plus outlined 
above were valid, there seems little doubt that there is no economic 
rationale for maintaining this methodology. What other justifications 
are there for its continued employment? 
Apart from the purely economic considerations there 
seems to be some political and social advantages in cost-plus 
pricing. These too should not be ignored. I would go along with 
Backman's views that "pricing is an art and not a scienceý. It 
cannot be reduce to mathematical formulas or be split into factors 
which when fed into a computer will produce the right price" 
(Backman, 1963: 25). What Backman basically argues is that a price 
fixer, be it the f irm itself or a public agency, must consider 
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other matters of vital concern- to the community - legal, political, 
administrative practicability and public relations, when fixing 
the price. He should not close his eyes to these factors and 
try to confine himself to the purely commercial aspects only. 
I find this argument very apt to the Tanzanian situation. 
First, political stability is an important objective. 
Second, fairness is an essential consideration. Here the major 
consideration is then not only that the NPC should be seen to control 
prices, but also the techniques employed should be seen as fair. 
The perception of the ordinary members of the community of what 
is "fair pricing" may not be the same as that of an economist. 
The Tanzanian public is likely to perceive prices which permit 
manufacturers to recover fully the costs of production plus a 
S 
controlled profit margin as fair as if the pricing were left 
to the forces of the market. 
In terms of administrative practicability, cost-plus 
pricing is easy to understand and apply. All those involved 
in 
the price-formation processes seem to have little difficulty 
in comprehending the methodology. This is an advantage acknowledged 
by proponents of the methodology (Mongi 1980, Whitworth 
1982) 
as well as its crýtics (Rice 1979). Bearing in mind that 
those 
responsible for the administration of the rules at present are 
not adequately equipped for the task - as seen 
in the manner 
in which the price control agencies are staffed, with people 
not well trained for the task; or businessmen who are self-employed 
and not competent in cost-accounting implementing 
the formula 
simplicity and clarity in the methods become an 
important consideration. 
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All indications are that the NPC is quite pleased with the results 
achieved by cost-plus pricing so far. This comes out clearly 
in the remarks of a senior consultant with the NPC, who observes 
Cost-plus pricing is easily understood by 
price controllers, businessmen and consumers 
because of the simplicity of the principles 
involved. Many firms (even those whose products 
are not subject to control) fix their prices 
on a cost-plus basis. They have little difficulty 
providing relevant information and cost data 
when called upon (Whitworth 1982: 486). 
The point made by those who defend the methodology is that its 
use is not based on economic considerations, but rather on practical 
considerations taking into account the political, social and 
economic objectives of society, the local environment, the managerial 
as well as administrative questions (Nyerere 1980; Mongi 1980). 
One important observation which may be made in conclusion 
about the price f ixing processes is that the procedures are not 
as simplistic as they appear from my analysis of the statutory 
provisions regulating them. As I have pointed out here and there, 
the question of who actually takes the decisions and on what 
basis (i. e. where does the focus of decision-making lie in practice) 
is largely political. To understand why prices of particular 
commodities behave the way they do - why do prices go up at particular 
periods of the year; what sort of justif ications are given for 
the increases - we need to look at the forces at play within 
the political environment. Unfortunately such analysis is sometimes 
difficult because the actual processes at work are not always 
disclosed to the public. What the public are told is the end 
result of what may have been long political pressures. In this 
respect I would argue that while it is true that the concrete 
decisions such as an announcement that the price of sugar is 
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being raised by so much per kilogramme, are made by the National 
Price Commissioner, the de facto decision-makers, as the Price 
Commissioner suggested to me, are the government Ministers and 
civil servants in the various sectors of industry (Mongi 1985). 
4.10 Alternatives to Cost-Plus Pricing 
There are various alternative pricing formulae, which 
if adopted, could overcome the problems encountered in cost-plus 
pricing. The alternatives include: average cost pricing, pricing 
according to what the market would bear, imported-substitute 
pricing and marginal cost pricing. 
4.10. (a) Average-Cost Pricing 
Here the total costs would be distributed equally across 
all units which share those costs. However, this would lead to 
subsidisation among units. Also, it would ignore the cost differ- 
entials involved in serving consumers in different markets. 
4.10. (b) Pricing Accordin2 to What the Market would bear 
Under this alternative, prices would be f ixed according 
to what consumers are prepared to pay. This rule can be applied 
in a scarcity market where consumers who can af f ord to pay higher 
46uld be given preference. But such an approach contradicts other 
objectives such as social justice - income and wealth distribution, 
equality and prevention of uncompetitive practices. It may also 
be an incentive to artificial shortages. Firms may withhold supplies 
so as to obtain higher prices. 
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4.10. (c) Imported Substitute Pricing 
In his recommendations to the NPC, Rice suggested that 
prices of local products should be set at the same level as those 
of imported substitutes (Rice 1979). The recommendation was rejected 
by the government on the ground that there would be a lot of 
practical difficulties in implementation. One difficulty is the 
different cost-structures facing domestic compared to overseas 
producers. The other is that imports come f rom many countries: 
Which country's products should be used to determine prices of 
local commodities? 
4.10. (d) Marginal Cost Pricing 
The formula favoured by economists is that of determining 
prices on the basis of marginal costs (Samuelson 1979; Leftwich 
and Eckert 1985). Under this formula, prices are determined by 
the marginal cost of producing the item. A marginal cost is the 
extra cost involved in producing and supplying one more unit 
of the product (Samuelson, 1979: 452-453). Af irm should produce 
until its marginal revenue from the last sold unit equals its 
marginal costs of production. The price should be the equilibrium 
price at which total output can be sold at the market. But marginal 
cost pricing has its own difficulties. 
7 
It may be difficult, for 
example, to obtain a marginal cost estimate (Rees, 1979: 5), or 
a marginal revenue - estimate (Samuelson, 1979: 451-455), let alone 
an estimate for the way the market will react to the extra output. 
Samuelson, 1979, Leftwich and Eckert, 1985, and other economists, 
however, demonstrate that marginal-cost pricing is the most sound 
For some of the difficulties encountered in estimating a marginal cost,, see, 
Fbid, G. L. ed. (1973)ý, The Nationalised Fuel Industries, London: Heineman 
Educational Books. 
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pricing formula from the perspective of economic and efficient 
allocation of resources. Also, it comes very close to making 
consumers pay the true costs of providing the goods and services 
(Samuelson, 1979: 453-457). 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Law and Practice 
Introduction 
In the preceding Chapter I examined the price-fixing 
procedures. In this Chapter an attempt will be made to examine 
the machinery established to ensure compliance and observance 
of the controlled prices. I shall first examine the enforcement 
agencies. Then I shall look at the style, methods and techniques 
employed. Finally, I will assess the adequacies of these mechanisms. 
Enforcement is probably the aspect that is of greatest 
concern to consumers. When people complain about the ineffect- 
iveness of the law, they usually refer to weak or no enforcement 
rather than shortcomings in the rules. Their view of the law 
is often gathered not from what the government says or the content 
of the regulations, but from the behaviour of law enforcers. 
First, let me begin with the enforcement agencies. 
5.1. The Machinery 
The power to enforce the controlled-prices rests primarily 
in the Price Commissioner, Assistant Price Commissioners, price 
inspectors and police off icers of or above the rank of Assistant 
Inspector, Section 27(l). 
Price inspectors may be appointed by the Price Commissioner 
for a period of fixed duration, or they may be authorised by 
a price commissioner or senior Police Officer for a specific 
assignment. In the latter case, authority must be in writing 
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Section 27(l)(a). Although the Act restricts the powers to police 
officers of the rank of Assistant Inspector and above it would 
seem that ordinary police officers can enforce the provisions 
of the law under the general powers vested in them by, and subject 
to the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Act 1985 (Section 
14). In the same vein, other persons authorised to exercise 
powers of police' officers - like members of the people's militia, 
the national service and vigilante groups do enforce the controls. 
Apart from these agencies, there are a host of other organs 
who enf orce other provisions of Part V of the Act. For example, 
quality and standards are enforced by the Bureau of Standards; 
weights and measuring instruments by legal metrologists from 
the Ministry of Trade. Finally, I would say, the members of 
the public themselves are also an important enforcement agent. 
Through their public vigilance, complaints to the police, press 
and party officials, the public facilitates detection of violations 
and apprehension of offenders. 
5.2. Two Styles of Enforcement 
An investigation into the Commission's enforcement 
methods and processes reveals that there are two distinct styles. 
The f irst may be categorised as the penal approach and the other 
as the conciliatory one. Each approach as wel shall see, aims 
at a specific class of violators and each seems to have its 
own logic. 
11 
will attempt to explain these approaches and the 
rationale behind each. 
For a fuller discussion of these enforcement styles, see Scholz, J. T. (1984) 
"Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement", Vol. 18, 
No. 2. Law and Society Revue. 179-224. 
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5.2.1. Penal Style 
The penal approach is governed by several penal rules 
in the Act. Examples are those rules which expressly prohibit 
certain forms of behaviour or conduct and those which impose 
compulsory obligations such as the rules forbidding: the sale 
of goods above the fixed prices (section 20); the marking and 
display of prices (section 17(l) and 30(l); the compliance with 
specified standards (section 21) and keeping of records (section 
18). Breach of any of these provisions leads to penal sanctions. 
Penal enforcement comprises three stages: detecting 
the violation, determining the rule contravened and applying 
the appropriate sanction. 
The rationale behind penal enforcement, says Baldwin, 
is to ensure deviant persons f ind it in their interest to comply 
with the law (Baldwin 1983). 
This strategy is adopted mostly in violations by indivi- 
dual traders as opposed to business organisations. The purpose 
is to deter the bad individual. Most of the individuals involved 
in contravening the controlled prices are merchants of adversity 
who move in to take advantage of scarcities on the market. Their 
actions are, therefore, unlikely to be continuous. Their conduct 
is momentary. merchants of opportunity have no f ixed occupation, 
no business address and lack reliable supplies. Frequently they 
are found on markets that are unofficial (on the pavements on 
roads) or move f rom street to street. Their behaviour is unpredic- 
table. As such a penal response, says the Price Commission, 
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is the most appropriate form of dealing with them. They, like 
hard core criminals, need a harsh treatment to deter them and 
others from engaging in undesirable social conduct. 
To implement this strategy the price inspectors are 
under instructions to visit periodically all shopping areas 
and market places, keep routine checks on shopkeepers, make 
close surveillance on vendors and hawkers, investigate all suspicious 
deals, set traps where necessary and strictly enf orce the letter 
of the law. The price inspectors never hesitate to prosecute 
individual price violators, no matter how trivial or minor the 
violation may be (e. g. an overcharge of a few cents). The courts 
response to individual violators is equally strict. 
Of course limited inspectorate and prosecutorial resources 
dictate some degree of selectivity in the prosecutions. But 
even in such selection, the overriding objective has always 
been to maximise, the deterrent effects on violators. 
The indiscriminate manner in which individual violators 
are dealt with is illustrated by the fact that in 1983 the number 
Of suspects netted in the price swoops overcrowded the remand 
prisons so much that visiting justices of the peace had to plead 
with police authorities not to detain petty criminals (Daily 
News, Daresalaam, April 20,1983; Africa Contemporary Record 
1982-83, B 278). 
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5.2.2. The Conciliatory Approach 
The conciliatory (or compliance) style is applied 
mostly to corporations. The Price Commissioners, as we shall 
see, do recognise that violations among corporations are bound 
to happen and are likely to be repetitive in nature. This is 
due to the poor economic conditions prevailing in the country 
which make it impossible for firms to comply strictly with the 
letter of the law (Mongi, 1985). 
Enforcement against firms, as we shall see below, 
takes a very conciliatory tone - seeking to remedy breaches 
without forcing the company out of business. I think the adoption 
of the conciliatory approach to corporations is conditioned 
by two main factors: First, there is the monopolistic nature 
of the corporations; and secondly, the nature of the regulatory 
framework. 
With regard to the first, we may note that since the 
majority of the corporations operate in an uncompetitive environ- 
ment the enforcers are constrained from taking any action 
which might push the firm to withdraw items from the market. 
Disappearance of goods from the market will not only cause hardship 
to the corporations but also to the consumers. As between the 
two options, seeing withdrawal of goods and tolerating the violations, 
the Commissioners prefer the latter. Common sense dictates the 
latter option. With regard to the second factor, the rules are 
designed to secure voluntary compliance by corporations. This 
is evidenced by those provisions which only lay down broad guide- 
lines as to the standards and criteria to be followed by business 
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organisations giving them discretion to apply those standards 
in individual circumstances. For instance, the rules lay down 
guidelines of a general nature as regards: costs (section 12) - 
quality and quantity (section 21); measures, packaging and labelling 
(section 21), and other like requirements. But the Act leaves 
a lot of leeway to the corporations to decide how to comply 
in individual cases. The Commissioners can only enforce these 
provisions through cooperation with the f irms concerned. It 
is not surprising, therefore, to find that emphasis is put on 
the need to provide circumstances under which a continuing and 
harmonious relationship between the enforcers and the corporations 
can be established. 
How this conciliatory approach is operated in practice 
can be summed up in the following case study of the Regional 
(government-owned) Trading Corporations. The case shows how 
violating corporation were given the benefit of doubt when wrong- 
doing is suspected; how explanations are sought f rom the corporations 
before any punitive action is taken, let alone contemplated, 
by the Commissioners. It further demonstrates, how legitimate 
reasons for non-compliance are accepted when warranted by circum- 
stances (economic or political), and the way technical violations 
are overlooked, especially if trivial. It also shows the extent 
to which generous abatement terms and periods are granted to 
offending public corporations and the extent to which prosecution 
is rarely considered against them, except as a matter of last 
resort. 
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In 1984 the Regional Trading Companies in Kigoma and 
4 
Rukwa regions were reported to the National Price Commissioner 
for selling cooking oil to consumers at prices above those fixed 
by the Commission. The reports were filed by the trading officers 
of those regions. The two companies admitted the violation, 
but defended their actions on grounds of economic necessity. 
The argued that the manufacturer of the oil, the Morogoro Vegetable 
oil Company (MOPROCO) had sold to them at prices above those 
fixed by the Price Commission and had refused to meet costs 
of delivery f rom the factory to the trading companies. Under 
the Act, prices of cooking oil are pan territorial (Price Control 
List, 1984: 2). The manufacturer is given an allowance to cover 
costs of distributing the commodity to the state trading companies 
in the provinces in the ex-factory price allowance. Since the 
regional trading companies had personally collected the oil 
from the producers, they had adjusted the territorial prices 
to cover these costs. The oil producers, MOPROCO, also admitted 
contravening the provisions of the price control order. But 
MOPROCO defended their conduct. They argued that the illegal 
increase was necessary to cover increased costs due to the rise 
in prices of inputs (tin containers and sunflower seeds). The 
increase in costs had taken place after the prices had been 
fixed. The Commissioner was in a dilemma. All three corporations 
had genuine reasons. He did not punish any of the corporations. 
Their explanations for violating the rules were accepted as 
legitimate. Instead, the Commissioner, negotiated on behalf 
of the trading companies, to compel the manufacturers to comply. 
The trading companies were warned not to raise prices in f uture 
without the consent of the Commission. That was the end of the 
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matter (Nditi 1985: 8-10). The consumers were completely overlooked. 
No remedy was granted to them. 
Two interesting points are raised by these cases: 
one is about the chain of violations by public corporations; 
the other is the extent to which the authorities, in an unprece- 
0 dented mood of tolerance, turn a blind eye to an open violation 
of the controls at a time when, and on a commodity for which, 
effective enforcement is needed most. 
All violators involved in this case were state-owned 
companies. They are all monopolistic in the supply and retail 
sale of the oil. one explanation for the chain violation is 
that the companies were simply abusing their monopoly power 
by exploiting consumers through monopoly rents. Another explanation 
could be that the prices f ixed by the Commission were unrealistic 
in the circumstances - the controled price being below the market 
price. 
The disturbing aspect of this is the precedent established 
by these cases. It almost amounts to licencing the corporation 
to break the law and get away with it. It also amounts to blessing 
the instinctive resort. to price-increases whenever a corporatiomý 
is in financial difficulties. It was certainly possible for 
the Commission to explore other ways for the corporations to 
absorb their additional costs through other ways than raising 
prices. Also the NPC could have ordered a refund of the overcharge 
to the af f ected customers to the extent that the illegal increase 
was higher than the actual costs of supplying the oil. 
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The second case of violations, cited by Nditi, is 
that involving firms in the soap and detergent industry and 
those in bread-making. All the firms in these industries were 
reported to the Price Commission in 1984 for omitting packaging, 
labelling and for selling underweight bread and substandard 
soap, by standards officers (Nditi, 1985: 4). Toilet soap and 
bread, for example, were sold unpacked and unlabelled. The consumer 
could not tell what brand of soap he was given, nor its chemical 
composition, nor its measurements. At most, the consumer could 
rely on his sense of smell or colour to judge the product. 
The case was the same with bread, the health risks notwithstanding. 
Firms in these industries justified their conduct 
on the ground that they could not afford packaging material 
due to government import restrictions. The material or their 
inputs, were not available locally. Again the Price Commission 
accepted those explanations as legitimate. It granted them a 
geperous abatement period. It allowed them to continue to sell 
their products, soap and bread, unpacked until such a time as 
the economic situation improves to allow the importation of 
packaging materials. Curiously enough, the prices of these commodities 
were not reduced to reflect the reduced costs on account of 
non-packaging, labelling, wrapping and other like expenses. 
While it is easy to accept the Commission's attitude 
as one imposed by economic imperatives, it is hard to justify 
the degree of liberalism it accords to the corporations. With 
establishment of the Mufindi pulp and paper mill it should be 
possible to require traders to wrap articles in ordinary paper 
(Africa Contemporary Record 1981-1982, B 287). 
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To sum up the observations in this section, we can 
say that the enforcement of the rules against corporations assumes 
a flexible, cooperative approach and not a penal one. Such a 
style is inevitable. It is in part, a recognition on the part 
of the Commission, that applying the abstract legal rules to 
complex, real life situations requires a degree of flexibility. 
Flexibility necessitates the use of legal and extra-legal methods 
- methods that combine negotiation, persuasion, advice and compro- 
mises between the law enforcer and the violators. Detection 
and proof of the violations is necessarily not so much f or the 
application of the formal sanctions. It is much more important 
as a means of monitoring compliance and enhancing prevention 
with the minimum of costs. 
5.3. The Techniques Employed 
The principal techniques employed in the enforcement 
process are: inspection, public complaints, prosecution, judicial 
review, parliamentary supervision and executive directives. 
The initiative and activation of the enforcement machinery originates 
from two sources: by the activitýes of the enforcers in inspecting 
and arresting violators; and from public complaints. 
I 
Studies by .1 Nditi show that, except for a few 'areas, 
like routine inspections and periodic swoops, in the majority 
of. cases, the enforcement machinery is set in motion by public 
complaints (Nditi, 1985: 5). This is as one would expect. The 
consumer is the first price-inspector and has more at stake 
if the controls are ignored. It would be true to argue that 
even in cases where the initiative against wrongdoers comes 
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from the officialsthe consumer is still indispensable in his 
role as a witness in almost every case. 
It is pertinent to observe here that the mere breach 
of the controls does not by itself lead to the penalisation 
of the violator. To get this result, someone must take the initiative 
and activate the enforcement process by detecting, arresting 
and prosecuting the offender. This is the role of the inspectorate 
functions of the price controllers and members of the people's 
militia. 
Inspection 
The Act imposes a duty on price-controllers to inspect 
shop-premises and market-places, to ensure that controlled- 
prices are observed (section 27) and that other provisions of 
the law are complied with. The Price Commission has appointed 
963 persons (as of December 1985) to carry out inspectorate 
functions (NPC Report 1985). 
Their duty is to: conduct routine inspection of trade 
premises, to ascertain prices; check accounts books; and verif y 
weighing and measuring instruments, among others. This total 
nfifter of inspectors gives an average of 48 price- inspectors 
for each region; or 10 for each District. In relation to the 
number of . licenced retailers the average is 100 shops per one 
inspector. A detailed breakdown of the figures shows that the 
inspectors are not evenly distributed (see Table 5 below). 
The names of persons to be appointed as inspectors 
are proposed by Regional and District Price Advisory Committees 
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and forwarded to the Chairman for approval. Apart from those 
specifically appointed, all Police officers, of or above the 
rank of Assistant Inspector, have powers of inspection (section 
27(l)). Most of the police officers of this rank contacted showed 
little interest in price control enforcement. Some considered 
themselves to be too senior to walk in the streets and shopping 
I areas. Generally the police seem to give a low priority to price 
inspection work. 
The main methods used by price inspectors are three: 
Firstly, they carry out routine inspection of retail premises, 
market places and other shopping areas to check the observance 
of prescribed prices, the keeping of records and use of proper 
measurements. Secondly, they use trap purchases - buying from 
a suspected violator posing as an ordinary customer. This is 
a familiar technique where complaints of violation have been 
received but no proof is forthcoming. Thirdly, is by taking 
samples of the commodity for verification of quality and standards 
with the Tanzania Bureau of Standards or the government chemist. 
TABLE 4: Regional Distribution of Price Inspectors 1984/85 
(excluding police officers) 
Region Appointed 
Cards 
Surrendered 
Cards 
Revoked 
Arusha 51 2 4 
Coast 35 - 1 
Daresalaam 102 28 5 
Dodoma 37 - 1 
Kagera 36 - 
Kigoma 40 - I 
Kilimanjaro 60 3 0 
Lindi 28 - 1 
Mara 60 1 
Mbeya 38 1 - 
TOTAL 34 14 
Region Appointed 
Cards 
Surrendered 
Cards 
Revoked 
Morogoro 48 3 1 
Mtwara 33 - - 
Mwanza 45 2 - 
Rukwa 28 1 - 
Ruvuma 32 - I 
Shinyanga 43 - - 
Singida 35 - - 
Tabora 44 1 1 
Tanga 89 10 - 
Tringa 
1 
32 
11 
1 
1 
18 4 
Sources National Price Commission, March 1985 
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The main object of inspection is to ensure compliance 
with the rules at the minimum cost. It is considered that patrols 
and unannounced swoops deter potential violators and are thus 
preventive. The familiar mobs (of price inspectors: comprising 
leaders, policemen, peoples militia and party leaders) found 
in the streets of Daresalaam and other urban centres are a product 
I of this policy. 
The effectiveness of inspections in deterring violations 
and detecting and apprehending violators cannot be overstretched. 
It is limited by several factors: The task requires sufficient 
resources in manpower, equipment, finance and inducements to 
motivate the enforcers. Test and trap purchases require money. 
The Commission is not given funds for that. The argument being 
that trap purchases cannot be made by ordinary currency. It would 
be dif f icult to prove whether the money given is the trap money 
where the trapper forgets the serial number of the note. Thus 
the Commission has to use police (dummy) notes. Lack of funds 
has also made it difficult for the Commission to conduct tests 
for quality and safety of products on sale. The Commission has 
no laboratory facilities for verifying the standard and safety 
of commodities. 
The most instructive example of how the Commission 
is disabled from enforcing standards and quality is the 1983 
case of Cassava f lour in Daresalaam. In June 1983 the Commission 
was unable to determine the cause of widespread diarrhoea among 
residents of Daresalaam city caused by consumption of flour distri- 
buted, and milled by the National Milling Corporation (Nditi, 
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1985: 10). Consumer allegations that the flour was mouldy and 
unfit for consumption were dismissed as speculative. The government 
issued a threat of criminal proceedings against anyone heard 
spreading rumours or speculating about the causes of the diarrhoea. 
The investigation into the problem was stifled. The Commission's 
inspectors have no calibration instruments. Moreover, it has 
no competent personnel to undertake a thorough verification of 
measuring devices. Those assigned to this department complained 
that the work requires such a big range of equipment to be carried 
around that neither the vehicles available nor the present staff 
could do it. By December 1985 the Commission's head office in 
Daresalaam had only five employees with some training in calibration. 
The area that suffers most from the Commission's weak inspections 
is inspection of product standards and quality. Effective inspection 
here would require knowledge and expertise in: the technology 
employed; in product mix; chemical composition and processing. 
The Commission is lacking in most of these areas. 
5.3.2. Public Complaints 
The easiest method of public access to the Commission 
is public complaints. A member of the public can complain to 
the Commission, Assistant Price Commissioner or any price inspector 
about a violation or suspected violation of any of the provisions 
of the Act. There is no prescribed procedure for lodging a complaint. 
It seems any of the following methods would suffice: by a letter; 
through the phone; or verbally. In addition complaints can be 
made through the press or local party officials, who in turn 
Will channel them to the controllers. This makes complaint the 
principal method through which the public can participate in 
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the enforcement of the Act. According to Cranston, complaints 
enable members of the public to contribute towards the effective 
administration of regulations in more than one way. First, the 
public become the main mechanism for setting the processes of 
the Act in motion. Second, they assist in enlightening or educating 
the controllers on areas where the Act is weak and therefore 
help to improve the effectiveness of the law. Third, they give 
legitimacy and credibility to the continued existence of the 
control organs. This point is absolutely right. For example, 
the NPC through the departmental ministry has always justified 
its existence by claiming that it has dealt with more complaints 
than the previous year (Budget Speech 1986/87, Daily News, Daresalaam, 
June 20,1986: 3). The same argument is used by the Commission 
to justify demands for increased expenditure. 
The important point here is: How often do consumers 
complain? How far are their complaints taken seriously and 
effectively investigated? 
There are no accurate figures showing the number of 
complaints recorded by controllers on an average annual basis. 
But looking at the number of people brought to the criminal courts 
-I 
every year for the violation of the various statutory provisions 
of the Act we can safely conclude that there are relatively fewer 
people who complain compared to the scale of violation reported 
ýa 
by researchers (Shimwelas, 1984; Nditi, 1985) and newspaper commen- 
taries (Uhuru, Daresalaam, October 19,1984; Daily News, Daresalaam, 
August 14,1985, p. j. ). The NPC's records show that between 1977- 
1984 the price inspectors recorded about 5020 complaints nationwide 
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(National Price Commission, Regional Price Inspection Reports 
1977-84). These are the recorded figures. They do not, as we 
shall see, include the countless occasions where a caution may 
have been given to offending traders (see Table 6 below). 
Several factors may have contributed to the low rate 
I of consumer complaints. I learned during field study in the districts 
that consumers, especially in rural areas, never complain formally 
about violations of the price regulations. They simply grumble 
in private. The reasons f or this attitude are probably many and 
varied. Staff of the Commission interviewed attributed the small 
number of complaints to the self-sufficiency of consumers. Rural 
people depend less on shops for the acquisition of their basic 
needs like food and housing (ILO, 1982: 257). Their reliance 
on the shops is less frequent than urban dwellers and the incidence 
of their exposure to exploitation by profit-seeking traders is 
relatively less. The other reason could be that market transactions 
between rural people tend to be conducted by non-use of conventional 
measurements. For example, rural people measure fresh food-grains, 
vegetables by heaps rather than weighing scales. They frequently 
barter their produce rather than use money. This inevitably prevents 
them from noticing certain types of infringements. 
While this may explain the relative dearth of complaints 
from rural communities, it hardly sounds convincing for the small 
number of complaints received from the urban people. So what 
could be the reasons for the relatively small number of people 
complaining formallY to the controllers. Cranston has catalogued 
a number of possible causes, some of which I find relevant to 
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the Tanzanian situation (Cranston, 1979: 55). He says one reason 
why consumers may not complain to a consumer protection agency, 
is ignorance and uncertainty. Consumers may not know about the 
existence of a legal price, or a price controller. Where they 
know about its existence they may still be uncertain as to what 
type of complaints the agency deals with and how to take the 
complaint there. I suspect this could be one of the prime causes 
of the small f igure of consumer complaints. It should be pointed 
out that although some consumers in Tanzania may be aware that 
there are government prices for certain items very few know that 
there are a National Price Commission or regional price controllers 
responsible for issuing and enforcing such prices. For most 
of them the existence of these agencies is something they may 
have heard or read in radio and newspapers. The Commission is 
largely to blame f or this state of af f airs. They have not publicised 
their services widely enough. A limited number of visits and 
seminars have been held by senior officials in some regions but 
these have been confined mainly to regional centres. The impression 
got f rom discussions with leading members of the NPC is that 
there is very little possibility of extending these visits to 
the district centres, still less to the villages in the foreseeable 
future. The officers argued that greater publicity will only 
further increase the demand for the commission's services and 
would add more strain to the already overworked staff. The govern- 
ment has made publicity one of the major areas of attention to 
improve the performance of the NPC (Budget Speech 1986/87 para. 123). 
The other factor is that consumers have a limited perspective 
which prevents them f rom complaining about certain types of 
infringements. For example, consumers may not easily recognise 
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that they have been adversely affected by an unlawful trade practice 
such as an incorrect quantity, a substandard product or misdescribed 
goods. Some consumer offences are complex and their harmful effects 
may take time to manifest. An example is that of food additives 
or medicines. The adverse effects in these items are not manifest 
until after use over a long period of time (Cranston 1984). 
I 
Another reason why consumers may not complain formally 
is the cost of complaining. Studies by Cranston show that where 
a large number of consumers are mildly affected by a violation, 
no one may suffer sufficient loss to make him complain because 
the benefits of doing so are so small compared to the expenses 
involved (Cranston 1984). A typical example in the Tanzanian 
case would be villagers who have been overcharged by a shopkeeper 
by a shilling or two above the controlled price. The costs of 
complaining, both financial and social may be so disproportionate 
that each individual victim may regard the violation as trivial. 
The potential complainant in this case will have to weigh the 
costs against the benefits - the costs of making a journey to 
the headquarters of the price controller, of paying for hotel 
accommodation and meals, of being subjected to bureaucratic 
procedures and of a possible retaliatory action from the shopkeeper. 
The prohibitive costs of complaining emerged as a leading 
factor which discourages consumers from launching formal complaints 
against traders violating this Act. For example, when I asked 
some consumers why they chose to tolerate or ignore what I saw 
as open infringements; the majority of the consumers said that 
it was a troublesome and very unpleasant experience to contact 
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the police. Many of them simply hate the idea of finding themselves 
in the witness box as prosecution witnesses just to be bombarded 
by questions f rom defence lawyers. Others said they saw no point 
in complaining because they would not be refunded the money if 
the violator is convicted. But most important is the fear of 
social repercussions facing those who dare to complain. For instance, 
they frequently face the possibility of being shunned away or 
even boycotted by the rest of the shopkeepers. This seems to 
be a real problem. Two reasons have aggravated this problem. 
Take the coupon or consumer registration system. Under it consumers 
may purchase certain goods from shops where they have been registered 
only. The commodities covered are those essentials - sugar, cooking 
oil, rice, soap, which are also scarce. If the shopkeeper decides 
on retaliatory action against a consumer whom he considers a 
troublemaker, which is of ten bound to be the case of those who 
complain to the price controllers, the alternative for the consumer 
is to transfer to another shop. The problem is that there may 
be no other shop nearby or the traders may have communicated 
with each other and thus refuse to accept such a customer. 
Finally, consumers may lack the information necessary 
to launch a complaint. For one, the average consumer is not given 
all the product information. For the other, he is not well-equipped 
to protect himself against subtle violations or other violations 
associated with prejudicial trade practices. In case of overpricing 
that takes the form of misdescription of goods, substandard quality 
or underweight, the violation is obviously concealed. In case 
of supermarket mispricing, the consumer cannot protect himself 
because he is not in a position to check the actual prices charged 
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against those marked on the goods. Where the goods are weighed 
or measured with every purchase, consumers are not in a position 
to assess whether retailers have made the appropriate measurement. 
In a situation of shortages, consumers would be too overjoyed 
with the sight of the scarce commodities to bother about such 
details. 
0 
All these factors limit the effectiveness of the complaints 
mechanism as a technique of enforcing the Act. 
5.3.3. Prosecutions 
Once a violation has been detected the controllers 
have to decide what action to take. Among the options open to 
them are: to issue a warning; to give advice on how to abate 
(e. g. where to get wrapping material); to compound the offence 
or to mount a prosecution. In choosing these options the controllers 
exercise extensive discretionary functions. How is the discretion 
exercised in practice? By whom are decisions actually made? What 
factors are taken into account when deciding whether or not to 
prosecute? Are there any uniform policies laid down for all 
controllers? What safeguards exist to ensure that decisions are 
not made arbitrarily or are influenced by improper pressures 
or are simply dictated by extraneous circumstances such as personal 
attitudes, administrative convenience, are some of the issues 
that need to be looked at here. 
First, who decides whether or not to bring a criminal 
prosecution. A rough guide on the choice of the various options 
- advice, warning, fine or prosecution to be taken by price 
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inspectors against persons found violating the regulations, can 
be gathered from the NPC's annual reports 1977-84. From those 
reports it appears that, an advice will be used where the contra- 
vention is detected for the first time (first offender), or trivial 
in nature or is unintentional. In such cases, the price inspector 
may advise the violator to refrain from future breaches or on 
6 what remedial measures to take to avoid the same. A problem that 
arises with this option is whose view of triviality do we adopt? 
Take the case of consumers overcharged by say a penny on a kilogramme 
of sugar - Seen f rom the perspective of each individual consumer 
the overcharge is certainly small and can be ignored. But the 
amount of money accrued to the seller will be large. Do we say 
the off ence is one of overcharging a penny or pence (which may 
run into hundreds of pounds)? 
A fine, on the other hand, may be imposed immediately 
where the violator readily admits his guilt and is willing to 
stop further violation. The power of price inspectors to impose 
a fine is conf ined by the Act. Where the price overcharge in 
a single transaction exceeds Tsh. 100.00 (about Elý) the inspectors 
cannot impose a fine. They must open criminal proceedings in 
a court, section 33. Where there has been a serious or persistent 
bkbach but the evidence available is not sufficient to sustain 
a criminal prosecution, an inspector may issue a caution or severe 
reprimand. 
What is important to remember about these options is 
that they do not constitute a hierarchy of responses that the 
inspectors ought to adopt in succession. On the contrary, the 
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individual price inspectors ard free to invoke any of the responses 
to individual cases. Generally, any single violation would be 
sufficient to warrant a prosecution. 
Once we recognize that individual enforcers exercise 
extensive discrimination, the question that naturally arises 
is: How often are offenders allowed to escape prosecution? I 
am af raid there are no accurate figures to prove this point. 
We know how many people are brought before the criminal courts 
every year. Rather more than 5393 persons were arrested for contra- 
vening maximum prices between 1977-84. Only 282 of those were 
prosecuted over the same period. This is rather a small number 
of the total. The rest of the violators were either warned or 
reprimanded. 
These statistics shed some rough idea of how discretion 
has been used by the price controllers. 
TABLE 5: Number of Cases Compounded, Prosecuted and 
Cautioned 1977-84 (excluding Daresalaam) 
Year Convicted Acquitted Fined Cautioned 
1977 95 9 724 68 
1978 48 0 897 47 
1979 1 9 655 22 
1980 17 15 478 18 
1981 24 23 1155 25 
1982 24 1 529 7 
1983 0 0 308 1 
1984 5 1 182 3 
TOTAL 214 58 3528 191 
Source: Regional Price Inspection Reports 1977-84, the 
National Price Commission, Daresalaam. 
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ýey: Fine includes cases compounded 
Convicted and/or Acquitted means Cases sent to court 
5.3.3. (a) Prosecution Policy 
Two competing views were expressed in response to the 
question whether violators of this law should, as a matter of 
0 principle, be prosecuted or not in all cases. According to the 
Commission, its officers are under instruction not to rush every 
case to the police for prosecution. Officers should first try 
to ensure compliance by using powers conferred on them - by admin- 
istrative sanctions. Especially so where the breach is committed 
by an organisation, or is minor or by a first offender or the 
violator admits his guilt and undertakes to remedy it (Mongi, 
1980: 97-120). The chairman argued that indiscriminate prosecution 
may be counter-productive. First, it could create the impression 
that the controllers are failing in enforcing the rules through 
available administrative procedures. This would be a reflection 
of weakness on their part and would strengthen the case of those 
calling for the Commission's abolition. Second, such a policy 
would flood the courts with cases. This is demonstrated by the 
situation in Daresalaam, where a special magistrate's court (City 
Magistrate) has been assigned to deal with violations of city 
bye-laws. Price control violations top the list of court cases 
in this court. My examination of the criminal register shows 
that 60 per cent of the cases brought by council officials to 
this court involved violation of price controls. By allowing 
price inspectors to dispose cases without resort to courts the 
controllers reduce the burden on what the Law Reform Commission 
has described as overburdened courts (Law Reform Commission 1977). 
Moreover, the powers conferred by the Act are discretionary. 
0 
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Their exercise requires flexibility. The circumstances giving 
rise to one violation may not necessarily be the same with other 
violations, though of a similar nature committed by another person 
in a different part of the country. Finally, too vigorous 
prosecution may alienate the controllers f rom trade and industry. 
Such isolation will undermine other objectives of the rules whose 
0 
implementation depends on voluntary compliance from trade and 
industry. The need to maintain trust, good will and cooperation 
demands selective prosecution. 
These views are more or less shared by magistrates 
and an academic researcher on this area. Nditi, who has researched 
on consumer protection, argues that the thrust of this law is 
to secure compliance by voluntariness. This is implicit in section 
8 and 12 which give f irms discretion on how to comply with the 
rules on individual cases (Nditi, 1985: 3). Magistrates at Kivukoni 
Court, probably the busiest court in the country, supported 
selective prosecution. The Senior Resident Magistrate stressed 
that this law should not be used to prosecute over petty and 
trivial breaches. She insisted that the decision to prosecute 
should depend on factors such as seriousness of the offence, 
frequency of occurence, damage suffered by consumers, class of 
oftender or wilfulness of the breach. In her view, prosecuting 
authorities should try to distinguish between violations committed 
under economic compulsions or pressures and those out of sheer 
villainy, between those by wealthy people and petty hawkers. 
And they should also f ind out whether the petty hawker is acting 
on his own or as an agent of the rich man . (Personal interview with 
Mrs Lya=Ya, March 1985. ) 
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But consumers had an opposite view. They called for 
prosecution of all violators. And there are strong reasons for 
this approach. First, it will limit the discretion of the 
controllers. Second, it will remove suspicions of discrimination 
or favouritism. When people feel that they are treated differently 
for similar offences suspicions, rumours and unwarranted allegations 
are bound to be raised. For instance, where violating traders 
are netted and fined or warned, people often suspect that corruption 
or bribery has taken place. When I asked some people what were 
their reactions to traders released f rom police custody in Kimara, 
Daresalaam, I was puzzled to hear that none of the interviewees 
thought this to be legal. On the contrary their familiar retort 
was typically one of dismay and deep suspicion - many simply 
thought the police had taken bribes from the traders. The familiar 
Swahili saying "Wamekula nao" (i. e. they eat together what they 
loot from us) was the classic answer I got. Such f eelings, however 
erroneous or ill-founded they may be demonstrate declining public 
confidence and belief in the way the controllers discharge their 
duties. What matters to the people in the street is not that 
justice is done but that they see it being done. A general policy 
of prosecution will help to demonstrate to the people that violators 
are treated equally, that the public is protected and the law 
is being enforced. It became very clear to me that common people 
associated enforcement of the Act with prosecutions and were 
ignorant of and unwilling to accept the other methods of dealing 
with violators. There is another advantage in adopting a policy 
of prosecution. Legal proceedings, especially the arguments by 
the prosecution and defence counsels, and the rulings by the 
judges,, help to stimulate public awareness in the law and identify 
areas in which ref orm, may be necessary. 
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5.3.3. (b) Problems of Prosecuting 
Prosecution as a method of enforcement is limited by 
a number of factors. The principal limitations relate to manpower, 
financial and other resource constraints. Limitations are also 
imposed by procedural and legal technicalities. In addition, 
social and personal factors reduce the effectiveness of prosecutions. 
a 
5.3.3. (b) (i) Manpower Resources 
First let us examine manpower resources. Prosecutions 
under the Act are conducted by police off icers of or above the 
rank of Assistant Inspector or persons appointed by the Director 
of Public Prosecutions. As regards police officers, who constitute 
over 90 per cent of the public prosecutors, the rank of inspector 
can be reached through various ways other than educational qualifi- 
cations. The basic qualification for joining the force is secondary 
education. Once in the f orce, promotion depends on a combination 
of qualities like length of service, bravery, outstanding performance, 
dedication to duties and passing professional examinations (Police 
Force Acts 1965-1972). Although the police do appoint officers 
with legal training to act as public prosecutors this is not 
always the case. Some of the prosecutions are conducted by officers 
without background training in law. Moreover, the officers are 
responsible for other police duties. They are therefore not in 
a position to devote adequate and careful attention to detailed 
preparation of the prosecution cases. 
Prosecution needs financial resources. Money is needed 
in witness expenses, preparation of reports, and trap-purchases. 
There are indications that the competence of prosecutions is 
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hampered by lack of finance. For instance, 20 per cent of prosecution 
cases at Kivukoni Court were withdrawn during 1982/84 for want 
of prosecution witnesses. My analysis of the reasons for withdrawal 
shows that in 60 per cent of the charges withdrawn the prosecutors 
could not get hold of the witnesses because of lack of funds 
to pay for travel or to send vehicles to collect witnesses. 
8 
5.3.3. (b) (ii) Procedural Formalities 
Bureaucratic procedures are a constraint to prompt 
prosecutions. This is caused by division of powers between invest- 
igating authorities and prosecuting agencies. 
The initial detection and investigation of crimes under 
the Act is carried out by price inspectors. These are men f rom 
junior ranks in the Commission. These then prepare reports and 
forward them to senior officials. The correspondence between 
junior and senior officers takes quite a long period even when 
they happen to share offices in the same floor or sit on adjacent 
tables. This is because communication between them has to be 
transmitted through the mailing clerk. Af ter scrutiny by senior 
officers, the case is then remitted to the police for prosecution. 
The police may again decide on further investigations. This will 
take another round of weeks before the case is finally brought 
to the court. These bureaucratic procedures cause other problems. 
One being delay. What makes delayed prosecutions problematic 
to prosecutors are consequences of such delay. Delay may cause 
witnesses to forget the events. The memory may become shaky or 
incoherent. Or the witness may get frustrated that no action 
is being taken. And since the star witnesses are invariably victims 
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of the crimes, frustration may force them into a non-cooperative 
mood. Moreover witnesses may migrate, change address or even 
die before the case opens. 
5.3.3. (b) (iii) Hostile Social Environment 
The major effect on prosecution witnesses which delayed 
0 
prosecutions cause or prosecution witnesses generally suffer, 
are criticism and public ridicule that is brought on them. I 
discovered that people who complain about violations are subjected 
to severe social pressure and tension. For example, traders always 
act in solidarity. They put pressure on complainants to withdraw 
their allegations threatening to deny them supplies of essential 
commodities. There are cases of witnesses refusing to testify 
for the prosecution for fear of criticism from neighbours or 
being ridiculed. In one instance I witnessed a shopkeeper refusing 
to sell a customer his share of the rationed goods because this 
customer would never stand any overcharge, direct or indirect 
and was generally the leading critic of the trader. The trader 
was commonly known to violate the established rationing procedures. 
The trader said to the customer: 
You can take your ration card to your police 
and party masters. Look for another shop. 
But I tell you nobody in this area is going 
to admit you. That is the reward of your 
conduct 
The customer's conduct was obviously that expected from any dutiful 
citizen. Another good illustration is that of the University 
Cooperative shop. In 1983 the shop manager was reported by party 
(CCM) leaders to the police for selling beans above government 
prices. The manager argued that the increase was necessary to 
cover costs. He had ordered the commodity f rom a private trader 
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after failing to get supplies from the National Milling Corporation. 
The dealer got supplies directly from peasants in up country 
b 
areas. This increased the costs. The police arrested the manager 
and opened criminal charges. Meanwhile the shop was closed to 
facilitate investigations. Residents on the University campus 
had no alternative shops for obtaining rationed goods. The residents 
began putting pressure on the complainants to withdraw their 
allegations. I got conflicting views on why such a relatively 
well-informed community behaved like that. Some of the residents 
thought the manager had behaved properly to save them from scarcity. 
And since the money from the overcharges went into the shop's 
f und there was no improper motive on the manager. Others thought 
the manager was involved in suspicious deals and stood to benef it 
from his relations with the trader. Still others thought it was 
a matter of envy. The shop manager commands more respect among 
professors than the Vice-Chancellor, or party chairman for that 
matter. The party leaders just wanted to get rid of this particular 
individual. 
In the end, the complainants refrained from testifying 
for the prosecution. The police withdrew the charge for lack 
of witnesses. 
5.3.3. (b) (iv) Availability of Evidence 
The decision whether or not to prosecute will largely 
depend on availability of evidence. The evidence must be credible. 
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Usually corroboration is necessary. Many prosecution cases collapse 
because of lack of evidence. And in cases of overcharging, obtaining 
sufficient evidence is a headache to prosecutors. Where the purchaser 
is not in possession of receipts, truthfulness alone may not 
be enough to convince the court. The case of Mohinlal Chandra 
v. R. ( 19801, Criminal App. 213 of 1980 is instructive. In the 
I 
trial court, the appellant was convicted of the offence of selling 
a piece of soap above the maximum price. It was alleged that 
he had sold a five bar piece for Sh. 50/= instead of the government 
price of Sh. 17/=. The prosecution did not produce any purchase 
receipts. Also the government order fixing the price was not 
produced. The magistrate relied on his knowledge of the price 
which the defendant never disputed. The prosecution brought several 
witnesses who had bought soap from the appellant at the inf lated 
price on that date. But none of the buyers had a purchase receipt. 
In the course of the prosecution a price control inspector purported 
to produce a number of invoices found among the appellant's books 
showing that the pieces of soap were sold at above the prescribed 
prices. The invoices were not legally produced in the sense of 
being made court exhibits. He only showed them to the magistrate 
and took them away. On appeal the conviction was quashed on the 
following grounds: First, no order fixing the maximum price had 
been produced. Second, the trial magistrate was not entitled 
to rely on his personal or common knowledge of the controlled 
prices. Third, although section 31(l) allows an invoice to be 
prima f acie evidence of the sale to which it relates at the price 
which it sets Out, it does so only upon the production of the 
invoice by a price inspector. Production must be in the manner 
recognised by legal procedure (i. e. the invoice must be a court 
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exhibit) . Fourth, the evidence of the alleged victims on record 
showed inconsistencies in the amount each was overcharged. 
It is important to appreciate the circumstances under 
which this contravention took place. Soap was scarce on the market. 
That is why the trader hid the commodity, sold it at inflated 
prices and issued no receipts. Even if he had issued purchase 
receipts the chances are that he would have recorded the off icial 
and not actual price charged. If ind it hard to understand the 
High Court ruling that magistrates are not entitled to rely on 
their personal knowledge of the government prices. Decisions 
of this nature are likely to complicate the prosecution of offenders. 
5.3.3. (b) (v) Proof of Mens Rea 
Whether knowledge of the maximum price is necessarsy 
to prove a charge of contravening the provisions of the Act, 
placing a maximum selling price on goods, is a question that 
has been determined by the courts in a series of cases. Section 
20 reads 
Any person who sells or lets on hire any 
price-controlled goods or renders any price- 
controlled service at a price or charge which 
exceeds the maximun price . ..... shall 
be 
guily of an offence. 
A similar provision in the Price Control Ordinance 1920 was inter- 
preted by the court as meaning that knowledge of the maximum 
pirces is essential before a person could be convicted for contra- 
vening a price control order, and that the duty to prove knowledge 
is upon the prosecution. The prosecution 
does not discharge its 
burden by merely establishing the existence of the order. It 
has to prove that Osuch order, af ter having been properly made, 
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has also been generally notified to the public". This was the 
holding in Jesang Papat v. R. [19491. The accused was charged 
with selling whisky at a price in excess of the controlled price. 
The def ence was that the appellants were ignorant of the maximum 
price. It was established that they had been arrested af ew hours 
af ter a maximum price order had been broadcast on radio. On appeal 
the conviction was quashed. The appellate court said in the circum- 
stances of the country it was 
unreasonable to assume that the appellants knew of the price 
order. The ruling in Popat's case was followed in subsequent 
cases. In Takars Hirj_: l__v. R. [19501, the order fixing the maximum 
prices for maize was displayed in the premises of the District 
Commissioner. The appellant was charged with contravening that 
order. He pleaded ignorance of the order. The appellate court 
held that the maker of the order must display it to the public 
in a prominent position as would bring it to the knowledge of 
the public and that it was unsaf e, in the circumstances of this 
case, to assume the accused was aware oE the maximum prices 
([1950] T. T. L. R. 341). It would appear from these cases" that 
knowledge of the maximum prices is an essential ingredient of 
the offence of selling at above the maximum price. 
Courts in the UK have adopted a different approach. 
In R. v. Philip Jacobs [ 19441 the Court of Appeal held that it was 
not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the appellant 
knew the maximum permited price of the articles sold, "The offence 
is to sell at the wrong price and in so far that was done, the 
offence was committed" ([1944] 1 All E. R. 485 (CCA)). In this 
I case the appellants were charged with conspiracy to sell price- 
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controlled goods in excess of the controlled price. The defence 
was that the appellants were ignorant of the maximum price. The 
trial judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied that 
the appellants were engaged in the sale concerned, it was not 
necessary, in order to find them guilty of the crime charged, 
I 
to f ind that they knew the correct maximum price of the commodity 
sold. 
The authority in Philip Jacobs' case seems to be more 
in line with the cardinal principle of criminal responsibility 
which places a duty on the citizen to know the law. It states 
Ignorance of the law does not afford any 
excuse for any act or omission which would 
otherwise constitute an offence unless knowledge 
of the law by the offender is expressly, declared 
to be an element of the offence (Section 
9, Penal Code, Cap. 16). 
5.4. Parallel Actions to Assist in Effective Enforcement of 
the Controlled Prices 
In order to assist in effective enforcement of the 
controlled prices the government has established statutory agencies 
to control quality, standards and measurements of the products 
as well as to supervise the distribution and physical movement 
of goods. All of these measures have a bearing on the prices. 
It was apparent that without such complementary measures prices 
could easily be violated through indirect techniques in size 
or short weighing. We shall attempt to examine these measures. 
and see how effective they are. First, let us look at the Weights 
and Measures Act. 
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The Regulation of Prices Act, it will be noted, empowers 
the Price Commission to regulate the, "packing, weight, size, 
quality, processing or the ingredients thereof" of any product 
(Section 21). Under this provision, the NPC is expected to: 
a) Promulgate standards for goods - these would cover 
enforceable standards in regard to things as material quality, 
0 
performance, design and safety; 
b) Require the marking of price per unit quantity on 
specific goods. Experience in the field of weights and measures, 
and food and drugs enforcement which constantly throws up light 
in relation to the sale of goods the interplay of the three factors: 
price, quantity and quality (Nditi, 1985) clearly shows that 
a statement of price per unit quantity would be of great use 
and convenience to consumers and would make fraud difficult. 
This requirement would be most useful in respect of commodities 
which are weighed, measured or counted from bulk and specific 
instances are the marking of salt, beans, meat or f ish products 
with a statement of price per kilogramme when exposed for sale 
in bulk. 
c) Require the informative labelling of goods. This 
is necessary in respect of pre-packed goods. The NPC is expected 
to make it mandatory for sellers of prepacked goods to ensure 
thbit the ingredients are clearly marked; that they should bear 
true designations and that the name and address of the packer 
should be stated. 
However, the burden of the functions on these matters 
has been eased on the NPC by laws which establish specialised 
bodies to take care of those functions. Some of the leading Acts 
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in this regard are: the Weights and Measures (Metric Units) Acts 
1978 and 1982, the Standards Act 1975, the Food (Control of Quality) 
Act 1977 and the Pharmacy and Poisons Act 1967. 
The Weights and Measures Act 1982 makes it compulsory 
for some goods to be packed and sold in specific metric units and 
quantities only. The Act repeals the imperial system of measure- 
ments and replaces it with the metric system (Preamble, the Weights 
and Measures Act 1978). Among the goods to be sold in specified 
metric units are foodstuffs, drinks, textiles, fuel, electricity 
and medicines. The Act empowers the Minister for Trade to appoint 
weights inspectors whose duty is to protect consumers by enforcing 
correct measurements (sections 15 and 16). The inspectors carry 
out this function through regular inspection and surprise visits 
to shops, trading premises and markets. The inspectors are supposed 
to check measuring instruments used in trade by every person 
at least once in every calendar year to assess and certif y the 
standards of weighing and measuring scales. 
A trader foundwithout proper instruments can be 
prosecuted, f ined or imprisoned or can have his licence revoked. 
In the case of A. G. v. Jethabhai Patel [19531 the East African 
Court of Appeal heýd that the possession of a defective weight 
for use in trade, in that case a weighing stone with a piece 
broken off, is wrong per se and that it amounts to a false and 
unjust weight ((. 19531 E. A. C. A. 24 (U). There is also an authority 
for saying that a trader Possessing a defective measuring instrument 
for use in trade or business can have his licence cancelled, 
as was in the case of Karioki s/o Gachohi v. R. (19501. Yet mere 
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neglect to ascertain defects in the instruments - defects which 
would have been found out by making reasonable examination of 
the weighing instrument, does not per se warrant the revocation 
of a licence: Jiviben d/o Mepa and Two Others v. R. [1952]. Since 
the power to revoke a licence can only be exercised by the grantor 
the inspe<--tor's powers are limited to recommending action to 
the business licencing boards. In ordinary circumstances traders 
without proper weighing and measuring instruments are not supposed 
to carry out trading. But this requirement would greatly incon- 
venience trade in rural areas. As a result the number of people 
trading without weighing instruments is likely to remain high 
in the foreseable future. 
5.4.1. Factors Limiting Enforcement of Weights and Measures 
Several factors limit ef f ecýtive enforcement of weighing 
and measuring standards. Firstly, there is a manpower and other 
resources shortage. As of July 1985 there were a total of 66 
weights and measures officers only throughout the country. These 
consisted of a Commissioner, an Assistant Commissioner and a few 
Principal Inspectors at the Head Office in Daresalaam. Each of 
the 20 regions had one Regional Inspector, about two senior 
inspectors, an assistant inspector and about five weights and 
measures officers. These 66 officers have to inspect over 64,000 
licenced shop-premises (Regulation of Trade Bill 1980, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1978: No. 1). This gives an average of over 
900 shops per inspector. Note that the shops exclude other businesses 
like butchers, petrol pumps, green grocers and many other businesses. 
I 
Secondly, the inspectors are not provided with transport and 
working facilities, like inspection kits. Financial constraints 
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make it dif f icult f or the government to import them. In any case 
the quantity of calibration devices that are required for the 
inspection is hard to obtain. Fourthly, when it comes to commodities 
like vegetables, fruits and others whose units vary so much in 
size that it is difficult to standardise them sellers sell them 
in heaps. Sellers using heap-measurements normally register changes 
in prices by varying the size of heaps rather than altering the 
prices charged. The difficulties of standardising the quality 
and quantity of some commodities means price-control can be aided 
by measures and weights only where the product is capable of 
standardisation. 
Fifthly, the type of weights and measures stipulated 
by the law are not easily available. Under the Imports Confinement 
Order 1981, the state owned, Agricultural and Industrial Supplies 
Company, is the sole importer of weighing and measuring instruments 
(G. N. 96 of 1981). Due to shortages of foreign exchange the company 
has been unable to import sufficient quantities to meet demand. 
A sixth factor, is ignorance and customs which people 
find hard to discard. After many decades of using the imperial 
British system of units and other traditional forms of measurements, 
t: iaders and buyers f ind it a little dif f icult to switch to the 
metric system. The bother of learning the new system, let alone 
acquiring the new instruments are added disincentives. In the 
rural areas people mostly use the banned measurements like tins, 
bushels, gallons and the foot, instead of kilogrammes and metres, 
as required by statute. Conservatism is further evidenced by 
the fact that even after the government ban on imperial measurements 
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and their non-availability in the shops, people have resorted 
to producing them locally. Local blacksmiths manufacture bushels 
and 'pishi' or 'kibabal (one 'pishi' is 4 litres and a 'kibaba' 
is a litre) modelled on the outlawed ones. Similarly, carpenters 
manufacture rules graduated in inches. Obviously, the accuracy 
a of these local ly-produced instruments is questionable. But there 
can be no doubt that these measurements are likely to continue 
being used unofficially for some time to come in future. Finally, 
the provisions of the Act relating to display of measuring and 
weighing instruments are technically weak. For example, there 
is no legal requirement that a seller should weigh any goods 
2 
at every sale or on demand by the consumer, Section 19(2). 
Judging by the number of consumer complaints in the 
national newspapers, violation of price controls through short 
weights and measures are a common phenomenon. A recent empirical 
survey by Nditi singles out butchers who fiddle with weighing 
scales to read more than the actual weight of the meat sold; 
and bakeries not caring about prescribed weights of bread (Nditi, 
1985: 8). Violation of weights is committed even by a leading 
public corporation to whom the government has made available 
all the necessary weighing instruments - the National Distributors 
Corporation. This public corporation has the sole monopoly in 
distributing food for Daresalaam city. Commodities like sugar 
and maize meal are distributed to retailers in gunny bags. Inspection 
by standards officers show a continuous breach by the Corporation. 
Further evidence of shortweighed and measured goods by this 
2. Section 19(2) requires traders to supply consumers an "original invoice containing 
a description sufficiently exact to identify the goods and the quantity sold". P 
-345- 
Corporation come from retail shopkeepers who refused to handle 
commodities distributed by this Corporation and it was only inter- 
vention by the Minister for Trade that saved the situation (Africa 
Contemporary Records, 1983: B279). My personal observations at 
the stores of the Corporation in Ilala and Kinondoni District 
. noticed that the weighing machines are not used by the Corporation's 
employees. One explanation given was that the urgency of the 
task of packaging and distributing food in time makes the reweighing 
of every bag impossible. The other, was that since the bags are 
of the same standard size they would weigh more or less the same 
when filled with food. This dispenses with the need for cross- 
checking the weight. The shortweight that retailers complained 
of was attributed by the corporation's officials to pilferage 
and unavoidable losses ordinarily expected in the course of 
distribution and not to shortweighing or measurements at the 
point of packaging. 
My observations at the corporation's premises discount 
these arguments. First, the manner in which employees fill and 
seal the bags does not conf orm to standards. The room that is 
left to facilitate the sealing of each bag is entirely the decision 
of the person sealing. Much depends on the whims of the employee. 
Moreover, the gunny bags used are worn out. The holes leave ample 
opportunity to dishonest employees to pilfer substantial amounts 
of commodities like sugar, wheatflour or beans. As a result retailers 
pay government prices f or underweight bags. To recover the losses 
they are forced to raise prices on consumers. 
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I also noticed that retailers use defective scales 
or f iddled with them so that they read less. It is not uncommon 
to see them using broken weighing stones. Moreover, some traders 
use outlawed units like the "foot" or "tin" making it very difficult 
for the consumer to know whether he is getting the right equivalent 
a 
of metric units or not. 
5.4.2. Enforcement of Quality, Standards and Descriptions 
As f ar as consumer protection is concerned, the quality 
of the commodities is perhaps a matter of interest far greater 
than the level of prices. And Parliament has legislated extensively 
on this area. Various statutory bodies have been established 
to enforce product standards to ensure consumers get goods of 
approved quality. Such bodies have been set up specifically for 
certain types of goods or services or for quality control in 
general. The most important institutions are: the National Food 
Commission set up under the Food (Quality Control) Act 1977 to 
control food standards. This Commission has powers: (a) to regulate 
the importation, manufacture, labelling, marking, storage and 
substances used in the manufacture of food; and (b) to prescribe 
minimum standards of quality in respect of food (Section 5(l)). 
Other specialised institutions for specific products are the 
Naiional Chemical Industires which regulates quality of chemicals. 
For general quality control there is the Tanzania Bureau of Standards. 
In addition, statutes establishing public corporations require 
them to produce goods or services of a prescribed standard. The 
Muhimbili Medical Centre Act 1976, for example, requires the 
corporation to supply medical services of a "kind normally provided 
by consultant and teaching hospitals", section 4(g). Since there 
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are no comparable institutions the presumption is that the services 
must conform to those of similar institutions elsewhere. Similarly 
the Railways Corporation Act 1977 enjoins them to provide services 
*efficiently, economically and with due regard to safety", section 
10(l)(a). Parliament therefore attaches great importance to quality 
. of services. In this vein, the Regulation of Prices Act empowers 
the Commission to prescribe quality, size and processing standards 
for price-controlled items, section 21. The Commission has not 
exercised this function due to lack of expertise. Instead it 
employs the services of the Bureau of Standards. Under the Declar- 
ation of Standards Notice 1984 the bureau has issued the standards 
for commodities like edible oils, food additives, soap, toothpastes, 
soft drinks, beer, textiles (Governmen Notice 56 of 1984). These 
compulsory standards have been adopted f rom those internationally 
recognised. But the goods covered are only a small fraction of 
the range of products that require control. 
Labelling is another important area relevant to price 
control. Quality and quantity description helps buyers to have 
a clear idea of what he is buying and whether it is worth his 
money. Many products are not labelled nor described (Nditi, 1985). 
5.4.3. Controlled Distribution of Essential Goods 
Fixing maximum prices without controlling distribution 
often does not achieve observance of the fixed prices. Indeed 
this has been one of the weaknesses for many consumers not getting 
the goods at controlled prices. The government has taken the 
following measures: First, it has established control over the 
distribution of scarce commodities. Second, it has instituted 
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system of consumer registration. Third it has issued coupons 
or ration cards. 
Let us examine the legal position as regards distribution. 
5.4.3. (a) Distribution System: How it is Implemented 
The two major Acts governing distribution are the Regulation 
of Trade Act 1980 and the Imports Control (Confinement) Order 
1981. The Regulation of Trade Act empowers the Minister for Trade 
to regulate or control the acquisition and sale of any goods 
"where in his opinion it is necessary or desirable to do so in 
public interest", section 3(l). Under this law, the Minister 
can designate the goods to be controlled and specify the names 
of dealers authorised to handle such goods, section 3(3). The 
Ministerial order containing the list of controlled goods and 
the designated dealers is Government Notice 150 of 1980. 
Under the Imports Control Order 1981 the minister has 
restricted the importation and distribution of specified products 
3 
to certain companies only (Government Notice 96 of 1981). Once 
goods have been brought under control it is an offence for a 
person, other than an authorised dealer to possess the goods 
for purposes other thAn his normal consumption. 
To assist in the enforcement of orderly distribution 
three measures have been instituted. First, the keeping of inventory 
records. Every primary producer or importer of rationed goods 
3. For example, Agricultural chemicals by the Agricultural and Industrial Supply 
Corporation (AISCO), baking powder, butter, cheese, cooking oil by the General 
and Food Corporation (GEFCO), air conditioners, tubes, radios. irons. watches, 
bicycles. sewing machines by'the Household Supplies Company (HOSCO). ' 
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is required to keep a periodic account of the stock and transactions 
in such goods. Second, there is periodic audit of producers and 
traders. The ration boards conduct routine audits of dealers. 
Each trader in controlled goods is accountable for the manner 
in which he acquires and distributes the goods. Finally, government 
party leaders and vigilante groups (from the people's militia 
0 
force or youth leagues) give escort to distribution vehicles 
to ensure that goods are off-loaded at the designated stations 
and in the quantities specified. At these stations the dealers 
are not allowed to sell the goods to consumers until headmen 
representing all the households entitled to the goods are present. 
It is the headmen who decide how much should go to a given f amily. 
Any contravention of the established distribution machinery is 
considered as an economic sabotage within the provisions of the 
Organised Crimes Control Act 1984 (Schedule to the Act) . The 
burden of proof shifts on the suspect to establish innocent possession. 
The penalty is severe - seven to fourteen years imprisonment 
with hard labour. 
The dealers authorised to handle controlled goods are 
state trading corporations, public institutions, cooperative 
societies and selected businessmen. All manufacturers and importers 
must sell their products to these institutions. These in turn 
sell to the Regional Trading Corporations. Each company has set 
up branches in the villages or group of villages. At the village 
level, villagers nominate the shopkeepers who will handle the 
goods. At each point of distribution party and government leaders 
are actively involved in supervision. Moreover, the government 
has established a network of depots throughout the country which 
act as reservoirs. 
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To illustrate how the system works in practice let 
us take the case of sugar. Sugar is produced by three firms, 
located inland - Tanganyika Planters in Arusha, Kagera in Bukoba, 
and Mtibwa in Morogoro. All the f irms send the sugar to the Sugar 
Development Corporation headquarters in Daresalaam. The Corporation 
a distributes to Regional Trading Companies, institutions and industries. 
The trading companies sell to cooperative shops or village shops 
as the case may be. The shops then sell to consumers according 
to amounts indicated in the ration cards. The Sugar Development 
Corporation can import sugar in event of shortage. Each institution 
in the distribution channel is permitted to recover costs of 
administration and distribution. The chain of agents obviously 
escalates prices. But the system has its advantages. First, it 
prevents discrimination. Consumers who live close to the factories 
have no better access than their counterparts in remote areas. 
Second, it is equitable. Third it ensures orderly conduct of 
trade in and availability of scarce commodities. Fourth, it gives 
government effective control over a major economic activity - 
internal and import trade. Fif th, it plugs loopholes which would 
otherwise have given traders unlimited opportunity for windfall 
gains in scarcity conditions. Above all, it has created more 
jobs. 
5.4.3. (b) Rationing of Goods in Short Supply 
For a number of commodities considered very basic, 
but in short supply, the controls have been supplemented by rationing 
per head per day. The object of rationing is to ensure equitable 
access by every person to the basic necessities of life. Among 
the goods currently rationed are sugar, cooking oils, maize meal, 
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petrol and soap. If the fixed prices were not supplemented by 
rationing distribution would be inequitable. Distribution would 
be made either on the basis of first-come-first-served principle; 
or more would go to those for one reason or another are favoured 
by the trader or simply through the black-market. In the first 
* case, customers would be subjected to hardships and inconvenience 
such as waiting in long, uncertain and demoralising queues. In 
the second, favoured customers might purchase goods in excess 
of their requirements and engage in black-marketeering. In the 
third situation, employed people would suffer most. Since they 
do not have time to stay in the queues they would be the natural 
victims of black-marketeers. 
Rationing applies to a few specified commodities only. 
It does not apply to all price-controlled items. It takes two 
forms: the regular ration card and the permit. A permit is a 
one-time authorisation. Permits are required for the purchase 
of consumer durables like cars, television sets, refridgerators, 
gasoline, tyres. Persons who wish to acquire these items have 
to convince the ration boards of their definite needs. 
The coupon (card) is used for basic items of household 
consumption like sugar, soap, beans. Every head of the family 
is issued with a card containing details about the size of the 
family, place of residence, headman and shop registered with. 
The headman, the tencell party leader, distributes the coupons. 
He ensures that every family gets its share of the goods. If 
there is not enough to go around allocation in on rotational 
basis. The amount given to each family varies with the size of 
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the family. When goods are rationed, a family is given a quantity 
enough to satisfy five members. There is no provision for guests. 
5.4.3. (c) Standards of Eligibility 
The regulations do not specify the criteria for distri- 
a bution or rationing. We can infer this from the practices. 
For goods that require special permits, applicants 
need to convince the boards of the special needs. As usual with 
law, certain categories are exempted. Senior government officers, 
executives in parastatals, foreigners, army chiefs do not require 
permits. Even when they are not expressly exempted by the law, 
the ration boards act sof tly and f avourably with them. For others, 
they have to prove genuine need for the goods. Considerations 
such as nature of employment, status, influence or friends in 
the boards play a vital role. 
In the case of household consumer goods, the control 
agencies do not, possess discretion. The practices are standard. 
Once the basic family allotment has been endorsed in the card 
it cannot be varied to accommodate subsequent changes in individual 
consumption habits or the presence of a visitor. The allocation 
does not take into account special categories like babies or 
the sick in the family. 
Institutional users like hospitals, schools and restaurants 
are given priority in distribution. Industrial consumers like 
bottlers, confectioners, are given quantities enough to satisfy 
their needs. The government of course has an interest in the 
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activities of industry. The criterion of eligibility for institutional 
and industrial users is their historical use. Extra amounts are 
generously provided on proof of increased demand for their services. 
5.5. Some Problems in Enforcing Distribution and Rationing 
4 There are at least five main problems involved in rationing 
and distribution: the criteria f or allocation; the level at which 
allocations are defined; interference with the distribution system; 
the black market and administrative issues involved in the allocation 
process. 
5.5.1. Criteria for Allocation of Goods 
It will be seen from the standards of eligibility that 
the criteria for the allocation are many, particularly when it 
includes criteria which are not legitimate. The problem is what 
would be the most acceptable criteria. The more widely acceptable 
criterion is the allocation according to needs. But the concept 
of "needsm is not always easy to def ine. Urgent needs as in the 
case of hospitals and basic needs do not pose major problems. 
But beyond such levels the concept becomes difficult to define 
and operationalise in relation to the rest of the consumers. 
A second criterion is allocation according to merit. This criterion 
is easy to operationalise. I would not dispute that priority 
in the allocation of sugar should go to babies or the sick. But 
one can certainly question the use of political merits as the 
basis of distribution. Finally, there are informal methods of 
allocation which are not only socially undesirable but also forbidden 
and criminal. Such methods are those based on personal links 
with the allocator; return of 
favours done to the allocator 
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and corruption. Indeed, the -government has condemned the use 
of such illegitimate methods (Sunday News, Daresalaam, October 
24,1983). Yet they are still prevalent (Africa Contemporary 
Record 1982-83: B279). 
5.5.2. Administrative Issues 
Distribution and rationing require a large and expensive 
administrative machinery. Many party and government officers 
are involved in monitoring the physical movement of goods and 
supervising in the distribution points. This imposes a heavy 
shift of manpower and financial resources from ordinary business 
of government to the controls. On the other hand traders frequently 
complain that the system imposes additional work, slows down 
business and necessitates hiring more workers. These expenses 
reduce the profits that they are expected to earn on controlled 
goods. Consumers too complain about the long and uncertain periods 
it takes to get the goods (Rice, 1979; Sunday News, Daresalaam, 
December 29,1985). 
5.5.3. Interference with Distribution 
One of the most pressing problems is violation of the 
procedures laid down for the distribution of goods both by unscru- 
pulous traders and rresponsible officials (Africa Contemporary 
Records 1982-83: B278). Traders violate the procedures directly 
and indirectly. They bribe the allocators to get more goods 
or jump the queues. Some traders appointed to sell the goods 
to consumers divert them to more lucrative outlets than the selling 
points. Others divert the goods to more profitable uses. For 
I example, instead of selling sugar to consumers, they will use 
it to make cups of tea. This is b-ecause a pound of sugar spent 
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on making and selling tea yields more money than the one sold 
directly to a consumer. 
5.5.4. Black Marketeering 
With respect to a number of the important commodities 
0 
under control, the operation of distribution and rationing, especially 
in the rural areas, has broken down. The upsurge of the black 
market is a clear indication. In these secret and illegal markets 
the control goods are more abundant than in the established shops 
(Whitworth, 1982; Shimwela, 1984). But the goods sell at several 
times than the government prices. The black marketeers (popularly 
know as Walanguzi, i. e. racketeers or "Fat Goats" in Swahili) 
are a common phenomenon both in rural and urban areas despite 
tough laws aimed at cracking down on them like the Economic and 
Organised Crimes (Control) Act 1984 and the Human Resources Deploy- 
ment Act 1983. The black marketeers operate to evade all*the 
established machinery for the acquisition and sale of basic commodities. 
The black market is largely the brain child of merchants. It 
is sustained by the unsatisfied consumers. It is boosted by dishonest 
officials who supply it with the controlled goods. This apparent 
interference with the controls says Galbraith, is a phenomenon 
found in many places where controls are imposed in a situation 
fcarced with shortages because 
The given supply can be sold at higher prices. 
It can be sold because buyers, however unhappy, 
would prefer to pay the higher prices than 
to accept their alternative opportunity which 
is to do without. The sellers, it can readily 
be assumed prefer the higher price to the 
lower one. Thus if the price increase is 
arrested by authority, the action runs not 
only against the interest of those buyers 
who are not able to satisfy all or substantially 
all Of their wants at a fixed price. An 
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incentive thus exists for a coalition on 
behalf of higher prices between sellers and 
at least some buyers. This coalition is based 
on an equally rational interpretation of 
immediate self interest on both sides (Galbraith, 
1980: 3-4). 
The question is where do the black marketeers obtain 
their goods? With the type of extensive controls that we have 
4 
seen above it would be difficult to understand how goods leak 
to the illegal market. While no satisfactory answer was given 
to me by regional authorities responsible for allocating and 
distributing the controlled goods, a hint on the possible causes 
of the problem came from the Prime Minister, E. Sokoine, who 
told Parliament: 
The black marketeers have built up such a 
relationship with leaders of the distribution 
bodies that it is impossible to distinguish 
them (Africa Contemporary Records, 1983: 
B278). 
The Prime Minister's statement clearly suggests dishonesty on 
the part of some public officers. It also proves ineffectiveness 
of the government in disciplining its officers and enforcing 
its policies. Who else is better placed to stamp out corruption 
or irresponsible officers than the government? 
The black market has generated other anti-social and 
criminal practices. One, being banditry. As the black market 
business became lucrative it ceased to be the domain of ordinary 
traders. Criminal gangs moved in introducing deadly and unprece- 
dented methods - seizure of goods on transit at gun point, hijacking 
of vehicles ferrying the goods, spurious manufacture (Ergas, 
1983). The other was economic sabotage. The black marketeers 
indulged in speculative hoarding, of money and goods, disruption 
of distribution, sale of adulterated goods and counterfeiting. 
-357- 
It is interesting to note that some of the people involved 
in the black market were men of substantial means and political 
power - politicians, senior police officers, party cadres, civil 
servants and parastatal managers (Africa Contemporary Records 
1983: B279). Accounts by Green speak of government and parastatal 
. employees resigning government employment to enter trade where 
they use their extensive influence and connections with the rationing 
and distribution agencies, in which they had formerly served, 
to acquire goods and sell them on the black market (Green, 1980). 
President Nyerere expressed his dismay on the rate of "young 
people leaving public service sector employment on flimsy or 
dubious grounds such as health or family problems just to be 
netted in the swoops against racketeers. They are at the helm 
of black marketeering" (Nyerere, Address to the Nation, April 
5,1983). It is some of this anti-social practices which prompted 
the passage of the Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act. 
Explaining the purposes of the Act, President Nyerere. its principal 
promoter said: 
This Act is designed to be periodically invoked 
to operate whenever it is felt that acts 
of economic sabotage are too rampant to be 
tolerated by society. The Act will be a permanent 
weapon of the nation in the war against 
saboteurs, racketeers and other anti-social 
elements. The treatment with abhorence of 
acts of that nature should be a permanent 
and ordinary feature of the national ethic 
(Statement of Objects, the Economic Sabotage 
Act 1983). 
The Act covers all offences under: the Regulation of Trade Act 
1980; the Imports Confinement Order 1981; the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1971; the Exchange Control Ordinance (cap 292) 
in -addition to hoarding, possession 
of excessive, liquid currency, 
occasioning loss to specified authorities, Possession of goods 
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suspected to have been stolen and theft by postal workers (The 
Schedule, The Economic Sabotage Act 1983). 
In conclusion we can say that there is a general unity 
between the Price Control Act, the Weights and Measures Acts, 
# the Food Act and the Standards Act. The four enf orcement services 
have, by their nature and administrative problems, an identical 
purpose. They exist to impose basic correctness in the essential 
attributes of goods on sale so that the consumer is protected 
from cheat, unfairness and hazard. Each of these laws share a 
common purpose and common charateristic of enforcement. The functions 
of the agencies established by these laws often operate upon 
the same goods, the same traders, the same premises. But the 
difficulty of the present situation is that although all these 
agencies are clearly facets of the same service - public protection, 
they have grown up in disparate and disjunctive way. They are 
guided by different government departments variable in their 
comprehension of problems, variable in expertise, outlook, under- 
standing and probably resource endowment as well. 
For the sake o consistency, uniformity and coordination, 
it would be better if some of the services could be offered by 
one or two agencies than the current duplicity of control agencies 
which can cause stalemate, inaction or confusion when it comes 
to locating responsibilities, say for control of food quality. 
Shall we hold responsible the agencies with general powers, like 
the NPC, or those with specific powers like the Food Commission? 
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5.6. Measures to Combat Contravention of Distribution System, 
Black Markets and Other Anti-social Practices 
To curb the wave of criminal and other social conduct 
outlined above, the government introduced the Economic and Organised 
Crime (Control) Bill in August, 25,1983. The rationale for the 
Act as stated by the Minister for Justice, was to 
a 
make provision for 
of certain crime 
misconduct through 
investigation and 
provision of ent 
remedies (Ibid. ). 
the control and eradication 
and culpable non-criminal 
the prescription of modified 
trial procedures and the 
ianced sanctions and new 
The Bill was passed with uncharacteristic speed and urgency. 
There was no opposition to it, nor any meaningful debate in the 
National Assembly, to say the least. Its chief sponsor was President 
Nyerere himself. But the initial groundwork to the Act probably 
began early in March 1983. The then Prime Minister made a public 
attack against black marketeeres blaming them for economic hardships 
facing consumers and promised stern government action. The Prime 
Minister lashed at rumours that the government was deliberately 
allowing the racketeers to operate freely and at the damaging 
inference that the government was on leave. In April 20,1983 
President Nyerere announced measures to crack down on economic 
and social vices. He announced that police raids had unearthed 
massive hoarding of currency, huge stocks of hidden goods and 
had exposed organised crime aimed at discrediting the government. 
It is on this occasion that he revealed his 
intention to move 
f or this legislation. He made it clear that he 
had strong reserva- 
tions about criminals escaping from 
justice by exploiting loopholes 
in the existing system. The Act would avoid such 
legal technicalities 
as facilitated escape 
by suspected criminals. He warnedt 
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For those of you who are accustomed to notions 
of legality, especially our brothers in the 
bench and bar, we seek their forgiveness. 
They will not find it comfortable this time. 
But I am afraid these are matters that may 
not be appropriate for the courts. Our actions 
may seem harsh. I believe we are justified 
and the people will support us (Radio Broadcast, 
April 5,1983). 
Indeed the people gave the Act overwhelming support 
through demonstrations, congratulatory messages and comments 
in the newspapers. 
The Act establishes an economic tribunal presided over 
by the High Court judge. The judges are appointed by the President 
from existing members. The tribunal sits with two lay members. 
Experience shows that the laymen are picked from those with a 
distinguished career in politics or civil service. There are 
no formal educational requirements except that they must be "literate 
members, aged between 30-60 years, responsible and reasonable 
members of the community" Section 5(l). 
All questions including the guilt of the accused are 
decided by majority votes. Legal representation is not allowed. 
There are no appeals to the Court of Appeal. But one can appeal 
to the President. The tribunal is not bound by rules of evidence. 
It has broad powers to "order seizure and confiscation of property 
used, obtained or involved in the commission of the scheduled 
offences". For purposes of this law an organised crime is broadly 
defined as any "offence or non-criminal conduct which is committed 
in combination or from whose nature a presumption may be raised 
that its commission is evidence of the existence of a criminal 
racket in respect of acts connected with or capable of producing 
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the offence in question", Section 2. 
Thus a mere accusation of violating the scheduled acts 
or a suspicion of the same is suf f icient to warrant a conviction 
by the tribunal. 
The Act validates searches, property seizure and arrests 
made by party personnel, vigilante groups, people's militia and 
the police, without search warrants. The Act was applied retro- 
spectively. This was intended to cover those netted by police 
swoops conducted before the passage of this law. 
The reasons for short-circuiting standard legal procedures 
were probably two: First, the difficulty of obtaining sufficient 
and admissible evidence. Most of the offences covered are surrounded 
by concealment, stealth or bribery and other transactions. Second, 
to avoid the possibility of suspects being freed on legal techni- 
calities. 
But the drastic measures -a dracoman law, harsh penalties, 
by-passing of standard legal procedures supplemented by a hostile 
campaign designed to mobilise public support for the action, 
were short-lived. most of the people arrested were subsequently 
released by a special committee set up to review individual cases. 
In one case involving the ex-Regional Commissioner for Kilimanjaro, 
President Nyerere invoked the Detention Act 1962 to have him 
back in jail following public discontent of his release by the 
tribunal. Obviously his detention under the Preventive Detention 
Act 1962 is questionable. For that law applies to of fences against 
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national security and not ordinary crimes (Martin, 1974: 87- 
93). Moreover, the appointment of High Court judges to chair 
the tribunals watered down the rigors of the Act. The judges 
insisted on legal fairness and would not allow political expediency 
to dictate the outcome of the cases. The judges had an upper 
hand in determining the outcome of the cases. They guided the 
proceedings, summed up the submissions to the laymen to form 
their opinion. I would say the judges charted out the final decision. 
It cannot be said that the judges abandoned their orthodox judicial 
attitudes simply because they sat on those tribunals. The most 
important blow to the Act was a change in government policy that 
came in July 1984. The government legalised most of the practices 
forbidden by the Act. For example, people were allowed to import 
some of the confined goods and sell them at non-controlled prices, 
to possess and use foreign currency within the country. This 
decriminalisation posed a dilemma. Hardly a year ago, in a nervous 
and overactive response to racketeering, the authorities had 
dragged people from their homes and streets, and thrown them 
into detention centres for possessing confined goods and foreign 
currency. Now it had legalised those practices. One problem was 
what to do with those still awaiting trial. For, when they committed 
the of f ences this law may not have been there. Af ter their arrest 
came the law and wa made retrospective. But by the time of the 
trial the acts are no longer criminal. To me this was a real 
problem - socially and politically. 
It could be argued that since the Act was retrospective 
those still awaiting trial should be released where it is shown 
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that the acts are now lawful. This however, will leave those 
already convicted feel that they were unlucky to be tried first. 
The public will think the laws are unruly. Maybe those in jail 
should also be set free. 
0 One other problem which trials before the economic 
tribunal raises in relation to other laws is the question of 
double standards. The ordinary laws covering offences transferred 
to the tribunals were not repealed. For example, a person selling 
goods at above the controlled prices or selling substandard goods 
could still be tried by ordinary courts under the Regulation 
of Prices Act (sections 20 and 21). Possession of foreign currency 
is still governed by the Exchange Control Act (cap 292). There 
were therefore two separate competent authorities with jurisdiction 
over these offences. In practice the Office of Public Prosecutors 
enjoyed an advantage. Where they were satisfied that the evidence 
gathered was adequate they took the cases to ordinary courts. 
And where the evidence was weak they turned the cases to the 
tribunals. 
This practice is, in my view, unfair. First, the evidential 
burden in the tribunals is upon the accused to prove his innocence. 
Often, the law establishing the tribunals presumes the guilt 
of the accused. In the courts the burden is on the prosecutor 
and the standard is high - beyond reasonable doubt. One can easily 
see a situation arising where a person is condemned to jail by 
the tribunals in circumstances which the courts would set him 
free. Finally, the penalties are stiff in the tribunals than 
the courts. A person convicted of the of f ence of possessing stolen 
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goods would get a maximum imprisonment term of seven years. The 
minimum would be anything less (section 311, Penal Code). For 
the same offence the maximum penalty in the tribunals is fourteen 
years imprisonment and the minimum is five, with hard labour 
plus confiscation of the property to the state. 
a 
5.7. The Sanctions 
The price controllers apply two types of sanctions: 
administrative and legal. 
Administrative Sanctions 
Administrative sanctions are not provided for by the 
Act. But they are the most frequently used. These include a warning 
issued verbally or in writing; verbal threats, public exhortations 
to traders to refrain from violations, withdrawal of licences 
and withholding of supplies. The withdrawal of licences and withholding 
of supplies requires coordination between the price controllers 
and licencing or distribution agencies. Where the controllers 
have found a serious and persistent breach of the controlled 
prices, they inform the licencing or distribution body about 
the matter and ask them to take the necessary measures. This 
is done in exceptional circumstances where the trader neglects 
warnings from the controllers. The application of such cross- 
sanctions does not raise difficulties. Since the regional or 
town directors head the administration and chair licencing and 
distribution authorities the controllers can obtain such action 
easily. These are the severest and most effective sanctions since 
they affect the livelihood of the trader. They are the ones feared 
most - 
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5.7.2. Legal Sanctions 
The Act provides two types of sanctions fines and 
imprisonment, or both, section 26. Where the amount of price 
overcharge in one transaction does not exceed Tsh. 100/= the 
controllers can compound the offence. Anything exceeding that 
0 becomes a court case. This explains why over 80 per cent of 
the offenders are fined. The other factor influencing the decision 
to impose a fine is the willingness of the offender to admit 
violation. From the statistical figures more than 5393 people 
were booked for contravening maximum price orders in the provinces 
(excluding Daresalaam) between 1977-84. But of these 3773 were 
fined by the controllers and 292 were taken to courts. There 
are no reliable statistics showing the number of those given 
a warning on the spot. 
In connection with f ines the question is how deterrent 
are they? How of ten are the controllers willing to impose maximum 
fines? How do traders feel about the fines given? Are their 
feelings the same for other penalties like imprisonment? 
The Act provides that the maximum f ine for the breach 
of any provisions shall be Tsh. 5000/= (i. e. E100). It is inter- 
esting to note that prior to 1981 the penalty was more severe. 
The maximum fine was Tsh. 50,000/= (i. e. fil, 000). An amendment 
of 1981 drastically reduced the penalty (G. N. 2 of 1981). A 
perusal of the Commission's records shows that on the whole 
the fines were extremely small. The Table below illustrates 
this. 
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TABLE 6: Total Amount of Fines 1977-84 for 
Overcharging (excluding Daresalaam) 
10 
Region No. of Offenders Fined Total amount Tsh. 
Arusha 263 239,900.00 
Coast 52 20,650.00 
Dodoma 583 491,820.00 
Iringa 279 137,150.00 
Kagera 168 43,215.00 
Kigoma 157 106,000.00 
Kilimanjaro 335 126,680.00 
Lindi 39 11,367.00 
Mara 210 140,700.00 
Mbeya 170 36,050.00 
Morogoro 196 184,255.00 
Mwanza 455 411,550.00 
Rukwa 402 205,150.00 
Ruvuma 417 79,965.00 
Mtwara 73 57,600.00 
Singida 314 18,840.00 
Shinyanga 628 506,574.00 
Tabora 451 175.857.00 
Tanga 201 121,970.00 
TOTAL 5393 3,381,293.00 
Source: National Price Commission, Daresalaam. 
Assuming that the fines were the same for every offender, we 
find that on the national average they were mild. They averaged 
less than Tsh. 1000 (i. e. E15) - half of the prescribed maximum. 
We also find that the regional variations are wide. In a small 
percentage of the regions, Coast and Lindi, the controllers 
imposed 
high fines averaging the maximum. In the rest of the regions 
the controllers were lenient. 
This attitude of the price controllers 
requires golne explanation. 
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One possible reason for the leniency is the restrictions 
in the Act which limit maximum fines to Tsh. 5000/=, section 
33. The second is the policy of the controllers not to impose 
the maximum penalty for the first offenders. According to the 
National Price Commission the maximum penalty is reserved for 
& subsequent or hardcore ýcriminals. To invoke the maximum penalty 
to first offenders will exhaust the latitude of discretion for 
punishing subsequent breaches. The controllers are liberal to 
impose any f ine below the maximum. This policy is in line with 
the general judicial policy on sentencing (Slattery, 1974). 
Once it is recognised that discrimination is exercised 
on such an extensive scale in fining a question arises: Are there 
any guidelines to control the exercise of the discretion by controllers 
to prevent abuses? I am af raid none exists. Much depends on the 
circumstances of each case and on the personal characteristics 
of each controller. If the officer who detects the violation 
does not want to impose af ine he may simply ignore the violation, 
or give a verbal warning. Such decisions may well depend on the 
officer's temperament, ideological leanings, commitment to the 
job and social background. 
In connection with sanctions, it is also important 
to examine those imposed by the courts and see whether they would 
in any way be more deterrent than those of the commissioners? 
Unlike the commissioners, the courts can impose af ine, 
an imprisonment or both, section 26. If we go by the general 
sentencing policy Of the courts it follows that since a fine 
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is the punishment named first it must be considered before jail 
(Slattery, 1974. - 20). Jail is an alternative to be invoked in 
case of persistent breaches or failure to pay fine. This policy 
is strictly followed in sentencing. For instance, out of 250 
people convicted of hiking prices by Kivukoni Magistrates Court 
during 1983-84 only 23 persons were imprisoned. And only after 
failing to pay fines. The jail terms did not exceed six months. 
In terms of f ines, those imposed by the magistrates were equally 
trivial. None exceeded Tsh. 2,000/=. The penalty of imprisonment 
most feared by businessmen is seldom invoked. 
This method of lightly dealing with offenders has brought 
two consequences. First, the non-deterrent sanctions encourage 
violations. Some authors say that there is a strong relation- 
ship between the severity of penalties'and the rate in the frequency 
of violations (Mitnick, 1980; Hawkins, 1980; Sholz, 1984). Second, 
it has made traders feel least threatened. For one the f ines are 
small. The traders f ind the costs and opportunities of disobeying 
far less than the gains. A number of traders interviewed gave 
me the same impression - that it pays to disobey this law. Asked 
why they indulged in such criminal practices a trader denied 
categorically: 
We are not criminals. It is not a crime, 
it is pure business shrewdness (i. e. to sell 
above the fixed prices). Only that you must 
have your money for fines ready. And we have 
never refused or failed to pay fines! 
The chairman of the Daresalaam Chamber of Commerce was equally 
supportive: 
i don't think jail is good for us. AM we 
are not robbers. Jail is for thieves and 
gangsters. We do not force anyone to buy 
at those prices. They are free to refuse. 
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It is clear from these statements that the busines class consider 
the sanctions least threatening to them. 
That being the case I think there is need for the penalties 
to be raised; for the authorities to recommend jail sentences; 
. to take action more quickly when accusations of violations are 
made and to take tougher action. 
5.8. Some Observations 
In sum judging by the experience so far enforcement 
of the controls has not been ef f ective. There hardly appears 
a major published report by the controllers without complaining 
about inadequate enforcement. The Minister for Finance conceded 
in his statement to the National Assembly when he said 
The enforcement of price controls, Mr Speaker, 
has always been a very difficult matter. 
It is indeed difficult to enforce today even 
in the small number of goods currently under 
control (Budget Speech 1985/86, Uhuru, July 
27,1985: 3). 
The Daily News lamented in its editorial of August 14,1985, 
about unjustifiable price increases that are causing "suffering 
to consumers and the economy as a whole", and argued that "many 
goods could be sold at prices cheaper than those charged without 
traders incurring losses" (Daily News, Daresalaam, August 14, 
1985). A study by ILO 1982 and 1983 examined the enforcement 
of the controls and concluded that it was sorely inadequate. 
Far f rom protecting consumers, it had created opportunities for 
corruption, smuggling, hoarding and boosted the black market 
(ILO, 1982: 15). 
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Tanzania is not unique in this predicament. Scanning 
through the available country literature one finds similar problems 
in other countries with price controls. Ghana (Killick, 1973) 
and Papua New Guinea are facing similar problems (Papua New Guinea, 
Law Reform Commission Paper 17 of 1981). British and American 
experiences suggest that formidable problems were encountered 
on enforcing the controls and there was no absolute success (Mitchell, 
1978; Eliot, 1979). But what makes Tanzanials, and other countries 
in the third worlds problems particularly acute are shortages 
of goods, manpower and financial resource constraints and inadequate 
policing. These are aggravated by dishonest and corrupt tendencies 
among enforcers (Sunday News, Daresalaam, February 1986: 1). 
My observations on the extent to which the controls 
were being enforced during the month of December 1985 revealed 
the following: 
Scarcities in the Market Dictate Prices 
The price list issued in September 1985 was a dead 
letter. The prices on the maýXet, especially in the villages, 
were much higher than those fixed by the government. Let us take 
a few examples. The listed prices for half a litre of beer were 
Sh. 26/=. In Daresaýlaam hotels it was selling at Sh. 45/=. Up 
i 
country it was as high as Sh. 70/= in Mbeya and Ruvuma, and 
Sh. 100/= in Mwanza. The trend was the same for other goods. 
The prices were dishonoured from the word "go". When I compared 
the prices actually charged with the fixed prices in the areas 
I visited I found that in none of the cities were the controlled 
I 
prices observed. Practically every person evaded the controls. 
Consumers knowingly paid prices higher than the fixed ones. 
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5.8.2. Enforcers Tolerating or Ignoring Violations 
In a number of cases the law enforcers seem to lack 
the will to enforce. The folowing description from the authors 
of Africa Events will illustrate the point. It shows how in Daresalaam 
the price controllers turn a blind eye to violations: 
Hawkers have their wares - where red beans, 
rice, sugar, wheat - are spread out in loose 
mounds on the ground on either side of the 
road. Here rice sells five times the official 
price. Small racketeers depots replenish 
the hawkers' supplies. Some of the bags bear 
foreign marks indicating that the local source 
is the government distribution (Africa Events, 
London, November 1985: 63). 
That being the situation the question that arises is why do the 
controllers ignore offenders when the rules are flouted so openly? 
Could it be a case of silent conspiracy, as the authors suggest, 
between government officers and black marketeers to allow freedom 
of the market? Indeed that seems to be the case. When asked to 
explain this apparently unwelcome development President Nyerere 
answered diplomatically 
Politically it is better to see the goods 
in the markets, the high prices notwithstanding. 
At least there is a positive effect about 
it - the psychological satisfaction. When 
people complain about high prices you tell 
them to work harder, get more money so that 
you can afford the goods. What would you 
tell people when the shelves are empty? (Sunday 
News, Daresalaam, December 29,1985: 3). 
The President's message is clear. The sight of goods flowing 
in the markets is a political tactic. To many it conveys the 
illusion of plenty which helps to curb political unrest. But 
the argument on high prices being an incentive to work is question- 
able. Where wages are controlled by state, the prices are so 
high and unemployment is rising it is difficult to see how the 
incentive argument operates. The only people with incentives 
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to work harder will be the racketeers. 
5.8.3. Uncooperative Consumers 
Of late consumers seem to have lost confidence in the 
NPC and have become uncooperative. Two examples demonstrate that. 
- First, they are prepared to pay higher than the government prices 
and do not complain. More disturbing is they conceal violators. 
For example, when the inspectors go to the streets consumers 
inform traders to close their shop premises or fix price labels 
on their goods to avoid arrest. In some cases consumers have conspired 
with traders to beat inspectors (Uhuru, Daresalaam, August 5, 
1985). The Price Commission believes that traders pay people 
to beat his men (Chairman's Report, Uhuru, Daresalaam, August 
5,1985). Consumers contacted said the inspectors were being 
molested because they were not taking action against traders. 
The consumers think the inspectors are in the pay of racketeers 
and prof iteers. These allegations and counter allegations 
reflect declining confidence in the controllers. The Commission 
has been forced to dismiss irresponsible officials (Mongi, 1985; 
f- 
Mafuru, 1985). There is need to restore public confidence. 
5.9. Judicial Review 
So far we have considered one side of enforcement - 
that against violators. To complete the picture we also need 
to look at enforcement against the law enforcers. This is an 
important point to consider. For one, consumers need to know 
what action is open to them where the Colmissioners fail in their 
duties or act in a manner prejudicial to their interests. So 
is the case with businessmen. This Point draws us into examining 
judicial review of the actions of administrators. 
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I will note go into the details of the principles 
governing review. This is well covered by existing studies (Bayne, 
19 69 : 343; Wade, 1982). 1 will therefore limit myself to the 
application of these principles to the agencies under discussion. 
a The principles governing the circumstances in which 
the East African courts have been asked to review the decisions 
of administrative agencies follow closely those developed by 
the English courts in a series of decisions. The leading case 
is that of Anisminic v. Foreign Commission [1969]. East African 
cases have adopted these principles and academicians from institutions 
in that region have welcomed them (Bayne, 1969; Kiapi, 1972; 
Martin, 1974). In Amir Junia and 15 others v. Tanzania Harbours 
Authority (1980] and in I. M. Mohana v. University of Daresalaam 
[19771 the High_ Court held that the decisions of administrative 
authorities will be nullified if they are found to be ultra vires. 
The circumstances which can occasion an ultra vires decision, 
says de Smith, are many and varied. These include where the agency 
fails to exercise its power in some way - such as subdelegation; 
acting under dictation of some other body; misapplying a policy 
or misconstruing the scope of its discretion. The authority may 
also be challenged if it acts in excess of its authority; pursues 
improper purposes; takes into account irrelevant considerations 
or acting unreasonably (de Smith, 1980). In addition, it should 
be remembered that the law on this area is still developing. 
The House of Lords indicated in the case of Re Racal Communications 
[19801 that the circumstances that may call for review are developing 
upon case to case and the present categories are not exhaustive 
«1980) 2 All ER 634). 
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Due to the dearth of decided cases, it is not easy 
to demonstrate how these circumstances would bring the decisions 
of the Price Commission under review. What one can say is that 
there have been cases in which some of the decisions of the Commission 
could be challenged. We have mentioned cases where Ministers 
# have ordered the Commission to raise prices unjustifiably. We 
have seen how the President did the same. Above all we saw the 
party using the Commission to raise funds. These occasions could 
be a subject of review. 
Three important legislative practices however severely 
limit the ability of the courts to control the NPC's decisions. 
First, the provisions of section 15 which seem to exclude the 
jurisdiction of courts. It reads, ONo decision of the Price Commission 
or an Assistant Price Commissioner made or purporting to have 
been made pursuant to any provision of this part shall be subject 
to review by any court on any ground whatsoever". The Part referred 
to covers sections 3- 14. Those sections contain the important 
provisions on price fixing; criteria for price determination; 
the costs permissible; price reviews and the Commission's power 
to hear appeals from assistant controllers. In the case of 
Re Marles Application [1958] the East African Court of Appeal 
he ld that where specific words are used to exclude the jurisdiction 
of the courts, it must be taken that Parliament intended to deprive 
the citizen of access to the courts and the courts are bound 
to give effect to such words (11958] E. A. 153). However, it has 
been held in other jurisdictions that an exclusionary clause 
of this type is only suf 
f icient to protect f rom review acts which 
are prima facie within the scope of 
the power granted (Anisminic 
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v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969] IAll E. R. 208 (H. L)). 
Where the limits of power are exceeded, or the power is exercised 
improperly there cannot be protection from such a clause. On 
this principle it could be said, for example, since section 12(2) 
of the Regulation of Prices Act lays down the circumstances under 
0 
which a price increase can be made, in a case where the Commission 
orders increases for reasons not apparently covered by these 
sections, it could be argued that the Act does not give the power 
to make such an order. The decisions in question therefore would 
be open to judicial review. 
The other limitation is section 9(2) which provides 
that the Minister may direct the Commission to determine or review 
prices if in the "opinion of the Minister it is in national interest 
that the prices be reviewed". And the Commission shall proceed 
to do so in accordance with the provisions of this Act. From 
this clause it would appear the question of whether the circum- 
stances or state affairs warrants a price review is a subjective 
matter for the discretion of the Minister. East African cases 
indicate that the courts will be extremely wary of reviewing 
the exercise by the Minister of such discretion (Re: Ibrahim 
[19701 E. A. 162; U ganda v. Commissioner of Prisons [1966] E. A. 
514). The English courts on the other hand have consistently 
held that even in such cases the discretion conferred on the 
Minister is not without limits and that a judge may enquire whether 
any objective basis existed for the exercise of the Ministers 
discretion (1p_adf ield v. Minister of Agriculture 119681 1 All 
E. R. 694). A similar progressive view has been adopted by one 
High Court judge in Tanzania. In the case of I. m. Mahona v. University 
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of Daresalaam [19771, Justice Kisanga, quoting the principle 
in Anisminic's case with approval, said the clause that the decision 
of a Minister "shall be final and conclusive" only applies "where 
there has been a real decision and not merely a purported or 
inoperative decision. The court will inquire whether the procedure 
4 
prescribed was followed and the circumstances justifying the 
decision existed". ([Civil Case 83 of 1977 (H. C. )] unreported). 
This case involved a Minister's decision to order dismissal of 
an employee without giving him a hearing and was nullified by 
the court despite the finality clause. The point is this approach 
by the judge is more progressive compared to that of the Court 
of Appeal. There is yet a further limitation. That is the grant 
of powers, which according to the words used, seem limitless. 
For example, section 9(l) reads as follows: "The Price Commission 
may from time to time determine and review.... price structures 
on a national basis", and section 16 says "The Price Commissioner 
may publish such list in such manner as will, in the opinion 
of the Price Commissioner, ensure the contents thereof coming 
to the notice of the members of the public who are likely to 
be affected thereby". It is difficult to see how the courts would 
be able to place limits on the exercise of such powers. 
It is necessary to remark here that what renders the 
exercise of powers by the Commission difficult to challenge in 
courts is not so much the exclusion clauses but the attitude 
of the government. In most cases, as we have seen, the government 
gives too much protection to public officers even when some of 
their actions are contrary to public expectations. Finally, it 
must be remembered that the courts 
depend on the individuals 
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to bring specific complaints before them. A host of financial, 
historical, geographical, cultural and legal barriers prevent 
people from making use of the courts to get their rights or remedies 
against unjust decisions of administrative bodies. For one, people 
are unaware that there are legal limits on the power of government 
0 and its institutions. Also they have little idea, or none at 
all, how such limits may be enforced. For the few that know, 
the costs of enforcing the rights through the courts, are needless 
to say, prohibitive. In addition legal technicalities naturally 
discourage such action. First, the potential plaintiff needs 
to possess an appropriate standing to sue (locus standi) . For 
example, a person seeking an injunction to prevent the Commission 
from acting illegally or improperly will have to show that the 
decision affects him more than the general public. Presumably 
firms or traders would find that quite easy. But the injunction 
may still be refused because the statute provides another equally 
good remedy - an appeal to the Commission (to review its decisions, 
section 13(l)(b)). That seems a bit strange. How can a person 
sit in judgment of himself ? Moreover, the court can refuse to 
issue an injunction if the order cannot be enforced or will cause 
inconvenience to the government. The alternative remedy is a 
declaration. There seems to be no strict requirements f or this 
order. For the law provides: "No action or proceedings shall 
be open to objection, on the ground that merely a declatory order 
is sought and the court may make binding declarations of right 
whether any consequential relief is or couid be claimed or noto 
(Civil Procedure Act 1966, section 7(2)). But a declaratory judgement 
may end up in an empty right. For such an order only declares 
the correct legal position. it does not require any party to 
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do anything. Disregard of declaratory orders does not amount 
to contempt of court. Obedience to such orders depends on the 
respect which the parties pay to court rulings (Wade, 1982: 500). 
This is a major weakness because unless society has built a strong 
tradition to the rule of law, judicial orders may be flouted 
'publicly. In Tanzania, as I am afraid in many other developing 
countries, such tradition is lacking. Instances where executive 
and administrative authorities disobey court orders are quite 
common. Two cases illustrate this. And since the cases involve 
Habeas Corpus - probably the most important constitutional safeguard 
against abuses by executive organs, the cases cast serious doubts 
about government compliance with non-obligatory orders like a 
declaration. 
In Att. Gen. v. Lesinoi and Another [1979] the government 
indirectly refused to enforce a court order to release detainees. 
The refusal was by conduct. The government kept on transferring 
the prisoners from one jail to another to render them inaccessible 
to the order. A similar ploy was employed in Re: Application 
by Massawe [19791. The Chief High Court judge protested openly 
against this attitude of the government. He warned: "The f reedom 
of a just man is worth little if court orders can be so arrogantly 
flouted" (per Muzavas, J. K. [1979] Law Reports of Tanzania 18). 
In view of this attitude of government, there is little 
reason to expect that decisions of the Commission declared unjust 
will be changed. Indeed we have already mentioned the price of 
sugar declared unfair by Parliament but ordered to continue by 
the government in 1980- 
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It is interesting to note that in many common law juris- 
dictions measures have been taken to modify the rigors of the 
rules on remedies so as to enable the citizen to pursue his rights 
in the courts without inhibitions. In the UK the rules on locus 
standi were relaxed in 1977. Now the courts can entertain applications 
for judicial review if the applicant has a sufficient interest 
(Supreme Court Rules, Amendment 3,1977 Rule 53). The House of 
Lords has indicated that the courts are "ready to control by 
way of review the actions of tribunals set up by statute to ensure 
justice is done" (Weekly Law Reports, December 1984: 1186). And 
to be exact, as Lord Scarman declared, the ancient restrictions 
no longer apply. What matters now is whether the issue is 
njusticeable and the nature of the case is suitable for review" 
(Reg. v. Envir. Secr. ex p. Notts. c. c. ([1986] 2 W. L. R. 1). 
Surely when courts in other countries, especially those 
in the common law family, are shaking off ancient restrictions 
it is a sign that there is something wrong with the law. 'It is 
an indication of a genuine need for change. There is no point 
why the legislature and courts in East Africa should not take 
similar measures. 
To sum up the arguments in this Chapter, we note that 
there are many factors which prevent effective enforcement of 
the regulations. The NPCIs resources, manpower and financial 
are limited. Its methods and techniques are weak in many respects. 
Consumers have been ignored in the enforcement machinery as a 
result little cooperation is forthcoming. But what makes enforcement 
more difficult is the poor state of the economy. Most of the 
-380- 
price controlled goods are in short supply (Government Paper 
1,1981 para. 61; Budget Speech 1986/87 para. 120). Because of 
shortages, cheating, profiteering and corruption enforcement 
is likely to be difficult (Africa Contemporary Record (1982- 
83: B278; Sunday News, Daresalaam, February 2,1986: 1; ILO 1982). 
4 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACT OF THE CONTROLS 
Introduction 
We have seen the reasons for the establishment of the 
a 
control system, the way it operates and the problems encountered. 
The ultimate conclusions of the study must take the form of an 
appraisal, by way of general conclusions, of the effects of the 
controls. The obvious question is: Do the controls work? The 
best way to elicit answers to this question would be to ask: 
What has been happening to inflation? Do people get the goods 
at controlled prices? Are the controlled items available? If 
all three questions are answered in the affirmative then beyond 
doubt the controls are working, and effectively too. If one or 
two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially 
if all three have, then they are not working. In that case further 
questions would have to be asked: Are those the only reasons 
why control did develop in the f irst place? Why has it persisted? 
Why today is it almost popularly accepted. as worthwhile? Are 
there any other viable effective alternative remedies to price 
control in the circumstances of Tanzania? 
Several country studies provide detailed answers to 
these questions, using - as Whitworth has suggested - various 
indicators to assess the impact of the controls. The range of 
indicators include: economic welfare (Rice, 1979); inflation 
(Shimwela, 1984); provision of basic human necessities (ILO, 
1983); foreign exchange earnings and balance of payments equil- 
ibrium (Ndyeshebola, 1980); political unity and stability (Nyerere, 
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1986) and cost and benefit analysis of operating the controls 
(World Bank, 1982). 
From these studies I find that the price controls are 
normally looked at from two, essentially conflicting, standpoints. 
There are those who set out to prove that price controls do not 
work in general and are not working in Tanzania in particular. 
Inevitably these choose indicators, criteria and information 
that supports their case. A typical example would be the World 
Bank Report 1982, the ILO Report 1982 and Rice 1979. On the other 
hand there are those who argue that the controls work. That the 
fact that they have not worked in other societies does not mean 
that they would not work in Tanzania (Nyerere, 1980,1986; Mongi, 
1980; Whitworth, 1982). In my view the dispute between these 
conflicting views cannot be reconciled unless we all have the 
same perception of what aworking" means, and we use the same 
criteria to judge the effect of the controls. We need to have 
some objective criteria and ideally that criteria should be the 
objects for which the controls were established. Otherwise to 
speak about whether an institution is "working" always begs the 
question: Working f or whom? Or, from whose point of view? Or, 
to what extent? An institution may be working but not producing 
the expected results. Yet it is working even if the consequences 
are adverse to those it was supposed to serve. 
To assess the performance of the controls I shall attempt 
to summarise: First of all its ef f ects on inf lation. Second, 
I will examine its impact on the social and political order. 
Then I will look at its consequences for the people. Finally, 
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I will look at the lessons it sheds on the relationship between 
law and social order. 
6.1. On Inflation 
To find out to what extent the controls have managed 
* to hold down the inflationary spiral we need to know what has 
been the trend in the inflationary rates before and after the 
imposition of the present controls and see how much of this has 
been caused by the controls. With regard to the first point, 
the figures on the annual rates of inf lation below illustrate 
the situation. 
TABLE 7: Annual Rates of Inflation 1972-85 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
26.5 10.5 19.4 26.4 16.9 1 11.6! 11.6ý 13.8 30.3 25.6 30 27.1 30.0 40.0 
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Operations Report (various), 
Daresalaam. 
The annual rates of inflation are calculated by the percentage 
increase in the Consumer Price Retail Index. It will be seen 
from this table that the inflationary trend has registered an 
upward trend since the 1970's. The reasons for this upward swing 
were outlined in detail in Chapter 3. 
It has been suggested that by conventional standards 
for developing countries there is little price inflation to worry 
about in Tanzania (Green, 1980: 57; Singh, 1986: 427). This view 
seems correct if one compares the Country's annual rates of 
inflation 
with those of other countries, both developed and developing 
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as well as those of the world taken as a unit together, as the 
I 
table below shows. 
TABLE 8: 'The Rates of Inflation in Various Countries 1973-1979 
TANZANIA AFRICAN 
STATES 
OTHER 
DEVELOPING INDUSTRIALISED 
WORLD IN 
GENERAL 
1973 10.5 9.3 21.5 7.5 9.4 
1974 19.4 19.0 31.5 12.7 15.2 
1975 26.4 16.9 26.2 10.8 13.4 
1976 16.9 18.1 28.2 7.9 11.0 
1977 11.6 22.8 29.1 7.9 11.3 
1978 11.6 18.4 24.6 6.8 9.6 
1979 13.8 21.0 29.0 9.0 12.0 
Sources: (i) Budget Speech 1986/87, Daily News, Daresalaam, 
June 20,1986 pp. 1-2; 
(ii) Ndyeshobola, A. A. "An Overview of Inflation in 
Tanzania: Causal Factors and Propagating Mecha- 
nisms" in Rwegasira, S. P. ed. (1980) Inflation 
in Tanzania (Institute of Finance Management, 
Daresalaam) pp. 7-36; 
(iii) M. F. Financial Statistics Rates of Inflation 
for Various Countries 1973-1979. 
It appears from the table above that compared to other 
African countries, Tanzania's annual rates of inflation are moderate. 
By standards of the other developing countries the situation 
could be categorised as mild. Certainly, as Singh points out, 
they are negligible compared to the sky-rocketing inflations 
of the Latin American dimensions (Singh 1986: 425-427). On the 
whole they are in line with the trend in the general World inflation 
rates. 
1. Figures compiled by Semboja, 19U and the ILO, 1982, show the rates of inflation 
to be slightly higher than those in this table, see ILO (1982) "Basic Needs 
in Danger: 'A Basic Needs Orientated Development Strategy for Tanzania" (ILO 
Office. Addis Ababa); Semboja, J. (1984) "Taxation, Government Activity old 
Inflation" (Dar*salaam, Economic Research Bureau, Unpublished. ) 
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There are several ways in which the price control may 
have contributed to this moderation in the inflationary pressure. 
First, because the percentage of essential commodities under 
control is greater than those not controlled (Mongi, 1980; Whitworth, 
1982) and because the controls are effectively administered at 
. the ex-factory and wholesale level (Rice 1979, Lipumba, 1984) 
the controls have certainly created a downward pressure on prices. 
According to surveys carried out by the government (Government 
Paper 1,1981 para. 62) and those by the NPC (Mongi, 1980) the 
controls have held down inflation in two ways: One, the authors 
argue that in the inflationary conditions prevailing in the economy 
manufacturers would always want to increase prices to maximise 
profits. And since the majority of the enterprises operate in 
a monopolistic market structure the opportunity for monopoly 
pricing is quite ample. The fact that they must apply to the 
NPC bef ore they can ef f ect price increases and that the NPC reviews 
those prices only once or twice a year has the effect of slowing 
them down (Rice, 1979). Second, in the Commission's view, also 
2 
supported by surveys carried out by the Tanzania Advisory Group 
that without the price regulations the level of price increase 
in most of the price controlled goods would have been much worse. 
Especially with the cutting back of imports in recent years caused 
by shortage of foreign exchange, the consumer goods available 
cannot satisfy the expansion in internal demand in an economy 
whose supply side is weak. Only a rapid increase in prices could 
bring supply and demand back into equilibrium if the market were 
left to determine prices. The Tanzania Advisory Group estimated 
2. The Group was set up by the World Bank in agreement with the government. to 
break down the deadlocked negotiations between them. 
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in 1983 that if the prices of the 2000 items currently under 
control were decontrolled, the price of each of the items would 
go up by not less than 100 per cent over their current levels 
(Africa Contemporary Records, 1983). Both Mongi and Whitworth 
hold similar views. They point out that the prof it margins earned 
A by some enterprises on some goods prior to the imposition of 
the controls were as high as 200 per cent (Mongi, 1980: 120; 
Whitworth, 1982: 481). Since the imposition of the controls local 
manufacturers are not allowed to earn a pre-tax rate of return 
on investment of more than 30 per cent per annum (section 12(5), 
as amended by Act 2,1981). Any firm which has earned more than 
3 
a 30 per cent rate of returns per annum for a sustained period 
is assumed to have abused its monopoly position and should therefore 
have its profit margins reduced. 
It is significant that the high profit margins made 
by firms prior to the controls were not solely caused by costs 
of supplying the products, but simply because the quantity demanded 
was greater than what was available (Rice, 1979; Whitworth, 1982). 
In those circumstances the pressure for private gain created 
by shortages sent prices escalating frequently and rapidly (Green, 
1980). Now that there are restrictions and ceilings firms have 
apparently been prevented from maximising profits by setting 
higher prices. The net result has probably been lower prices. 
Further evidence that the controls have had an anti 
inflationary effect comes from recent experiences with decontrols. 
3. A pre-tax Rate of Return on Investment of 
30% per annum is considered by the 
NPC high enough to encourage investment. But since company tax is currently 
50 per cent of profits, the firms in practice got 15 per cent annual rate of 
return on investment (The 
Income Tax Act, 1973, the Schedule). 
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In July 1984 the government decontrolled the prices of some of 
the goods. The reasons given were two: The f irst, was to enable 
the NPC to concentrate its efforts on fewer goods so as to improve 
its performance (Government Paper 1,1981, para. 64). The other, 
was to enable individuals with their own private foreign exchange 
4 
to import the goods or supply those services which the government 
and the parastatal sector are not able to supply in sufficient 
quantity (Sunday News, Daresalaam, December 29,1985). Those 
supplying the products were allowed, to determine prices, 
taking into account the costs actually incurred in procuring 
the products. Af ter af ew months of decontrol the prices of the 
decontrolled items attracted strong criticism from consumers, 
the government and the press as prices soared. The Minister of 
Planning told Parliament in October 20,1984 that the prices 
of 200 items decontrolled in July 1983 had registered an average 
increase of about 50 per cent over a period of one year. The 
same products had a price increase of 30 per cent only (i. e. 
an annual average of 3 per cent) during the 10 years of price 
control. In the case of meat the increase was much bigger. Prices 
rose by 30 per cent within three months of decontrol. The Minister 
said that this increase was twice as much as what the NPC had 
granted meat traders in the whole of 10 years of price control 
(Uhuru, Daresalaam, October 29,1984). The Minister went on to 
point out that the controls have also contributed to price stability 
in an indirect way. They create attitudes and behaviour necessary 
for price stability among both consumers and traders. He said 
that in times of scarcity the belief that prices will go up further 
stimulates spending hysteria which in turn curtails savings. 
it also leads to speculative hoarding and creates artificial 
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shortages. The imposition of price controls promotes the propensity 
to save as it restores confidence in the ability of the economy 
to maintain a stable price level. This confidence acts to reduce 
purchases in excess of actual needs. Consequently, there is a 
moderation in the inflationary pressures. It would follow from 
4 
these accounts that the controls have had a restraining influence 
on inflation. 
6.2. Do Consumers Get the Goods at Controlled Prices 
This is an important question in determining whether 
the controls protect the economically weak groups. To answer 
this question I compared the retail prices for some basic necessities 
in ten urban centres between the controlled prices and what consumers 
actually paid. The official or controlled prices are derived 
from the National Price Commission and the Central Statistical 
Bureau. The market prices are constructed from various sources 
such as the monthly data of the Marketing Development Bureau, 
a U. N. sponsored body attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
compiles monthly prices for various food stuffs; reported cases 
from the Central Police Station in Daresalaam, Court files and 
academic surveys by Semboja, 1984 and Lipumba and Mbogoro, 1984. 
These sources were supplemented by my own observations during 
fieldwork. The results are reflected in Table 10 below. 
it is clear f rom this table that in all cases consumers 
were charged prices above those f ixed by the controllers. The 
market prices were relatively higher f or commodities whose demand 
is relativelY inelastic like maize flour. This 
implies that if 
the rate of inflation were measured by a retail price 
index of 
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TABLE 9: Official and Market Prices for Selected Commodities 
in Ten Urban Centres 1973-1983 (in Shillings per kilo) 
COMMODITY 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Maize (flour) Official 0.80 1.25 1.25 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.25 2.50 2.50 3.70 
Market 3.70 4.90 3.90 5.10 4.50 4.10 3.60 3.00 3.10 6.00 
Sugar Official 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 8.50 10.00 7.00 17.00 17.50 
Market 14.00 11.80 15.50 14.50 11.60 12.30 13.40 12.50 25.00 35.00 
Rice Official 1.65 2.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.50 5.35 5.35 6.35 7.50 
Market 7.70: 8.00 
1 
12.60 11.60 9.10 8.10 
1 
9.50 8.00 10.50 15.00 
Wheat (flour) Official 1.50 2.40 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.85 6.35 6.35 7.50 
Market 7.70 9.50 11.50 10.90 1 9.50 8.50 8.50 11.00 12.50 16.00 
Key: Official = GOvernment Price Market = Market Price 
what consumers actually pay, assuming the controlled goods constitute 
a major percent of the inflationary indicators, the inflationary 
rates in Table 8 would probably be higher. 
6.9. on Promoting Industrial Output 
To promote production the controllers, as noted in 
Chapter 4.6.3. (g), allow firms to make a profit margin sufficient 
to enable them earn the minimum necessary to meet their activities 
and investments. Despite this provision the economy has experienced 
a steady decline in output in recent years (Budget Speech 1985- 
86 para. 36, Lloyd's Bank Group, Country Report 1985). Output 
of goods under price control, as well as those without., has fallen. 
The table below illustrates the extent of the decline for selected 
products. 
It is clear from Table 10 that with a decline in per 
capita availabilitY of goods, even if 
incomes were static and 
the population were the same, demand would be high and this would 
have an impact on prices. 
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TABLE 10: Commodity Production Levels in Selected Industries 
1966-1982 
Commodity Unit 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1982 
Batteries 1000 cartons - - - - 312 210 
Beans 1000 tons - - 34.6 31.6 30 28 
Beer 1000 litres 15,816 33,140 64,823 69.000 59,015 51,000 
Canned Meat Metric tons 9.310 6,988 4,878 5,056 n. a. n. a. 
Cement Metric tons 146,910 167,632 236,956 266,000 1,100,000 369,000 
Cigaretttes Metric tons 2,049 2,137 2,923 4,649 5,500 4,700 
Cooking Oil 1000 tons - - - - 60 23.9 
Fertilizers 17,035 13,400 13,700 
Garments Million pcs - 1.5 0.4 
Maize 1000 tons - - - 300 213 105 
Petroleum Metric tons 463,143 626,403 763,083 731,000 750,000 669,000 
Rice 1000 tons - - - 26 245 12.7 
Shoes 1000 Pairs 1,490 2,200 2,457 2,700 1,400 2,900 
Soap 1000 cartons - - - - 56 25 
Textiles 100sq. metres; 14.315 46,260 74,136 84,344 200.000 103,500 
Wheat 1000 tons - 37.0 37.8 36.5 35.0 28.0 
Sources: Africa Contemporary Record 1976]77, B345; Annual 
Surveys of the Economy 1982, Ministry of Planning, 
Daresalaam; Government Paper 1,1981. 
What is not clear is how much of this decline could 
be attributed to price controls. The World Bank and ILO reports 
say that the controls are partly to blame for favouring managed 
over f ree markets and basic needs instead of external growth 
which stifle investments especially in the private sector (World 
Bank Report 1980, ILO Report 1982). The government, on the other 
hand, denies that the controls have anything to do with declining 
output. According to Government Paper No. 1,1981, which contains 
a comphrehensive survey of the causes, the main factors are: 
a) Lack of skilled and trained manpower. 
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b) Inefficient management and marketing systems. 
C) Deterioration in Labour relations - caused mainly by lack 
of political awareness by workers to recognise that there 
can be no workers' rights without obligations. Workers have 
been demanding better terms when th eir productivity in output 
per man hour has fallen. 
d) Personal clashes among parastatal ma nagers. 
e) Dishonesty and corruption among some employees.. 
f) Lack of proper incentives in the p ay structure, as a result 
of which hard working employees and lazy and negligent workers 
are treated the same. 
g) Shortage of foreign exchange for importing raw materials, 
spares and machinery. 
h) Frequent interruption in the supply of fuel, water, energy. 
i) Limited investments and lack of appropriate technology. 
j) A rapid decline in the terms of trad e facing primary exporters. 
It appears from the governments view price control 
is not one of the causes for the fall in industrial output. But 
the Director of the National Productivity Council, the chief 
adviser to the government on policy matters regarding Productivity, 
Incomes and Prices (established under the National Productivity 
Council Act 1981, No. 20, section 4) says the controls affect 
productivity. The Director cites the case of the price of maize 
flour which sells cheaper than raw maize (Shimwela, 1986: 7). 
As a result firms have little incentive to expand production. 
Instead they resell the maize to consumers. 
6.4. On the Redistribution of Money Incomes 
We noted in Chapter 4 that the controls are regarded 
as an important instrument f or an equitable distribution of money 
incomes. The objective is to use the controls to limit accumulation 
of wealth by businessmen through unfair pricing practices in 
the scarcity conditions (Government Paper 1,1981, para. 4). To 
see whether the controls are achieving this objective we have 
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to examine what is happening to the consumers and traders in 
this regard. 
There is no statistical evidence to show how much traders 
have benefitted at the expense of consumers as a result of the 
4 
failure of the controls. But several studies would lead one to 
conclude that traders have made a substantial gain. First, studies 
by Rice in 1979 show that the controls are only effective up 
to the district level. Once the district authorities allocate 
goods to retail traders there is no control over the prices that 
consumers pay (Rice, 1979: 110-116). Second, an empirical study 
by Semboja reveals that the exclusion of basic services like 
transport charges for private bus owners, rent, fresh foods, 
from control and that of certain consumer goods, especially those 
which are close substitutes for the controlled items, has contributed 
to windfall gains to those supplying them (Semboja, 1985). Third, 
studies by Green in 1980, show that government and parastatal 
employees were leaving public employment to enter private trade. 
Many resigned public employment on flimsy grounds such as family 
problems. Using their contacts and influence over the state trading 
corporations, these officials became very successful businessmen 
(Green, 1980). Fourth, and most important of all, during police 
raids mounted in the campaign against economic saboteurs under 
the Economic and Organised Crimes (Control) Act 1984, some traders 
were found with vast sums of cash, in local and foreign currency, 
and huge stocks of basic commodities hidden in their homes. This 
prompted Nyerere (ex-President) to lament in bewilderment 
We have millionaires in our midst; they are 
our uncles and their names are the same as 
ours. This is strange (for a socialist countryl). 
But it is a good thing because it helps us 
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better to understand the meaning of capitalism. 
We used to have a radio programme called 
'Capitalism is savagery!, We think it is 
a joke! But capitalism is a mysterious disease 
- It is a disease of greed and disease that 
has no end (Africa Contemporary Record 1982- 
83, B284). 
These events, taken together with the point made earlier in Chapter 
6.3 (Table 10), that consumers do not get goods at the controlled 
prices, show that the controls have not halted the accumulation 
of money incomes by traders at the expense of consumers. The 
redistribution of money incomes in favour of traders is reinforced 
by other practices. For example, the rich live close to the distri- 
bution centres, have better access to suppliers; can hire others 
to queue for them; have more flexible working hours and better 
information and contacts with the allocators. So they buy the 
goods at controlled prices and resell them to their less fortunate 
cousins (Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-83, B278; Sunday News, 
Daresalaam, December 29,1985). The money obtained is used to 
expand the activities. The situation we get is, in the words 
of a popular christian parable, one in which, "To him that hath 
shall be given, f rom him that hath not shall be taken away even 
that which he hath". Or, as a journalist with Africa Events describes 
it, "that of water trickling from the desert to the ocean or 
big fish swallowing the small ones" (Africa Events, London, November 
1985: 67). 
6.5. On Social Differentiation 
What has been the effect of the controls in evening 
out social differences? The question I wish to consider here 
is: How far do the people feel that they are treated equally 
by the controls. 
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We noted earlier on that the controls were also seen 
as a mechanism for advancing social equality (section 
One would expect that the controls would ultimately wipe out 
social distinctions such as: "bosses and servantsm, or "urban 
and rural" or "employed and jobless" in the implementation of 
4 
the controls. Unfortunately that does not seem to be the case 
at the moment - at least not when it comes to access to the controlled 
goods. 
What we find in the distribution of price controlled 
goods is that access has become a function of ones status, employment, 
residence, wealth and contacts with the distributors. So that 
getting access to the controlled items largely depends on these 
factors. It seems the controls tend to sharpen social distinctions. 
The controls are putting everyone in the social group he belongs 
to. Even in institutions, access to goods depends on the position 
one occupies. In the common shops status and influence determined 
largely by income will be the main factor. 
The extent to which the controls sharpen social differences 
is amply demonstrated by the type of expressions which have arisen. 
These expressions describe the privileged and under-privileged 
position which some groups occupy in relation to the controls. 
For example, people point mocking f ingers at shops in military 
barracks and police shops, where soldiers buy goods at ex-f actory 
prices and supplies are regular, as 'Duka la wenyewel - meaning . 
the 'shop of the men' (i. e. the real holders of state power). 
Shops in universities and other institutions of higher learning 
are called 'Duka la wasomil - meaning the 'shop for the educated 
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elite'. Within the institutions themselves when rationed goods 
are distributed, the command is often lanza na bosil - meaning 
Iset aside enough for the boss'. In shops where common people 
get their goods, frequently characterised by inadequate and uncertain 
supplies, people call them 'Duka la kaya' - literally meaning 
4 
'the shop of the ten household' or of the 'commoners'. These 
Swahili expressions neatly sum up the people's reactions - their 
displeasure with the manner in which the controls treat them. 
It seems to me the controls which were honestly conceived to 
reduce social differences are having an opposite effect. They 
tend to sharpen social differentiation. 
6.6. Facilitating Access to Basic Needs 
One area in which price control policy in general has 
had remarkable success is in facilitating access to basic needs. 
The provision of basic needs is the central focus to Tanzania's 
development strategy. On the proclamation of the Arusha Declaration 
in 1967, President Nyerere said that the purpose of all social 
economic and political activity must be the development of 'Man' 
(Daily News, Daresalaam, February 5,1967: 2). Since then this 
theme has been reiterated in all policy-papers as well as in 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 1984. The government's 
intentions in this area have been matched by concrete action. 
And by all accounts the results have been remarkable. Weaver 
and Kronomer cite some of the achievements in this field as: 
an increase 3m adult literacy f rom 10% of the population in 1960 
to 73% in 1980, making Tanzania the leading state in adult literacy 
in Af rica (ILO, 1983) and an increase in primary school enrolment 
f rom a bare 25% of the school age population in 1961 to almost 
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95% in 1980 (World Development 1980: 840). Other achievements 
include the growth in life expectancy from 35 years in 1960 to 
51 years in 1980; the existence of health centres in 35% of the 
villages - centres which never existed in 1960; the provision 
of free and clean tap water to about 40% of the population and 
village shops in 75% of the villages (World Development, 1981: 
167) . 
There are two ways in which price controls contribute 
to these developments. First, by enabling the government to use 
the control system as a mechanism of collecting revenue to supply 
some of these social services. Second, in so far as the controls 
work efficiently - as in the case with some commodities like 
pharmaceuticals, salt, maize meal, shoes; and people get regular 
supplies through government agencies as in the case of water, 
electricity, air and rail transport, books and other educational 
material, the welfare of the majority is promoted. But statistical 
figures are sometimes misleading. People do not drink or eat 
taps and village shops. My own observations during field work 
discount some of the successes catalogued above. I found that 
while structures like schools, water pipes, health centres lay 
in the villages their efficiency is poor. Many schools lack basic 
equipment like chalk-boards, desks, exercise books and above 
all, teachers. Clinics without medicines or medical staff; idle 
generators awaiting fuel and empty shelves in the shops are a 
common village phenomenon. President Nyerere has acknowledged 
these problems. He once said, "I do get disturbed when I discover 
that schools are without desks, chairs or other basic equipment" 
(Africa Events, London, November 1985: 64). But he is far from 
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dissatisfaction, "At least the existence of the facilities serves 
as a symbol of good socialist intentions", he concludes (Ibid. ). 
To conclude the argument in this Chapter I would say 
that judged by the indicators that seem most relevant to consumers 
4 
- the prices that they actually pay and availability of the controlled 
goods and the stability of their money incomes, the controls 
are not effective. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Given Tanzania's political orientation and programme, 
price control is likely to remain a significant government policy 
for the foreseable future. The alternative, that is regulation 
by the market, is not a suitable solution in the highly uncompet- 
itive environment f acing the economy. Recent experiences with 
the controls reflect some important lessons on the relationship 
between law and economic regulation. One immediate lesson is 
the discrepancy between law and the practice. In most cases people 
have not been getting goods at the controlled prices (ILO, 1982: 
26). Economic forces operating behind demand and supply could 
not be deterred by the regulations. This implies that price control 
without economic reforms are meaningless. The key to success 
lies in developing a healthy economic environment. These are 
also the lessons from other developing countries like Ghana (Killick, 
1978) and Burundi (IMF Surveys 1968-72, vol. 5, p. 389). The other 
lesson is that in purely economic terms the controls seem to 
show little by way of measurable gain. Why have they been allowed 
to persist then? The major reason is probably their contribution 
on the social and political front. Tanzania's social and political 
stability, according to an ILO Report, is partly due to its price 
control policies. The report notes that although 
Consumers are not receiving goods at controlled 
prices so that their real incomes are much 
less, nonetheless price control has had a 
stabilising effect on social and political 
fronts (ILO Report 1982: 19). 
In the same vein the former President, Nyerere, told the IMF 
that if he were to sign an agreement with them on the condition 
that the controls be dismantled, OPeople will take to the streets, 
-399- 
I will have riots. And I will lose everything" (Daily News, Daresalaam, 
November 24,1984 p. 1). This shows that in determining the desira- 
bility of an institution one should not limit oneself to rigid 
economic criteria such as the amount of money which consumers 
have saved as a result of the controls or whether the controls 
can pass a cost and benefit analysis. One has to look at the overall 
role of the institution in the social, political and economic 
life of the society. 
Apart from these achievements, the National Price Commission 
has made a significant contribution in regulatory administration. 
For example, when it was set up in 1973, the NPC was entrusted 
with establishing and operating an entirely new organisation 
and discharging a pew and complex assignment. The statutory rules, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, were in most places ambiguous or silent, 
or in some cases susceptible to no clear meaning. The Commission 
had virtually no precedents to rely on. Over the years it has 
built a body of knowledge and expertise to enable it to conduct 
a far more positive system of regulation. 
The Commission's practices shed some useful experiences 
in the exercise of discretionary powers. one such aspect is the 
variety of procedures used in determining prices of different 
products - the typeq of considerations they take 
into account. 
In some cases, political and governmental in terests predominate. 
In others, consumer welfare has loomed large. 
In conclusion, I would argue that the past record of 
comparative failure points to the urgent need 
to set in hand 
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the institutional reforms necessary to reform the economy so 
as to create correspondence between the economic structures and 
the control system. This is necessary if this well-intentioned 
piece of legislation is to succeed. 
0 
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